Aff Starter Pack – Search for mh370


Asia Pivot Backlines A-to Containment Turn and “No SCS War” now



Download 1.41 Mb.
Page21/26
Date22.04.2018
Size1.41 Mb.
1   ...   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26

Asia Pivot Backlines



A-to Containment Turn and “No SCS War” now




Frontline

( ) Not unique – US-Sino conflict coming in the squo.



Denmark ‘14

Abraham M. Denmark is Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research. He previously served as Country Director for China Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War?” – National Interest – May 31, 2014 – http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-tensions-the-south-china-sea-spark-war-10572


In the South China Sea, where China’s ambitious “nine-dash line” claim of sovereignty has been disputed by several other claimants, relations have in recent weeks turned remarkably chillier. Vietnam and the Philippines are facing the brunt of Beijing’s ire, and the potential for crisis and conflict is significant. Positions are hardening, willingness to compromise is low, and the fact that the Philippines is an ally of the United States raises the potential for a disastrous crisis and potential conflict between the U.S. and China.

( ) US attempts at the Pivot are inevitable – but success hinges on strong regional alliances.



Chadha ‘14

(Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) is a Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses -- ASIAN STRATEGIC REVIEW: US Pivot and Asian Security – a book edited by S.D. Muni, Vivek Chadha – From Chapter Three: “Military Implications of the

US Rebalancing Strategy” – by Vivek Chadha – http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fidsa.in%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2Fbook_ASR2013.pdf&ei=AY-XU8rjNuaO8gG3g4CQBg&usg=AFQjCNG_ooiEIMhuGCnMzg7oy_t67sZTgQ)
The process of rebalance or the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific has started taking shape, and it will undoubtedly remain the cornerstone of US strategy. It will reinforce focus on the region for the forceable future. However, while this paper focuses attention on the military aspects of the rebalance, it needs to be emphasised that the tendency to equate economic and military strength in figurative terms tends to confuse numbers with the ability to influence events. US rebalancing is not as much about increasing its numbers in the region as the desire to shape the course of events to its advantage and protection of the security architecture created by it. For the US, besides its qualitative edge in technology and proven military capability, the network of alliances and partnerships is the most important factor to lead the rebalance. On the other hand, in addition to building military capability, China’s inability to effectively influence events is dictated by a heavy reliance on foreign trade, especially with Southeast and East Asia. However, the lack of allies who can help further its desire to dominate the region is in stark contrast to the US. What the US will lose in relative military terms to China as an individual country, it will more than make up for it through its system of alliances and partnershipsmilitary as well as diplomaticwhich is bound to impact its ability to influence events. “A smart-power narrative for the twenty-first century is not about maximizing power or preserving hegemony. It is about finding ways to combine resources in successful strategies in the new context of power diffusion and ‘the rise of the rest’.”56 This, as the rebalancing approach suggests, will form the basis of the US strategy for the region.

( ) No link – Pivot can shape Chinese actions without being containment.



Kay ‘13

Dr. Sean Kay is a Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan University specializing in international politics, international security, international organizations, and U.S. foreign and defense policy. He is also the Director of the Arneson Institute for Practical Politics and Public Affairs and Chair of the International Studies Program. Sean Kay is a Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Eisenhower Institute in Washington, D.C. specializing in international security. “America’s Asia Pivot – A Return to Realism?” – Working Paper Prepared for the Center for International Security and Peace Studies – October 2013 – http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcepsi-cipss.ca%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2014%2F02%2FSeanKay-Workingpaper_5x5.pdf&ei=jI6XU7a8JcW28AHGrIDgCg&usg=AFQjCNF0wKneKLskCakFk_XB9wZA6xhanQ


