Arctic Oil/Gas Neg

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Econ Decline Inev

Europe is an alt cause to econ decline- their recession isn’t over

Stefan Steinberg 5/25/14

Stefan is a writer for Global research who specializes in global economic analysis and the Eurozone. “Economic Stagnation in Europe. Towards a Deflationary Spiral?”

A number of new reports confirm that the European economy continues to stagnate and is threatened with a deflationary spiral.¶ The latest Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), which measures the future purchasing plans of key companies in the euro zone, registered a downturn in June for two of the continent’s key economies. The PMI index estimate for June hit a six-month low of 52.8, with both services and manufacturing branches declining.¶ Europe’s second biggest economy, France, registered a PMI of 48. Any figure under 50 represents a contraction. The June figure means that the French private sector has now contracted for four of the last six months. The PMI figure for Germany, while above 50, was also down. A separate statistic for Germany, the Ifo business climate index, also fell in June to its lowest level since December 2013.¶ Following years of economic decline in many countries throughout Europe as a result of the harsh austerity policies dictated by the European Union, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the growth recorded in Europe’s biggest economy, Germany, was regarded as a positive exception to the continental trend.The latest figures, however, confirm that the economic crisis is increasingly shifting from the periphery to the core of Europe.¶ France is Germany’s single biggest trading partner, and its contraction has a negative affect on Germany’s leading export industries. Another factor cited by the business press for the slowdown in Germany, however, is the continuing crisis in Ukraine, which threatens the country’s energy supplies and its extensive interests in eastern Europe. Moreover, the crisis in Iraq has pushed up the price of oil and increased costs for many industries.¶ The latest figures contradict a series of media reports and declarations by economic institutions that the European economy was emerging from recession. In its April economic report, the OECD declared: “The euro area economies, including those most heavily hit by the crisis, appear to be turning the corner after many years of low and uneven growth.”¶ In fact. the European Central Bank has already downgraded its modest estimate for growth in the euro zone in 2014 to just 1 percent. The downgrade came after figures released at the start of this month revealed that inflation across the euro zone had fallen to 0.5 percent in May, down from 0.7 percent in April. The figure for inflation considered by the ECB to be compatible with economic growth is 2 percent.¶ In a separate report released on June 16, the Center for Economic Policy Research declared that the “extremely weak economic developments since early 2013” indicate that the euro zone recession was not over.¶ While austerity cuts into spending throughout the continent, levels of private and public debt continue to soar. Unemployment throughout Europe remains at the highest levels since figures have been collected. The extent of the social devastation in Europe was most recently recorded in the June report from the International Labour Organisation.¶

AT Price Spikes

Squo solves oil price spikes

Brian Mahoney 4/29/14

Writer for Law360, legal focus news website. “White House Plugs Energy Strategy Ahead Of New Carbon Rules”

(May 29, 2014, 3:57 PM ET) -- The Obama administration’s energy strategy — bolstered by an increase in domestic production of natural gas — has protected the U.S. economy from oil shocks and will help the country transition to cleaner fuels, the White House said in a report on Thursday in advance of new rules on coal-fired power plants. ¶ The report touts the administration’s “all of the above” energy strategy, saying the domestic energy economy has experienced “unforeseen” changes in the past decade, brought on largely by rapid increases in natural gas and renewables production.¶ The natural gas boom, in particular, has reduced the impact of international oil shocks caused by reduced production of petroleum from exporting countries, the report said.¶ “The energy sector has provided key support to the recovery from the Great Recession, and the U.S. economy’s exposure to abrupt adverse changes in world oil markets should continue to decline,” the report said.¶ The report comes in advance of anticipated U.S. Environmental Protection Agency rules that would add new restrictions on coal-fired plant emissions. Its release is likely timed to rebut Republican critiques of the new regulations as harmful to the economy.¶ The regulations, proposed in September, would limit emissions for new coal-fired plants to within 1,100 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour. For new natural gas-fired plants, large and small plants would have slightly different requirements, with large ones required to limit emissions to 1,000 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour and small ones required to limit emissions to 1,100 pounds of carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour.¶ Thursday's report says that added regulations reducing carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants will contribute to making domestically produced natural gas a viable alternative to coal.¶ “Looking ahead, the relatively low price of natural gas will make it an economically attractive alternative fuel as regulation of CO2 and other emissions under the Clean Air Act further reduces coal-fired electricity generation,” the report said.¶ The report said that the EPA’s light- and heavy-vehicle standards and the country's reduced petroleum demand could also bolster the country’s energy economy.¶ It acknowledged environmental concerns arising from the natural gas boom, which has been facilitated by the controversial extraction method known as hydraulic fracturing. The report classifies natural gas as a “transitional fuel.”¶ “Natural gas is comparatively cleaner than many other sources of energy,” the report said. “And while extraction of natural gas raises some environmental concerns, including fugitive methane emissions, the administration is supporting safe and responsible development including a strategy to address gaps in current data on methane emissions.”¶ The White House also acknowledged that many of the advances leading to the increased production of natural gas over the past decade have predated the administration’s energy policies and were developed by companies in the private sector.¶ “Some of the recent trends in the energy sector predate the administration and stem from technological advances and risk taking by American entrepreneurs and businesses, as well as from government-supported research and other public policies,” the report said.

