Chapter 5 HIGH/HOT/HEAVY COMBAT AIR ASSAULTS IN AFGHANISTAN 2007-2011

Operation Enduring Freedom organizational and command level changes in 2006 and 2007 affected the number of combat operations and air assaults conducted by Coalition forces. In October 2006, NATO/ISAF assumed responsibility for RC-East, after taking control of RC-South the previous July as described in Chapter 4. By the end of 2006, ISAF was responsible for all five contiguous commands in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁶ As a consequence, CFC-A was deactivated in February 2007, and CJTF-76 (10th Mountain Division) became the ISAF headquarters for RC-East. At the same time, 4th BCT, 82d Airborne (TF Fury) at FOB Salerno assumed responsibility for the RC-East southern provinces, leaving 3d BCT, 10th Mountain (TF Spartan) at Jalalabad to cover the northern provinces. CJTF-76 was then re-designated CJTF-82, with arrival of the 82d Airborne Division headquarters element in March. Finally in June, the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team (TF Bayonet) relieved TF Spartan. TF Bayonet units were split up, with Soldiers eventually operating from eighteen satellite bases in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces.¹⁴⁷

ISAF launched a number of Coalition operations, such as HOOVER, HAMMER, ACHILLES, SILVER, SILICON, HARAKATE YOLO, COMMANDO FURY, and SNAKEBITE in 2007. The Battle of Musa Qala, the largest engagement of the year, involved primarily US, Afghan and British troops. A Chinook detachment from B Company, 3d General Support Aviation Battalion, 82d Combat Aviation Brigade with four Chinooks at Kandahar provided critical support to the numerous FOBs and COPs throughout RC-South. During Operation FURIOUS PURSUIT, Bravo Company, 3d GSAB inserted 400 Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 508th PIR into an area in the Helmand River Valley known as the ‘heart of darkness’ in a four-Chinook air assault in April 2007. This operation, which cleared enemy fighters from the village of Sangin and liberated two British forward operating bases that were under siege, also included Afghan, Estonian, Dutch, Canadian, British and US Special Operations Forces.¹⁴⁸ Sadly, two pilots and three crew members from B Company, along with two passengers, were killed during a night air assault when their CH-47 was shot down in the Upper Sangin Valley, Helmand Province, on 30 May 2007. The aircraft was second in a flight of three. Landing and unloading troops at the HLZ was uneventful, however upon lift-off, the CH-47 was hit below the cockpit and between the right main and rear auxiliary fuel tanks with rocket propelled grenades. The aircraft nosed over immediately and crashed.¹⁴⁹

Regional Command – East Air Assaults

In RC-East, a second B Company detachment flew dozens of air assault missions in support of TF Fury and TF Bayonet Soldiers in the Waygal and Pitigal Valleys, Nuristan Province, and the Korengal and Chowkay Valleys in Kunar Province.¹⁵⁰ In July 2007 for example, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment Soldiers air assaulted onboard Chinooks into HLZ Shetland, located at the 10,000 foot level in the mountains of Nuristan Province. The purpose of the mission, called Operation SARAY HAS, was to search for Taliban who had been firing missiles at FOB Naray from the mountain-top villages of Badermashal and Cherigal. Although the Taliban shooters were not discovered, the mission was considered a success. “We came up here to…deny the enemy use of the hilltop,” Headquarters and Headquarters Troop executive officer, First Lieutenant Christopher Richelderfer said before the Soldiers were extracted from the mountain.¹⁵¹

Next in August, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment and Afghan National Army elements conducted a night Chinook air assault onto a 7,000 foot mountain overlooking the Chowkay Valley. The TF Bayonet mission, designated “Destined Strike,” used CH-47s to ensure that the Soldiers could quickly seize the high ground above the valley. At daybreak, the troops moved down the mountain and began sweeping villages in the valley. After five days, the operation was completed and the Soldiers were extracted by Chinooks.¹⁵² Afghan and TF Bayonet Soldiers air assaulted into three remote villages in the Pitigal Valley along the Pakistan border in search of Taliban leaders in September. Twenty Taliban fighters were killed and 11 captured during this operation, in which a bombmaking factory was also discovered. ¹⁵³

A second CH-47 Chinook detachment deployed to Afghanistan in September 2007. Detachment 1, B Company, 3d Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment, comprised of pilots, crews, and support personnel from the New York and Maryland Army National Guard, split their assets sending two aircraft to Kandahar, two to FOB Salerno, and four to Bagram.¹⁵⁴ The Guardsmen arrived just in time to participate in TF Bayonet’s Operation ROCK AVALANCHE, a series of multiple-company night sequenced air assaults into the Chapa Dara, Shuryak, Pech, Watapor, and Korengal River Valleys, all of which were Taliban strongholds in Kunar Province. Paratroopers from all four 2-503 IN companies were positioned, then, re-positioned, at different times and into different locations throughout Kunar in an effort to drive Taliban fighters from safe haven and into the open. A total of eight Chinooks flew dozens of day and night air assault lifts over the course of the seven-day operation.¹⁵⁵

