Qala-i Jangi Prison Uprising

Qala-i Jangi Prison Uprising

On 24 November, the day of their arrival at the makeshift Qala detention facililty, Taliban captives killed two NA commanders in separate hand grenade suicide attacks.⁸⁰ Despite these unexpected attacks, the NA failed to expand the force guarding the prison (only about 100 NA soldiers).⁸¹ The next morning, two CIA officers, unaccompanied by security, arrived to interrogate the Taliban and to search for al-Qaeda members. Rather than questioning prisoners one-on-one in private, the officers interrogated small groups of Taliban outdoors in the central courtyard of the prison complex.⁸² Several Taliban wandered freely within the compound, having been untied by the guards in order to wash and pray.⁸³ The American presence provoked the Taliban and one attacked a guard with a rock and grabbed the guard’s AK-47.⁸⁴ Within minutes, the Taliban seized control of the prison and the remaining guards fled. One of the CIA officers escaped; however the other, 32 year-old Johnny Michael Spann, after having shot three Taliban, was killed in the uprising, thus becoming the first American hostile-fire casualty in Afghanistan.⁸⁵

Later that afternoon, US Special Forces and British SAS soldiers arrived at Qala-i Jangi and took control of the situation. For the rest of the day, they called in air strikes on the south end of the compound where the Taliban had concentrated. On 26 November, additional SF troops and Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division (having been flown in from K2 to serve as a quick reaction force) joined the US and British forces at the prison. They established a new command post and positioned an NA tank in the northeast corner of the facility. Unfortunately, a misdirected 2,000 pound bomb struck the north wall of the command post later that morning, killing several NA soldiers and wounding five US and two SAS Soldiers.⁸⁶ That evening, two AC-130 Spectre gunships strafed the Taliban end of the prison with cannon fire for more than two hours. By the next day, the surviving Taliban were nearly out of food, water, and ammunition. NA tanks shelled a building where the remaining prisoners held out. By late that afternoon, the fighting ended and a Special Forces team was able to recover “Mike” Spann’s body.

A group of Taliban survived, however, by hiding in the basement of the prison complex. For several days they refused to come out despite being doused with burning oil.⁸⁷ Finally, on 1 December, 86 Taliban emerged and surrendered after the basement was flooded with frigid well-water. Among the survivors was the so-called “American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh, who then was treated at the Afghan hospital in Sheberghan, detained for debriefing at Camp Rhino (the US Marine Corps base in southern Afghanistan), and held in solitary confinement aboard the USS Peleliu in the Arabian Sea before being handed over to the US Justice Department. ⁸⁸ Many of the Taliban involved in the Qala-i Jangi insurrection were among the first arrivals at the newly established Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.⁸⁹

General Dostum felt betrayed by the Taliban uprising at the prison. He had hoped that his humane treatment of the prisoners would be seen as a gesture of reconciliation. As a result, he chose to not search the prisoners as thoroughly as he should have. “We treated them humanely….we did not search them well enough because we trusted them,” he would later remark. “That was a mistake.”⁹⁰
Dominance of SOF Directed Air Power in Support of the Northern Alliance

SOF-directed joint air power was clearly the decisive factor in the early Northern Alliance victories in Afghanistan. During the first three months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 120 stationary targets, 400 vehicles, and numerous Taliban/al-Qaeda troop concentrations were destroyed in US bombing attacks. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft flew more than 6,500 strike sorties and dropped 17,500 munitions (57% were precision-guided) on Taliban targets.⁹¹ Carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18 aircraft accounted for 75% (4,900) of strike sorties flown, while US Air Force fighters, bombers, and special operations aircraft flew 11%, 10%, and 3% of strike sorties, respectively (Figures 1 and 2).⁹²

Interestingly, however, despite flying fewer sorties, Air Force aircraft delivered more than 70% of the ordnance dropped during the October to December 2001 timeframe. This was due primarily to the large payload capacity of the eight B-1 and 10 B-52 bombers that were deployed at Diego Garcia and their extended loiter-time capabilities—missions often lasted up to 15 hours. In addition, B-1s dropped the majority of JDAMs (2,800), more than all other aircraft combined. In one instance, four B-1s delivered 96 JDAM bombs in a 20 minute period.⁹³ Conversely, B-52 bombers delivered the preponderance of Mk 82 500-pound, free-fall, unguided general purpose (dumb) bombs (approximately 6,000).⁹⁴ Mk 82 accuracy had improved significantly since Operation DESERT STORM due principally to radar improvements and new weapons ballistics computers on the aircraft.⁹⁵

