Yemeni Report Explores Al-Qa'ida's 'New Strategy' in Southern Yemen

Sources Say Al-Qa'ida in Yemen Planning 'Islamic Emirate of Abyan-Aden'

GMP20110614144001 Kuwait Al-Siyasah Online in Arabic 14 Jun 11

[Report by Yahya al-Sudmi: "80 Military Men Killed in Zanjibar and Fights With Al-Qa'ida Turn Into Guerilla War, Sources to Al-Siyasah: 'Al-Qa'ida Plans to Proclaim the Islamic Emirate of Abyan-Aden'"]

(Passage omitted about incident involving the killing of two Al-Qa'ida fighters in Abyan; covered in referent item)

[Description of Source: Kuwait Al-Siyasah Online in Arabic -- Website of leading independent daily with liberal, anti-Iran, anti-Islamist line and close ties to both the ruling family and Saudi Arabia; URL: http://www.al-seyassah.com/]

Forum Member Posts Article on 'Strategic Course' for Jihad in Yemen

GMP20110603571004 Al-Tahaddi Islamic Network in Arabic 03 Jun 11

[Article attributed to Abdallah Bin-Muhammad, posted by "Muhib al-Tahaddi," user number 10116, dated 3 June: "Strategy for Empowering Ansar al-Shari'ah"]

The Challenge Front

Before I start elaborating on this point, I would like to address part of an article I wrote about three years ago in the winter of 2009: The Timing of the Entry of the Warrior Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin to the Arabian Peninsula. I received notices that article was a topic of interest to a number of leaders in Yemen. What concerns us here is that in it I mentioned some of the necessary requirements that would facilitate the entry of Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin to Yemen. As we are currently dealing with a comparable situation resembling that scenario in terms of importance and gravity, it is important to compare between what we expected in theory and what we are facing today in reality. We must also assess whether our current advancement in the governorates of Abyan is the result of perfect alignments that allowed for it to happen, or if it was the result of a military gamble with unplanned consequences. Here is an excerpt from the article The Timing of the Entry of the Warrior Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin to the Arabian Peninsula:

"The first step taken by the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, in establishing an Islamic state was to find those who would harbor him and support him with victory. The Oath of Aqaba solidified his great establishment. As we look at the geography and human topography of the Al-Najd region, we find that Yemen is ideal for fulfilling such a mission. Weapons abound there, and its people are accustomed to a rough, tribal, life as yet untainted by the influences of modernity. The people in Yemen, additionally, are quite familiar with the cause of jihad, since they witnessed the recent jihad against the communists. Furthermore, over the years, Yemen has and will always provide support to Islam. Therefore, the first step for us in this matter is to examine the tribal map well, just like Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq did when he asked tribes to offer shelter and give victory to the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. He would ask them: "How is your supply of arms? We should then initiate direct contact with them through scholars, leaders, and those close to the tribal leaders in order to explain to them the ramifications of the battle against the neo-Crusaders, and the religious and historic responsibilities of the tribes. We should then offer them the possibility of harboring and giving victory to Shaykh Usama Bin Ladin in their lands. It is important to understand that the vow of loyalty by tribes to the shaykh is tantamount to a death oath; it is not a fishing trip or merely moral support. It was mentioned that Prophet Muhammad had offered himself to the Bani Shayban tribe in his search for shelter and support. They said: 'That which you are asking for is what the kings detest. If you would like that we provide you with shelter and victory, we would do that.' The prophet, peace be upon him, then answered: 'Your response was not bad if you were indeed sincere. The religion of God will not gain victory except by those who surround and protect it,' [Hadith]. This Hadith demonstrates that the support needed to gain victory should be comprehensive. It cannot be comprehensive without support for all the Arabs in their battles, or if it is about fighting the Crusaders and not the apostates. This is the type of support that the Al-Aws and Al-Khazraj tribes provided when they vowed to support the prophet, peace be upon him. On that day, As'ad Bin-Zurarah said: 'Wait, O people of Yathrib. We have come to him because we are confident that he is the messenger of God. If you vow loyalty to him, you will abandon all Arabs. Your best men will be killed and you will be fought. If you think that you can remain steadfast in battle and be patient if your best men are killed, then go ahead and make the vow. You will be rewarded by God. If you have any fears, then leave him and you will have an excuse before God.'