1NC AT Deficits

Terminal solvency deficit- current law mandates only 10% percent of royalty profits go to the USFG- that’s 2.5 billion dollars

CBO 12

Congressional Budget Office, POTENTIAL BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF IMMEDIATELY OPENING MOST FEDERAL LANDS TO OIL AND GAS LEASING requested by the Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget August

CBO estimates that bonus payments from leasing in ANWR would increase gross federal receipts by $5 billion over the 2013–2022 period.14 Under current law, 90 percent of that money would be paid to the state of Alaska and 10 percent would be deposited in the U.S. Treasury. Most legislative proposals related to ANWR that have been introduced over the past two decades have called for 50 percent of bonus payments and royalties to go to the federal government and 50 percent to the state.¶ If legislation was enacted in 2013 to open ANWR to leasing, no production would be likely to occur for 10 years and production probably would not peak before 2032. The federal government would receive no royalties from those leases until production began. Forecasts of energy prices over 20 years are not very reliable, and they usually encom- pass a wide range. Assuming that oil prices over the 2023–2035 period might range from under $100 per barrel to over $150 per barrel (in 2010 dollars), and using data published by EIA about the amount of oil that could be produced from ANWR, CBO estimates that the government’s gross receipts from royalties might total between $25 billion and $50 billion (in 2010 dollars) over that period.15 The federal portion of the royalties could be as high as $25 billion (if 50 percent went to Alaska) or as low as $2.5 billion (if 90 percent went to Alaska).

2NC AT Deficits—Small Profit

Alaskan oil industry contributes less than 2% to total GDP

Spiewak 9

Monika, Ph. D candidate, Leonard N. Stern School of Business at NYU, Theory and Evidence...Drilling for Oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, an honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Science Undergraduate College, May

In 2007, the domestic oil industry, from drillers to pipeline operators, added over $241 billion to the U.S. economy. The valued added by the entire domestic oil industry constitutes less than 2% of annual gross domestic product. The Alaskan petroleum industry contributes even less to the national economy. The value added as a portion of sales by this capital-intensive industry increases as the price of oil increases. As firms compete for fewer oil resources, particularly in periods of high oil prices, the amount of required labor and capital increases. According to the American Petroleum Institute, oil field service costs have increased dramatically. The price of drilling for an onshore well of 10,000 to 12,499 feet increased from $111 per foot drilled to $294 per foot drilled. Alaskan onshore drilling costs increased from $283 to $1,880 per foot drilled in the same period.7 Equipment must be fortified to withstand harsh Alaskan conditions. The remote location makes equipment transportation cost much greater than in the contiguous states. While the API anticipates a moderation of drilling service costs, they do not expect prices to return to 2000 levels.

Reducing deficits is a myth---not nearly enough revenue and the timeframe is 2 decades

Dinan 12

Stephan, More oil drilling brings limited cash to govt., 8/9/Ciera’s birthday,

Opening up federal lands to more oil and gas exploration would boost the federal treasury through new royalty payments, but would make almost no dent in the federal deficit, according to figures released Thursday by the Congressional Budget Office. The nonpartisan budget office said opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to exploration — which is banned under current law — would bring in about $5 billion over the next decade, and about $2 to $4 billion a year in the decade after that. Meanwhile, pushing the Obama administration to open up other areas such as the outer continental shelf, which are legal but which the administration has opposed, would bring in about $2 billion over the next decade, the CBO said. The years beyond that were too uncertain for CBO to make a prediction. The $7 billion total for the next decade — the standard budget window — is less than one-tenth of a percent of the $6.4 trillion in cumulative deficits President Obama is projecting over that same period. CBO analysts said one issue for revenue is the long lead time it takes between when leases are sold and oil or natural gas is actually extracted.

1NC SCS/China Adv

Alt cause- shipping routes, fish, and oil

Deutsche Welle ’12 (9-5 ("Why is the South China Sea such a bone of contention?" 9-5-12, l/n, accessed 10-6-12, mss)

Why is the South China Sea such a bone of contention?

The tension in the South China Sea has escalated since the start of the 21st century, as neighboring states vie to protect their strategic and economic interests, but what are they really fighting for? Its geopolitical location, an abundance of fish and huge gas and oil reserves make the South China Sea particularly attractive to the 10 states that all lay claim to parts of it - China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Cambodia. There are also hundreds of islands and reefs in the South China Sea, which the Vietnamese call the East Sea. The Paracel Islands (known as the Xisha in China and the Hoang Sa in Vietnam), the Spratly Islands (known as the Nansha Qundao in China, the Truong Sa in Vietnam and the Kapuluan ng Kalayaan in the Philippines) are the most important disputed island groups. The sea is also important to the rest of the world as it connects Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia with East Asia and at least one third of global shipping transits through its waters. Almost all of China's oil exports arrive via the South China Sea and nearly all of China's exports to Europe and Africa go in the opposite direction. "In strategic and military terms, the South China Sea is in a key position that enables control not only over South East Asia but over the wider realm of South and East Asia too," Gerhard Will from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin told DW. Fish in abundance The South China Sea is also home to an abundance of fish. According to the International Crisis Group, 10 percent of the annual global fish yield hails from this huge body of water. However, the fisheries are at risk from over-fishing and pollution. More and more, fishermen are being forced out into deeper waters to make a living but here they sometimes clash with maritime patrol forces protecting their national interests. Fishermen have been arrested, their nets damaged and their boats confiscated by the security forces of other countries. Such incidents have increased in recent years. Not only is fish an important source of protein for the population, it is often an important branch of the economy. In 2010, the fishing industry made up 7 percent of Vietnam's GDP. In the Philippines, some 1.5 million people earn their living from fishing. Rich in gas and oil However, it is the unknown riches of gas and oil that are creating most of the tension over the South China Sea, especially as the energy needs of China and Southeast Asian nations grow as their economies boom. "The deep waters have not yet been explored. Companies are reluctant because of the border disputes," Hans Georg Babies from the German Mineral Resources Agency told DW. Estimates for the amount of oil range from four to 30 billion tons. The latter figure would be equivalent to all of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves.