Above and beyond the OEF strike sorties, more than 17,000 aerial support missions took place in the initial months of the conflict. The United States and Germany flew 125,000 tons of military materiel and humanitarian relief supplies to the AOR (4,800 airlift missions). Also, the Air Force, Navy, and Royal Air Force flew 8,000 tanker missions in support of the air war. The extended-range operations undertaken for OEF could not have been accomplished without the sustained in-flight refueling capability that tankers provided. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights accounted for an additional 1,300 sorties, flown by Predator, Global Hawk, U-2, RC-135, E-3, E-8, and EC-130 aircraft. Finally, Coalition aviation components flew a wide variety of OEF-related missions (approximately 3,000).⁹⁶

Increased use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) emerged as the dominant trend in the Afghanistan air campaign. Having represented only nine percent of the ordnance used in Operation DESERT STORM, PGMs now accounted for 57 percent of the bombs dropped during the early stages of OEF. Likewise, the ratio of PGMs to sorties rose from 0.32 during DESERT STORM to 1.66 for OEF. Discussions at the CAOC would now address how many targets could be destroyed during a single mission as opposed to how many missions would be required to destroy a single target.⁹⁷

Logistics Challenges Encountered During Early OEF Combat Operations

Currently, the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has a more robust organic logistics support capability than it did in the early months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Prior to OEF, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) were accustomed to deploying/operating in small teams. As a result, their logistics needs were fairly limited. At the time, the existing, non-deployable, Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) with one support battalion, two forward support companies, and one headquarters company was sufficient to meet ARSOF team-oriented logistics requirements.

However, when the 5th Special Forces Group deployed to K2, the assigned forward support element (members of “A” Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion) was nearly overwhelmed with the enormity of logistics requests. There were only approximately 400 Soldiers in the entire 528th Support Battalion to provide combat service support for 15,000 Special Operations Forces in ARSOF. This ratio appears inadequate in contrast to conventional force levels (3,300 support personnel for a 15,000 troop heavy division, for example).⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the 528th performed admirably at K2 by quickly establishing a warehouse, a clothing distribution center, a 24/7 dining facility, and ration and refueling points. The 507th Corps Support Command replaced the 528th in December 2001 after SF combat operations in northern Afghanistan had subsided.⁹⁹

Soldiers and Army civilians from the 200th Materiel Management Center (MMC), 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) in Kaiserslautern, Germany also provided much needed logistics support to CIA and SOF personnel during the early days of OEF. A special OEF cell was established at 200th MMC headquarters to provide, as they claimed, “corner-cutting, on-the-fly, I-want-it-now, customer-driven” support services as “unconventional as the war being fought.”¹⁰⁰ The cell operated 24 hours a day and was in direct contact with US troops on the ground in Afghanistan via satellite phones and email. When certain items were not readily available in the system, MMC members used their government credit cards to make the necessary purchases on the local German economy. When cargo parachutes were in short supply, the cell had hundreds more sent to Germany by Federal Express. During the first 60 days of OEF, the 21st TSC air-dropped dozens of western saddles, 12,000 pounds of horse feed, two million humanitarian meals, two million pounds of wheat, 93,000 blankets, specialized batteries, nonmilitary tactical gear, camping equipment, mountaineering clothing, plus tons of extra equipment and supplies.¹⁰¹

Without doubt, the workhorse airlift aircraft thus far in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was the C-17 Globemaster III. The Air Force had recently purchased 80 of these aircraft to replace the aging C-141 fleet for intertheater mobility missions. C-17s carried a larger payload and could operate from smaller, unimproved, airfields. Typically, C-5 Galaxy or commercial aircraft airlifted personnel and equipment from US aerial ports of embarkation to staging bases. To accommodate this movement, the Air Force established two air bridges—one flowing eastward from Moron Air Base in Spain, Rhein-Main and Ramstein air bases in Germany, and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; the other moved westward from Andersen Air Base on Guam to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. At these intermediate staging bases, aircrews transferred cargo from the larger C-5s to C-17s for delivery to the theater. Unfortunately, a single C-17 could not accommodate all the cargo from a C-5 transport. This discrepancy caused considerable backlog and congestion at the various staging bases and resulted in split theater shipments.