"After we make the vow, we should implement the plan by preparing for attacks and choosing a region most suitable for centralizing and launching the forces. That area needs to be well-supplied with all that is needed to make it a triangle of death for the enemy forces, should they consider approaching it. This will not be possible without bombing and eliminating all the security and military bases from this area. It is important to pay attention to the fact that this battle is not against the people or the members of the police or the army, for they will always be on the side of the victors. This is a battle against the reigning regime that is fighting us by using them. Meanwhile, our numbers do not allow us to enter into a confrontation with all these sides. Therefore, it is important to concentrate our efforts on destroying the foundation of the regime in power until it becomes too difficult for it to preserve itself. In order to preserve its existence in this scenario, the regime would be pushed to cross all the red lines. It will dare enough to cross the sanctity of the tribes by killing or imprisoning them, just like in the Red Mosque [in Pakistan]. That action would eventually create an explosive situation, which we need in our operations in order to guarantee the stability of our own region." End of Excerpt

Let us now move on to discuss the expected hazards on the ground, which have three strategic dimensions: local, regional, and international.

1. The Local Danger This danger is manifested in the Yemeni army, as well as the security forces and tribal militias loyal to the government. Their danger is no longer imminent after the takeover of the Ja'ar and Zanzibar governorates and their surroundings. As the tribes in the south participated in the revolution to overthrow the regime, they are no longer dangerous. Lately, the Yemeni army has faced divisions from within. As a result, we are now confronting half an army operating in a semi-hostile region due to the delicate situation in the south. That army is now suffering from rapid deterioration in its morale due to the recent revolt against its supreme commander. It is also suffering from poor support and lack of supplies due to regional and international pressures now pushing Ali Abdallah Salih to step down. Such weakness seemed more apparent in the inability of the army to regain its camps and storage facilities that were seized by the tribes in Al-Jouf, Sa'ada, and elsewhere. Therefore, the Yemeni army leadership, from the beginning, sought final resolutions, such as using planes and warships to bomb Zanzibar and Ja'ar after its failed attempt to regain towns with ground forces. The helpless army even bombed water tanks in the cities and electric plants in order to pressure the residents to force the mujahidin out of their towns. Such confrontations are ongoing. Through this quick overview of the situation in Yemen, I see that the time is ripe for the mujahidin to enter Ja'ar and Zanzibar during such a suitable political situation, where the grounds are leveled for them to overtake the army. This is not a suicidal gamble, and it does not take away from the courageous conquest of Zanzibar.

2. The Regional Danger This danger is represented in the neighboring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which is the major supporter of the war against the mujahidin in Yemen. After the collapse of the Arab regimes in the face of the Arab revolutions, such regional danger has become limited to Saudi Arabia. There is no risk from the Arabs sending their armies (like the intervention of Saudi security forces against the Huthis). Every Arab country now is concerned with its own survival, so there is no worry in them sending military reinforcements. Despite that, some neighboring countries tried to preserve stability through an initiative by the Gulf states, but that did not succeed. In light of this, there is no Arab force left but Saudi Arabia to support the Yemeni Interior Ministry, and the political security of the country, without using its own military reinforcements. Since these forces are already occupied with suppressing revolt in their own countries, Saudi Arabia will not be able to play this role. Saudi Arabia does not have geographical influence in the jihadist zones of Abyan the way it does along its borders with Sa'ada, which is controlled by the Huthis. Saudi Arabia cannot play an individual role in the fight against the jihadist entity beyond utilizing its intelligence activities against the mujahidin, in collaboration with world powers. That challenge was and still remains present, yet the observer of recent events in Bahrain and the subsequent humble efforts of the Gulf states realizes that their attention is focused mainly on the bigger threat facing them, manifested in Iran. This has made them realize that the threat of the mujahidin in Yemen is secondary. In light of this, I see that the mujahidin conquest of Ja'ar and Zinzibar is possible, amid certain regional circumstances that facilitate such a thing. I also believe that the jihadist entity in this region, God willing, will be more shielded from the Arab conspiracies for the first time in contemporary history, because the Arab deviance, manifested in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, is preoccupied with other matters.

