An Bord Pleanála


Questions by Ryanair to DAA



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Questions by Ryanair to DAA

Mr. Hayden for Ryanair stated that the present involvement of Ryanair in the hearing was without prejudice to the fact that the information requested by them was not provided by the DAA.


Gateway 1 and 2 were specifically identified in the documents and it was clear that the planning authority did have access to these. Also in the Annex 2 of the P&W study though not submitted with the application, was referred to in the LAP.
Basis upon which the capacity justification for T2 is driven was based on information from airlines, which was specifically excluded. He referred to letter from Tiros, stating that some sections were removed.
In examining the methodology upon which scheduling and predictions made regarding capacity they needed that information.
Also in the 06 forecasting report, schedule for 2005 was not included although it was provided for 2000-2004, and for 2006. Everywhere he went to objectively identify the basis upon which the numbers were driven forward for capacity were not provided.
The Board was being asked to adjudicate in the dark. There was a fundamental flaw in the process. He wanted note it before proceeding further with his questions.
Mr. O’Donnell stated that as much document as possible was being provided, with the exception of those given to the DAA in confidence.
Ms. Coveney explained that in the reason why there was no 2005 entry in PDFA2006 was because it was not finalised in 2005, and was simply moved into 2006. There was nothing missing. The figures contained in the EIS and in DAPF06 were identical, ad same figures were used for forecast.
In response to questions in relation to various items on the graphs Ms. Weston stated that the graph was generated using information provided by ACL (airport coordination Ltd). Same source used by Ms. Congdon. She did not have specific access to information regarding how much of it was Aer Lingus. That could be requested if necessary, from the company.
In relation to a number of questions as whether the orange in the graph showed excess capacity in T1 she responded that the graph was about demand not capacity, and that one was a demand graph while the other was a forecast graph.
In response to the question as to how much of the purple demand in T1 created the demand for T2, she stated that the forecasting was not based on that. In response to the question as the T2 peak starting at 7 o’clock did not justify capacity at T2 she said there was no causal relationship.
In response to question by Ms. Lawton regarding prohibition of night time flights extending to 7 am she stated that one of the scenarios they looked at was a curfew for T2. Mr. O’ Connell stated that this was a theoretical basis for creation of the model for demand forecasting.
There were further explanation of where the figure of 4200 came from, regarding peak hour between 615 and 715 at 15 minute intervals and the buffer between each slot.
In response to request by Mr. Hayden to provide busy day schedules, Ms. Coveney stated that they had extensive consultations with airlines about their future plans, and revealing of information received in confidence was not appropriate. Revealing full schedule of T2 would reveal explicitly the plans of Aer Lingus as it would be the main user. They were asked by Aer Lingus not to do so. Mr. Hayden insisted that he was entitled to busy day schedule the basis on which 92,000m2 development at T2 was justified.
Mr. O’Donnell stated that busy day schedule was not the basis, but was one of considerations.
Following further difference of opinion as to whether Aer Lingus was going to purchase extra aircraft, Mr. Hayden suggested the information be provided to the inspector only. The inspector advised that any information she received would have to be made available to the parties.
In response to suggestion by Mr. Hayden that the inspector engage an aviation expert to interpret the numbers, the inspector stated that the inspector and the Board would have regard to the views of both sides in their deliberations.

Mr. O’Donnell distributed a copy of the document entitled ‘Independent Verifiers Report’, (exhibit G-18/04/07) which he stated was commissioned by the minister for transport and reading from page 3 of the said report stated that the report had verified that the methodology used was appropriate. In Mr. Hayden’s view the report was an assessment of delivering a terminal with pre-determined capacity, and was assuming the need was there.