Resource irrelevant- it’s an entirely a sovereignty issue

Hogue ’12 (9-21 – Platts Asia news editor of energy (Thomas, "Five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks: oil and the dispute over the two China seas," Platts, 9-21-12,, accessed 10-6-12, mss)

In the East China Sea, China has estimated there may be as much as much 160 billion barrels of oil and 210 Tcf of gas, although other estimates run lower. None of the figures mentioned in a US Energy Information Administration report in 2008, however, really jive with an interim report from state-owned CNOOC that shows 300,000 barrels of crude oil and liquids and 6 Bcf of gas produced from East China Sea licenses in the first six months of the year. That’s out of CNOOC’s total domestic output of 105 million barrels of crude oil and liquids and 118.1 Bcf of gas. In short, practically nothing. As well, other oil companies don’t have much faith in the potential of the region. In 2004, Shell and the then Unocal pulled out of contracts to explore for natural gas in the Xihu Trough to the northwest of the Diaoyu-Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, saying that the resources weren’t commercial. The record of futility in the area goes back further, with Taiwan and Japan not having made any significant finds onshore or offshore after spending decades looking for oil and gas resources since the 1970s. The closest significant oil and gas fields of any size lie further to the north and to the west in China’s Bohai Bay. Not really what one would consider highly prospective territory then. What that means is that the dispute over the barren rocky outcroppings in the East China Sea likely has nothing to do with oil and gas, and thus there is no potential commercial gain that might eventually bring China and Japan together in the interest of the mutual economic benefit of jointly exploiting much-needed hydrocarbon resources. And what that means is that as long as each country is claiming that the Diaoyu-Senkaku islands are an “integral partof its territory, periodic eruptions of anti-Japan protests in China and disruption to Japanese businesses there is what can be seen ahead.

SCS de-escalation now- China and regional economics

Jinping ’12 (, 9-21 -- AP staff (Xi, "China Sidesteps South China Sea Island Disputes," AP,, accessed 10-6-12, ms)

China has sought to soothe neighbors it has feuded with over territory in the South China Sea, a stark contrast to recent angry statements and violent street protests targeting Japan over a similar dispute. Vice President Xi Jinping — China's presumed next leader emphasized economic ties and civic exchanges in remarks Friday to delegates from the 10 countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Xi played down South China Sea territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam and others that have flared up again this year. "I hope the situation would not reverse backward and bilateral relations could come back to the track of normal development," Xi told the Philippines' interior and local government secretary, Mar Roxas, according to China's official Xinhua News Agency. In his address at the annual meeting with ASEAN members, held in the southern Chinese city of Nanning, Xi said China was committed to "common development and steadily improving cooperation mechanisms in various fields." With two-way trade growing 20 percent annually to $362.8 billion last year, China and its southern neighbors are increasingly intertwined, requiring even greater cooperation across a range of fields, Xi said. The contrasting approaches to the territorial feuds highlight Beijing's desire to keep the South China Sea disputes in check and avoid drawing in China's chief rival, the United States, which maintains close security ties with many countries in the region. While eager to assert its claims, Beijing needs a peaceful regional environment to achieve its development goals and has a limited capacity to handle multiple diplomatic crises simultaneously.

China is still deterred in the SCS – their evidence is exaggerated

Kania 1/13 [Elsa Kania, The South China Sea: Flashpoints and the U.S. Pivot, 13 January 2013, 2013 Harvard Political Review,]

Equilibrium and Interdependence? One paradox at the heart of the South China Sea is the uneasy equilibrium that has largely been maintained. Despite the occasional confrontation and frequent diplomatic squabbling, the situation has never escalated into full-blown physical conflict. The main stabilizing factor has been that the countries involved have too much to lose form turmoil, and so much to gain from tranquility. Andrew Ring—former Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Fellow—emphasized that “With respect to the South China Sea, we all have the same goals” in terms of regional stability and development. With regional trade flows and interdependence critical to the region’s growing economies, conflict could be devastating. Even for China—the actor with by far the most to gain from such a dispute—taking unilateral action would irreparably tarnish its image in the eyes of the international community. With the predominant narrative of a “rising” and “assertive China”—referred to as a potential adversary by President Obama in the third presidential debate—China’s behavior in the South China Sea may be sometimes exaggerated or sensationalized.