Could America successfully make this level of shift in priorities? The new Secretary of State, John Kerry signaled skepticism over the pivot strategy in his confirmation hearings. He warned in January 2013 that: “"We have a lot more forces out there than any other nation in the world, including China…And the Chinese take a look at that and say, 'What's the United States doing? Are they trying to circle us?' I think we need to be thoughtful in how we go forward.”46 He then embarked on his first official trip to Europe, and devoted the bulk of his time to the broader Middle East. If America failed to pivot its military deployments away from Europe and realign in the Middle East, then the ability to sustain the pivot to Asia could be lost. This outcome would raise security concerns among American-friendly countries in the Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile, American liberal and neoconservative worldviews continued to press American leaders to advocate for democracy and human rights in China. The Chinese government says this damages efforts to promote mutual gains and they have increasingly come to see America’s posturing as their own existential threat. As Wei Jingsheng, a prominent Chinese dissident concludes: “America’s social and political system is very attractive to ordinary people in China, and this, the communist government feels, is a fundamental threat to the government’s survival.”47 Still, the pivot and its assumed benefits united realists like John Mearsheimer and liberals like Joseph S. Nye. Nye wrote: …China’s leaders cannot predict their successors’ intentions. The US is betting that they will be peaceful, but no one knows. A hedge expresses caution, not aggression. American military forces do not aspire to ‘contain’ China in Cold War fashion, but they can help to shape the environment in which future Chinese leaders make their choices. I stand by my testimony before the US Congress of 1995 in response to those who, even then, wanted a policy of containment rather than engagement: ‘Only China can contain China’…the last thing the US wants is a Cold War II in Asia.

( ) Turn – Pivot can deter and avoid violence. Strong alliances are key.



Chadha ‘14

(Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) is a Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses -- ASIAN STRATEGIC REVIEW: US Pivot and Asian Security – a book edited by S.D. Muni, Vivek Chadha – From Chapter Three: “Military Implications of the



US Rebalancing Strategy” – by Vivek Chadha – http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fidsa.in%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2Fbook_ASR2013.pdf&ei=AY-XU8rjNuaO8gG3g4CQBg&usg=AFQjCNG_ooiEIMhuGCnMzg7oy_t67sZTgQ)
The US Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan W. Greenert elaborates on the concept of forward deployment, which is one of the three tenets of the navy’s overall approach.36 He argues that forward deployment will deter aggression, influence events beyond the US shores and better deal with uncertainty. This deployment is centred on “bases” provided by allies like Japan and South Korea and “places” leased by partner countries like Singapore. In addition to the advantages of a forward presence, the policy also helps retain initiative and maintains presence at global hot spots, which would have otherwise required the maintenance of large standing fleets. This is also one of the measures undertaken for cost-cutting, as a result of sequestration. Even as the US plans for deployment around its traditional bases in the region, with a degree of readjustment, the possibility of local resentment against these, as has happened in the past cannot be ruled out. While the concept of rotation of troops can partially address this limitation, however, contingencies to further reduce permanent presence could be seen in future.37 This could have an impact on the deployment of troops, air assets as well as missile defence platforms. The US Navy has 285 ships at present and these are likely to go up to 300 by 2019.38 This will be augmented by forward deployment of assets in the Asia- Pacific region. Presently, the US Navy has approximately 50 ships deployed in the region on any given day. These operate from its bases in Japan, South Korea, Guam and Singapore. Of these 50 per cent are part of its policy of Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF). This includes the carrier “USS George Washington, nine cruisers and destroyers, four amphibious ships and three SSNs”.39 The redeployment of naval assets will be supported by relocation of troops in the region. The decision to rotate 2500 marines in Australia over six years and increase the presence of ships and aircrafts, is one of the major changes that have brought about.40 Similarly, stepping up of ties with Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia has witnessed an impetus in the recent past. While the US decided to rotate four LCS progressively into the future in Singapore, Philippines is likely to witness enhancement in the rotational policy, along with efforts to improve the capacity of its armed forces.41 A summary of changes in deployment that are likely to take place are listed as follows (Table 1):42 The above data provides certain clear indicators regarding the rebalance envisaged for the US forces. A brief summation of the same reinforces the following: • First, it is evident that there is indeed a shift which is taking place in terms of US military assets. However, it is also clear that this is likely to be facilitated in large measure by the withdrawal and drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even as assets are planned to be transferred from these theatres, their final move will be contingent upon the residual military assets required in the region and second, their battle worthiness after a decade of intensive deployment. • Second, the shift is also accompanied by an intra-Asia-Pacific rebalance. This will entail a larger presence of assets in Guam, Australia, Philippines and Singapore, thereby spreading them in proximity of potential hot spots. • Third, core military assets like cruisers and destroyers will be relieved by non-traditional security assets like littoral combat ships. This will enhance the conventional war fighting capability of the US and simultaneously enhance its footprint against sub-conventional threats and in pursuance of humanitarian initiatives. • Fourth, the rebalance will be facilitated by a forward posture that will increase efficiency, cut costs and maintain presence in critical areas of interest of the US. The US rebalancing is likely to receive an impetus as a result of technologies and inductions, which will facilitate achievement of region specific objectives. This will include the Virginia class submarines and modules for cruise missiles. This nuclear powered deep ocean submarine has anti-submarine and shallow littoral capability.43 The P-8 Maritime Surveillance Aircraft and MH-60 antisubmarine helicopters will further enhance the ability to counter envisaged submarine based threats. The surveillance and electronic warfare capability will be increased through the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance sensors on board the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles and EA-18G electronic aircraft with strong jamming capability. The US Air force will deploy its fifth generation aircraft in the region to ensure capability accretion. The Army will improve upon the ballistic missile defence capability, with the initial deployments already having begun. The forces will enhance their cyber capabilities, given the increasing importance of the same in recent times. The decision to build upon the capacity of Guam as a strategic base, as also in Marianas, Saipan and Tinian will be a part of infrastructure development in the region. The US derives strength in the Asia Pacific region through its network of allies and partners. Though the alliances have a Cold War history, yet their relevance has been reinforced in the recent past. These have also been augmented through partnerships, which aim at cooperation for common interests and concerns. A summary of the same is given as follows (Table 2).