The response to Mr. Hayden regarding source of information relating to airports at Athens, Lisbon (rebuttal by ms. Weston) Paul Willis of ARUP had worked at projects for Lisbon and Athens. Mr. Hayden requested the raw data and stated that the graph showed Manchester to have value of 0.002 while their figure of 0.004 would have brought it more inline with the graph.
There were explanations of the concepts busy hour and peak hour. The former was based on historical data (listing of all days in a year in a descending order in terms of passenger numbers and choosing the value at 95%). The other definition involved use of peak hour on the day when Rider Cup was held, while busy day was a busy day without any external driver. The hearing agreed to use the term busy hour to prevent confusion.
In relation to the question regarding discrepancy between EIS and the response document of Ms Weston 12.4mppa vs.11.4mppa, Ms. Weston responded that her figure of 11.4 was arrived using today’s conditions and market share to make a direct projection to 2013 (27.7 x 45%) to demonstrate how the figures of 46-52mppa given by Ms. Congdon was inconceivable. The projection methods used in s. 2.2.4.5 of the EIS were much more sophisticated.
There were further discussion relating to the second graph of Ms. Weston’s response paper, and in particular the accuracy of the figures arrived, whether the inverse of the formula was used, and whether the correct number was indicated after division of the figure 4200 by 11.4mppa annual capacity.
The next day M. O’Donnell announced that the documents required (capacity, benchmarking, DAPFo6/01, rebuttal evidence by R. Weston) were made available on the table for third parties. Those could be photocopied were also provided to the parties. In response to query from the inspector he sated the studies such as car parking and planning history indicated on map would also be made available.

Also provided was a copy of Draft Gateway 2 (exhibit F-18/04/07)


Further rebuttal papers were prepared by both parties overnight.


Ryanair continuing

Mr. Hayden stated that the benchmarking papers did not provide the information requested. The source of the information was not provided for verification. Gateway 1 and 3 were not provided.


