Arctic Oil/Gas Aff Inherency

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Arctic Oil/Gas Aff

Inherency

No JDZ Now

No joint development zone now—the U.S. position makes it impossible to compromise

Menage 12 – MA Candidate

(Kim K., “High Ideals in the High North, ¶ Interdependence in a Territory Sui Generis”, http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2012-0419-200416/Final%20version%20Thesis_K.K.Menage.pdf)

During the negotiations, Canada was prepared to accept a compromise jurisdictional boundary along the¶ geographic coordinates put forth by the US, providing that the US would grant Canada similar boundary¶ concessions in the Gulf of Maine and off the Strait of Juan de Fuca.¶ 258¶ ¶ 255¶ Ibid., p. 85.¶ Canada also suggested a shared ¶ access hydrocarbon zone in the Beaufort Sea that would be largely located on the American side of an ¶ agreed boundary, as "co-operative sharing of trans-boundary resources would take the sting out of any accommodation on the boundary."¶ 259¶ This was a critical precondition for Canadian flexibility as any other¶ option would place the Trudeau government in the politically undesirable position of having to defend an¶ agreement that favoured American maritime jurisdictional interests in the North over those of Canada,¶ with nothing to show for it. Although economic access rights would not fully satisfy the Canadian Inuit ¶ Land Agreement requirements, they could have contributed significantly toward securing the agreement ¶ of the Inuvialuit people to a new boundary treaty.¶ The United States approached the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary and accompanying shared access¶ zone issues with an altogether opposing perspective. US officials firmly insisted that the equidistant¶ principle applied to delimitation of the Beaufort Sea, and that Canada should accept the American¶ position.¶ 260¶ The US has consistently put forth a position based on the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention¶ which, despite not having ratified it, it interprets as customary international law, as well as criteria¶ established by the ICJ.¶ 261¶ In so doing, the US insists that the boundary must be arrived at using ‘equitable¶ principles’ and argues that it follows an equidistant line to the northeast of the 141st meridian. In order¶ for the US to accommodate Canada in the Gulf of Maine and off the Strait of Juan de Fuca, it would also¶ have had to depart from its official international legal position. The Cutler team staunchly believed that¶ compromise would be viewed as predominantly favouring Canadian interests and that it would not stand a¶ chance of being politically supported both in the interagency process, and by Congress. Moreover, while¶ intent on reaching agreements on all outstanding boundary disputes, the United States was opposed to¶ any kind of package-deal. "As a first principle," David Colson confirmed, "we were not in favour of linking¶ one boundary settlement to another [...] we did not want to give something away for the sake of simply¶ gaining a concession on another boundary issue."¶ 262¶ The US proposal did not include forthcoming¶ boundary accommodations on any of the other three outstanding maritime boundaries, and thereby¶ offered no reasonable quid pro quo.¶ US officials were also unwilling to recognize the 141st meridian as laid down in the 1825 and 1867¶ treaties as applicable for the purposes of delimiting maritime boundaries. As we have seen in the¶ previous chapter, this is quite understandable as the sea was terra communis omnium at the time the¶ treaties where made and maritime borders where unheard of! However, how can the US dispute the ¶ application of the 1825 treaty to one maritime zone, when it has already accepted that, in effect, the very ¶ same treaty defines the maritime boundary with in another, namely its western border with Russia? ¶ Camille Antinori observed that “The United States is virtually saying that the same treaty that delimits a ¶ maritime boundary in the west does not delimit a maritime boundary in the east.”¶ 263¶ Finally, freedom of movement by indigenous peoples for the purposes of hunting and fishing is already ¶ quietly tolerated in the northern portions of the land territory and along the coastline between Alaska and ¶ the Yukon Territory, which could have formed a precedent for shared economic access.¶ 264¶ The US and Canadian legal positions are long standing and mutual cooperation between Ottawa and ¶ Washington was ultimately not forthcoming due to unbridgeable historical differences. In political terms, ¶ the joint mandate of the respective bargaining delegations had been too ambitious, and so was gradually¶ reduced in scope with substantive attempts to resolve the Beaufort Sea boundary being cast aside. The ¶ US and Canada both prohibited any work in the disputed zone until the border was resolved. According to¶ Christopher Kirkey, “the existence of an interdependent relationship, coupled with differing national¶ economic, political, and legal positions, best explains why a neutral outcome was produced by¶ negotiations over outstanding Canada-U.S. Beaufort Sea issues.”¶ 265¶ In this analysis however we must say ¶ that as both states had just as much to lose, and both states where equally basing their claims on either ¶ faulty or unratified legal bases, Canada was in fact engaging in impressively ‘Cooperative action’ by ¶ offering to yield to the US border claim in the form of a package deal (1), while the US staunchly rejected¶ any compromise (‘Disruptive diplomatic exchange’) (-1).