Beginning in mid-October Soldiers from Bravo Company, 2-503 IN, conducted a coordinated air assault of the Abas Ghar ridgeline that dominated the Korengal Valley. This was the same area, known as the Valley of Death, where in 2005 a Chinook had been shot down killing all 16 passengers onboard. Alpha Company air assaulted onto Phase Line Ridgeway, 7,500 feet above the Shuryak and Pech Valleys near the village of Aybot. The heavy-weapons platoon from D Company also air assaulted onto a nearby ridgeline with its 40 mm MK19 grenade launcher, M2 machine guns, and 81 mm mortar tubes. “I’ve never air assaulted with a MK19 before,” said grenadier Specialist David Hooker after setting up his firing position near the HLZ.¹⁵⁶ Operation ROCK AVALANCHE ended successfully on 25 October 2007 with scores of Taliban insurgents killed during numerous firefights and other sustained contacts.

In December 2007, two additional Chinooks from B Company 3-126th were repositioned to FOB Salerno to participate in operation DEADWOOD, designed to capture Taliban leaders and disrupt enemy in the Khost Bowl. This was a complicated night air assault mission involving US Special Forces, Afghan commandos, Chinooks, Black Hawks, and Apaches. The assault teams struck three different locations on the same night. The air assault plan was unusual in that, depending upon the objective, different aircraft would take the flight lead as the entire packaged moved from one HLZ to the next. “We did this to support the ground commander’s intent,” explained Captain Eric Fritz, OIC of the Chinook contingent at Salerno. In one insertion, Chinooks landed within feet of a targeted house – 60 troops instantly surrounded the building. “This is the advantage of using Chinooks for assaults,” Fritz said, “you can use surprise and mass against the insurgents giving them little time to react.”¹⁵⁷ Prior to conducting the operation, the assault team practiced the mission during a flying rehearsal on Christmas Day.

Chinook pilots and crews from B Company, 3-126^th, at FOB Salerno took part in an additional large air assault mission, designated COMMANDO RECON, in April 2008. Four CH-47s inserted 100 US Special Forces Soldiers and Afghan commandos into 10,000 foot-high HLZs in the Afghanistan elephant trunk area, eastern Ghazni Province. One Chinook landed an team on the highest mountain top in the objective area to provide overwatch for the operation. “This was a pure CH-47D air assault with four Chinooks, 2 AH-64 Ds and a C-130 gunship for cover,” Captain Fritz later wrote.¹⁵⁸

Back in RC-South Chinook crews from both B Company, 3d GSAB, 82d CAB and Detachment 1, B Company, 3d Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment flew missions in support of the aviation task force at Kandahar, TF Corsair, 2d Battalion, 82d CAB. These missions typically involved routine re-supply, but also included 2-3 aircraft air assaults with ISAF forces – either, US, British, Australian, Dutch, Canadian, or Afghan – in search of high value Taliban targets or enemy weapons caches.¹⁵⁹ After weeks of high-level planning, however, ISAF launched Operation SNAKEPIT in December 2007 to retake the Taliban-occupied town of Musa Qala in Helmand Province. Thousands of NATO and Afghan forces massed south of the town, while 600 Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment conducted a late-afternoon air assault to seize Roshan Hill on the north side. Chinooks, Black Hawks, and Apaches – nineteen helicopters in all – participated in SNAKEPIT air assault, which was one of the largest in Afghanistan since Operation ANACONDA. Although some fierce fighting occurred at Musa Qala, the Taliban slipped away and ISAF troops gained control of the town within three days.¹⁶⁰

On 2 December, two Chinooks from B Company, 3-82d AVN flew from Bagram to Kandahar to temporarily join TF Corsair for the air assault on Musa Qala, referred to alternatively as Operation SNAKEPIT and/or Operation MAR KARARDAD. At a preliminary briefing the following day, critical aspects of the operation involving objectives, intentions, responsibilities, scheduling, sequencing, forces available, and the enemy situation were presented and discussed. The initial plan stipulated the insertion of three companies from 1st Battalion, 508th PIR into an area north of Musa Qala. Three separate helicopter lift serials, each accompanied by AH-64 Apaches, were called for in the plan. Serial one consisted of four US Chinooks; four British Chinooks made up serial two; and two Dutch Chinooks, along with four US Black Hawks, comprised serial three. Additional Black Hawks were slated to provide overhead command and control.