No escalation- China constrained

Dibb, 12 -- ANU strategic studies professor

(Paul, "Why I disagree with Hugh White on China's rise," The Australian, 8-13-12,, accessed 10-5-12, mss)

Hugh White has raised serious questions about how to manage that relationship and, in particular, his view that the US should share power as an equal with China (discussed comprehensively in The Weekend Australian on August 11-12 ). I disagree with much of his analysis and policy prescriptions for the following reasons. First, he exaggerates the dangers in tensions between these two powers and, especially, the risks of conflict leading to nuclear war. He says competition between the US and China will inevitably lead to confrontation and military conflict. That did not happen in the more dangerous Cold War confrontation between the USSR and the US. This was because it was clearly understood on both sides just how destructive a nuclear exchange would be. And yet, White suggests a scenario in which a military incident in the South China Sea could lead to China dropping a nuclear weapon on American military bases in Guam, and the US doing nothing in retaliation. In other words, the US, with more than 5000 strategic nuclear weapons, has backed down and accepted nuclear devastation on its territory with all the precedents that would set. Second, there is little recognition of just how limited China's military capabilities are. It is simply not good enough to accept the pumped-up claims of the US Naval War College that US aircraft carriers are vulnerable to ballistic missile strikes by China. I've heard all these exaggerated views before out of the US. Of course, China is developing some serious modern capabilities but do we actually believe that the US will sit on its hands and do nothing? Unlike America, China has no experience of modern war and much of its military technology is either reverse engineered from Western designs or bought from Russia, which has made no technological breakthroughs for more than 20 years. Ballistic missile attacks on US aircraft carriers from China's mainland would simply invite devastating blows on targets inside China. As for US power sharing and treating China as an equal, why should the US create what former prime minister Paul Keating calls "strategic space" for it? What is being implied here: giving China all the South China Sea or a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia or a free hand to threaten Japan? The fact is that the correlation of forces in our region leaves China with no real friends other than Pakistan and North Korea. Given China's aggressive posture, practically every other major country in the region is moving closer to the US. When China's foreign minister threatens members of ASEAN by stating that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries", he is acting like a bully. Little wonder that China's strategic space is limited. Then there is the question of human rights and asserting, as do both Keating and White, some sort of moral equivalence between US values and those of China. Both seem to imply that because the Communist Party of China has taken hundreds of millions of people out of poverty this somehow cancels out its gross human rights abuses. Let's just remember that China's Communist Party was responsible in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution for more than 30 million deaths of its own people. And, in recent memory, this was the party that rolled the tanks over students in Tiananmen Square. There is no way Washington will concede moral equivalence to a communist regime. Finally, what about White's proposal for a Concert of Asia in which China and the US would share power? As he acknowledges in passing, this would risk sacrificing the security of middle and small powers. It must be remembered that in the Concert of Europe in the 19th century middle powers such as Poland either disappeared or were carved up. Just what is proposed here for countries such as Vietnam? Moreover, the Concert of Europe worked because there was a common European culture, which does not exist today in Asia. The fact is that the situation between China and the US is nowhere near as perilous as suggested by Keating and White. Nuclear deterrence and increasing economic interdependence will act as a brake on military adventurism by both sides. Moreover, as Australia's former ambassador to China, Geoff Raby, points out, China is utterly dependent on foreign markets and is in reality a highly constrained power.

Oil triggers all their links

IBTN, 12

(International Business Times News, "South China Sea: Chinese, Philippine And Vietnamese Oil Tenders Escalate Tensions," 8-2-12, l/n, accessed 10-6-12, mss)

South China Sea: Chinese, Philippine And Vietnamese Oil Tenders Escalate Tensions

China has given a go-ahead for its first major tender of oil and gas blocks in the South China Sea, close on the heels of Beijing establishing a military garrison on a disputed island in the waters. China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC), a state oil giant, invited foreign companies in late June to bid on nine oil blocks in territories spread in 160,000 sq km of water, which are also claimed by Vietnam. Companies could decide whether to bid on the blocks until next June, Reuters reported. China lays claim to almost the entire South China Sea, including what is recognized by the U.N. as the exclusive economic zone of other neighbors, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and Brunei. On July 23, China approved a military command to be based in Sansha City on Woody Island in the Paracels. The city was established June 21 in an area under the Chinese jurisdiction that is also claimed by Vietnam. The garrison was approved as 1,100 Chinese residents elected 45 legislators to the new city's congress. The troops would be ''responsible for managing the city's national defense mobilization, military reserves and carrying out military operations,'' Xinhua news agency reported. Vietnam's state oil firm, Petrovietnam, has condemned Beijing's oil exploration tender, calling it a "serious violation of international law" since the blocks lie well within the country's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Hanoi called on energy firms to turn down the offer. It was reported July 20 that India's state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) would continue its oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea, off the Vietnam coast, ignoring Chinese objection.

