All their disads are non-unique – a Privatization’s inevitable internationally
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The private sector is way better Kosatka 14 – staff writer at Aviation Pros (Art Kosatka, 12/10/14, “Airport Screening Privatization Continues To Be A Better Option,” http://www.aviationpros.com/blog/12026516/airport-screening-privatization-continues-to-be-a-better-option)//twemchen In allowing privatization, Congress required the TSA Administrator to determine “that the approval (of private screening) would not compromise the security or detrimentally affect the cost-efficiency or the effectiveness of the screening of passengers or property at the airport.” In other words, TSA itself must agree that they do at least as good a job. TSA also continues to maintain overall regulatory responsibility, and the local TSA Federal Security Director provides oversight of the privatized operations, no matter who is running them. In brief, the privatization program was successfully piloted at five volunteer airports representing a full range of risk profiles, eventually expanded to the current 18 airports that prefer an approach of business over bureaucracy. Thirteen more airports have applied; one is in the application adjudication phase, two are in the source selection phase, and ten have discontinued commercial air service, so screening is no longer required there. The private screening employees are required to maintain precisely the same qualification criteria of Federal TSOs, receive no less pay than Federal TSOs, endure the same training and testing, and are subject to a proven business model of effective management rather than that of the government agency consistently rated by the annual Partnership for Public Service survey of its own employees, including screeners, as the worst place to work in government. SPP key Inserra 14 – staff writer at CNS News (David Inserra, 10/2/14, “19th Airport Tosses TSA for More Efficient Private Screening Program,” http://cnsnews.com/commentary/david-inserra/19th-airport-tosses-tsa-more-efficient-private-screening-program)//twemchen The main benefits of the SPP are enhanced productivity and lower costs, while maintaining equal or greater levels of security. How can this be? One major reason is that the private sector can be far more efficient and flexible in hiring and training employees than the government, reducing employee turnover, increasing productivity, and lowering personnel costs, even though salaries and benefits are identical to TSA agents. A study by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure found that taxpayers could save “$1 billion over five years if the Nation’s top 35 airports operated as efficiently as [San Francisco International Airport] does under the SPP model.” With TSA managers still overseeing screening operations at SPP airports, security is not endangered. In fact, when the workforce is better managed under the SPP, other benefits, including better security and better customer service, naturally follow. The TSA, however, has been loath to get out of frontline screening. The TSA started rejecting all requests for SPP expansion in 2011 until Congress acted in 2012 to reverse the TSA. The TSA has been slow to approve SPP requests as it has held that the SPP is actually more expensive, even though various government and nongovernment studies have criticized its findings. As SFB joins the list of SPP-administered airports, the TSA should do more to get out of the personnel management game and return its focus to overseeing security at U.S. airports. The existing SPP framework should be reformed to allow more airports to easily join SPP and to choose their own contractors from a list of TSA-approved screeners. The SPP offers better, more efficient, and friendlier screening for less money. SFB and 18 other airports are reaping these benefits—isn’t it about time the SPP came to the airport nearest you? 2ac – terrorism – i/l – trick The plan’s changes are impermanent – SPP rollback is eventually inevitable – but doing the plan in the interim allows the TSA to learn valuable lessons from the private sector which makes overall security more efficient Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen TSA officials provided a power point presentation to Committee staff from January 5, 2011, providing a recommendation to Administrator Pistole to completely eliminate the SPP. They intended to do this by renewing contracts at the existing 16 SPP airports for one year, refusing any future applications, and setting up a timeline to federalize the SPP airports. TSA, Screening Partnership Program, Power Point Presentation (Jan. 5, 2011) [hereinafter TSA SPP Power Point]. The following 16 U.S. airports participate in the SPP: San Francisco International Airport (SFO), Sioux Falls Regional Airport (FSD), Tupelo Regional Airport (TUP), Charles M. Schultz Sonoma County Airport (STS), Sidney-Richland Municipal Airport (SDY), Dawson Community Airport (GDV), Wokal Field/Glasgow International Airport (GGW), Havre City-County Airport (HVR), L. M. Clayton Airport (OLF), Lewiston Municipal Airport (LWT), Miles City Airport (MLS), Key West International Airport (EYW), Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Greater Rochester International Airport (ROC), Roswell International Air Center (ROW), and Jackson Hole Airport (JAC). 