Extension – Not Unique – Conflict Coming Now




( ) Neg ev is rhetorical window-dressing – China will be aggressive in the SCS.



Denmark ‘14

Abraham M. Denmark is Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research. He previously served as Country Director for China Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War?” – National Interest – May 31, 2014 – http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-tensions-the-south-china-sea-spark-war-10572


Many of China’s elites have recognized this change in the distribution of power and believe China should act more assertively in the pursuit of its interests in the South China Sea. Led by large state-owned corporate interests such as CNOOC and SINOPEC and abetted by hawks in the PLA, China’s leaders have apparently been convinced that Beijing should abandon Deng’s precedent of restraint and conciliation and instead seek to change the status quo in China’s favor. China’s strategy toward the goal of strengthening control over the South China Sea has been fairly remarkable for its ingenuity. While certainly assertive, China’s leaders have insisted on a strategy that is restrained and defensive on its face. Beijing always couches its actions as reactions to perceived attacks and incidents from the other claimants. Yet China’s behavior is always to escalate the situation and use its overwhelming power to enhance its claims and strengthen its position. This approach, which can be called Reactive Assertiveness, is used by Beijing to describe China as fundamentally defensive and its adversaries as the ones causing trouble. With all apparent genuineness, Beijing paints the claims and actions as impinging on China’s national sovereignty—an equivalent to a foreign military force establishing a beachhead in Florida. As one Chinese scholar told me, “This is our territory and we have every right to use any means necessary, including the use of force, to evict them.”

( ) Tensions will grow – China won’t engage in unilateral restraint.



