Briana Santaniello October 26, 2013 Good and Evil on the Rails

Good and Evil on the Rails

1. The direct cause of the Metrolink accident was Robert Sanchez’s failure to call out two signals while operating the train. While operating the train, he made four phone calls, sent 21 text messages, and received 21 messages (Steiner & Steiner, 2012). His cellular phone was a distraction; however he had been reported, warned, and spoken with on a number of occasions about his cell phone use and yet continued to go against the rules. The indirect cause of the Metrolink accident was the lack of a safety measure in place to prevent the accident from occurring. Despite Sanchez’s failure to call out the signals, the trains continued to operate and move toward their destinations, eventually crossing paths and resulting in a collision.

2. To prevent the accident, a number of actions could have been taken. First and foremost, Sanchez could have been fired. He had been reported on numerous occasions, he failed the compliance test, was caught on several occasions, and yet received an award for “safety and rules compliance” (Steiner & Steiner, 2012). Sanchez continued to get away with his disrespect for the rules and lives were lost because of it. Firing Sanchez would have prevented this particular incident; however this and similar incidents could have been prevented with other actions. Global positioning systems (GPS) could have been installed in the trains to track their movement throughout operation. Computers could have been installed to record data and send out specific information regarding their current route, speed, and position to other trains. Devices could have been utilized to monitor signals, switches, and track alignment. Additionally displays could have been installed to show “the schedule, position, speed, and control settings of each train in the network and allow remote command of train and train functions” (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010).

Management was deficient. Sanchez had been caught using his cell phone by various parties and was able to keep his job. He was trusted by management, despite his blatant disrespect for the cell phone rules, and was even given an award for safety and rules compliance. Regulators were deficient because his compliance was not tested even after being caught. Management and regulators were suffering from the halo effect or “the generalization from the perception of one outstanding personality trait to an overly favorable evaluation of the whole personality” (Merriam-Webster, 2013). Both management and regulators did not see that his behavior was an actual problem that could lead to harm and allowed his exceptional train engineering abilities to overshadow his fatal flaw. Sanchez should have lost his job, been heavily disciplined, or put on probation until his behavior changed. Repeat offenses that continued to happen after this proposed disciplining would have resulted in termination. Management should have taken this problem more seriously. If they had, perhaps Sanchez would not have used his cell phone while operating a train and those lives would not have been lost in this accident.

3. The cost of positive train control is somewhat justified by the likely safety gains for passengers. Cost-benefit analysis is “the systematic calculation and comparison of the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation” where “costs are reductions in human welfare” and “benefits are increases in human welfare” (Steiner & Steiner, 2012). The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) performed benefit-cost calculations in which the safety benefits were determined to be between $440 and $674 million over 20 years. Each statistical life was calculated to have a value of $6 million. Final cost estimates for installing the proposed train controls were found to lie between $9.6 and $13.3 billion over 20 years, indicating that the cost of positive train controls exceeded the potential benefits received. However since the accident and the subsequent installation of positive train controls, “there have been no Metrolink passenger fatalities from train accidents” (Steiner & Steiner, 2012). When considering the number of passengers that ride a Metrolink each day and the number of passenger fatality-free years since the positive train control installation, the cost is justified by these proposed safety gains, but such costs need to be managed more effectively, as discussed in the response to upcoming question five.

4. The Federal Railroad Administration valued a statistical life at $6 million. As Steiner & Steiner write, “methods of calculating the value of a statistical life are controversial because they clash with values of fairness and equality” (Steiner & Steiner, 2012). The method gives less value to the lives of the poor, homemakers, and retirees. Perhaps, then, the statistical life should have been valued at more than $6 million, in which case the cost of installing positive train controls would be even more justified.

5. Money spent to regulate railroad safety is not being spent in the most efficient way to reduce risks of death and injury in society. A significant amount of money is being spent on preventing passenger fatalities, and yet the majority of train fatalities occur because of trespassing on tracks, motorists riding across railroad crossings, and some fatalities were on-duty railroad employees. Positive train control consists of GPS installation, the use of computers to record and send out locomotive data, devices to monitor signals, switches, and track alignment, wireless interfaces allowing for remote control, and computers and displays to show the schedule, position, speed, and control settings of each train in the network. While using the combination of these individual elements provides for a great deal of safety, not all elements are absolutely required. Using only one or a few of these elements strategically could potentially allow for equal safety results and lower costs. This would allow more money to be spent on preventing the trespassing, motorist, and on-duty employee fatalities.

6. The railroads were justified in opposing legislation to mandate train controls. The costs do outweigh the benefits when one considers that not all of the positive train control measures are absolutely necessary and that the majority of the railroad fatalities are not from passengers. However their argument against the mandate was flawed because it portrayed the railroads as both negligent and unwilling to spend money to prevent passenger fatalities. Had the railroads argued that the same fatality prevention results could be achieved through less costly measures and proposed methods to prevent the fatalities associated with trespassers, motorists, and on-duty employees, their opposition may have been viewed more favorably.

7. Video recording in locomotive cabs is not an invasion of privacy. If train engineers are only responsible for operating the train while on duty, any actions they perform while operating the train should be available for review. Pharmacists and pharmacy technicians are monitored through video recording while the pharmacy is open, as are many other professionals in other fields. The video monitoring is for the protection of patients, pharmacists, and technicians. It is also used to determine the origin of mistakes, such as when a prescription is sold to the incorrect patient. A number of technicians have been caught using their cell phones in the pharmacy while on duty and have been reprimanded because of this and it has resulted in a no cell phone policy in the pharmacy. Unions should not oppose the use of video recording, as it is standard in many fields and allows for improved safety.

8. On October 19, 2013 a bicyclist was struck and killed by a Metrolink train in Palmdale. The bicyclist had been pedaling around the crossing gates, ignoring the gates, bells, and lights (Pringle, 2013). Accidents like these continue to happen because too much money is being spent on preventing passenger fatalities, when the majority of railroad accidents are from trespassers, motorists, and on-duty employees. Such an incident further displays the need for more effective measures to be implemented to prevent such fatalities.

Works Cited

1. 
   Steiner, G., & Steiner, J. (2012). Business, government, and society: A managerial perspective, text and cases. (13 ed., pp. 183-193). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
   
2. 
   National Transportation Safety Board (2010). Collision of Metrolink Train 111 With Union Pacific Train LOF 65-12 Chatsworth, California, September 12, 2008: Accident Report. Washington, DC: NTSB, 2010 (p.55).
   
3. 
   Merriam-Webster (2103). Definition of halo effect.
   
4. 
   Pringle, Paul. Metrolink commuter train kills cyclist in Palmdale. Los Angeles Times. 20 Oct. 2013.