General Dostum Reclaims Mazar-e Sharif

General Dostum Reclaims Mazar-e Sharif

In early November, Mazar-e Sharif became the first Taliban-controlled city to fall to Northern Alliance forces. Strategically situated in the Balkh River valley some 35 miles south of Uzbekistan along the 4000-year old Silk Road, Mazar is the capital of Balkh province and has been a major regional trading center since the days of Alexander the Great. As the second largest city in Afghanistan and with a population (U.N. estimate 2001) of 200,000 Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens, Mazar (tomb of the saint) was named in honor of the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, Hazarate Ali, who was enshrined there in a blue-tiled mosque built during the twelfth century.⁵⁶

In 1997, the Taliban briefly seized control of Mazar-e Sharif from a mujahideen militia group commanded by General Abdul Rashid Dostum. The Taliban were repulsed in just a few days, but returned in force the next year to re-take the city with a vengeance (“the massacre of Mazar-e Sharif”). Dostum’s militia force, along with two others, led by General Mohammed Atta and General Mohammed Mohaqqeq, respectively, were forced to withdraw south through the Balkh Valley to a number of enclaves in the Hindu Kush Mountains.⁵⁷ A stalemate would exist between the Taliban and these militia groups, soon to be known collectively as the Northern Alliance, until US forces arrived to support the NA in the October 2001.

Pakistani government resistance to the prospects of a Northern Alliance (Uzbeks and Tajiks; no Pashtuns) take-over of Kabul had resulted in the United States’ temporarily withholding SOF support of NA operations even in northern Afghanistan.⁵⁸ By mid-late October 2001, however, that attitude had changed dramatically. Senior officials in the Bush administration realized that fully backing the NA offered the best opportunity the US had for defeating the Taliban.⁵⁹

Meanwhile, ODA 595 had wasted little time calling in its first series of air strikes on 21 October against Taliban positions in the village of Chapchal.⁶⁰ General Dostum was pleased with this first strike. He radioed the opposing Taliban commander and announced, “This is General Dostum speaking. I am here, and I have brought the Americans with me.”⁶¹ In quick succession, NA forces then took the villages of Bishqab, Cobaki, and Oimetan, assisted in great measure by numerous additional air strikes directed by ODA 595. By this time, General Dostum had his full compliment of US support personnel (CIA officers, SF teams, an SF command and control element, and Air Force terminal attack controllers who carried LST-5 satellite radios for contacting strike aircraft and Laser Acquisition Markers [SOFLAM] for pinpointing enemy targets), and he was ready to move north and re-take Mazar-e Sharif. Toward that end, US cargo aircraft dropped much needed food, ammunition, and supplies to NA forces in the Darya Suf Valley.⁶² Additionally, since no vehicles were available and terrain in the Darya Valley was so treacherous (winding mountain trails at elevations in excess of 6,000 feet) NA forces and their American counterparts were forced to travel on horseback and by mule.

Next, ODA 534 linked up with General Mohammed Atta’s forces in the Balkh River Valley on 4 November.⁶³ The intent at this point was for Dostum to keep moving through the Darya Suf Valley, while Atta pushed north in the Balkh. Once they met, the combined force (which also included an NA group led by General Mohammed Mohaqiq) would continue up the Balkh Valley and attack the Taliban stronghold at Tangi Gap.

On 5 November, General Dostum’s men were again on the move and carried out a classic cavalry charge against well-entrenched Taliban troops at Bai Beche. The astonished Taliban defenders retreated northward toward Tangi.⁶⁴ At about the same time, Taliban forces surrendered to General Atta at Aq Kuprok, only to retake the village in a surprise counterattack. Assisted by US air strikes, Atta’s militia was able to regain control of Aq Kuprok the next day. Hundreds of Taliban reinforcements had been slaughtered by additional air strikes as they first moved south to assist at the battles of Bai Beche and Aq Kuprok, then once again as they retreated north in disarray.⁶⁵ The next village north, Sholgerah, fell with little resistance. Then on 9 November, B-52 strikes, directed by SOF controllers, ended last-ditch efforts by the Taliban to fight at the Tangi Gap (twelve miles south of Mazar at the northern end of the Balkh Valley). Later that day, NA forces crossed the Pul-e-Imam Bukhri Bridge and seized the Beh Dadi civilian airport.⁶⁶ The next day, General Dostum and his Special Forces advisers rode into town to the cheers of a grateful local citizenry.