Joint development zone won’t happen now

Manicom ’10

(James, “The Salience of National Identity in the Arctic: Lessons From East Asia”, Paper Presented to the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Concordia ¶ University, Montreal, June 3 2010.)

Finally, according to Blanchard, joint development become harder to accept when national ¶ identity is at stake. While the resources of the extended continental shelf area are currently out of ¶ reach for all parties, states have resisted cooperative resource development in disputed areas ¶ closer to shore. Canada and the US have thus far resisted joint development efforts in their ¶ overlapping claim to the Beaufort Sea, despite the proven existence of commercial oil reserves ¶ and interest from international oil companies.¶ 70¶ Russia‟s oil and gas industry is typically ¶ reluctant to take on foreign partners for fear of losing controlling interest in exploitation ¶ projects.¶ 71¶ Despite this reluctance to enter into JDAs however, it is not apparent that this is due to ¶ resistance from domestic political constituencies concerned about national sovereignty, as has ¶ been the case in East Asia. The area of potential overlap on the continental shelf is ¶ geographically remote and remains an abstract political issue, even with the current focus on ¶ Arctic politics. Joint development in the area of overlap may never be technically possible.¶ Russia and Norway have a track record of cooperation on fisheries and recently concluded a ¶ delimitation agreement in the long disputed Barents Sea.¶ 72

No joint development zone now—won’t talk about it when making its claims

Byers ’10 – professors of political science at the University of British Columbia

(Michael Byers, Who Owns the Arctic?, pg. 104, 2010)

Unfortunately, the Canadian government is now considering ¶ whether to leave the Beaufort Sea dispute unresolved when it submits its claim to an extended continental shelf with the UN. The ¶ thinking is that, because the Commission on the Limits of the ¶ Continental Shelf will not make recommendations with respect to ¶ disputed areas, Canada could simply ask the commission to stay ¶ away from the disputed zone and continue with the status quo. ¶ But such an approach would simply delay the inevitable. It would ¶ also negate the opportunity for creative trade-offs involving multiple disputes, and it would stall the momentum of the recent, very ¶ positive cooperation on seabed mapping.

No Sectorial Approach Now

Canada won’t win the sectorial approach should be used now

Petkunaite ’11 – master’s candidate at CUNY

(Dovile, “Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic? UNCLOS and the Barents and Beaufort Sea Disputes”, The City College of New York, June 2011, http://digital-archives.ccny.cuny.edu/gallery/thesis/2011SpSs13.pdf)

The core of the current United States - Canada dispute is the line that goes ¶ between the Alaska/Yukon land frontiers into the Beaufort Sea (Figure 6). The dispute ¶ involves two related issues: the interpretation of the language describing the boundary ¶ in the 1825 treaty, and the international rules of continental shelf delimitation and ¶ application. The maritime boundary line is critical for both claimants, as they disagree ¶ as to whether the median line or sector approach should determine the border. The ¶ United States seeks the equidistance principle as a solution to the issue because it ¶ reflects the direction of the coastlines. Moreover, the United States claims itself and ¶ Canada to be bound by the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, and by ¶ customary international law. The United States insists that international law does not provide detailed description of how the continental shelf should be determined;¶ therefore, Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf should be applied –¶ relying on the equitable principle.¶ 240¶ However, Canada objects to it and insists that ¶ equidistance rule does not apply because it is contrary to the UNCLOS provision of ¶ the “special circumstances”. ¶ Canada claims the 141¶ st¶ meridian into the Arctic Ocean. Canada‟s position ¶ stems from the 1825 Boundary Treaty¶ 241¶ between the United Kingdom and The ¶ Russian Empire that sets the 141¶ st¶ meridian line in the Beaufort Sea.¶ 242¶ Canada is the ¶ successor state to the United Kingdom in terms of applicability of this treaty. The ¶ United States, in turn, is in charge of Alaska.¶ 243¶ Canada claims that the 1825 Treaty ¶ provides a boundary which divides both land and sea. The United States questions the ¶ terms used in the treaty and does not accept that it applies to the maritime boundary in ¶ the disputed area.¶ 244¶ Undoubtedly, it will be difficult for Canada to prove that when ¶ the Treaty was negotiated, the negotiations included the delimitation of a maritime ¶ boundary. In addition, Canada‟s position is complicated by the fact that concept of ¶ “territorial sea” was accepted only in 19¶ th¶ century – after the 1825 Treaty was adopted. ¶ Moreover, the particular wording (for example: “as far as the Frozen ocean”) used in ¶ the treaty may not contribute to the Canada‟s position as it has expected.¶ 245

