Ddi 2011 1 Space Debris da
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- B. Each launch creates space debris, increasing collision risk irreversibly Physics Today
- C. Space debris causes Russian miscalc
- D. A US-Russian war is the only existential risk Bostrum 02. (
- all-out nuclear war
- annihilate our species
- existential risk
- CP prevents space militarization world-wide ICIS 02
- CP solves Taiwan war and avoids a space arms race, world-wide proliferation, space debris, and saves the NPT Zhang 05
- China i s even more concerned about space-based BMD systems that would be far more dangerous to Chinas nuclear deterrent
- Space Militarization DA A. Obama’s promise to not weaponize space has relieved China’s fears Zhang 11
DDI 2011 1 Space Debris DA A. Space debris is at the tipping point. Government policy has forced countries and companies to stop cluttering space Blake '11 [Heidi Blake, investigative reporter for The Daily Telegraph. She was nominated for Young Journalist of the Year and Scoop of the Year in the 2010 British Press Awards, 2/01/2011, "Space so full of junk that a satellite collision could detroy communications on Earth", pg. online @ www.telegraph.co.uk/science/space/8295546/Space-so-full-of-junk-that-a-satellite-collision-could-destroy-communications-on-Earth.html// gh-bprp] Bharath Gopalaswamy, an Indian rocket scientist researching space debris at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, estimates that there are now more than 370,000 pieces of junk compared with 1,100 satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO), between 490 and 620 miles above the planet. The February 2009 crash between a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite and an Iridium Communications Inc. satellite left around 1,500 pieces of junk whizzing around the earth at 4.8 miles a second. A Chinese missile test destroyed a satellite in January 2007, leaving 150,000 pieces of debris in the atmosphere, according to Dr Gopalaswamy. The space junk, dubbed “an orbiting rubbish dump”, also comprises nuts, bolts, gloves and other debris from space missions. "This is almost the tipping point," Dr Gopalaswamy said. "No satellite can be reliably shielded against this kind of destructive force." The Chinese missile test and the Russian satellite crash were key factors in pushing the United States to help the United Nations issue guidelines urging companies and countries not to clutter orbits with junk, the Space Posture Review said in May. The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) issued Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in 2009, urging the removal of spacecraft and launch vehicles from the Earth’s orbit after the end of their missions. Mazlan Othman, director of UNOOSA, said space needs "policies and laws to protect the public interest". B. Each launch creates space debris, increasing collision risk irreversibly Physics Today, October 2007 “Space Debris, http://ptonline.aip.org/journals/doc/PHTOAD-ft/vol_60/iss_10/35_1.shtml” As a result of this space activity, a tremendous amount of debris has been left orbiting in space. Orbital debris is any human-made object in orbit that no longer serves a useful purpose. It comes in the form of discarded equipment and rocket stages, defunct satellites, bolts and other hardware released during the deployment of satellites, and fragments from the breakup of satellites and rocket stages. Space debris is a growing concern. With their high speed in orbit, even relatively small pieces of debris can damage or destroy satellites in a collision. Since debris at high altitudes can stay in orbit for decades or longer, it accumulates as more is produced. As the amount grows, the risk of collisions with satellites also grows. If the amount of debris at some altitudes becomes sufficiently large, it could become difficult to use those regions for satellites. There is currently no effective way to remove large amounts of debris from orbit, so controlling the production of debris is essential for preserving the long-term use of space. C. Space debris causes Russian miscalc Jeffery Lewis, Center for Defense Information, July 2004 “What if Space Were Weaponized?, http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/scenarios.pdf” This is the second of two scenarios that consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America’s opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenario looked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons attack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in space, such as a piece of space debris striking a Russian early-warning satellite, might be the catalyst for an accidental nuclear war. As we have noted in an earlier section, the United States canceled its own ASAT program in the 1980s over concerns that the deployment of these weapons might be deeply destabilizing. For all the talk about a “new relationship” between the United States and Russia, both sides retain thousands of nuclear forces on alert and configured to fight a nuclear war. When briefed about the size and status of U.S. nuclear forces, President George W. Bush reportedly asked “What do we need all these weapons for?” 43 The answer, as it was during the Cold War, is that the forces remain on alert to conduct a number of possible contingencies, including a nuclear strike against Russia. This fact, of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been increasing its reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the country’s declining military might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledge to refrain from the “first use” of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclear weapons to repel a NATO invasion. In October 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reiterated that Moscow might use nuclear weapons “preemptively” in any number of contingencies, including a NATO attack. 