2ac – terrorism – i/l – xt: innovation Poole 6/4 – Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the Reason Foundation (Robert Poole, 6/4/15, “Airport Policy and Security Newsletter #106,” http://reason.org/news/show/airport-policy-security-news-106#e)//twemchen The results of recent DHS Inspector General "Red Team" testing of passenger checkpoints were so bad that DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson dumped TSA's Acting Administrator and called for major revisions in screening operating procedures. Because the IG report apparently reveals major vulnerabilities in current operations, it's understandable that it remains classified. But with checkpoint screeners having failed 67 of 70 tests, Congress's Homeland Security Committees need to ask some very hard questions of DHS and TSA in coming months. We should have seen this coming, based on previous reports from the DHS Office of Inspector General. Last September it released a one-page "Spotlight" report—basically an unclassified summary of a report called "Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations." (OIG-14-142, September 2014) It reports on Red Team operations at an undisclosed number of airports not at passenger checkpoints but on checked baggage screening operations. The summary states, "We identified vulnerabilities in this area caused by human and technology-based failures. We also determined that TSA does not have a process in place to assess or identify the cause for equipment-based test failures or the capability to independently assess whether deployed explosive detection systems are operating at the correct detection standards." It also reports that having spent $540 million for checked baggage screening equipment since 2009, "Despite that investment, TSA has not improved checked baggage screening since our last report in 2009." A more detailed report on all airport screening equipment—passenger and checked baggage—came out just last month, titled "The Transportation Security Administration Does Not Properly Manage Its Airport Screening Maintenance Program." (OIG-15-86, May 6, 2015) It found that "Because TSA does not adequately oversee equipment maintenance, it cannot be assured that routine preventive maintenance is performed or that equipment is repaired and ready for operational use." This report also cites a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report from July 2006 (GAO-06-795) which found that TSA "did not have policies and procedures requiring documentation for the review of contractor-submitted performance data," nor did it have "reasonable assurance that contractors were performing as required." That was nine years ago. The May 6th DHS report finds that today "Neither GAO nor TSA could provide documentation and details about the actions taken [or not]" in response to those 2006 findings. In other words, one possible cause of at least some of the failures documented by the DHS OIG Red Teams on baggage screening (last fall) and passenger checkpoint screening (this spring) is that some of the expensive body scanners and EDS machines may not be working properly—and the screeners operating them have no way to know this. Another probable cause, of course, is that managing checkpoints and EDS machines hour after hour, day after day, is incredibly boring, especially when screeners virtually never catch anyone with malicious intent, which might keep their interest level high. DHS Inspector General John Roth told the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on May 15th that screeners "spend long hours performing tedious tasks that require constant vigilance," but his Red Teams "repeatedly found that human error—often a simple failure to follow protocol—poses significant vulnerabilities." Long-time TSA critic Rep. John Mica (R, FL) said, "This [Red Team] report is an indictment of the failure of the TSA. Not just in one area, but in almost every area of their functions." Though invited, TSA did not send a witness to that hearing. Thanks to the diligent work of GAO and the DHS Inspector General, we know there are serious management failures at TSA. Recommendations get made, especially after bursts of negative publicity, but nothing much seems to change. This looks to me like a classic example of low-performance bureaucracy at work, gradually expanding its functions (scope creep) while failing to be accountable for results. It also reflects the conflict built into TSA from the outset: it is both the aviation security regulator and the provider of a large portion of airport security services. A long-proven remedy for this kind of government failure is competitive contracting. When a properly qualified company is selected to perform certain tasks, if it fails to perform adequately, the ultimate remedy is to cancel the contract. Airports already have the right, by the