AND US has shifted to de-escalation instead of containment- peace settlements will solve

Etzioni, 9-26 -- George Washingtin University internal relations professor

(Amitai, senior advisor to the Carter White House; taught at Columbia University, Harvard and the University of California at Berkeley, "Cooler Heads in the South China Sea," National Interest, 9-26-12,, accessed 10-6-12, mss)

The United States is realizing that the escalating tensions in the Far East, especially between China and Japan, should no longer be viewed as an opportunity to contain China. Instead, our first priority should be to get everyone to calm down. At issue are the territorial rights over some forty piles of rock, most uninhabited, some barely sticking out of the water. These conflicts already have led to large nationalist anti-Japanese demonstrations in China and similar anti-Chinese demonstrations in Japan; saber-rattling activists planting their nation’s flag on some of the islands; and clashes between vessels of several regional nations—all fueled by increasingly hot rhetoric by public leaders. These smaller clashes look increasingly like the type of incidents that can spin out of control and lead to more serious conflagrations. The United States, which keeps veering between seeking to engage China and moves to “contain” it, had at first—at least indirectly—urged the nations of the area to band together and push back against Chinese claims to many of the islands at issue. However, most recently Secretary Panetta called on China and Japan “to move forward and not have this dispute get out of hand” and emphasized that all parties share a responsibility to resolve the conflicts peacefully. And—the ever industrious U.S. think tanks have taken off their shelves a whole host of proposals that could defuse the crisis. Disputes over maritime territorial rights fall under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and should be settled in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). (The fact that the United States did not ratify the treaty involved seems immaterial because Washington typically operates as if it were committed to UNCLOS.) But such settlements take years. In the short term, the think tankers are calling on China and Japan to establish a hotline so that their leaders will be better able to nip in the bud any unintended confrontations. Moreover, both nations are urged to declare unequivocally that “military force is not an option.” A more ambitious plan calls for a return to a derailed 2010 agreement for the joint development of gas fields in the South China Sea. The Economist suggests that the nations involved should do the environment a favor and turn the islands and surrounding seas into marine protected areas to combat overfishing, a problem that seriously threatens the economies and ecology of the region. Douglas H. Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace points out that to combat overfishing, China, Vietnam and Taiwan have already “initiated fishing seasons, periodic bans, and limits on sizes of catches to support sustainable harvesting, but these are not harmonized and often conflict.” Hence Paal calls “greater control of the fishing fleets, with effective sanctions on misbehavior under rules agreed upon in common, [an] achievable and responsible goal.” One must acknowledge that islands are not fought over simply as real estate but because they serve as markers for determining maritime rights. According to a widely followed reading of international law, a nation’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends two hundred miles off its shores. Thus, if nations can populate and prove ownership over tiny islands in their near seas, they can expand their EEZ and gain access to the surrounding natural resources—not only fish but also coveted fuels and minerals that lie beneath the seabed. Hence, for nations such as China and Japan, whose economies are highly dependent on the secure access to and development of such resources, these islands are much more than “piles of rocks.” In Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, Mark Valencia, Jon Van Dyke and Noel Ludwig suggest establishing “regional sovereignty” over the islands in the South China Sea among the six claimants, allowing them to collectively manage the islands, territorial seas and airspace. Of course, this would require an agreement among the parties as how to share the spoils. Another option, put forward by Peter Dutton of the Naval War College, would emulate the resolution of the dispute over Svalbard, an island located between Norway and Greenland. The Treaty of Spitsbergen, signed in 1920, awarded primary sovereignty over Svarlbard to Norway but assigned resource-related rights to all signatories. Applying this model to the South and East China Seas likely would entail giving sovereignty to China while permitting other countries to benefit from the resources. Though, at least in the near term, such a solution is unlikely to be accepted by the other claimants. Still others have suggested declaring a moratorium on any exploration until the tensions are defused and conflicts are worked out. And a troika of foreign ministers in the region, including nations not directly involved such as Indonesia and Australia, has been urged to help work out an evenhanded solution. Those who hold that all these suggestions are naive should note that such settlements do take place. One case will have to stand for several others. In 2009, five years after the decades-old dispute was brought to court, the ICJ settled a dispute between Ukraine and Romania over the Black Sea, whose seabed holds an estimated ten million tons of oil. One key issue was whether the Serpent Island would be considered a cliff or an island. The Romanians claimed it was “a cliff” (hence irrelevant to territorial demarcation) while Ukraine held it was “an island” and thus that Ukraine’s maritime boundaries extended beyond Serpent Island’s shores. The ICJ ruled it a cliff and delivered a judgment that granted Romania about 80 percent of the disputed area (though the oil was more concentrated on the Ukrainian side). Both sides accepted the decision. If cooler heads prevail and Washington continues to throw its weight in support of tensions reduction and conflict resolution by negotiation, some of these proposals or others like them may carry the day. All sides surely realizegiven the fragile state of the global economy, the political transition in China, the rise of nationalism that threatens to spin out of control—that this is a particularly poor time to escalate tensions.