44 So, it remains business as usual with U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. And business as usual includes the occasional false alarm of a nuclear attack. There have been several of these incidents over the years. In September 1983, as a relatively new Soviet early-warning satellite moved into position to monitor U.S. missile fields in North Dakota, the sun lined up in just such a way as to fool the Russian satellite into reporting that half a dozen U.S. missiles had been launched at the Soviet Union. Perhaps mindful that a brand new satellite might malfunction, the officer in charge of the command center that monitored data from the early-warning satellites refused to pass the alert to his superiors. He reportedly explained his caution by saying: “When people start a war, they don’t start it with only five missiles. You can do little damage with just five missiles.” 45 In January 1995, Norwegian scientists launched a sounding rocket on a trajectory similar to one that a U.S. Trident missile might take if it were launched to blind Russian radars with a high altitude nuclear detonation. The incident was apparently serious enough that, the next day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that he had activated his “nuclear football” – a device that allows the Russian president to communicate with his military advisors and review his options for launching his arsenal. In this case, the Russian early-warning satellites could clearly see that no attack was under way and the crisis passed without incident. 46 In both cases, Russian observers were confi- dent that what appeared to be a “small” attack was not a fragmentary picture of a much larger one. In the case of the Norwegian sounding rocket, space-based sensors played a crucial role in assuring the Russian leadership that it was not under attack. The Russian command system, however, is no longer able to provide such reliable, early warning. The dissolution of the Soviet Union cost Moscow several radar stations in newly independent states, creating “attack corridors” through which Moscow could not see an attack launched by U.S. nuclear submarines. 47 Further, Russia’s constellation of early-warning satellites has been allowed to decline – only one or two of the six satellites remain operational, leaving Russia with early warning for only six hours a day. Russia is attempting to reconstitute its constellation of early-warning satellites, with several launches planned in the next few years. But Russia will still have limited warning and will depend heavily on its space-based systems to provide warning of an American attack. 48 As the previous section explained, the Pentagon is contemplating military missions in space that will improve U.S. ability to cripple Russian nuclear forces in a crisis before they can execute an attack on the United States. Anti-satellite weapons, in this scenario, would blind Russian reconnaissance and warning satellites and knock out communications satellites. Such strikes might be the prelude to a full-scale attack, or a limited effort, as attempted in a war game at Schriever Air Force Base, to conduct “early deterrence strikes” to signal U.S. resolve and control escalation. 49 By 2010, the United States may, in fact, have an arsenal of ASATs (perhaps even on orbit 24/7) ready to conduct these kinds of missions – to coerce opponents and, if necessary, support preemptive attacks. Moscow would certainly have to worry that these ASATs could be used in conjunction with other space-enabled systems – for example, long-range strike systems that could attack targets in less than 90 minutes – to disable Russia’s nuclear deterrent before the Russian leadership understood what was going on. What would happen if a piece of space debris were to disable a Russian early-warning satellite under these conditions? Could the Russian military distinguish between an accident in space and the first phase of a U.S. attack? Most Russian early-warning satellites are in elliptical Molniya orbits (a few are in GEO) and thus difficult to attack from the ground or air. At a minimum, Moscow would probably have some tactical warning of such a suspicious launch, but given the sorry state of Russia’s warning, optical imaging and signals intelligence satellites there is reason to ask the question. Further, the advent of U.S. on-orbit ASATs, as now envisioned 50 could make both the more difficult orbital plane and any warning systems moot. The unpleasant truth is that the Russians likely would have to make a judgment call. No state has the ability to definitively determine the cause of the satellite’s failure. Even the United States does not maintain (nor is it likely to have in place by 2010) a sophisticated space surveillance system that would allow it to distinguish between a satellite malfunction, a debris strike or a deliberate