It seemed to be based on absolute wish list of Aer Lingus but even then they were not able to verify, because they were not given the source information. He also argued that Boyd report (Verifier’s report) did not rely on Gateway 2 or 3, and did not verify how they got to 4200.
Ms. Congdon stated that based on the shortage of information they decided to use other airports as benchmark to see if the 4200 figure was plausible, sensible and realistic. The information regarding the airports they used was verifiable, while they could not do so regarding information about the other airports which were presented in the rebuttal paper as being more comparable to Dublin.
There was a long discussion regarding methodology used in arriving the critical figure of 4200. Ms. Weston explained how they would reach their figure. This was the approach used in the EIS. The graphs (which were based on Ms. Congdon’s paper) were omitted but the 5 main points remained the same.
The main argument put forward by Ryanair was that as they did not have access to the information used by DAA (Gateway 1, 2, 3 ) they had used other airports as benchmarking to indicate DAA figure was not realistic. In particular elements of Gateway 2 (chapters 2 and 3, parts of chapter 8, and index) were not provided. They maintained that their own figures were verifiable.
Ms. Weston explained that they did not develop a methodology using benchmarking. Such an approach was not seen elsewhere. They had instead used the local data which was more relevant based on demand at the local airport. Secondly they would not use the airports used by Ms. Congdon.
She stated the far column in the submitted paper did in fact provided the source of the information regarding those airports (Athens, Lisbon etc)
In response to the question by the inspector whether there was an agreement on the methodology (by the two experts), and whether the same figure would be reached, if an agreed methodology was used, Ms. Congdon stated that while they could use the same methodology based on design day time table, they would also ‘sense-check’ the figure using other airports as benchmark to see if the figure was realistic, sensible and economic, and to challenge the assumptions. There was no evidence if such a sense-check was used.
In response to query from the inspector, Ms. Congdon stated that while they could not provide a figure because they did not have access to source information, they could state that if 4200 was used as a basis, it would lead to a grossly oversized terminal for the throughput of passengers.
At the invitation of Mr. O’Donnell, Mr. Foley stated that in meeting its obligations to provide appropriate facilities to meet the future needs of Dublin Airport they used the most robust methods. They and their consultants ARUP had shown great diligence in their work. The project was conceived in the aftermath of the AAP, and because a number of parties were involved the state had required an independent verification of the process to check if it demonstratably met the needs in a cost-effective way. The Verifiers had direct contact with ARUP without any involvement by DAA which was kept at arms length, at the end of which DAA was advised that the Government was supporting the project. At the request of the DAA the Government had agreed to make the report public.
He referred to S.6.2.2 of the report and in response to question by Mr. Hayden confirmed that the authors of the verifier’s report had access to all the confidential information. They had access to all pertinent information including Gateway 1, 2 and 3.
In response to Mr. Hayden’s suggestion that Boyd was a construction company, with no aviation expertise, and that they were given 4200 as a requirement, to assess whether it was good value for money from construction point of view, Mr. Foley stated that Boydcreetsweet (Writers of the Verifier’s report) had access to aviation and architectural expertise. He noted that the conclusion in page 4 had referred to Gateway 3.
He categorically stated that the brief included evaluation of the full proposition, including user consultation, the process that led to the sizing of the terminal , efficiency, and construction costs. To infer that their brief was merely validating a predetermined sized terminal was not correct.
In response to the question from Mr. Hayden he repeated that the T1 design capacity was 10-15 million. As a result of Government decision to examine alternative models for funding of transport, they could not proceed with their 2003 T2 proposal. Instead they were forced to introduce ongoing, interim, quasi-emergency measures, to alleviate the congestion. The current 22 million processing capacity was not an appropriate or acceptable level, and they intended to return to 15 million following completion of T2. Their aim was to provide a two-terminal system with 15 million capacity each.
Mr. Hayden stated that they did not object to another terminal. It was yes to another terminal but no to the proposed 92,000m2 capacity.
In response to the query from the inspector Mr Foley stated that the Pier D had no impact on the processing capacity.
Mr. Hayden first asked what the operating capacity of T1 was then draw attention to reference (s.8.9) that the residual operating capacity of T1 was 20 million plus. Also the 1999 annual report had stated that with 6 bay terminal extension and pier D the capacity would increase to 20million.
Mr. Foley stated that there has been significant changes in the nature of business, since 1999. There has been changes to the aircraft type from 120 passenger aircraft to 189 passenger aircraft ( 50 % increase in aircraft size), which necessitating increased processing capacity. Also there has been significant changes in security requirements (liquids etc). They had to remove a number of existing retail units to allow processing. The predicted 20 million capacity was not the same.
In response to reference in Gateway 2 for residual operating capacity of 20million in T1, Ms. Westin explained that it was under the heading of alternative airline assignments and was one of the scenarios they looked at to ensure a robust analysis. What they were aiming at was a 32 million overall capacity in 2018 with 15million in T2.
Mr. Foley was happy that Ryanair agreed there was need for another terminal. The size of the terminal had to be decided on the basis of at least one of the airlines operating from that terminal, to make it viable. They also had to provide an appropriate level of service. Operating capacity of T1 was not relevant in this context.


Questions to planning authority


At the invitation of the inspector to express the planning authority’s position on the capacity issue, Sean O' Faircheallaigh (FCC) said crucial for them was the passenger numbers and not so much the size of the terminal. He stated that the reference to 30 million in S. 4.2 of the LAP was an approximate figure. There was no cap in the objectives. They would have included a cap if they wished so. Their main thinking was the overall development of the airport campus and balanced distribution of development within the campus. Two runway system would bring the overall capacity to 60 milllion. Their main consideration was to ensure the development of the eastern campus did not compromise the development of the western campus. Within this 30 million was very much a broad perspective.


In response to the query from the inspector as to whether the figure of 30 million arose from carrying capacity of the existing environment and constraints, he said no, it had nothing to do with the environmental constraints or transport /traffic considerations.
Their overall vision was to ensure the airport realised its full potential and that the development would move into the western campus following reaching capacity in the eastern campus.
In response to question by the inspector in relation to reason behind condition number 28 Rachel Kenny for the planning authority stated that it was put to ensure the development accorded with the LAP. It was also considered that it was a reasonable figure to stimulate and ensure movement into western campus. They were working on consultations to stimulate development on the western campus, and to start receiving detailed proposals for development in the western campus.