3. The International Threat This threat is embodied by America, which runs the only overt foreign military force in Yemen. Its forces are centered at its naval base in Djibouti, and its intelligence is based on the island of Socotra. But like in Pakistan, the Americans cannot advance without the support and help of the Yemenis in the areas of intelligence and military efforts. As the Americans are now siding with the Yemeni people who demand that Ali Abdallah al-Salih step down, they will not receive the same level of cooperation as they did in the past. The international threat here is mainly limited to the US. I believe that the world community, represented in the United Nations and its Security Council, has shown a disparity in views on Libya and Syria, and have lacked a consensus on military intervention in other troubled warzones. Indeed, while NATO member-states were divided over military intervention in Libya, they did not show the same sentiment toward Syria, and they will certainly not consider military intervention in Yemen due to the lack of common interests or imminent threats to Europe. Despite this, the Americans will not leave the situation in Yemen without addressing it or treating it, even temporarily. This leads us to the situation in Waziristan and the battle of the drones, which is the challenge at hand. The signs of that upcoming battle are crystallizing more now as their war hero, David Petraeus, is close to assuming the leadership of the CIA. Of course, such battle will take place once the US tightens its grip on arms control and the management of naval surveillance, in collaboration with the international fleet currently stationed off the coast of Yemen and Somalia. In my view, this is the closest America can go amid the Arab revolutions on the one side, and its bad policies in Afghanistan and Iraq on the other. Within the framework of that weakened American role in the region, I say that the entrance of jihadist forces to Ja'ar and Zinzibar could not come at a better time for such a dangerous and strategic move. Such a move, God willing, will remain safe from any international military or allied intervention against it.

Now that we have recognized the nature of the threats facing the mujahidin on the ground, I can say that the jihadist project in the Abyan region is a viable one. It has developed according to the conditions and requirements necessary to sustain it, and in accordance with the spirit of resistance, as well as the reliance on God. But once the mujahidin control that region, the challenges thereafter are no less threatening than the previous ones. We can sum up those challenges in the following three points:

1. Provision of Services Success in controlling countries is one thing, but success in managing them is another. Therefore, colonial countries usually seek the best experts in the fields of commerce and business to preside over the management of countries after they fall under their control. Accordingly, the Americans used Bremer as a civilian governor of Iraq, based on his extensive expertise in managing multinational corporations. When we discuss the administration of regions such as Ja'ar and Zanzibar, we are not necessarily talking about cities like Dubai or Riyadh, for the main services of concern in Yemen are humble and basic: electricity, water, and communications. God willing, these basic services can be provided under the mujahidin at the same level, or even better. In luxury cities like Dubai or Riyadh, the residents there would not be satisfied with services below what they are used to in their lavish lifestyle. Therefore, upon examining the map of the world, we will not find countries better than Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen in which to form Shari'ah-ruled areas and countries. In those countries, the nature of the population and their standard of living would not suffer much from the impact of international embargos and blockades typically associated with such pariah projects. According to what is happening in the Arab region, which is already showing signs of a general chaos that will eventually lead to famine and forced mass migrations, the people there will be concerned primarily with peace and security. Ultimately, those people will be willing to vow loyalty to whoever meets their basic needs. At that point, our role will come in handy in the post-Abyan and Aden control phase. This scenario is similar to what happened initially with the Taliban in Afghanistan, when it provided security in the regions under its control. People there asked the Taliban to take over their other regions for security in return, and also to end all the looting, killing, and robbing. The same happened in Somalia with the Al-Shabab Movement. It all starts with the mujahidin providing safety and security as a basic service for the inhabitants of their region, and after that they can solidify their position. The present challenge facing Ansar al-Shari'ah is represented in displaying a similar, positive, model in terms of providing security and basic services so that more people will approach you in order to join you.

2. Attraction of Human Resources One of the most important anticipated challenges is attracting the human resources available in the region and investing in them properly in the building and administration of their region. Scientists, preachers, tribal leaders, doctors, engineers, and others in can cover most aspects of the preaching, communication, and the building of infrastructure in the cities and villages of Abyan Governorate. Attracting them is a true indicator of the real growth of the movement of the brothers. There is nothing better than including these community elements in a minor Shura council to address provincial affairs, in my opinion. If they are trusted, they can be fully integrated later in order to benefit from their expertise. It is also possible to assign some of the preachers and scholars the task of establishing the Islamic educational curriculum for various age groups, and to support and encourage this in order to make it a viable alternative to traditional education. Additionally, some scholars can be assigned to deal with judicial matters and supervise those in charge of propagating virtue and preventing vice, for they are the best to understand the circumstances of the people in that regard. It is worth pointing out that attracting and integrating scholars gradually into the system allows them to exert their best energies in those matters, and strengthens the foundation of viable governance. There is no need to punish those who dissented in the past. Instead, we should respond to bad deeds with kindness, just like our prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, did on the day of Al-Fath. Accordingly, it will be possible to gradually employ these important segments of society to help push forward the wheel of reconstruction and societal development.