An additional planning session took place on the morning of 4 December, followed by a final synchronization meeting involving dozens of US, British, and Dutch representatives in the afternoon. That evening, the entire plan for SNAKEPIT, including a minute-by-minute overview, was briefed to the CJTF-82 command and staff. Additional critical details, such as ISR data, fire support, radio call signs/frequencies, and the final timeline, had been fleshed out and were presented during the command briefing. The original plan for a night insertion was revised such that all landings would now occur during daylight. This change was made to accommodate British concerns regarding low illumination cycles and night vision systems issues.¹⁶²

On 5 December (D-2), TF Corsair conducted the Air Mission Briefing in which the operational plan was first presented to the pilots and crews who would actually fly the air assault mission. Photos of the HLZ, a large open wadi north of town, were presented and reviewed. The enemy situation was described in more detail – Musa Qala was a center of insurgent activity, numerous foreign fighters were in the area, and the Taliban were heavily armed and willing to fight. Additional important information regarding weather conditions, flight sequencing, air routes, abort/down aircraft/go around procedures, rules of engagement, and the ground force (approximately 375 Soldiers from 1-508th) scheme of maneuver was also formally presented. Later in the day, the same briefing was presented to all of the flight crews from all three nations, more than 100 attendees, during the official Air Crew Mission Brief held in the TF Corsair motor pool building. Following this briefing, the motor pool floor was used for a ‘rock drill,’ in which the pilots and crews walked through the air assault, studied the timelines, reviewed their roles and responsibilities, and considered several contingency scenarios.

During update briefings the evening of 5 December and next morning, SNAKEPIT participants were kept up to date on progress of the British and Afghan ground operation south of Musa Qala. They were also informed that the entire mission had been compromised by an Afghan informant working at Kandahar Air Field and that the Taliban would be waiting with heavy weapons to attack the air assault helicopters. It was anticipated that the Taliban would remain undercover to avoid the Apaches and any preparatory fires, then pop up and begin firing as the aircraft were on final approach. During a loading rehearsal later in the day, 1-508th Soldiers practiced getting on and off the helicopters. It was determined during this routine exercise that the original load plan, 40 troops per Chinook or 35 troops plus an M-Gator, was impractical. With the approval of the 1-508th battalion commander, the load factor was subsequently reduced to 30 Soldiers per Chinook. That evening, all of the air and ground forces slated to conduct the air assault gathered in a large hangar for the final Combined Arms Rehearsal which gave everyone involved the opportunity to review the plan for the last time.

On D-Day morning, 7 December 2007, a Predator drone feed spotted Taliban vehicles in the proposed HLZ. Further observation indicated that the enemy fighters were planting IEDs along the primitive roadway that ran through the wadi. Although it was obvious at this point that the Taliban new exactly where the air assault aircraft would be landing, the mission was not cancelled or changed. At mid-day, the Paratroopers assembled on the tarmac for a final briefing before boarding the helicopters. The aircrews conduct one last briefing as well.

At 1520, the Apaches and C2 Black Hawks in serial one lift off. Next, five US Chinooks carrying the main effort 1-508th ground force launched, followed thereafter by two US Black Hawks and four British Chinooks, and lastly by four more US Black Hawks and two Dutch Chinooks. When the aircraft were 20 minutes out from landing, preparatory fires, including a salvo of guided multiple rocket launched missiles, hit suspected Taliban target in and around the HLZ. Unfortunately, due to the convoluted USAF approval process, anticipated preparatory air strikes never materialized. As a result, Taliban firing positions threatening the air assault egress route were not attacked and destroyed as planned. With just a few minutes remaining before the lead Chinooks were scheduled to land, the Air Assault Mission Commander, Colonel Kelly Thomas flying overhead in the C2 Black Hawk, ordered the entire flight to divert to an alternative HLZ over two miles away. All of the landings and departures at the alternate HLZ were uneventful and uncontested. The paratroopers then conducted a night movement to their originally assigned initial objectives.

By the next day, all three 1-508th companies were in contact with Taliban resistors. Apaches provided overhead fire support, while Chinooks began a seemingly endless series of day and night resupply missions. Nearly all the aircraft were fired upon, and three Apaches were hit, but not seriously damaged. By 10 December, the US ground forces had reached their primary objectives outside of Musa Qala and began preparations for the planned battle handoff to Afghan troops. Over the next four weeks, the transition of responsibility to the Afghans was postponed several times. Finally, during the second week of January 2008, the 1-508th Soldiers were extracted by Chinooks and returned to Kandahar.

An additional series of troop rotations took place in 2008. In mid-January, the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade – TF Destiny – replaced the 82d CAB at Bagram. The headquarters of the 82d Airborne division was relieved in April by the 101st Airborne Division. The new headquarters became CJTF 101 and assumed command of operations in RC-East. At the same time, the 4th BCT, 101st ABN replaced the 4th BCT, 82d ABN; and in July, the 3d BCT, 1st Infantry Division relieved the 173d Airborne Brigade, thereby retaining the two brigade force structure arrangement in RC-East. CH-47 combat air assault support during this period was provided by B Company, 6th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment and B Company, 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, 159th Combat Aviation Brigade, which had recently begun flying the upgraded ‘F’ model Chinook.