Further questions by Ryanair

There were further discussions and disagreements as to whether the on going developments at T1 (area 14, pier D, portcabin area, removal of bank and retail) etc would bring T1 to acceptable level of service. DAA maintained to the contrary, while Ryanair maintained that in the CIP report this was presented as bringing the capacity in T1 to 20 million plus.


Mr. Hayden referring to the earlier statement that Dublin Airport had two major airlines and the remaining 23% was not adequate to fill a terminal, stated that as part of moving Aer Lingus into the new terminal and the one world alliance which Aer Lingus belongs, the DAA was replicating facilities such as pre clearance into the new terminal. These already existed in T1 and had DAA considered building a low cost terminal and move Ryanair out of T1 and into the new terminal there would be no necessity for duplication of services, and demolition of Corballis House to make way for the large building. Moving Ryanair out of T1 would free 40% of the capacity in T1 and allow DAA to provide a level of service they consider adequate.
Mr. Lamond referring to the capacity enhancement report stated that option B specifically looked at a northern location for a low cost carrier, but there were fundamental problems in terms of surface access and necessity to demolish a number of hangars. A location adjacent to pier D as suggested by Ryanair would necessitate development within the curtilage of OCTB. It also had insufficient kerb side. All the traffic would have to go in front of T1. In contrast at a southern location they could dramatically improve traffic situation.
In response to question from Mr. Hayden, Mr. Foley stated that the road access from Naul road (indicated on the LAP) was reserved as part of securing in the long term, access to the western campus at the eastern most point. The PM/ SOM study had concluded that in order to overcome the access and traffic difficulties, the terminal building must be pushed further east from OCTB, and the result would be a terminal too far away form public transport (Metro and GCT) located at the heart of the campus. It would also lead to a situation where two terminals operated in complete independence from each other rather than in unison.
Ms. Weston stated that each terminal whether low cost or not still had to provide immigration facilities (those from outside Europe were required to go through immigration while travelling in Europe).
The main driver for location of pre-clearance for US immigration in T2 was because the existing in T1 did not comply with US regulations.
In response to the question from Mr. Hayden if they considered a low cost option in a southern location Mr. Lamond stated that the balance of wide body stands was towards south while narrow bodied aircrafts was to north. It was therefore better to provide a terminal which would accommodate airlines such as intercontinental with wide bodied aircraft. Aer Lingus with mixed bodied aircraft in the southern section was a better option.

Questions to Mr. Evans

(He needed to leave the hearing shortly)


Mr. Sweetman referring to paragraph 2.1 of Mr. Evans’s report asked if he considered an additional airport to the south west. Yes it was considered and explained in the second bullet as a single runway serving GDA. The precise boundaries of GDA were not determined. No he had not looked at Portarlington. Yea availability of land was one of the considerations but commercial viability of the airport was more important.
In response to question form Mr. Swetman he stated that environmental considerations were hazard, noise, coast line, and areas of special scientific interest or their Irish equivalent. In response to question by Mr. Sweetman as to what were the environmental considerations in the case of large Bord Na Mona owned midlands bog adjacent to railway, he said information was provided for reasons of completeness, an concept of another airport was not considered.
Mr. Byrne concentrated on the term ‘preferable’ and asked whether the proposed development was preferable in the NSS context which aimed at moving development away from the over developed eastern seaboard. Was decentralisation a consideration and what criteria they had used in singling out one aspect of the Government policy that is importance of Dublin Airport for the Irish economy. He stated that if this preferable to the DAA which is a commercial organisation. Scott Wilson report was limited to what is best for the DAA. In the runway appeal they were told the brief was for another runway. In this case the brief was for another terminal. There was no real consideration of an alternative airport. The key driver was the ownership of land rather than a serious assessment of where in the country it is best to locate an airport. There was no macro level objective assessment of where the airport should be located in the country. There was no Government policy regarding aviation infrastructure. The AAP was a knee jerk reaction, it was not a policy.
There was discussion regarding the percentage of passengers originating in the GDA, whether 80% was from GDA or whether 70% from outside Dublin City and County. The Scott Wilson Report of 2004 had identified 79% of the passengers closer to Dublin Airport than any other airport.
In response to question from the inspector as to how they examined accessibility Mr. Evans said it was map based. Proximity to existing infrastructure was weighted against other criteria on map basis.