Sun ‘14

Yun Sun, Fellow with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center, “China’s New Calculations in the South China Sea” – June 10th – available via: http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/chinas-new-calculations-in-the-south-china-sea/


In recent months, China’s unilateral actions asserting its claims in the South China Sea (SCS) have driven regional tensions to a new high. China’s well-calculated moves are motivated by multiple internal and external factors. These include boosting President Xi Jinping’s prestige and authority for his domestic reform agenda, along with an assumption that the United States is extremely unlikely to intervene at this moment in time. Other than the overt actions to assert its claims in the SCS, official statements and legal studies analysis from within China also reflect a recalibrated determination to uphold the country’s controversial nine-dashed line in the South China Sea. From a Chinese perspective, the most transparent and direct explanation of China’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea is simple: China believes that its past unilateral restraint has done nothing to improve China’s position regarding SCS disputes and these inactions have in fact resulted in other claimant countries strengthening their presence and claims. Therefore, for China to improve its position in the current climate or for future negotiations, it must first change the status-quo through all available means necessary. China prefers to utilize civilian and paramilitary approaches but does not reject military coercion if required. An advantaged position and certain exclusive privilege in the South China Sea are both believed to be indispensable for China’s aspiration to become a “strong maritime power,” a “key task” stipulated by the 18th Party Congress in 2012 and a policy personally endorsed by Xi. While China’s aspirations for a “Blue Water Navy” and naval expansion face multiple choke points along its east coast from Japan down to the Philippines, the South China Sea is considered to offer China a much larger and less constrained maritime domain for naval maneuvers.


( ) Not-unique – conflict coming now because China perceives weak US deterrent.



Sun ‘14

Yun Sun, Fellow with the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center, “China’s New Calculations in the South China Sea” – June 10th – available via: http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/chinas-new-calculations-in-the-south-china-sea/


Last but not least, China is behaving assertively in the South China Sea because it believes it can. This assessment is not only based on China’s growing military capacity, which dwarfs the capabilities of perhaps all other Southeast Asian claimant countries combined, but also on a strong conviction in China that the United States will not use its hard power to counter Chinese actions. China has watched closely the US hesitation about military intervention in Syria, and also in Ukraine, and draws the conclusion that the Obama administration does not want to involve itself in a military conflict. It is further believed that there is no desire within the Obama administration for a foreign policy legacy that includes a conflict with China. Having said that, China does recognize the difference between Ukraine, which is not a member of NATO, and the Philippines, which is a US ally. However, when China seized control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, the United States did nothing. Furthermore, as Madame Fu Ying, Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, pointed out recently at the Shangri-La Dialogue, the dispute between China and Vietnam “has nothing to do with US.” The implied message is that Vietnam is not even a US ally and the likelihood of US military intervention on behalf on Vietnam is extremely remote, if not non-existent.

( ) Not an exaggeration – conflict is coming.



Denmark ‘14

Abraham M. Denmark is Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research. He previously served as Country Director for China Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Could Tensions in the South China Sea Spark a War?” – National Interest – May 31, 2014 – http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-tensions-the-south-china-sea-spark-war-10572


Similar incidents have played out in recent months between China and the Philippines. After China took effective control over the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, Beijing seemed to set its sights on the Second Thomas Shoal—a small land formation about 105 nautical miles from the Philippines but is claimed by both countries. To buttress its claim, the Philippines in 1999 intentionally beached the hospital ship Sierra Madre on the reef and has maintained a small crew on the beached craft ever since (see an exceptional piece about the sailors on the ship and the broader dispute by the New York Times here). Most recently, the Philippines arrested a group of Chinese fishermen found 70 miles from the Philippines near Half Moon Shoal with a ship filled with endangered (and valuable) turtles. To an outsider, all this hyperbole and saber rattling about small rocks, oil derricks, fishermen, and turtles must seem like much ado about nothing. Yet it is deadly seriousthese seemingly trivial issues are used as avatars for deadly serious questions about history, power, ambition, and national sovereignty. An examination of how countries see these issues and how they have behaved in the past provides a window for how they are likely to act in the future. It’s not a comforting thought. The common denominator in all of the South China Sea’s existing disputes is China. Beijing serves as the primary catalyst for tension and crisis in these disputes. Its declaration of a nine-dash line claim of sovereignty that covers almost the entire Sea is stunning in its ambition and audaciousness: in April, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Daniel Russel described the claim as lacking any “apparent basis under international law regarding the scope of the claim itself.” That’s because China has justified its claim by asserting its historical control over those waters, yet the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—which sets standards for defining territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and the land features that generate them—does not allow for claims based on history. Moreover, while various Chinese dynasties have at various times controlled various islands within the South China Sea, China has never controlled all of them at the same time.