ISAF and CJTF 101 operations in RC-East during 2008 focused primarily on clear, hold, and build activities. As a result, the number of RC-East platoon and company FOBs and COBs had grown to 35 by 2008.¹⁶³ Many of these facilities were in remote locations often inaccessible by road, thus increasing the ground troops’ dependence on helicopters – principally Chinooks – for resupply and general support. Combat air assaults during this timeframe were typically company-sized or smaller and often included Afghan forces. After Taliban overran the Bari Alai Afghan outpost in Kunar province on 1 May, for example, an ANA commando company, along with US Special Forces advisers, conducted a Chinook air assault into the nearby Helgal Valley in an effort to block the escaping insurgents.¹⁶⁴

In July 2008, B Company, 1-506 IN and a company of Afghan soldiers air assaulted into the Tangi Valley, Wardak Province, to block a Taliban force that had ambushed a 203d Afghan Corps jingle truck convoy.¹⁶⁵ Later, during Operation MANE – a major offensive in the Jalrez and Nerkh Valleys in October – the 1-506 IN battalion TAC, the Scout and Mortar Platoons, and an Afghan platoon air assaulted by Chinook onto an over-watch position near the Jalrez district center. A platoon from C Company then conducted a night air assault to reinforce blocking positions in the Nerkh near FOB Airborne. An estimated 180 Taliban were killed or wounded in firefights and air strikes during the two-day operation.¹⁶⁶ After replacing 1-506 IN in Wardak in February 2009, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry continued conducting air assault operation in and around the worrisome Tangi Valley. During a two battalion operation in March, 2-87 IN began sweeping the valley from the north end, while 3-71 Cav entered from the south. At the same time Afghan commandos with Special Forces advisers air assaulted onboard Chinooks deep into the valley in search of Taliban leaders. Enemy resistance was light and the two-day Tangi sweep concluded after the two battalions met near the Lowgar-Wardak provincial border.¹⁶⁷

“We did dozens of air assaults with Chinooks in my year over there 2008-2009…there were a whole series of DEVIL, VIPER, SPADER, ROCK, and other operations, including about a dozen more CJSOTF missions we resourced,” 3d BCT, 1st ID commander Colonel John Spiszer explained.¹⁶⁸ The brigade conducted at least four Chinook air assaults per month for the first six months, then up to seven or eight a month during the latter half of the deployment.¹⁶⁹ Once Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, arrived in Kunar Province in February 2009, they also conducted several Chinook insertions in conjunction with Operation LIONHEART along the rugged Pakistan border. LIONHEART was a complementary operation, involving US, Afghan, Pakistani military, and Pakistani Frontier Corps forces, designed to prevent Taliban insurgents from crossing the border into Afghanistan. “What we have done is refocus our…intelligence, surveillance [and] reconnaissance assets to identify who is transiting the border and launch attacks on those deemed a threat,” Spiszer told the American Forces Press Service when the operation began in November 2008.¹⁷⁰

During Operation VIPER SHAKE in the spring 2009, troops from 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st ID (TF Spader) used Chinooks for air assaults into the mountains surrounding the Korengal Valley. 1-26 IN was almost entirely dependent on helicopter support since its platoons were scattered throughout the dangerous and volatile Kunar, Pech, Watapor, Chapadara, and Korengal Valleys in Kunar Province.¹⁷¹ The 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team that replaced 1-26 IN in Kunar experienced numerous firefights and skirmishes in these same valleys. “We used a lot of Chinooks up there…in the Hindu Kush region…usually at least one Chinook on all of our air assaults,” 2-12 IN commander, Colonel Brian Pearl, recalled.¹⁷²

Meanwhile in Zabul Province, the Taliban had successfully closed down portions of Highway 1, the main roadway connecting Kabul to Kandahar. Intelligence reports indicated that the Taliban were launching their attacks on the highway from sanctuaries in the Lurah River Valley. During the spring 2008, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry initiated a series of Chinook air assaults from FOB Qalat into HLZs near villages in the valley. The villages were systematically searched for weapons and cleared of insurgents. “Company-size air assaults were most effective…and with not enough aviation support to go around, Chinooks were most efficient…you could get a larger number of guys in with fewer lifts,” Colonel John Allred, 2-506 IN battalion commander at the time later explained.¹⁷³ Allred described how occasionally a company would air assault into a village, stay for several days and then extract out. Thinking that the Americans were gone for good, Taliban would move back into the village. The 2-506 IN company would then air assault right back into the same village, catching the Taliban off guard and putting them on the defensive in villages throughout the valley. With their support network in the Lurah seriously disrupted, the Taliban were unable to continue attacking Highway 1. Second Battalion went on to conduct a series of additional Chinook air assaults in Paktika Province, after deploying there later in the year.¹⁷⁴

