Ddw 2011 1 Kritikal 1ac- inherency



Download 77.57 Kb.
Date28.01.2017
Size77.57 Kb.
#9683

DDW 2011

1

Kritikal 1AC- Inherency
Contention 1: Inherency
Currently a provision of NASA’s budget plans prohibits the U.S. from cooperating bilaterally with China

Johnson-Freese 6/10/11- Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US naval War College (6/10/11, “US-China Space Cooperation: Congress’ Pointless Lockdown,” http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/us-china-space-cooperation-congress%E2%80%99-pointless-lockdown/) SP
In early May when the US government was scrambling to pass a budget, a provision was slipped into the NASA appropriations bill that while counter to Obama Administration policy of expanded space cooperation, was not as important as getting a continuing resolution passed and so allowed to slide through. Section 1340 of NASA’s budget prohibited NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” It also prohibited the hosting of “official Chinese visitors” at any NASA facility. Clearly, a comprehensive ban on US-China space cooperation was intended. Just as clearly, ban supporters are under the impression that Chinese space officials are anxiously banging on the proverbial US door, waiting and hoping for the opportunity to work with the United States – which just isn’t the case. China has energetically and broadly moved out on their own in space, and based on watching on-going US political kabuki dances about its future space plans, and seeing how difficult and tenuous it can be for other countries to partner with the US – on the International Space Station (ISS), for example – most Chinese space officials consider working with the United States as a potential liability to their own already-underway plans. In fact, many countries consider that they can afford only so much US friendship, though Congress continues to act as though the US is the only game in town if countries want to develop a robust space program. Rarely do US attempts at isolating countries – ally or competitor - succeed without unexpected, and negative, consequences. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 restricted data sharing from the Manhattan Project with allies including Britain, resulting in a significant wartime rift and leading to Britain developing their own bomb. After the infamous Cox Commission Report in 1999 which investigated charges of theft and illegal satellite technology transfer to China, the US attempted to block dual-use satellite technology from sale or launch there. As a result, European space industries that had been niche providers developed much broader capabilities so they could circumvent US prohibitions. US companies have lost business and the globalization of technology marches on. For many years, Chinese politicians considered there would be geostrategic benefits to be derived from being a partner on the ISS, symbolic of the “international family of spacefaring nations.” The United States stiff-arming them from involvement is a factor behind China now developing its own space station.

Kritikal 1AC- Inherency
Public, political, and military slander creates an endless cycle of paranoia that prevents the U.S. from cooperating with China

Jeff Foust, editor and publisher of The Space Review, The Space Review, 3/3/08, China and the US: space race or miscommunication?, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1075/1, dk



Those in the US who are concerned about Chinese military space capabilities routinely cite a bevy of evidence, much of which appears in official Defense Department documents, in support of their claims. This evidence suggests that China is actively developing a wide range of ASAT weapons, from the kinetic kill vehicle tested last year to exotic approaches, like “parasitic microsatellites” that could stealthily attack larger spacecraft. Many of those claims, though, are dubious. “A lot of the information that our analysts and intelligence officers are consuming—that’s driving their perceptions of Chinese intent regarding their civil and their military space programs—is based on very shoddy sources,” said Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China program manager for the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists. Kulacki, speaking about US-Chinese relations in space at the New America Foundation in Washington last month, said that many of the reports about Chinese military space projects came from questionable sources and were either inaccurate or misinterpreted by US analysts. A case in point is the claim of Chinese development of parasitic microsatellites, which appeared in the 2003 and 2004 editions of Defense Department reports to Congress about the Chinese military. “In chasing that source down, it turns out it’s from an individual’s web site—a blogger—who made the whole thing up,” Kulacki said. (The same Chinese blogger, he added, had published claims of a fanciful array of other advanced weapons on his site.) In another case, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center mistranslated a publication by a junior instructor at a Chinese artillery college and concluded that China was planning to deploy ASAT systems. To better understand the types of sources out there, Kulacki and colleagues reviewed 1,500 articles published in China that referenced ASAT technology in some manner between 1971 and 2007, and grouped them into four categories. Nearly half—49 percent—were classified as “reviews” that provided only general information, while an additional 16 percent were “polemics”, or political diatribes with little technical information. Such articles are considered “trash articles” in China, Kulacki said: “They’re things people have to publish because they’ve got to publish something. They’re very low value and not read in China.” Of the rest, 29 percent of the articles represented some kind of original analysis of ASAT technology, while only 6 percent delved into technical issues. Moreover, those technical articles don’t get the same level of attention by American analysts as the reviews and polemics. “If you look at the citations in US reports on this, we’re undervaluing the journals that actually might contain information that could tell us something meaningful about Chinese ASAT capabilities,” he said. While American views of Chinese space efforts may be based on questionable sources, Chinese views of American space efforts are more complex. “In a general sense, the Chinese public and Chinese professionals have a very positive view of the US space program,” Kulacki said. He noted that a public expo about spaceflight in China shortly before the Shenzhou 6 mission was primarily about American space efforts, including a wall in the back that featured portraits of the astronauts who died on the space shuttle Columbia in 2003. There are, though, more hostile views of US space programs in China, particularly of American military space projects. Those articles tend to be written not by space professionals but by political officers in the Chinese military, who write polemics that claim that the US wants to fight space wars. Because they’re not written by professionals, Kulacki said, they tend not to be sophisticated: in one example shown by Kulacki, a Chinese article was illustrated by a model of an American ASAT weapon—made of Lego bricks. This results in something of an echo chamber effect between the “polemical communities” in the US and China. “They feed off of each other for sure,” Kulacki said. “There is this whole tiny dialogue between these two hawkish communities in these two countries that dominates the entire discussion on this in the public domain.” There are also Chinese suspicions of American motives elsewhere in space. Kulacki noted that, shortly before the Shenzhou 5 launch, NASA provided orbital debris tracking data to the Chinese so they could avoid any potential collisions. A Chinese official involved with the mission told Kulacki that the data came late in their planning process, raising suspicions. “The relationship is so bad that he was convinced that NASA did that on purpose to mess them up,” he said. “There’s a lot of mistrust and bad feelings.”
Kritikal 1AC- Inherency
The U.S. government arbitrarily characterizes China as a threat