Wont escalate—tensions are bluffs for negotiating leverage

Gupta ’11 (10/23 Rukmani Gupta, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses,10/23/11, South China Sea Conflict? No Way,

Despite what opinion pieces in the Global Times may say, there’s reason to suspect that China doesn’t want to escalate conflict in the region. Although commentary from the United States has suggested that China considers the South China Sea a ‘core interest,’ no official Chinese writing can be found to corroborate this. In addition, China’s caution can also be seen as a reflection on Chinese military capabilities, which aren’t seen as strong enough to win a war over the South China Sea. In fact, the China National Defence News, published by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s General Political Department, has likened the use of force by China in the South China Sea to shooting one’s own foot. Not only would the use of force bring ASEAN together on the issue, it could conceivably involve the United States and Japan, derail China’s plans for continued economic growth and undo China’s diplomacy. Chinese declarations on the South China Sea can therefore be seen as attempts to exaggerate claims so as to secure a better negotiating stance.

1NC Chemical Industry

Environmental regs biggest i/l to collapse the chem industry

Shannon 10

Mike, Global and US Sector Leader Chemicals and Performance Technologies, “The Outlook for the US Chemical Industry” KMPG

US chemical companies are also concerned with the Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) implemented by the European Union (EU). While this regulation has no effect on US soil, US producers exporting an additive or solvent or other substances for use by an EU manufacturer may find their product within REACH jurisdiction. 66 The European Commission has estimated that the direct costs of REACH to the chemical industry will total US$2.8 billion over the first 11 years of the regulation. 67 In the US, mechanisms to limit carbon and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have the greatest potential to influence the chemical industry. Existing US cap-and-trade programs include: • Acid Rain Program (part of the 1990 Clean Air Act) • NOx Budget Trading Program (first administered in 2003) • Clean Air Interstate Rule which uses a cap-and-trade system designed to reduce sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides nationwide by 70 percent 66 Chemical News & Intelligence: ‘Costs of EU chemical regulations reach US businesses,’ February 17, 2010 67 European Commission: ‘REACH in Brief,’ October 2007 • Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a market-based effort by ten northeast and mid-Atlantic states to limit GHG emissionsMidwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord and the Western Climate Initiative in which US states and jurisdictions in Canada and Mexico are designing regional cap and-trade programs

EPA monitoring regs crush the chem industry

Shannon 10

Mike, Global and US Sector Leader Chemicals and Performance Technologies, “The Outlook for the US Chemical Industry” KMPG

New EPA regulations also carry a heavy price tag for compliance. On September 22, 2009, the EPA finalized the Mandatory Greenhouse Gases Reporting Rule, which includes reporting for a wide range of public and industrial sources. 70 Many chemical companies will be required to install some sort of monitoring devices, some of which will cost US$40,000 – 80,000 per emissions point, according to some estimates. 71 The EPA estimates that compliance with the new rule will cost the private sector US$115 million in 2010, and US$72 million per year thereafter. 72 The ACC predicts that the compliance cost for companies will be much higher, based on the costs of installing the monitors and the added costs of gathering data for reports to the EPA. 73

Global warming regulations are weakening the chemical industry.

Lammey ‘8

Alan Lammy, Oil and Natural Gas Futures Analyst. May 5, 2008. Natural Gas Weekly. “Chemical Business-Cycle Downturn Could Be Bearish for Gas Market”. Lexis.

"There are more and more regulations forced upon the industry as a consequence of newly developed climate-change policies," another industry director said. "And, of course, the industry will have to live with high oil and natural gas prices for the foreseeable future. The profitability of the chemical industry has always been held captive to the domestic and worldwide economies, plus the cost of its feedstock oil and gas. We're already starting to see a slow down for our products. So as we slow our production accordingly, it will undoubtedly put more natural gas supply back on the market."

Naval Power 1NC

Our fleet can take anyone’s—no challengers

Work 12 - United States Under Secretary of the Navy and VP of Strategic Studies @ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Robert O, "The Coming Naval Century," May, Proceedings Magazine - Vol. 138/5/1311, US Naval Institute,

For those in the military concerned about the impact of such cuts, I would simply say four things:¶ • Any grand strategy starts with an assumption that all resources are scarce, requiring a balancing of commitments and resources. As political commentator Walter Lippmann wrote: “The nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means, and its means equal to its purposes.”¶ • The upcoming defense drawdown will be less severe than past post–World War II drawdowns. Accommodating cuts will be hard, but manageable.¶ • At the end of the drawdown, the United States will still have the best and most capable armed forces in the world. The President well appreciates the importance of a world-class military. “The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances,” he said. “We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced.”¶ • Most important, as the nation prioritizes what is most essential and brings into better balance its commitments and its elements of national power, we will see the beginning of a Naval Century—a new golden age of American sea power.¶ The Navy Is More Than Ships¶ Those who judge U.S. naval power solely by the number of vessels in the Navy’s battle force are not seeing the bigger picture. Our battle force is just one component—albeit an essential one—of a powerful National Fleet that includes the broad range of capabilities, capacities, and enablers resident in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. It encompasses our special-mission, prepositioning, and surge-sealift fleets; the ready reserve force; naval aviation, including the maritime-patrol and reconnaissance force; Navy and Marine special operations and cyber forces; and the U.S. Merchant Marine. Moreover, it is crewed and operated by the finest sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, civilian mariners, and government civilians in our history, and supported by a talented and innovative national industrial base.¶ If this were not enough, the heart of the National Fleet is a Navy–Marine Corps team that is transforming itself from an organization focused on platforms to a total-force battle network that interconnects sensors, manned and unmanned platforms with modular payloads, combat systems, and network-enabled weapons, as well as tech-savvy, combat-tested people into a cohesive fighting force. This Fleet and its network would make short work of any past U.S. Fleet—and of any potential contemporary naval adversary.