Extension – Alliances successfully deter

Note to students: For this arg, I would also consider reading the Friese ’14 card on the next page. It is especially strong.



( ) Strengthening US alliances will successfully deter China.



Ratner ‘14

(et al; Dr. Ely Ratner Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security – “Roiling the Waters” – Foreign Policy – Jan-Feb – http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/21/roiling_the_waters)


Beyond America's traditional alliances in Northeast Asia, the Obama administration must demonstrate a concrete, long-lasting commitment to Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore in order to provide the United States with a more diversified set of partners and forward-operating locations in Asia, as well as broader political legitimacy. Beijing's planners worry about America's burgeoning military alliances and partnerships in Asia. Good. That means they'll be more reluctant to start a fight if doing so means China could end up facing a multitude of the region's powerhouses. The point, of course, is not to increase the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China. Rather, the goal is to cultivate real, long-term stability in Asia that doesn't give China a license to push, prod, and bully.

( ) Bolstered alliances deter Chinese aggression.



Ratner ‘14

Dr. Ely Ratner Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security – Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: “China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia: Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia and Oceania and Implications for the United States” – March 13th – http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Ratner_Testimony.pdf


Nevertheless, the United States should continue deepening its treaty alliances and security partnerships in Southeast Asia. This has the multiple benefits of enhancing U.S. military access and presence in the region, building partner capacity to support U.S. operations, and augmenting the capabilities of individual states to more independently defend their interests and deter Chinese coercion.

Alliances boost US presence and prevent war via deterrence.



Bong 10

Youngshik Daniel Bong, American University School of Int’l Service, Assistant Professor, Ph.D., Wellesley Post-doctoral fellow and Williams College Assistant Professor of Korean Studies, Autumn 2010, Korea Observer, 41.3: 471-495


Mindful of the growing gap between the capacity of the existing security arrangements and the arrival of new threats, some nonetheless suggest it might be possible for the San Francisco system to gradually evolve from a thick cord composed of complex bilateral strings into a set of building blocks for an overarching multilateral system. Sunghan Kim (2008), an expert on the U.S. Korean security alliance, argues that in the long run the San Francisco System may naturally evolve into a multilateral system. He indicates that some of the bilateral alliances, such as the U.S.-Korean alliance, have partially departed from the traditional raison-d’etre focused upon deterrence and transformed themselves into a more comprehensive alliance premised upon human security. Continued U.S. presence through a bilateral alliance network is essential for preventing great power competition between China and Japan from flaring up and the mistrust between these two countries from developing into open and violent rivalry. The practice of U.S.-Japan-China trilateral cooperation will make bilateralism and multilateralism compatible in the long run.

A-to “Alliance won’t moderate China” (Hiebert)

( ) Pivot strategy does moderate Chinese aggression



Friese ‘14

Christopher Freise, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Christopher Freise is a PhD candidate in the School of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne. In 2011 he was a RSIS-Macarthur visiting fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He also completed a research fellowship at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia in 2008 that primarily focused upon East Asian security architecture. His research interests include international security, East Asian regionalism and security architecture, the impact of domestic politics upon American foreign policy, American grand strategy, US-Indonesian relations, and Southeast Asian politics. Prior to his PhD candidature, Christopher worked in Washington, DC for the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. He has extensive teaching experience in a variety of subjects, including American politics, international security, and Asia-Pacific international politics at both the University of Melbourne and La Trobe University. He received a BA (with Honours) in History and American Politics from the University of Virginia – “CIAO Focus, May 2014: America's Pivot to the Far East” – obtained via CIAO, Columbia International Affairs Online database