terms of the 2001 Aviation & Transportation Security Act that created TSA, to opt out of TSA-provided passenger and baggage screening, replacing it with TSA-approved security contractors. But until now, fewer than two dozen airports have done so. 2ac – terrorism – i/l – xt: security gap Solves the security gap – that causes terrorism Poole 14 – Searle Freedom Trust Transportation Fellow and Director of Transportation Policy at the Reason Foundation (Robert Poole, 4/7/14, “Airport Policy and Security Newsletter #99,” http://reason.org/news/show/airport-policy-and-security-news-99#e)//twemchen In the aftermath of November's shooting attack at LAX that killed a TSA screener, the screeners' union (American Federation of Government Employees) called for creating a new category of armed screeners. But after it consulted with a large array of aviation stakeholders, TSA has rejected that proposal. Instead, its March 26th report made 14 recommendations to more effectively deal with the threat of "active shooters" at airports. In particular, it called for armed law enforcement officers (local police or airport police, if an airport has them) covering security checkpoints during peak periods. Other recommendations include mandatory screener training and exercises to prepare them for the active-shooter threat, ensuring that all TSA wireless devices are programmed with the airport's emergency number(s), weekly testing of panic alarms at airports (and more alarms where warranted), plus linking the panic alarms to airport security cameras, to guide first responders to the location of a shooting threat. The LAX shooting raised a number of examples of poor coordination between the TSA screening operation and the rest of the airport's security systems. Not having panic alarms linked to the airport-run closed-circuit TV system is one example; another is the failure of 911 calls at LAX to be routed directly to airport police. These are examples of the lack of integration of airport security as it is currently organized. Thanks to Congress in 2001 giving TSA the primary role of checkpoint and baggage screening, it operates as a separate presence at each airport. All the rest of airport security—access to sterile areas, perimeter protection, lobby security, etc.—is the airport's responsibility. To be sure, TSA has a (proper) regulatory role over those non-TSA aspects of the airport's security. But this kind of divided operation is inherently suboptimal, compared with the kind of integrated security that is typical of European airports. The fundamental flaw, as I have pointed out in congressional testimony and in this newsletter, is that TSA was created with the dual roles of aviation security regulator and airport screening provider. That creates a conflict of interest in that when it comes to baggage and passenger screening, TSA regulates itself. But it also creates divided security responsibilities at the airport, when unified security would almost certainly be more secure. Hence, if and when Congress ever decides to get serious about devolving the screening function to airports (letting them perform it with either their own TSA-approved staff or purchase it from a TSA-approved screening firm), they would not only be removing TSA's conflict of interest; they would also be promoting unified security at each airport. 2ac – terrorism – i/l – at: regs turn There are no regs now Elliott 15 – staff writer at the Washington Post (Christopher Elliot, 6/4/15, “Is Washington ignoring air travelers?,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/is-washington-ignoring-air-travelers/2015/06/04/fd881a6e-0555-11e5-8bda-c7b4e9a8f7ac_story.html)//twemchen Perhaps that’s why travelers seem underwhelmed. When arguably the most powerful travel committee in Washington answers a question about its achievements with “tap, don’t talk,” can consumers be forgiven for feeling as though Washington doesn’t care? Instead of dealing with issues that really matter to travelers, legislators are nibbling around the edges, passing bills that make no noticeable difference to the average air traveler. Sally Greenberg, the executive director of the National Consumers League, sees it as a massive, system-wide failure. “There’s no regulation or oversight of the airline industry,” she says. “The Department of Transportation is a paper tiger. There have been no congressional hearings or oversight for the past five years.” Centralization’s worse for regs Ervin 4 – Inspector General of Homeland Security (Clark Kent Ervin, 4/22/4, “ HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT SCREENER PRIVATIZATION,” Aviation Subcommittee, Lexis)//twemchen When contractors and local TSA officials needed decisions and/or direction, they often had difficulty getting headquarters officials to respond. Some local TSA and contractor officials found it easier to make their own decisions rather than seeking headquarters approval or guidance, leading to inconsistencies among pilot airport program management and, thereby, making comparisons between the federal workforce and the contractor workforce even harder to make. In conclusion, OIG believes that, in theory, pilot programs can be a useful tool in exploring program innovations and improvements, but, in this instance, TSA must develop meaningful performance measures and standards so that overall performance and the effects of new improvements can be measured and assessed, and contractors must be given the flexibility to determine what works best for their own situation. 