Ryanair continuing questions

In response to question from Mr. Hayden, Mr. Moran referred to the three options considered in the terminals and Piers Study for future scenarios, as accelerated short-haul growth, accelerated long-haul growth and retention of existing mix of short and long haul. Within each option there were three more options. The eastern campus was the preferred option for the ultimate growth of 30million and beyond. After 30 million any further development ought to go west in the form of satellite piers. West meant west of the cross runway. He referred to drwg. On page 108, figure 6. The final was for a build up of 43million. They had envisaged 30 million by 2019. The landside access would come from the east. Additional infrastructure would be required after 2020.


In response to the question by the inspector whether they were proposing to increase capacity beyond 30 million only through piers, he said it was in this option where it was envisaged accelerated long haul growth. Upper band option beyond 2020 was through land utilisation framework plan.
Mr. Foley stated that PM/SOM underpin the location of the terminal, and looked beyond 30 million to ensure any construction up to 30 million did not prejudice post 30 million development. The base criterion for the 30 million development was that it would not constrain ultimate capacity. The ability of the airport to grow beyond 30 million had to be protected. The development before the Board was predicated on the ‘busy hour’ schedule for 30-35 million.
Mr. Hayden referred to page 22 and busy hour rate of 2495 for 2002, and 3400 for 2004. He asked if 3400 was at an acceptable level for 17 million passengers (2004).
Referring to the predicted capacity of 6000 pph for 30 million capacity (paragraph.1.7), Mr. Hayden asked if Mr. Moran calculated this independently. Yes it was based on IATA space measures.
In response to the question if 6000 pph was for the 30 million capacity and if 5500 was being required for T2 (second phase) would that not leave 500 for T1, Mr. Foley for DAA stated that Mr. Moran’s study was completed in 2003, when Aer Lingus had not formulated its detailed business plans. Now they had detailed requirements. Also Ryanair had increased its footprint at the airport by 50 %. There was also inefficiency arising from splitting of two terminals.
Mr. Moran referred to his 3 different scenarios where he had predicted a low growth scenario of 4500 pph, and high growth scenario of 6000-6500pph. In the low growth scenario derivation footprint would be 82600m2 of net footprint. He noted this was net and not gross, which would be closer to 100,000m2. There would be inefficiency as a result of splitting two terminals. Referring to p 19 appendix B he emphasised that the 4500 passenger flow was for the lower end and 6000-6500 was for the upper end depending on different scenarios. In the context of master plan they had tried to capture the future changes. Iteration of the master plan they would still use the same methodology used by Ms/ Coveney and Ms. Weston for design specifics and would probably come up with the same figures. There was no change in the master plan context, but refinement would be required at detailed design stage.
Following further discussions Ms. Congdon stated in order to achieve the busy hour rate proposed, all of the departures must be bunched into a single hour which she considered would not be the case (long haul busy hour was later in the day). Secondly the amount of increased in the aircraft to be ordered or leased by Aer Lingus was not realistic ( leased aircraft would be based elsewhere etc). This was her professional conclusion.
In response to question whether the second phase (5500pph) would require the construction of pier F, DAA stated that pier E together with improvements to piers A and B would be adequate. In response to suggestion that this was unauthorised development by stealth he stated these would be applied for later.