Fighting in the city would resume, however, when several hundred Taliban, who had taken refuge in the former Sultan Razia girl’s school, refused to surrender. An estimated 300 Taliban fighters, mostly Pakistanis and non-Afghans, were subsequently killed when US air strikes (called in by Special Forces) destroyed the school.⁶⁷ Finally, the Northern Alliance took nearly 3,000 Taliban prisoners in Mazar-e Sharif and the surrounding area.⁶⁸ “This is a great victory,” proclaimed NA Deputy Defense Minister, Atiiqullah Baryalai, “Our forces have captured the city. The Taliban are fleeing.”⁶⁹ Soon thereafter, Abdul Henan Hemat, head of the Taliban Bakhtar News Agency, conceded victory to the Northern Alliance. “For seven days continuously they have been bombing Taliban positions. They used very large bombs,” Hemat acknowledged reluctantly.⁷⁰ Victory at Mazar-e Sharif would represent Operation ENDURING FREEDOM’s first noteworthy success.

The ten-man Special Forces A-Team 585 was inserted by helicopter into a landing zone near the village of Dasht-e-Qaleh close to the Tajikistan border on 25 October. From there, they made their way south to rendezvous with local Northern Alliance commander, General Bariullah Khan near the Taliban stronghold of Konduz. Their mission was to assist General Bariullah’s forces in taking several small villages and ultimately capturing Konduz. ODA 585 split into two elements on 28 October—one to help equip Bariullah’s forces with additional supplies for the move to Konduz and the other to continue directing air strikes on the Taliban trench lines and command bunkers that lie ahead. At one point, the team doubled back through Tajikistan and re-entered Afghanistan behind Taliban lines.⁷¹ From there, they called in devastating bombing runs on the Taliban reverse slope defensive positions. Northern Alliance fighters then overran Taliban positions at Kal-a-Khata, captured the town of Chickha, and pushed south to the perimeter of Konduz.⁷²

While General Bariullah and ODA 585 were approaching Konduz from the north, A-Team 586 and Northern Alliance forces commanded by General Daoud Kahn were moving toward Konduz from the southeast. Initially, ODA 586 flew to a remote landing zone near the Tajikistan border on an MH-47E Chinook helicopter. From there, they flew on a Northern Alliance (Russian-built) helicopter to Farkhar for the link-up with General Daoud. By 11 November, the team was calling in air strikes for Daoud’s forces as they attacked the city of Taloqan. NA General Massoud had made Taloqan (located 40 miles east of Konduz) his headquarters until the Taliban seized the city in September 2000.⁷³ Although an initial assault faltered, NA troops, with the help of US airpower, successfully reconquered Taloqan on 13 November. Ten days later, Daoud captured the city of Khanabad (not to be confused with K2 in Uzbekistan) fifteen miles east of Konduz.⁷⁴ ODA 586 controllers had directed dozens of air strikes against Taliban and al-Qaeda troops, trucks, tanks, mortar positions, and bunkers along the approach to Khanabad.

At the same time that General Daoud was closing on Konduz from the east and General Bariullah was approaching from the north, General Dostum was moving in from the west. Thirty thousand NA troops surrounded the city.⁷⁵ Each general conducted his own surrender negotiations. After holding out for several days, the Taliban (along with numerous Uzbeks, Chechens, Pakistanis, and Arabs) finally acknowledged the bleakness of their desperate situation and surrendered Konduz to the Northern Alliance over a four day period from 23-26 November. Dostum set Afghan Taliban free, while foreign fighters and al-Qaeda were held prisoner. With the fall of Mazar-e Sharif, Taloqan, and Konduz, the entire northern tier of Afghanistan was now in the hands of Northern Alliance forces. Much of this success was accomplished through devastating US airpower coupled with SOF operators on the ground pinpointing lucrative targets. “The more people we get on the ground, the better the targeting information is,” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld explained after the siege of Konduz.⁷⁶

An unusual series of events transpired during the last few days of the Konduz fight. Northern Alliance forces claimed that several Pakistani aircraft had flown into Konduz to rescue Pakistanis who had been fighting along side the Taliban. Observers claimed that the planes were flown by the Pakistani Army Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and that those evacuated included Pakistani generals, intelligence agents, and al-Qaeda leaders. Both the US and Pakistani governments denied the reports. JCS Chairman, General Richard B. Myers, responded to a Pentagon news conference question by declaring that “the runway there is not usable….[too]short for your standard transport aircraft. So we’re not sure where the reports are coming from.”⁷⁷ Nevertheless, apparently a significant number of potentially valuable human intelligence sources were able to elude capture. Eventually, many would conclude that the US allowed the airlift in exchange for Pakistan’s continued support in the War on Terrorism.⁷⁸