attack – and Russian space surveillance capabilities are much more limited by comparison. Even the risk assessments for collision with debris are speculative, particularly for the unique orbits in which Russian early-warning satellites operate. During peacetime, it is easy to imagine that the Russians would conclude that the loss of a satellite was either a malfunction or a debris strike. But how confident could U.S. planners be that the Russians would be so calm if the accident in space occurred in tandem with a second false alarm, or occurred during the middle of a crisis? What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common – according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 “moderately serious” false alarms between 1977 and 1983 – an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable. 51 Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously earlywarning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits. 52 The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites – in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. The loss of an early-warning satellite could look rather ominous if it occurred during a period of major tension in the relationship. While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. D. A US-Russian war is the only existential risk Bostrum 02. (Dr. Nick, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at YALE, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 3-8-02, http://www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Banning Counterplan CP: The United States federal government should sign and adhere to the World Treaty Banning Space-based Weapons and publicly commit to only deploying a ground-based BMD system in the United States. CP prevents space militarization world-wide ICIS '02 (Institute for Cooperation in Space, "World Treaty: Sample Letter to John Manley & other World Leaders", http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:oIkCGIeGoGAJ:www.natural-person.ca/pdf/Permanent_Ban_on_Space-Based_Weapons.doc+space+militarization+"United+States"+sign+treaty+banning&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjkDF8vtbp6w_hhQOMvpnxW3s0gaR21DX34x4zuCsgBfw__jjCwtTsROZ-iaNfteJ4MNC4eZqdPZ1uDADJq9qq-K5FpooZv8SXgbb9D6o2S2sZ9GhrG_7J4RNNIXu-iDNUa0Jv3&sig=AHIEtbRpYNYXpNF3s-v6j-V4EiSOS0PUzw// ASpomer) I am writing to request that you support a permanent ban on space-based weapons by signing the World Treaty Banning Space-based Weapons. There are only a few months remaining until the final abrogation of the ABM Treaty in June 2002. At that time, a legal void will come into being, and there will be no effective international barriers to the weaponization of space. The World Treaty banning space-based weapons is designed to fill that void by creating a permanent, world-wide ban on the testing, development and deployment of space-based weapons. The World Treaty creates a world space peace-keeping agency to monitor, verify and enforce the space-based weapons ban. You have been faxed a copy of the World Treaty Banning Space-based weapons, and a copy of the text of the World Treaty is at www.peaceinspace.com. In the United States, the Space Preservation Act of 2001 (HR2977) has been introduced into the U.S. Congress by Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio), requires the U.S. President to negotiate and enter into the World Treaty banning space-based weapons. Nearly ALL of the world's 189 member-nations of the support a permanent ban on space-based weapons (UN General Assembly Resolution 55/32 of January 3, 2001). Canada, Russia, and China - three of the world's preeminent space-faring nations - have each called for a World Treaty banning space-based weapons. Canada first called for a space-based weapons ban in 1982, and again in 1998 and 1999 (Canada was blocked at the UN Conference on Disarmament). Russia on September 28, 2001 stated, "Russia invites the world community to start working out a comprehensive agreement on the non-deployment of weapons in outer space and on the non-use of force against space objects. As the first practical step in this direction, a moratorium could be declared on the deployment of weapons in outer space pending a relevant international agreement. Preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space forms an important part of the set of measures designed to ensure strategic stability." China actually introduced the prototype of a World Treaty banning space-based weapons on June 6, 2001 only to be stymied at the UN Conference on Disarmament. CP solves Taiwan war and avoids a space arms race, world-wide proliferation, space debris, and saves the NPT Zhang '05 (Zhang Hui, QUALS, 2005, "Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective", http://www.wsichina.org/space/focus.cfm?focusid=94&charid=1// ASpomer) Neutralizing China's nuclear deterrent In particular, China is concerned that the U.S. missile defense network will undercut China's strategic nuclear deterrent. Even a limited missile defense system could neutralize China's fewer than two dozen single-warhead ICBMs that are capable of reaching the United States. China is even more concerned about space-based BMD systems that would be far more dangerous to China's nuclear deterrent than a non-space-based BMD system. In addition, Beijing is worried that the deployment of missile defense systems would further promote