U.S. opposes Canada’s sectorial proposal now

Canada and the U.S. are non-committal over sectorial approaches

Boswell ’10

(Randy, “Canada non-committal over U.S. position on Beaufort Sea dispute”, Canwest News Service, 3-9-2010, http://www.canada.com/technology/Canada+committal+over+position+Beaufort+dispute/2662672/story.html)

The Canadian government is probing the implications of a geographic anomaly that could make the American position on a disputed Canada-U.S. boundary in the Arctic Ocean more beneficial to Canada than the U.S.¶ The bizarre development in the long-standing Beaufort Sea border dispute came to light following a weekend conference in Alaska involving Canadian and U.S. experts on Arctic politics and international law.¶ What emerged from the meeting was the realization that a large swath of ocean north of Alaska in the central and northern Beaufort would come under Canadian jurisdiction using the controversial American formula for drawing the international boundary.¶ In effect, the dispute over a Lake Ontario-sized section of the Beaufort could grow to include a northern overlap zone as big as Lake Superior — potentially quadrupling the area of contested waters.¶ The issue has only come into focus now because both Canada and the U.S. are gathering geological data in a bid to gain undersea territorial extensions in the outer Beaufort — beyond each country's 370-kilometre coastal economic zone — under a UN treaty on continental shelves.¶ "We are aware of the potential effect that extending (the disputed boundary line) in the Beaufort Sea could have in dividing the extended continental shelf," Foreign Affairs spokesman Alain Cacchione told Canwest News Service.¶ "There is still a lot of work to be done to determine the outer limits of the extended continental shelf and thus the size and location of the shelf," he added. "This information is needed to determine the extent of any potential overlap between Canada and the U.S." throughout the Beaufort basin.

No Beaufort Sea Resolution Now

The Beaufort Sea is still under dispute now

Tensions are inevitable in the Beaufort Sea over jurisdiction fights

No Beaufort Sea resolution now

Lewendon ’12 – MA candidate in Terrorism, Security and Society at King’s College London

(Samuel, BA in Political Science from Huron University College at the University of Western Ontario in Canada, “Security Implications of Arctic Sovereignty”, The Risky Shift, 10-23-2012, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/10/the-security-implications-of-arctic-sovereignty/)

There have already been disputes for sovereignty over particular areas of the Arctic. Disputed areas include the Northwest Passage, the Beaufort Sea, Hans Island and the North Pole. Canada considers the Northwest Passage to be internal waters which entitles Canada to the right to enact fishing and environmental laws, to enforce taxation and import restrictions. The United States and others consider the Northwest Passage international waters. This would entitle ships to a right of passage and limit Canadian authority over the area.¶ The Beaufort Sea covers the boundary between the Yukon (in Canada) and Alaska (in the United States.) Canada maintains that sovereignty should be distributed based on extensions of the land border while the United States disagrees. The United States has leased land under the sea that Canada considers to be its own to search for oil. The issue has yet to be resolved but would probably be settled by a tribunal if the United States ratifies UNCLOS.

Status Quo Negotiations Failing

Status quo negotiations are going nowhere—Canada is becoming frustrated with U.S. apathy towards the Beaufort Sea

Ibbitson ’12

(John, “Dispute over Hans Island nears resolution. Now for the Beaufort Sea”, The Globe and Mail, 8-23-2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/dispute-over-hans-island-nears-resolution-now-for-the-beaufort-sea/article563692/)

In fact, negotiations are beginning to bear fruit after years in which Canada refused to discuss competing claims. The United States and Canada have long disagreed over where the border between Alaska and Yukon should be drawn, as it projects into the Beaufort Sea. While the Americans have sought a negotiated settlement, Canada preferred to agree to disagree.¶ But there is oil under the seabed, and petroleum companies are anxious to get at it. Last year, the Conservative government declared its willingness to reach a deal. The two countries have embarked on a joint mapping expedition of the ocean floor.¶ That exercise may not be completed until 2013, because the ice is too thick for much of the year, and a Canadian government official speaking on background said it might not be possible to complete an agreement until after then. In the meantime, a bilateral "dialogue of experts" is underway, with the next meeting scheduled for Washington in the spring.¶ Some Arctic-watchers believe the slow pace of the talks over the Beaufort is frustrating an impatient Prime Minister Stephen Harper.¶ "The people at Foreign Affairs already have very full plates," said Michael Byers, a political scientist at the University of British Columbia who specializes in Arctic issues. "They don't see the urgency of negotiations now when a solution probably isn't doable this year or even next year. So you have this tension between the Prime Minister's Office, which wants to see progress, and the department, which doesn't see it as a top priority."