In Paktia Province, 1st Squadron, 61st Cavalry faced a similar problem. The Haqqani Network, an insurgent group allied with the Taliban, had closed down the Khost to Gardez road and set up an illegal toll-collecting operation near the Seti-Kandow Pass. 1-61 Cav and Afghan soldiers from 1st Brigade, 203d ANA Corps initiated a series of Chinook air assaults, designated Operation RADWA U BARQ, to clear the pass area of Haqqani fighters. The squadron conducted one assault per month beginning in April 2008; then during RADWA U BARQ IV in July, two companies air assaulted directly into the Haqqani sanctuary high in the mountains north of the pass. The surprised insurgents fled the area, leaving behind weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Shortly thereafter, the Khost-Gardez road reopened.¹⁷⁵

Finally, in June 2008, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, 1st ID deployed to RC-South to support and augment Canadian (TF Kandahar) and British (TF Helmand) forces. 2-2 IN assumed responsibility for the Maiwand, Ghurak, and Shah Wali Kowt districts in western Kandahar Province. The battalion went on to conduct a series of ground and air assaults operation with Canadian, British, and Australian forces to interdict Taliban infiltration routes, attack insurgent sanctuaries, and search for high value targets/IED cells in the more troublesome Zhari, Panjway’i, and Arghendab districts.¹⁷⁶

Combat Air Assaults in 2009 and 2010

As with previous years, significant command changes occurred in Afghanistan during 2009. CJTF 82 replaced CJTF 101 in RC-East. The 4th BCT, 4th Infantry Division took over from the 3d BCT, 1st ID at Jalalabad Airfield and assumed responsibility for Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman Provinces. Out of FOB Shank, 3d BCT, 10th Mountain Division began conducting operations in Logar and Wardak Provinces, while 4^th BCT, 25^th ID at FOB Salerno took command in Khost, Paktia, and Paktika. By mid-year CH-47 Chinook heavy lift support was provided by the 159th CAB in RC-East and the 82d CAB in RC-South. General Stanley McChrystal became commander of ISAF and USFOR-A in June, and earlier in the year, President Obama had announced a significant OEF US troop increase, with “a clear and focused goal…to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”¹⁷⁷

Soldiers from the 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment, along with an Afghan platoon, air assaulted onboard Chinooks into the Zormat district, Paktia Province, to establish COP Kalagu during Operation KALAGU THUNDER in April.¹⁷⁸ In Operation HIWAD PARAST, the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment conducted two air assaults into the Minzi Mountains, Paktika Province, to assist Special Forces Soldiers in attacking and exploiting a large Taliban camp/IED factory.¹⁷⁹ In June, 1-501 IN began Operation YUKON RECOVERY in which dozens of Chinook air assaults were conducted in the futile search for a captured 1st Squadron Soldier.¹⁸⁰

General McChrystal arrived in Afghanistan just in time to oversee Operation KHANJAR, an unusually large brigade-sized offensive push into the Taliban infested Helmand River Valley in southern Helmand Province that began in July. The KHANJAR plan called for 4,000 Marines from the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and 650 Afghan soldiers to simultaneously night air assault into the towns of Nawa-l-Barakzayi, Sorkh-Duz, and Kanashin – all Taliban strongholds in the valley. Since the Marines had insufficient helicopter assets to conduct the mission on their own, both the 82d CAB (B Company, 3d Battalion) and the 159th CAB (B Company, 2d Battalion, were called upon to provide Chinook and Black Hawk support for the operation, which envisioned upwards of 50 aircraft.¹⁸¹ Chinooks – 15 in all – were provided by B Company, 3d Battalion, 82d Aviation Regiment and B Company, 2d Battalion, 238th Aviation Regiment (Army National Guardsmen from Illinois and South Carolina). “What makes Operation KHANJAR different from those that have occurred before, said 2d MEB commander, Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, is the massive size of the force introduced, the speed at which it will be inserted, and the fact that where we go, we will stay, and where we stay, we will hold, build, and work toward transition of all security responsibilities to Afghan forces.”¹⁸²

On the night before the air assault, the Chinooks flew from Kandahar to FOB Bastion to rehearse loading and pick-up zone (PZ) procedures with the Marines.¹⁸³ During the actual assault the following night, PZ execution was flawless. With 31-33 Marines per aircraft, three lifts of four Chinooks each flew under night vision goggle conditions into pre-determined HLZs in the Helmand Valley. Black Hawks and escort Apaches accompanied each lift. The first four Chinooks then returned to Bastion, refueled at the Marine FARP, picked up the remaining 2d MEB Marines, and flew them to the objective area. Some aircraft took enemy fire while approaching and departing the HLZs, however none were damaged.¹⁸⁴