In response to question from Mr. Hayden that in view of the fact that the business profile of operators at Dublin Airport had shifted in the direction of low cost, point to point operation why they did not provide a terminal suitable for such operations at the chosen location, Mr. Lamond stated that the southern location was recommended by the master plan. As this section was more suitable to accommodate wide bodied aircraft it was more logical for location of a terminal that would use such aircraft. The LOS ‘C’ being provided was recommended by IATA as being minimum acceptable service at reasonable cost. A terminal which would serve purely ‘low-cost’ operators would be at a different level of service.


Mr. Foley stated that IATA level of service ‘C’ was required by all those consulted and 90% of the airlines had signed up to it.
In response to question by Mr. Hayden as to whether they were asked to design a terminal suitable for low cost model (at least 40% of the passengers were using the other airline with low cost model), Mr. Lamond responded that they were asked to design a terminal with LOS ‘C’. Mr. Hayden objected that he did not get an answer, and objected to the ruling by the inspector to move on.
There were further discussions in relation to the source of figures, whose graph it was and who could /should request the data from ACL. Noting that the same was discussed in the previous day, the inspector asked who ever had produced the graph in the first place should try to provide the figures unless there was a confidentiality problem.
In response to question by the inspector Mr. Hayden stated that in their view the level of demand did not justify the size of the terminal being proposed. He repeated he did not get the answers to how much of the purple in the graph was Aer Lingus and what time line was being used to justify the 4200 figure. Failure to furnish the numbers was denying Ryanair the opportunity to see why this happened. He argued that there was an obligation on the inspector to present this to the Board.
In response to the question by the inspector what would be the following question if he were given the source data, he said they would prove that the EIS and the methodology used for calculating numbers were fundamentally flawed. If they were not given the source data then they would argue that there was not that level of demand to justify the size of the terminal.
He repeated that in the second phase (where master plan had predicted 6000 pph), 5500 pph would be through T2. This would leave T1 where Ryanair operated with only 500 passengers. He asked again what changed.
At the direction of Mr. O Donnell, Mr. Moran responded by saying that there were no changes in the fundamentals of master planning. Schedules presented at the time provided range of values between 4500-6000. The range options for facilities would remain the same. They would follow the methodology used by Ms. Weston and Coveney if they were to provide numbers for detailed design.
Ms. Weston stated the argument in relation to lack of information for peak was not correct. She referred to Appendix 1A (redacted Gateway 2 document), and graph entitled T2 planning day profiles and stated that the figure 4144 at bottom right was indicated between 615 and 714. There were 28 aircraft in that schedule.
Mr. Hayden asked if IATA level C was comparable to the service required by low cost carriers. Ms. Weston was currently designing a low cost carrier terminal using IATA LOS ‘C’
Mr. Moran stated that the main characteristics of low cost carriers were 25 minutes turn around, ease of access to gate room, ease of access to landside, facilities for 189 passengers. They had considered these in addition to the IATA service level C, and they had also benchmarked it against other low cost airports in Europe and US.
In response to the question by Mr. Hayden (referring to page 22 of DAPF06/01), as to how much of the growth shown in timelines between 2007 and 2013 was as a result of Aer Lingus, Ms. Coveney referred back to her three growth scenarios and said there were various ways the market changed.
Mr. Hayden repeated as to how much of the increased capacity reflected / represented what they have factored as Aer Lingus increase.
Ms. Coveney stated earlier it was said the peak hour required 28 aircrafts. As Aer Lingus had already 28 aircraft, theoretically they could squeeze all their aircraft into the peak hour without purchasing any aircraft. There were two major players. Ryanair had already indicated very strong growth while Aer Lingus had plans to grow. Mr. Hayden noted the question was not answered.
Mr. Hayden asked if their projections not included carbon tax. Ms. Coveney referred to the growth scenarios, an said ‘Cesar’ project would deliver 12% efficiency in fuel emissions. Mr. Hayden repeated the question as to whether carbon tax was included.
Ms Coveney stated that it was not known when and how much but the low growth scenario would cover it. The charges regarding baggage and priority seating had not have any effect on the demand. Mr. Hayden said the EU charges would commence on 2011, and therefore ‘when’ was known.
In response to question by Mr. Hayden that it was anticipated that the development would cater a lot more than what is presented, Mr. Moran stated that the terminal and piers would cater for 30 million. The ultimate capacity of the airport would be more than 30 million.
In response to question if T2 was being designed for a capacity of 15 million, Ms. Weston responded that on the basis of busy hour 4200, phase I would deliver a capacity for 11.4 million, and on the basis of busy hour of 5500 phase II would deliver a capacity of 14.9 million. Following suggestion by Mr. Hayden that one would get 27 million using the ‘ratios’, she stated they were not using ratios. Mr. Hayden asked Mr. Moran what ratios he had used, and asked for an explanation of the discrepancy in the figures presented in the 2003 study and those presented in the hearing..
Mr. Foley stated that Mr. Moran had stewardship of the master plan, but was not involved since 2003. The new Board had asked P&W to re examine the conclusions. Linking of the two was not appropriate.

