All their disads are non-unique – a Privatization’s inevitable internationally
Download 1.61 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Privatization is key—TSA empirically fails at organizing efficient airport surveillance
| --AFFIRMATIVE--
***CASE ***1AC 1ac – no disads All their disads are non-unique –a) Privatization’s inevitable internationallyEdwards 13 – Director of Tax Policy Studies at Cato (Chris Edwards, 11/19/13, “Privatizing the Transportation Security Administration,” No. 742, Lexis)//twemchen Many other countries have privatized their airport security screening.132 More than 80 percent of Europe’s commercial airports use private screening companies, including those in Britain, France, Germany, and Spain.133 The other airports in Europe use their own in-house security, but no major country in Europe uses the national government’s aviation bureaucracy for screening.134 Europe’s airports moved to private contracting during the 1980s and 1990s after numerous hijackings and terrorist threats, and it has worked very well.135 Canada also uses private screening companies at its commercial airports, and some airports also use private firms for general airport security. After 9/11, the government created the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, which oversees screening at the country’s 89 commercial airports.136 But the screening itself is carried out by three expert private firms—G4S, Garda, and Securitas— which are each responsible for a group of particular Canadian airports. Aviation security firms have developed a great deal of expertise over the decades. They have responded to the demands of their clients, and they apply the best practices they have learned across the airports they serve. Private businesses make mistakes, but unlike government bureaucracies they are more likely to improve their performance over time, particularly in a competitive contracting environment. Many countries have embraced privatization not only for airport security, but also for other parts of their aviation systems.137 Dozens of countries have privatized major airports, and some have privatized their air traffic control systems. Canada, for example, privatized its system in 1996, setting it up as a nonprofit corporation, Nav Canada.138 That reform has been a big success, with Nav Canada running one of the safest air traffic control systems in the world and winning awards for its top performance.139 Canada also privatized its 26 largest airports in the 1990s.140 In many ways, the United States has become a laggard in commercial aviation. Numerous other nations have privatized their airports, air traffic control, and aspects of their aviation security. American policymakers should study those reforms and pursue such innovations here. Privatization offers a viable alternative to America’s often mismanaged and inefficient government aviation infrastructure. With regard to aviation security, the federal government has an important role to play. But its near-monopoly over airport screening has resulted in it getting “bogged down in managing its bloated federal workforce,” as one congressional report concluded.141 Operating the vast passenger and baggage screening system takes the government’s focus away from proper federal activities such as terrorism intelligence and analysis. b) It’s inevitable in the US – and increases are comingTrainor 12 – staff writer at the Montana Standard (Tim Trainor, 9/2/12, “Airport may use private screeners,” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, Lexis)//twemchen Sixteen U.S. airports use private screeners, including nine in Montana. Airports in West Yellowstone and Kalispell will soon be added to the list. Shea said more could soon be lining up to join the program. "What I think we'll see is the process go forward, more and more airports will become privatized," he said. "It's better for airport and more and more will want to apply." 1ac – plan The United States federal judiciary should substantially curtail the TSA’s authority to conduct domestic surveillance of airports covered by the TSA’s Screening Partnership Program on the grounds that such oversight constitutes an improper search and/or seizure under the fourth amendment.The United States federal government should substantially curtail the TSA’s authority to conduct domestic surveillance of airports covered by the TSA’s Screening Partnership Program.The United States federal government should substantially curtail the TSA’s authority to conduct domestic airport surveillance commensurate with the conferral of this authority to local airport management.1ac – solvency Privatization is key—TSA empirically fails at organizing efficient airport surveillanceErvin 4 – Inspector General of Homeland Security (Clark Kent Ervin, 4/22/4, “HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE: SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION HOLDS A HEARING ON AIRPORT SCREENER PRIVATIZATION,” Aviation Subcommittee, Lexis)//twemchen Based on our own work on this matter, the Office of Inspector General found that there is not a sufficient basis at this time to determine conclusively whether the pilot airport screeners performed at a level equal to or greater than that of federal screeners. TSA needs to develop measurable criteria to evaluate both contractor and federal screeners properly. Available data from limited covert testing suggests that they performed about the same, which is to say equally poorly, but the apparent consistency in performance was not unexpected considering the extraordinary degree of TSA involvement in screening, hiring, deploying, training, and promoting pilot screeners. TSA's tight controls over the pilot program restricted flexibility and innovation that the contractors might have implemented to perform at a level exceeding that of the federal workforce. For example, the inability to hire screeners independently left pilot program contractors totally dependent on TSA to obtain their initial workforce and to fill any vacancies caused by attrition or to meet peak period needs during the first year of the contract. As a consequence, the pilot program contractors said that they could not effectively and immediately address problems with high attrition levels, understaffing, excessive overtime, and employee morale. The staffing shortage at the Kansas City Airport, for example, was so severe that to meet the minimum staffing requirements and to ensure airport screening security, TSA temporarily deployed 68 federal screeners to two passenger checkpoints and three baggage-screening areas. The federal screeners were deployed to the Kansas City Airport for two months, costing TSA over $1 million. Applicant screening was also a problem. Covenant prescreened all the applicants prior to sending them to the TSA assessment center to increase the likelihood that TSA would agree that the prescreened applicants were qualified. However, only 31 percent of the prescreened applicants passed the TSA's assessment process, and that was about the same percentage as passed the TSA assessment center who were not prescreened. The contractor had to wait for future TSA-initiated assessment centers to be set up before it could attempt to fill the remaining vacant positions, and TSA refused to share its assessment criteria with the contractors so that future contractor prescreening could increase the likelihood of the pass rate. The pilot program contractors were also restricted in the overall number of screeners that they could hire and in how screeners were trained. For example, although the TSA pilot contract award press release and the pilot program contract stated a requirement for baggage screening, TSA did not include authorizations for baggage screeners in the initial hiring or staffing level. To attain staffing flexibility, pilot program contractors, with approval from local TSA, did cross-train passenger screeners in checked baggage screening on their own. TSA's management oversight of the pilot program was generally decentralized, and program and operational issues had to be routed through numerous divisions within TSA in order to be researched, discussed, and then finally approved. When contractors and local TSA officials needed decisions and/or direction, they often had difficulty getting headquarters officials to respond. Some local TSA and contractor officials found it easier to make their own decisions rather than seeking headquarters approval or guidance, leading to inconsistencies among pilot airport program management and, thereby, making comparisons between the federal workforce and the contractor workforce even harder to make. In conclusion, OIG believes that, in theory, pilot programs can be a useful tool in exploring program innovations and improvements, but, in this instance, TSA must develop meaningful performance measures and standards so that overall performance and the effects of new improvements can be measured and assessed, and contractors must be given the flexibility to determine what works best for their own situation. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.61 Mb. Share with your friends:
|