a preemptive U.S. military strategy. As viewed by Chinese leaders, China's own small strategic nuclear arsenal appears to be a plausible target for U.S. missile defenses.10 China fears that the BMD network would give the United States more freedom and power to intervene in its affairs, including undermining the country's efforts at reunification with Taiwan. Moreover, China is concerned that putting weapons in space would constrain its civilian and commercial space activities. China sees itself as a developing economic space power, dependent on free access to space for financial gain. However, U.S. driven space weaponization directly threatens this access. Arms race Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to assume that China and others would attempt to block their deployment and use by political and, if necessary, military means.11 Many Chinese officials and scholars believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. This includes negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization plans.12 In responding to any U.S. move toward deployment space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from doing so -- as it is advocating presently. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely develop responses to counter and neutralize such a threat. Despite the enormous cost of space-based weapon systems, they are vulnerable to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology ASAT attacks including the use of ground-launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds or space mines. It is reasonable to believe that China and others could resort to these ASAT weapons to counter any U.S. space-based weapons.13 This, however, would lead to an arms race in space. To protect against the potential loss of its deterrent capability, China could potentially resort to enhancing its nuclear forces. Such a move could, in turn, encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to respond to any country's deployment of space weapons.14 Moreover, constructing additional weapons would produce a need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. This impacts China's participation in the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).15 Eventually, failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process, to which the nuclear weapon states committed themselves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would damage the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime itself, which is already at the breaking point. As Hu Xiaodi, China's ambassador for disarmament affairs, asked, "With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate weapons of mass destruction or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and stability, and hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all States."16 Worsening space environment Weaponizing space would further exacerbate current problems with space debris.17 Even worse, some scientists warn that if a number of satellites are destroyed in the course of a war, the Earth would be encased in a cloud of debris that would prevent future satellite stationing and space access.18 Given concerns over the space debris issue, senior scientists in China have emphasized that preventing environmental pollution should not only apply on Earth, but should also apply in outer space. As Xiangwan recently noted, "prevention of pollution in space should be put on an agenda and as time goes by, this problem will become increasingly obvious." He further states: "In preventing space pollution, the following two issues are worth noticing: space garbage and weaponization of space." "[W]eaponization of space is more dangerous than ordinary space garbage," since "it will seriously pollute space" and "it will threaten peace and stability on the Earth."19 Space Militarization DA A. Obama’s promise to not weaponize space has relieved China’s fears Zhang 11 (Dr. Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, 5/3/11, “US missile defence and China’s nuclear posture: changing dynamics of an offence–defence arms race” International Affairs Vol. 87 Issue 3 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00990.x/pdf ACC 7/25/11) Recent evidence suggests that the Obama administration has taken important measures to restrain US missile defence, including cuts in future funding and the elimination of new weapons programmes. As the second part of this article indicates, these measures have mitigated China’s long-standing concerns about missile defence. In addition, the Obama administration officially opposes the deployment of weapons in outer space. This position has fundamentally reversed Bush’s space policy and reduced Chinese fear of space-based missile defence. Moreover, Obama’s ideal of a nuclear-weapons-free world has moderated Chinese anxieties about the US pursuit of nuclear dominance. His administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, released in April 2010, acknowledged US acceptance of strategic stability between the two countries, indicating a willingness to provide strategic assurance to China that its nuclear deterrent will not be compromised by US missile defence. Finally, the United States has also taken measures to promote nuclear dialogues with China—a trend that actually began during the last year of the Bush administration. 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