No deterrent effect

Daniel 2

Donald C.F. “The Future of American Naval Power: Propositions and Recommendations,” Globalization and American Power. Chapter 27. Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University.

In sum, there would seem to be a special role for the U.S. Navy in contingency response along littorals, but, outside the context of a specific crisis, constant day-to-day presence does not do much to deter unwanted behavior. Thus, it would seem a raising of false expectations to argue, for example, that the “gapping of aircraft carriers in areas of potential crisis is an invitation to disaster—and therefore represents culpable negligence on the part of America’s defense decision-makers.”33 In the early 1960s, the United States maintained three aircraft carrier battlegroups in the Mediterranean Sea but later gradually found that it needed to scale back. Currently, a single battlegroup operates there for less than 9 months of the year on average. This is a significant reduction, but no one can prove that the Mediterranean region became less stable. Conversely, the Navy began to maintain a regular presence in the Arabian Gulf in 1979, but this did not prevent Iran or Iraq from attacking ships during their war. In the 1980s, attacks generally increased in number over the 8 years of the war. As for deterring the initiation of a crisis in the first place, it is essentially impossible for an outsider to prove that such deterrence was successful except in the rare case in which a deterred party admits that he was deterred and states the reasons. Adam Siegel, John Arquilla, Paul Huth, Paul Davis, and a Rutgers Center for Global Security and Democracy team led by Edward Rhodes have each attempted to study the effects of forward presence and general deterrence. The deficiency of such study is always in making the definitive link between them. The majority of these studies suggest that “[h]istorically seapower has not done well as a deterrent” in preventing the outbreak of conflicts,36 principally because land-based powers not dependent on overseas trade are relatively “insensitive” to the operations of naval forces.

Naval power not key to hegemony

Goure 10

Daniel Goure. PhD in IR, BA in government, VP of the Lexington Institute, member of the Department of Defense Transition Team, former director of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of State, senior analyst on national security and defense issues with the Center for Naval Analyses. “Can the Case be Made for Naval Power?” 2 July 2010. Lexington Institute.

More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

China makes naval power obsolete—anti-access/area-denial capabilities effectively shut out US ships

Krepinevich 9— president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Andrew, “The Pentagon’sWasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of American Power” Foreign Affairs Volume 88 • Number 4, July/August

In East Asia, an even more formidable challenge is emerging. China’s People’s Liberation Army is aggressively developing capabilities and strategies to degrade the U.S. military’s ability to project power into the region. The PLA’s buildup is being guided by the lessons drawn by the Chinese military from the two Iraq wars and the 1999 war in the Balkans. The Chinese were particularly impressed by the effectiveness of U.S. precision-strike capabilities and the role played by space systems, which provided reliable navigation and communications, as well as weather, targeting, and missile-warning data. The effort is also being driven by the Chinese experience during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, when a U.S. aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Nimitz, entered the Taiwan Strait to compel China to stand down from its threats to Taiwan. This display of U.S. naval power bolstered China’s determination to curb the United States’ access to East Asia. Senior Chinese political and military leaders decided it would be foolhardy to challenge the U.S. military head-on. Instead, China is working to combine Western technology with Eastern stratagems, aiming to be able to seize the initiative in the event of a conflict by exploiting the element of surprise. The Chinese approach would entail destroying or disrupting the U.S. military’s communications networks and launching preemptive attacks, to the point where such attacks, or even the threat of such attacks, would raise the costs of U.S. action to prohibitive levels. The Chinese call the military capabilities that support this strategy “assassin’s mace.” The underlying mantra is that assassin’s mace weapons and techniques will enable “the inferior” (China) to defeat “the superior” (the United States). Chinese efforts are focused on developing and fielding what U.S. military analysts refer to as “anti-access/area-denial (a2/ad) capabilities. Generally speaking, Chinese anti-access forces seek to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate from forward bases, such as Kadena Air Base, on Okinawa, and Andersen Air Force Base, on Guam. The Chinese are, for example, fielding large numbers of conventionally armed ballistic missiles capable of striking these bases with a high degree of accuracy. Although recent advances in directed-energy technology—such as solid-state lasers—may enable the United States to field significantly more effective missile defense systems in the next decade, present defenses against ballistic missile attacks are limited. These defenses can be overwhelmed when confronted with missile barrages. The intended message to the United States and its East Asian allies and partners is clear: China has the means to put at risk the forward bases from which most U.S. strike aircraft must operate. Area-denial capabilities are aimed at restricting the U.S. Navy’s freedom of action from China’s coast out to “the second island chain”— a line of islands that extends roughly from the southeastern edge of Japan to Guam. The PLA is constructing over-the-horizon radars, fielding unmanned aerial vehicles, and deploying reconnaissance satellites to detect U.S. surface warships at progressively greater distances. It is acquiring a large number of submarines armed with advanced torpedoes and high-speed, sea-skimming ascms to stalk U.S. carriers and their escorts. (In 2006, a Chinese submarine surfaced in the midst of a U.S. carrier strike group, much to the U.S. Navy’s embarrassment.) And it is procuring aircraft equipped with high-speed ascms and fielding antiship ballistic missiles that can strike U.S. carriers at extended ranges. Advanced antiship mines may constrain U.S. naval operations even further in coastal areas. The implications of these efforts are clear. East Asian waters are slowly but surely becoming another potential no-go zone for U.S. ships, particularly for aircraft carriers, which carry short-range strike aircraft that require them to operate well within the reach of the PLAs a2/ad systems if they want remain operationally relevant. The large air bases in the region that host the U.S. Air Force’s short-range strike aircraft and support aircraft are similarly under increased threat. All thus risk becoming wasting assets. If the United States does not adapt to these emerging challenges, the military balance in Asia will be fundamentally transformed in Beijing’s favor. This would increase the danger that China might be encouraged to resolve outstanding regional security issues through coercion, if not aggression.