Much attention has been devoted to the Obama Administration’s “Pacific Pivot” and the vocal reassertion of an upgraded security, economic, and diplomatic presence in East Asia by the United States. Commentators have ascribed various rationales to these efforts, including speculation that this is part of a “containment” strategy towards China, a reaction to the US presidential election cycle, or, more benignly, an effort to forestall concerns of American withdrawal from the region. These explanations have some elements of truth, but also fall short of fully describing or understanding the strategic rationale behind these moves. Significantly, these public steps to assert American power in Southeast Asia have been largely welcomed by, and come at the invitation of, Southeast Asian states. This does not suggest that these states support or are participating in a “containment” policy towards China, but rather that Southeast Asian states have actively sought to ensure a continued American security presence in the face of increasing Chinese assertiveness and aggressiveness over the South China Sea. The South China Sea has therefore become a bellwether in Southeast Asia for how a more powerful China would act. While responses have varied within ASEAN, the willingness of the United States to pursue successful diplomatic efforts through ASEAN - led venues like the East Asia Summit suggest that Chinese actions have resulted in the very thing Beijing has sought to avoid – an increasingly legitimatized American security presence within Southeast Asia. For the states of Southeast Asia, the attractiveness of the United States’ presence stems from a strategy of hedging or potential insurance should China act more aggressively in the future. While China retains important advantages in Southeast Asia, including proximity and the allure of continued economic growth, these also remain issues that elicit some concern amongst Southeast Asian states – particularly over the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) substantial budgetary and strategic expansion. Chinese leaders face difficult decisions over the South China Sea: unable to back off its initial claims due to nationalistic sentiment or to aggressively assert its military advantage over fellow claimants due to the (invited) security presence of the United States and undoubted backlash that would certainly occur, it is forced to pursue its claims in multilateral forums in which it is outnumbered, or attempt to pressure other claimants bilaterally, a tactic that may confirm fears many Southeast Asian states have about what form a “rising China ” may take in the future. China retains the most power over how the South China Sea situation will be resolved, but the present options available will likely force some compromise of China’s maximalist territorial claims within the Sea.


A-to “US Alliances means Vietnam and Others start war with China”




( ) Southeast Asia nations very unlikely to initiate a hot war with China.



Ratner ‘14

Dr. Ely Ratner Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security – Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission: “China and the Evolving Security Dynamics in East Asia: Security Dynamics in Southeast Asia and Oceania and Implications for the United States” – March 13th – http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Ratner_Testimony.pdf


Similarly, there is considerable uncertainty about the future implications of China’s rise. A number of countries are concerned about China’s pattern of assertiveness in recent years, which has included a willingness to use military and economic coercion to settle political disputes. At the same time, there are powerful factors limiting countries’ ability and willingness to stand up to this behavior. One obvious driver is the growing gap in military and maritime capability between China and individual Southeast Asia states. In addition, every country in the region counts China as its first or second leading trade partner, leaving governments appropriately worried about the economic implications of political or military tensions with Beijing. Compounding military disparities and economic interdependence is the geographic reality of China. Governments in the region frequently note that while U.S. attention to Southeast Asia has historically blown hot and cold over time, China will almost certainly retain outsized economic, cultural and political influence in the region. This means that engaging and working with China is more a necessity than a choice. The bottom line is that when it comes to matters of regional security, short of an armed conflict that dramatically reorients the security order in the region, the vast majority of states in Southeast Asia- -regardless of their relative concerns about the implications of China’s rise--are unlikely to assume a traditional balancing posture against China. Simply put, governments in the region do not want to have to choose between the United States and China. Instead, Southeast Asian countries are by and large pursuing a portfolio approach to enhance their security and hedge against prevailing uncertainties. This includes at once seeking stronger security ties with Washington, deepening relations with Beijing, building up their own independent military capabilities, developing security partnerships with other Asian countries, and looking to regional institutions and international law to manage disputes and temper great power competition.



Download 1.41 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   18   19   20   21   22   23   24   25   26




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2020
send message

    Main page