From the beginning of the air war until mid-December 2001, C-17s air-dropped more than two million humanitarian daily rations for the Afghan people.¹⁰² Since there were no in-theater bases initially, these food drop missions often lasted up to 30 hours and required a third pilot joining the C-17 crews in order to rotate rest periods. Despite the fact that there had been no CENTCOM or Air Mobility Command off-the-shelf plan for airlift to Afghanistan, the U.S Air Force executed this phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (and dealt with the various problems that arose) in a highly professional manner.¹⁰³

Since the principal objective of OEF was to disrupt, destroy, and defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda, CENTCOM did not consider nation building and stability operations to be high priority issues. As a result, CENTCOM planners did not include a robust civil military operations (CMO) component in the OEF plan. Nevertheless, to support humanitarian relief assistance for the Afghan people, CENTCOM requested that the US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) establish an appropriate organization to coordinate these relief activities. A Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF), composed of elements from the 377th Theater Support Command, the 122nd Rear Operations Center, and the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, subsequently formed in Atlanta and Tampa, then moved to Kuwait, and eventually deployed to Kabul in early December 2001.¹⁰⁴

Relatedly, just four days after the OEF air war began, an officer from the 96th Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command deployed to Islamabad, Pakistan to establish a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and to organize Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC), the primary functions of which were to de-conflict humanitarian vs. combat operations, conduct assessments, and identify potential relief projects. Also, a Liaison Officer and several Civil Affairs teams from the 96th CA deployed to K2 during the October-December timeframe in support of the 5th Special Forces Group. Two of these teams relocated to Bagram and Mazar-e Sharif, respectively, in late November.

During this same time period, Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams from the 96th CA joined infiltrated SOF A-Teams. Their mission was to assist Northern Alliance leaders (and their families) and to initiate collaborative efforts with local Afghan civilian leadership groups. Some Survey Team members began wearing civilian clothes in an effort to blend in with Afghans. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complained about this practice, however, thinking that locals would be unable to distinguish between Soldiers (in civilian attire) and NGO personnel. Shortly thereafter, CENTCOM ordered CA Soldiers in Afghanistan back into uniform.¹⁰⁵ After the NA victory in Mazar-e Sharif, 96th CA, 5th SFG, and 10th Mountain Division Soldiers began working to open a new hospital and to rebuild the Sultan Rasia girl’s school.¹⁰⁶

Many US civilian and military officials had expected that defeating the Taliban in northern Afghanistan would take much longer than it actually did. However, the speed with which the Northern Alliance routed the Taliban resulted from a unique combination of military effects that had never previously been employed together. Special Operations Forces directed precision-guided munitions air strikes in support of an indigenous ally (the NA) against enemy forces (Taliban) while often not even in contact. Precision directed US airpower was the combat multiplier that enabled an outnumbered NA to destroy Taliban infantry and armor and to liberate northern Afghanistan in just over six weeks.

Despite al-Qaeda-led counterattacks at Bai Beche and Konduz, US SOF suffered no casualties in the battles for Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, and Taloqan. The principal reason for the lack of casualties was that Air Force terminal attack controllers attached to SF A-Teams used laser illuminators and GPS equipment to engage Taliban fighters at significant stand-off distances. For example, controllers were able to acquire Taliban targets at ranges of up to 10 kilometers at the village of Bishqab and five kilometers at Ac’capruk.¹⁰⁷ The resulting technique took on a new name, ground-directed interdiction (GDI), and differed from typical close air support in which supported forces are normally in direct contact with the enemy. GDI facilitated attacks on moving targets, ensured compliance with CENTCOM rules of engagement, and enabled the concentration of devastating effects without concentrating physical forces.¹⁰⁸ US Army Colonel Mike Findley (former Commander, Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command) argued. however, that although the mix of players in the GDI equation was unprecedented, the Northern Alliance (along with its SOF advisers) was essentially no different than any other conventional ground maneuver force requiring periodic joint fire support.¹⁰⁹ Matching concentrated fire power with nimble ground maneuver elements to vanquish an enemy force has always been a principle factor for success in warfare. As such, JSOTF-North became by default the functional ground force (supported) commander directing A-Team/NA maneuver units against the Taliban and employing complementary US air support whenever needed.

In addition, some have suggested that the Taliban was simply a rag-tag, poorly-trained, incompetent, and reluctant-to-fight enemy force.¹¹⁰ This may have been true during the first few days of special operations forces (SOF)-directed US bombing, when the enemy was exposed and easily acquired. The Taliban learned quickly however, and by November 2001 had adopted a variety of cover-and-concealment techniques and began taking cover and dispersing their troops. These efforts proved at least partially successful in minimizing the devastating effects of American air strikes, and would serve the Taliban well in future operations such as Tora Bora and Anaconda. Also, although Afghan Taliban were often hesitant to stand and fight, the al-Qaeda forces—many of whom had received sophisticated military training—were significantly more likely to engage in combat, and proved to be formidable adversaries (as demonstrated at Bai Beche and Konduz, for example).