Naval Power 2NC—UQ

Besides a 2-1 fleet displacement advantage over Russia and China combined the US Navy is qualitatively superior

Work 9 - United States Under Secretary of the Navy and VP of Strategic Studies @ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Robert, VP of Strategic Studies @ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Strategy for the Long Haul: the US Navy Charting A Course for Tomorrow’s Fleet”,

What this means is that the United States currently faces only two plausible naval competitors — Russia and China. The aggregate displacement of the combined fleets of these two countries amounts to 1,186,715 tons. With a war fleet of 3,121,014 tons, the US Navy enjoys a 2.63-to-one advantage in fleet displacementand fleet capabilities — over the combined Russian-Chinese fleet. However, these figures assume that every Russian and Chinese ship is well maintained — a questionable assumption. For example, a recent review of the Russian Navy reveals that thirteen Russian ships, amounting to some 113,922 tons of shipping, are inoperable due to poor maintenance.13 Despite some recent embarrassing maintenance inspections on US Navy ships,14 in any comparison with these two potential naval adversaries, it seems likely that the US Navy enjoys an even wider advantage in terms of both immediately available combat-ready warships and overall combat capabilities than a simple comparison of fleet displacements suggests. When factoring in the 2,445,555 tons of warships operated by US friends and allies, the US naval advantage over its potential naval competitors only widens.

US is not facing naval challengers—other aspects of heg outweigh

Goure 10

Daniel Goure. PhD in IR, BA in government, VP of the Lexington Institute, member of the Department of Defense Transition Team, former director of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of State, senior analyst on national security and defense issues with the Center for Naval Analyses. “Can the Case be Made for Naval Power?” 2 July 2010. Lexington Institute.

This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy this is many years off. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses.

Naval Power 2NC—Not Key to Heg

naval decline won’t collapse heg

Friedman 7

(George, Stratfor, April)

The issue for the United States is not whether it should abandon control of the seas -- that would be irrational in the extreme. Rather, the question is whether it has to exert itself at all in order to retain that control. Other powers either have abandoned attempts to challenge the United States, have fallen short of challenging the United States or have confined their efforts to building navies for extremely limited uses, or for uses aligned with the United States. No one has a shipbuilding program under way that could challenge the United States for several generations. One argument, then, is that the United States should cut its naval forces radically -- since they have, in effect, done their job. Mothballing a good portion of the fleet would free up resources for other military requirements without threatening U.S. ability to control the sea-lanes. Should other powers attempt to build fleets to challenge the United States, the lead time involved in naval construction is such that the United States would have plenty of opportunities for re-commissioning ships or building new generations of vessels to thwart the potential challenge. The counterargument normally given is that the U.S. Navy provides a critical service in what is called littoral warfare. In other words, while the Navy might not be needed immediately to control sea-lanes, it carries out critical functions in securing access to those lanes and projecting rapid power into countries where the United States might want to intervene. Thus, U.S. aircraft carriers can bring tactical airpower to bear relatively quickly in any intervention. Moreover, the Navy's amphibious capabilities -- particularly those of deploying and supplying the U.S. Marines -- make for a rapid deployment force that, when coupled with Naval airpower, can secure hostile areas of interest for the United States. That argument is persuasive, but it poses this problem: The Navy provides a powerful option for war initiation by the United States, but it cannot by itself sustain the war. In any sustained conflict, the Army must be brought in to occupy territory -- or, as in Iraq, the Marines must be diverted from the amphibious specialty to serve essentially as Army units. Naval air by itself is a powerful opening move, but greater infusions of airpower are needed for a longer conflict. Naval transport might well be critically important in the opening stages, but commercial transport sustains the operation. If one accepts this argument, the case for a Navy of the current size and shape is not proven. How many carrier battle groups are needed and, given the threat to the carriers, is an entire battle group needed to protect them? If we consider the Iraq war in isolation, for example, it is apparent that the Navy served a function in the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces. It is not clear, however, that the Navy has served an important role in the attempt to occupy and pacify Iraq. And, as we have seen in the case of Iran, a blockade is such a complex politico-military matter that the option not to blockade tends to emerge as the obvious choice.

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