Negotiations are slow now

Lovecraft ’12 – teaches at the University of Alaska - Fairbanks

(Amy Lauren Lovecraft, U.S. Arctic Policy:¶ Context, Currents and Our ¶ Canadian Neighbour, The Canada U.S. Institute at the University of Western Ontario, Research Note No. 3, 2012, http://thecanadausinstitute.uwo.ca/Files/CUSI%20Research%20Note%203%20Lovecraft.pdf)

The two most significant arctic disputes between the U.S. and ¶ Canada are marine – the Beaufort Sea and the Northwest Passage. ¶ The former stems from controversy over a wedge-shaped slice ¶ of territory resting on the International Boundary between ¶ the Yukon Territory and Alaska. In short, the U.S. believes the ¶ boundary line should be based on equidistance while Canada ¶ rests its claims on the Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1825), to which ¶ Canada is a successor to Great Britain. Furthermore, when ¶ Alaska was purchased from Russia, the U.S. accepted similar ¶ wording related to the extension of the maritime boundary as ¶ extending from the Yukon-Alaska land border. Canada and ¶ the U.S. are currently engaged in friendly technical discussions ¶ over the disputed wedge, in part due to the potential for natural ¶ gas. Consider that it took Russia and Norway about 40 years of ¶ such discussions to produce the Barents Sea Agreement. Most ¶ recently a surprising twist to this debate has arisen in which ¶ Russia may be able to claim continental shelf territory that ¶ would result in Canada and Russia meeting up around 80°N. ¶ latitude.¶ 15

New developments in mapping have complicated negotiations

Boswell ‘12

(Randy, “Russia, Canada neighbours?”, Nunatsiaq News, 2-14-2012, http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674russia_canada_neighbours_seabed_territorial_push_could_bring_borders_t/)

In the western Arctic Ocean, the Canada-U.S. dispute over the Beaufort Sea flows from the different methods used by the two countries to delineate the maritime boundary north of the Yukon-Alaska land border.¶ While Canada has long argued that the offshore boundary should simply follow the straight line north of the Yukon-Alaska border along the 141st meridian, U.S. officials contend the demarcation should be calculated using an “equidistance” formula based on the shape of the two countries’ respective coastlines — bulging northward on the Alaskan side, vaguely indented on the Canadian side. It’s a method that would give the U.S. control over a triangle-shaped, 21,500-sq.-km wedge of the Beaufort that Canada claims for itself.¶ But an unexpected twist emerged recently in the Beaufort Sea dispute — a quirk that the Canadian government has acknowledged is now a factor in the ongoing negotiations to resolve that matter, and which Baker and Byers suggest could eventually lead to the creation of the first-ever Russia-Canada boundary far north of the disputed zone.¶ Put simply, the U.S. position — when applied to the central and northern parts of the Beaufort Sea — would actually favour Canada, pushing the boundary between the two countries on a roughly 45-degree angle far to the northwest and eventually to a point above 80 degrees north, where it would intersect with the U.S.-Russia maritime boundary.¶ Similarly, Canada’s current position on the dispute would favour this country in the southern Beaufort but entitle the U.S. to more undersea territory at northerly latitudes.¶ The reason for the anomaly is that, as the boundary runs away from the mainland coast of the two countries, the more Canada’s Banks Island comes into play under the U.S. formula for drawing the demarcation line, pushing the maritime border westward and expanding Canada’s area of jurisdiction.¶ Until recently, the focus of the dispute was on potential oil and gas resources in the southern wedge of the Beaufort. But the Verhoef-led research — much of it carried out jointly with U.S. scientists in recent summers — has been illuminating the huge potential for seabed claims and potential petroleum targets far from the mainland coasts of Yukon and Alaska.

Negotations won’t work now

Lytvynenko ’11

(Anneta, Arctic Sovereignty Policy Review, Committee of Deputy Ministers, 2011, http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1355.pdf)

The United States would prefer that the maritime boundary between Alaska and Canada be equidistant, ¶ while Canada advocates for it to be on the 141th meridian. Canada is eager to resolve this dispute ¶ diplomatically. Both parties are jointly mapping the ocean floor. However, the officials suggest an ¶ agreement is unlikely before 2014.¶ 13¶ Access to oil and gas deposits is at stake.

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