KHANJAR was a complex, complicated, air assault operation involving dozens of US Army, US Marine Corps, US Air Force, and British fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The airspace de-confliction process – vertical and horizontal separation – required intricate planning and extensive coordination. “We had lots of liaison officers, established excellent communications, worked through contingencies, minimized risks, rehearsed, and developed lengthy execution checklists,” explained Colonel Paul Bricker, 82d CAB commander and air mission commander for the northern Helmand air assault. Because of the significant number of aircraft involved, “we tried to keep the execution simple,” Bricker added, “with timed releases, specific distances between serials, Apaches over the HLZs before H-hour, and minimal time on the ground for the Chinooks and Black Hawks.”¹⁸⁵ “The new ‘F’ model Chinooks were the best helicopters in Afghanistan, capable of bring in so much combat power in a short period of time…and our combat-tested veteran Warrant Officer pilots were at the top of their game during KHANJAR,” Colonel Bricker continued.¹⁸⁶ Brigadier General Nicholson, the 2d MEB commander, was duly appreciative of Army aviation’s contribution, later noting, “I was very, very pleased with Marine aviation and frankly with Army aviation…[on] a couple of our principal lifts we used Paul Bricker and the Combat Aviation Brigade…they did a tremendous job in support of the Marines.”¹⁸⁷ Chinook crews from the 82d CAB continued to support ISAF operations in the Helmand Valley and throughout RC-South during the summer 2009.

In July and August, for example, Chinooks flew air assault missions into the Zhari and Panjway’i districts, Kandahar Province, with Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, during a series of operations designated TORA AWAR I-V.¹⁸⁸ Subsequently, 1-12 IN air assaults back into the Zhari district in November to capture a prominent IED maker.¹⁸⁹ Back in Paktika in September 2009, 1-501 IN initiated Operation GERONIMO DARAU to clear the districts of Sar Hawza, Mata Khan, and Yahya Khel, and to reopen a key roadway between the provincial capital Sharana and the commercial city of Orgun. Following a daylight air assault – flown by Chinook crews from the 159^th CAB – into Sar Hawza, the 1st Battalion Scout Platoon located and killed seven insurgents and a Taliban commander.¹⁹⁰ “One of the biggest impacts achieved during Operation GERONIMO DARAU was defeating the insurgent command and control…this was critical because this district connects two of our largest population centers…I believe GERONOMO DARAU was an overwhelming success,” said 1-501 IN executive officer, Major Jeffrey Crapo.¹⁹¹

After Taliban overran Barg-e Matal, Nuristan Province, in July 2009, Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division air assaulted into the area to recapture the village during an operation designated MOUNTAIN FIRE. Following a Taliban counterattack, troops from 2-12 IN at Camp Blessing conducted an additional air assault into Barg-e Matal to provide reinforcement. By the end of July, the Taliban withdrew after having lost 170 KIA.¹⁹² “This operation [MOUNTAIN FIRE] shows that Afghan and Coalition forces can go anywhere, anytime, and successfully conduct any operation we choose to defeat the enemies of Afghanistan,” Colonel Randy George, commander 4th BCT, 4th ID, told ISAF Public Affairs representatives following the re-taking of Barg-e Matal.¹⁹³

In February 2010, the 82d CAB participated in two additional combined, joint, ISAF air assaults operations. During Operations MOSHTARAK and HELMAND SPIDER, some 15,000 US Army, US Marine Corps, British, Canadian, Danish, Estonian, and Afghan forces attacked the villages of Marjah and Nad-e Ali in Helmand Province. The objective of the operations was to protect and secure the Afghan citizens living in the region, and not necessarily to kill Taliban. US, British, and Afghan troops had been conducting shaping operations in preparation for the mission for several weeks. “We’re going to take Marjah away from the Taliban,” Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson, commander, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, said before the operations began. Chinooks, Black Hawks, Apaches, and CH-53 Sea Stallions from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadrons 463 and 466 inserted the 1^st Battalion, 6^th Marine Regiment, plus additional ANA soldiers, into Marjah during a night air assault on 13 February. Prior to the insertions, Predator drones and Apaches took out Taliban IED teams and anti-aircraft weapons positions near several intended HLZs. Other Landing zones were secured by US and British Special Forces and Afghan commandos. As the first Chinooks approached the objective area, Marine AV-8B Harriers illuminated the landing zones with infra-red flares visible only by the pilots and crews flying with night vision equipment. The approaches, landings, and departures were executed without incident and all eleven objectives in and around Marjah were secured within minutes.¹⁹⁴