2ac – terrorism – i/l – at: costs more Costs less Trainor 12 – staff writer at the Montana Standard (Tim Trainor, 9/2/12, “Airport may use private screeners,” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, Lexis)//twemchen If a qualified company submits an under-budget bid, a contract may be awarded and the company could begin. Shea said it's possible the new contract will save the airport money as well. They’re completely wrong Edwards 13 – Director of Tax Policy Studies at Cato (Chris Edwards, 11/19/13, “Privatizing the Transportation Security Administration,” No. 742, Lexis)//twemchen TSA had argued that private screeners are more expensive than federal screeners, but the GAO found that claim to be incorrect.124 Indeed, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure released a report in 2011, which found that expanding the SPP program would generate savings.125 It found that the private screeners at the San Francisco airport were 65 percent more efficient than the federal screeners at the Los Angeles airport. The SFO screening operations also had lower employee attrition rates than LAX, leading to reduced costs from recruitment and training. Federal rules require that private screeners be trained to the same standards as federal screeners, but even with that restriction SFO was able to achieve those standards at lower training costs than TSA screeners.126 2ac – terrorism – i/l – morale magnifier Framing issue – even if each internal link isn’t sufficient, its failures ensure a proliferation of bad press, destroying morale and making security terminally ineffective Elliott 10 – staff writer at Elliott.org citing TSA officer Ron Moore (Christopher Elliott, 12/4/10, “Ex-TSA officer: “Every new controversy breaks down morale further”,” http://elliott.org/first-person/ex-tsa-officer-every-new-controversy-breaks-down-morale-further/)//twemchen Not a day goes by when someone isn’t upset over something and Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) feel caught in the middle. They cringe when a TSO does a poor job and realize it reflects on everyone. Pat-downs are not comfortable for the TSO but there is a very specific right way to do the job and TSA’s staffing problems mean less training and preparation. It should be noted that there are two kinds of passengers: experienced and inexperienced. When a passenger who flies rarely comes in loaded for bear, thanks to media reports they are quick to complain although too often they complain to others after the fact not on the checkpoint. Some TSA agents have reportedly spoken out about the new security procedures. Does this reflect what your former colleagues are telling you? No. I will say that a TSO can screen a thousand passengers and the five who are disrespectful stick with you. Those who disrespect TSOs would likely make comments regardless. This media narrative just gives them the new script. This is nothing new in terms of morale. How is morale? Morale is extremely low and turnover is extremely high simply because TSOs enforce very strict rules yet work in a workplace with virtually no rules or rights. That may sound like union talk, but TSOs are treated as if they are in the military and have to follow orders even for things such as going to the bathroom. Every new controversy breaks down morale further since TSOs can’t escape the media reports while off duty. By the way, I hear from TSOs nationwide not just BWI. I want to make that point clear so those who were close colleagues are not singled out as sources and face retaliation by TSA management. 1ar – terrorism – i/l – at: costs more We’re cheaper – best ev Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 11 – Prepared for Chairman John L. Mica (CTI, 6/3/11, “Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Oversight and Investigations Staff Reform; TSA Ignores More Cost-Effective Screening Model,” http://www.aaae.org/?e=showFile&l=XQVIPZ)//twemchen The Committee conducted a cost analysis of screening costs at LAX under the Federal structure and the SPP structure, using efficiencies at SFO as the model for SPP savings (See Appendix 2). If LAX operated as efficiently as SFO, then 867 screener FTEs could be cut from the LAX Screener Allocation Model. Committee staff did not conduct an analysis of the performance of screening operations at SPP and non-SPP airports in this study, however the Committee did request that GAO conduct a performance analysis of operations at SPP and non-SPP airports (see Appendix 8).34 Analyses to-date, however, have found that private screeners perform at a level equal to or greater than TSOs. We’ll insert this table into the debate –
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