I should note that throughout the questions and answers session Mr. Hayden demanded on a number of occasions that the person he asked the question should answer. This was opposed by the first party on grounds that the questions were being put to people who were not involved in the section of the project referred to in the question. (for example Mr. Moran had not been involved in the project since 2003, after completion of the master plan, and could not answer question regarding design evolved since then) Inspector ruled that the questions were to be put to the party, and be responded by the person chosen by the lead.



In response to question by Mr. Hayden Mr. Moran stated yes the master plan had envisaged a single building designed as an annex to the T1, but the fundamentals of the master plan for location of the building to the south east of T1 would not change. No northern option would not be preferred.
In response to the question by the inspector why the design was changed from extension to T1 to two separate terminals, Mr. Foley stated that a key component of the Government direction was that a terminal capable of independent operation be provided and tendered out.
In response to the question by the inspector to compare the present location for a separate terminal building with a northern location, Mr. Moran said he still would not locate a separate terminal in the northern location because of deliverability (removal of hangars), shallow depth of the apron, single sided pier, and risk of delays arising from impact on the OCTB and its curtilage. On balance he did not think he would change the conclusion that south east of T1 was the best option.
In response to question can independent operation could be achieved if it relied on pier B, Alan Lamond stated that their brief was for a terminal managed independently, but it would have to have airside connectivity.
In response to question whether they took up where the Terminal and Piers study left off, he stated that they were asked to review the work carried out previously, and had found that it was solid piece of work, but the world had moved on an. Nevertheless they had come up with similar conclusions.
In response to question he stated that yes the four options examined were not the same as the previous study, but formed the basis of how one could seek to add capacity. Yes they had considered the option of extending the existing building in the south-easterly direction (p 20), but there were serious constraints, such as two circular concrete ramps, energy centre and the services for T1 went up through the ramps. Mr. Hayden noted these were still present when the previous option was chosen. The only thing that had changed was independent operation.
Mr. Foley stated it was incorrect to say that the new DAA Board had accepted the previous body of work by its predecessor. The Government had asked for an independent study (assessment).
In response to question by Mr. Hayden as to why the findings of the previous study was materially altered, Alan Lamond stated that they had to have a fresh approach in terms of deliverability with minimum disruption to the existing operations.
In response to the number of stands in pier E, he stated that it was purposefully designed to have ‘mars’ stands (multi aircraft ramp stands) which could be used by either code E or code C type aircraft (Wide or narrow bodied). There were 19 contact stands. As 6 stands were lost in pier C the net gain was 13.
In response to the question by the inspector in relation to the original brief to incorporate pier C, Mr. Lamond stated that the building was kept and the area use was apron capacity. Yes there would be changes in terms of reconfiguration, and re grading of the apron, and re-alignment of the taxiways for optimum efficiency.
There was a lot of discussion regarding ability of the pier E to accommodate all the narrow bodied aircraft generated by the 4200 capacity particularly when 5 wide bodied aircraft arriving in the morning would take up considerable area. DAA maintained that both pier E and pier B would be used, through different gate utilization chart. Mr. Hayden questioned how this would represent independent operation and maintained that in order to serve the proposed capacity pier F as well as configurations to other piers would have to be carried out and the development before the Board did not reflect the whole development required.
Mr. Foley stated that no connectivity to the rest of the airport would lead to inefficiency which would not comply with the Government directive. He reiterated that the independent verifiers report was required to assure the Government.
In response to the question by the inspector whether the pier capacity would be adequate to process 4200 passengers, Ms. Weston said yes until phase 2, and remote stands could be used if necessary, while Mr. Foley stated the plans for further improvements to other stands would be after 2009.
Mr. Hayden referred to S. 9.3.1 and stated that that assumed already extended pier B.
He referred to earlier discussion regarding inadequacy of kerbside facilities for northern option and stated that Ryanair had presented a plan to DAA showing that was not the case. He asked on what basis the plan was rejected. Mr. Lamond stated that they had looked at the previous proposals, and there was inadequate kerb side facilities and there were problems in terms of impact on OCTB, and traffic. Mr. Hayden further asked why section 10-14 of the Gateway 2 was not provided, and why there was confidentiality issue in retail areas.