82d CAB Chinook pilots and crews also took part in the Coalition air assault on objectives surrounding Nad-e Ali. This second air assault “was even more complex as it included over 20 rotary-wing aircraft from the US, Britain, and Canada,” explained 82d CAB commander Colonel Paul Bricker after the assaults had been completed.¹⁹⁵ There actually may have been as many as 40 helicopters involved in the Nad-e Ali assault, including three Canadian Chinooks, four Canadian Griffon gunships, several British Chinooks, plus additional US Chinooks, Black Hawks, and Apaches. Eleven hundred British and Afghan soldiers were inserted into objective area HLZs by eleven separate lifts in little over and hour. The individual lifts were spaced just minutes apart and each country was assigned its own airspace and approach/departure routes, with flights inbound to the HLZs flying at lower altitudes than returning flights.¹⁹⁶

In Zabol Province, 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 82d Airborne Division conducted a series of air assaults and sweeps of Taliban safe havens in the Shamulzai district along the Pakistan border.¹⁹⁷ Chinooks from the 3d Combat Aviation Brigade provided support for many of these missions.¹⁹⁸ As with previous OEF air assaults, when significant numbers of troops were need for deliberate or hasty missions, Chinooks often delivered enough force to surround and capture an entire village. “This war would grind to a screeching halt without Chinook heavy lift assets,” Sergeant First Class Jeremy Whittaker said.¹⁹⁹ Although not considered a true combat air assault, Chinooks from F Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry participated extensively in Operation MOUNTAIN DESCENT II, the evacuation of 4th Brigade Combat Team Soldiers from multiple COPs scattered throughout the Korengal Valley. “We [were] the main transportation element moving equipment and personnel out of the various COPs swiftly and safely from the so-called valley-of-death,” said 3d CAB plans officer, Major Michael Reyburn.²⁰⁰ Due to the rugged terrain, many locations in the valley were accessible only by air. And since previous retrograde operations at COPs Bella and Keating had been contested by the Taliban, MOUNTAIN DESCENT II was conducted entirely during hours of darkness, with 500 Soldiers and five-hundred thousand pounds of equipment extracted in 76 flights over the course on four nights. A lone Chinook lifted off with last contingent of Soldiers at 0300, 14 April 2010.²⁰¹

In September 2010, Chinooks from 4th Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment conducted an air assault mission with the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Wardak Province during Operation TALON PURGE. Nearly 350 Afghan commandos and Paratroopers from 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment were inserted at night by four Chinooks and two Black Hawk helicopters from 3d CAB into five HLZs in Chak district. Two Army National Guard Chinooks from the 168th Aviation Regiment (Oregon and Washington) flew five round trips each, with 30 passengers per aircraft, from COP Sayed Abad west of FOB Shank to the objective area. Two additional CH-47s from 2d Battalion, 3d Aviation Regiment based at Bagram conducted three round-trip flights in support of the complex mission. The air assault into the Chak Valley was the largest undertaken by 173d Soldiers during their 2009-2010 OEF deployment.²⁰² Once on the ground, the Paratroopers quickly located and killed a Taliban commander and several subordinates. “We came in, secured key locations, and fought it out with the insurgents…they have to realize that we can and will go into any area in this country…,” Sergeant Bradley Mora, a squad leader with A Company, 1-503 IN, said following the operation.²⁰³

Flight operations tempo for Chinook crews in 2010 at FOB Shank was intense. To begin with, the FOB was a 6,600 feet and “we still had to climb out over the mountains,” said Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jeffrey Hutchinson, D Company, 1st Battalion, 169th Aviation Regiment. “Ninety percent of the HLZs we went into were also at 6,000 feet or higher.” “We ran dozens of missions…do the infil at night, then do a resupply, and finally do the exfil,” Hutchinson continued.²⁰⁴ With only two Chinooks at Shank, D Company pilots flew missions day and night for 30 days straight during one stretch in 2010.²⁰⁵ Chief Warrant Officer 4 Gary Ossinger, who arrived with B Company, 3-10 General Support Aviation Battalion later in the year, agreed with the OPTEMPO assessment. Bravo Company’s Chinooks were split, with several at Jalalabad in direct support of 1st BCT, 101st Airborne and others at Bagram in general support of the entire RC-East AO. “We did at least 200 air assaults…seemed like every night,” Ossinger explained. “F model Chinooks were the main air assault platform…and a typical mission involved two CH-47s, escorted by two Apaches, inserting a relatively small force into a strategic location at night.”²⁰⁶

In October 2010, 1st Squadron, 33d Cavalry conducted a joint air assault with Afghan troops into a mountainous region of Khost Province. The objective of Operation WAR OLD COFFEE (translated from Pashto) was to disrupt Taliban supply routes and destroy enemy weapons caches. Chinooks making the insertions were required to execute pinnacle landings on the mountain tops so that the off-loaded Soldiers could quickly capture the high ground. Two substantial caches were discovered and destroyed by an attached explosive ordnance team. Chinooks were well suited for this high altitude operation – “you can get the most guys and equipment in in one shot,” said 1st Squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Lutsky.²⁰⁷