Furthermore, there were a number of noteworthy aviation component accomplishments during the initial months of OEF in addition to the unique SOF/strike aircraft teamwork described above. The expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (Predator and Global Hawk) provided both faster reaction times and longer dwell times than did traditional orbital assets. This enabled significantly improved ISR data fusion, near constant surveillance of Taliban activity, a substantial shortening of the kill chain, and major reductions in sensor-to-shooter link times. Unfortunately, teams on the ground could not communicate directly with UAV operators. Overall, however, improved capability to communicate data permitted aircrews to retarget in flight and to re-strike targets if necessary.¹¹¹

Despite some initial growing pains, the CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base provided an unprecedented level (quality and quantity) of timely air support for Special Forces A-Teams and the Northern Alliance. Joint service cooperation/integration (Air Force/Navy) was harmonious from the start, as all CAOC members focused on sharing information and on the common objective of defeating the Taliban. Improved technology provided CAOC operators with proximate real-time theater connectivity, situational awareness, and the ability to deliver devastating firepower on demand.¹¹²

A few controversies did arise, however. Military/civilian personnel at CENTCOM and in Washington may have exercised undue levels of centralized control over mission planning and execution, thereby interfering with timely target approval decision cycles.¹¹³ This, coupled with excessively restrictive rules of engagement (JAG officers influencing target choices), rear-area scrutinizing of live Predator data, inherently lengthy mission distances (up to15 hours from Diego Garcia), limited loiter capability, and the fact that CENTCOM and CAOC were separated by eight time zones may have detracted from air power reaction times as new targets emerged. Additionally, the CIA often secretly flew armed Predators within the AOR in support covert SOF/other governmental organization (OGA) operations without advising the CAOC. To address this issue, liaison officers at CENTCOM, CAOC, and JSOTF-N developed a broad-based coordination plan that integrated all friendly OEF participants—SOF, covert SOF, OGA, and the Northern Alliance.¹¹⁴ Eventually, JSOTF-N established a limited Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) to coordinate joint fires and began using killbox procedures along with blue-force tracking to help eliminate friendly-fire incidents.¹¹⁵

Fortunately, commanders quickly resolved the few difficulties that arose early on in OEF. For example, JSOTF-N’s assumption of the role of “supported” command clarified command relationships among the participants. Also, CENTCOM requested the first time ever use of commercial satellites to address skyrocketing data transmission bandwidth demand.¹¹⁶ This, however, did not completely alleviate occasional range and reliability problems with targeting systems, data links, and FM tactical radios encountered by infiltrated special operations forces. In addition, extensive mountain flying operations revealed high-altitude lift limitations with MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. Although Black Hawk crews flew hundreds of dangerous OEF support missions, several such missions involving flights into mountainous terrain were, of necessity, shifted to MH-47 Chinooks (maximum gross weight of 50,000 pounds vs. 22,000 pounds for the Black Hawk). Taking time to assess variations in aircraft capabilities complicated mission planning for SOF commanders.¹¹⁷ Special Forces teams also had to contend with minor language barrier issues. ODA-534 was advised that General Atta spoke Arabic. No problems were anticipated, since several team members spoke the language. Shortly after their insertion into the Balkh River Valley, 534 learned that Atta in fact spoke Pashto and Dari, but not Arabic. The team quickly improvised by finding a few older NA soldiers who spoke Russian. These Afghans then served as translators for ODA-534 (most team members spoke Russian) for the remainder of the mission.¹¹⁸

In fewer than two months, the Northern Alliance, supported by US SOF and air power, decisively defeated the Taliban, put al-Qaeda on the run, and liberated six northern provinces, seven key cities, and nearly 50 additional smaller towns and villages.¹¹⁹ NA forces killed nearly ten thousand enemy soldiers and took several thousand more prisoners. A rare fusion of small SOF teams (trained eyes on the ground), strike aircraft/bombers, and precision-guided munitions brought about the remarkable accomplishments realized during combat operations in northern Afghanistan. SOF also provided tactics, techniques, and procedures advice to the NA and dealt adroitly with various Afghan factions, rivalries, and tensions. Only roughly 100 SF Soldiers infiltrated northern Afghanistan (seven A-Teams and one ODC), thereby adhering to “limited footprint” directives and proving that devastating firepower can be brought to bear by small, highly trained, units.¹²⁰ Also, American forces gained valuable insight into how the Taliban and al-Qaeda would fight. Moreover, CENTCOM had demonstrated to doubters that the US could rapidly project destructive land, sea, and air power over exceptionally long distances. In addition, US combat participants proved the concept of “jointness” both viable and workable, as all—CIA, SOF, conventional Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—cooperated unselfishly in support of the OEF mission. Finally, both the Mazar-e Sharif airport and the Freedom Bridge to Uzbekistan reopened, thus enabling large inbound shipments of humanitarian assistance. Afghan refugees were able to return in significant numbers to Takhar, Konduz, Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan, Sar-e Pul, and Faryab provinces. Would the battles for Kandahar and Tora Bora, or Operation Anaconda be as successful?