Following request for presentation of Ms. Congdons response to rebuttal paper (although the inspector had ruled that rebuttal of rebuttal style presentations would not be accepted), there was difficulty arising from non-availability of the two capacity experts for questions (Ms. Congdon would need to leave that evening due to prior commitments, and Ms. Weston would return to Canada the next day)


There was also disagreements in relation to the late receipt /presentation of information. Ms. Congdons response paper was not presented to the hearing until 5pm in the afternoon (Exhibit A-19/04/07)
This would present problems for DAA in terms of examination of the points raised in the paper by Weston, prior to departure of Ms.Congdon. (they maintained the paper was ready at lunch time and Mr.Hayden had the floor all afternoon for questioning)

In return Mr. Hayden complained that they were given the information by DAA at 1030 the night before, which lead to a late night work by Ms Congdon.


Ms. Congdon stated that it was important that she be given the opportunity to talk because there were flaws in the rebuttal. (DAA stated that they withdrew rebuttal evidence in relation to points 9-18). She read parts of her paper at the end of which she concluded that there was nothing in the rebuttal paper which caused her to alter her assessment of the terminal capacity which would be provided by T2 proposed by the DAA. It was either

  • Too big relative to the size of new terminal development required to enable 30mppa to be handled in the eastern campus, given the existing and planned capacity of T1, or,

  • DAA would use the existence of spare terminal capacity to seek to justify the raising of the limits within the LAP to allow the full capacity of the terminal to be exploited.

Her best estimate was still that T2 as proposed once both phases are complete, would provide terminal capacity at Dublin Airport for around 46mppa. Capacity provided once phase 1 is complete, would exceed 40mppa. This was clearly not efficient and cost effective development.


There were questions to Ms. Congdon by Ms. Weston, Mr. Foley and Mr. O’Donnell, (related to worldwide expertise of Ms. Weston, and joint work of the two experts) prior to her departure.


Questions by Mr. Swetman to DAA

The next person to ask questions to DAA was Mr. Sweetman, who concentrated on European requirements in relation to air transport policy, and EIA Directive ( in particular Art 5(1) and Annex IV). He stated that there was no reference to policies (/concerns) of Director General Environment in relation to sustainability of aviation industry.


He asked about environmental considerations in making a decision for not choosing a low cost terminal at the same site. He queried whether the impact arising from works such as reconfiguration of the taxiways, aprons etc were included in the EIS.
He required references in the EIS to the remote construction compound required by the planning authority.
He concluded that the EIS was rushed and botched and did not comply with the requirements of the Directive.




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