By December 2010, Chinooks from 6th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Aviation Regiment, 10th Mountain Division had replaced those of 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Aviation Regiment at Jalalabad and FOB Sharana. Chinook crews from 6-6 Cav and 3-10 GSAB subsequently conducted an air assault with 2d BCT, 34 ID Soldiers and Afghan troops into the Galuch Valley, near the town of Hind Dor, Laghman Province, in March 2011. Operation BULLWHIP, which cleared the valley of Taliban, was the largest air assault by 101st Airborne Soldiers during their OEF X-XI deployment. The air assault crews encountered very little enemy resistance when landing in the valley.²⁰⁸ “We were going…out there with overwhelming combat power…the large mass of folks we brought and the fact that we air assaulted in…the enemy probably made the decision that it was best not to fight,” Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kremer, commander 133d Infantry Regiment, 2d BCT, surmised following the successful insertion.²⁰⁹

In RC-South, 2d BCT, 101st Airborne Division and Afghan forces from the 205th Corps kicked off Operation DRAGON STRIKE, a large-scale ground and air assault into the Zhari, Arghandab, Maiwand, and Panjwai districts surrounding Kandahar City, in September 2010. The objective of the operation was to regain control of Highway One and to “disrupt enemy sanctuaries and staging areas [used] for attacks into Kandahar City,” said Colonel Rafael Torres, director of the ISAF Joint Operations Center.²¹⁰ Chinook support – 21 aircraft total – for DRAGON STRIKE came from B Company, 6th Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, B Company, 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation Regiment, and an Australian rotary wing detachment. Since ground movement in many areas of Kandahar Province was often restricted by extensive vegetation, numerous rat lines, and dozens of Taliban-placed IEDs, aviation support was essential to freedom of movement and the ability jump over the IED belts. “The enemy knew we would have to come from north to south, and they had prepared some pretty nasty defensive belts [trenches, bunkers, IEDs, minefields] to keep us from doing that,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, commander 2d battalion, 502 IN at the time. “So the air assaults were a way of jumping behind those defensive belts…we coined the term ‘back clears’…you air assault to the south of these defensive belts and then back clear up to them… you’re coming from an area that is likely to be less of a threat,” Benchoff continued.²¹¹

During the initial month of DRAGON STRIKE, Chinooks conducted 24 air assaults, placing a large number of troops – but broken down into small elements – into strategic locations spread throughout the AO. The extensive number of insertions frustrated the Taliban’s situational awareness, and prevented the insurgents from reinforcing. In the first week, eight Chinooks were hit by enemy fire. Prior to the operation, portions of the objective area had been declared ‘no-fly’ zones due to the heavy concentration of Taliban anti-aircraft fires. Since the plan called for the inserted forces to remain in-place for months rather than being quickly extracted, resupply requirements were unceasing. Each night four Chinooks were assigned to fly the seemingly endless resupply missions.²¹²

Early in the operation, B Company and the Scouts from 2-502 IN air assaulted at night onboard Chinooks into the town of Baluchan south of the battalion FOB at Howz-e Madad. The Scouts were extracted and flown to a different location within a few days, while B Company remained to hold the ground around Baluchan for several months.²¹³ Second BCT was the main effort during DRAGON STRIKE. “We had four Chinooks for six weeks…and used [them] for multiple air assaults…normally run at battalion level…a two ship air assault with multiple turns,” Colonel Arthur Kandarian, 2d BCT commander, said in describing the CH-47’s contribution to the operation. “The Chinooks and Black Hawks…were from 101st CAB and their support and bravery were the finest I have observed,” Kandarian continued. “We trained with the CAB before we deployed and fought with them in Kandahar so we enjoyed a phenomenal relationship.”²¹⁴

Although DRAGON STRIKE continued into 2011, by late October 2010 Highway 1 was Taliban-free. Kandahar Governor Tooryali Weesa drove without military escort from Kandahar City to Howz-e Madad for a shura with village elders. “This has not been possible since 2004 and would have led to a catastrophe even three weeks ago, British Major General Nicholas Carter, RC-South commander, said referring to Governor Weesa’s hour-long trip, then adding that “Operation DRAGON STRIKE made this possible.”²¹⁵ During the fall of 2010 and winter 2011, 2-502 IN conducted several additional Chinook air assaults into the Zhari and Maiwand districts during a successive series of DRAGON STRIKE sub-operations code-named Nashville, Clarksville, Franklin, and Nolensville. Numerous Chinook and Black Hawk air assaults were subsequently completed by the 2d BCT in the brigade-sized Operations DRAGON DESCENT and DRAGON WRATH in January/February 2011. Finally, during Operation MOUNTAIN JAGUAR in Maiwand district, 2-502 IN executed nine Chinook air assaults in 30 days to disrupt the Taliban spring offensive. On the final mission, “we air assaulted all four maneuver companies,” Lieutenant Colonel Benchoff recounted.²¹⁶