Pan 04- Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University (June-July 2004, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political”) SP
More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations.*

Kritikal 1AC- Plan Text
The United States federal government should increase its cooperative space exploration with the People's Republic of China.
Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
Contention 2: Securitization Advantage
China develops aggressive space programs as countermeasures to US military space development- changing current policies can end the security dilemma

Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, JSTOR, 2011, The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March/April 2011) (pp. 311-332), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311, dk



China’s military space program and its strategies for space warfare have caused rising concerns in the United States. In fact, China’s military intentions in outer space have emerged as one of the central security issues between the two countries. In November 2009, after the commander of the Chinese Air Force called the militarization of space “a historical inevitability,” General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, urged China to explain the objectives of its rapidly advancing military space program.1 Indeed, in the wake of China’s January 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test, many U.S. experts have attempted to identify China’s motives. One driver of China’s military space program is its perception of a forthcoming revolution in military affairs. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as a new and critical dimension of future warfare. The comment by the commander of the Chinese Air Force captures this perception of the PLA.2 In addition, China’s military space program is seen as part of a broad asymmetric strategy designed to offset conventional U.S. military advantages. For example, as observed by Ashley J. Tellis in 2007, “China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies, and those of the George W. Bush administration in particular, but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capabilities of the United States.”3 Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France, U.S. Air Force officers, contend that “Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential U.S.-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race.” Instead, they argue, China’s military space program is driven by a desire to “counter the space-enabled advantage of U.S. conventional forces.”4 This perspective implies that given the predicted U.S. superiority in conventional warfare, China feels compelled to continue its offensive military space program. Inevitably, this perspective sees China as the main instigator of a possible space arms race, whether implicitly or explicitly. China’s interpretation of the revolution in military affairs and its quest for asymmetric warfare capabilities are important for understanding the 2007 ASAT test. This article suggests that the Chinese military space program is also influenced by the security dilemma in international relations. Due to the anarchic nature of the world order, “the search for security on the part of state A leads to insecurity for state B which therefore takes steps to increase its security leading in its turn to increased insecurity for state A and so on.”5 The military space relationship between China and the U.S. clearly embodies the tragedy of a security dilemma. In many ways, the current Chinese thinking on space warfare reflects China’s response to the perceived U.S. threat to its national security. This response, in turn, has triggered American suspicion about China’s military intentions in outer space. Thus, the security dilemma in the U.S.-China space relationship has inevitably led to measures and countermeasures. As Joan Johnson-Freese, a scholar at the Naval War College, observed after the January 2007 ASAT test, China and the U.S. “have been engaged in a dangerous spiral of action-reaction space planning and/or activity.”6 This article, citing firsthand Chinese military sources, identifies the major factors contributing to the security dilemma that is driving China’s military space program. The first is China’s attempt to respond to perceived U.S. military strategies to dominate outer space. Chinese strategists are keenly aware of the U.S. military’s plan to achieve so-called full-spectrum dominance, and the Chinese military feels compelled to deny that dominance. The second factor is China’s concern about U.S. missile defense, which could potentially weaken Chinese strategic nuclear deterrence. Many PLA analysts believe that a multilayered ballistic missile defense system will inevitably compromise China’s offensive nuclear forces. China’s response is to attempt to weaken the U.S. space-based sensor system that serves as the eyes and brains of missile defense. Thus, U.S. missile defense has forced China to contemplate the integration of nuclear war and space warfare capabilities. Because of the security dilemma, many experts in both China and the U.S. have expressed growing pessimism about the future of arms control. However, this article suggests that precisely because the current U.S.-China military space relationship is governed by the security dilemma, it is amenable to changes in the strategic environment that could extricate both from their mutual mistrust and the ongoing cycle of actions and counteractions. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S., efforts by the Obama administration to curb missile defense, and the fundamentally altered situation in the Taiwan Strait offer a window of opportunity for the two countries to relax the tensions in their space relationship. With the right strategies, China and the U.S. could slow the momentum toward a space arms race.

Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
Representational hostility leads to future distorted and hardline policymaking

Lubman 04 (Stanley, Distinguished Lecturer in Residence (retired); Senior Fellow, Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the Law and has specialized on China as a scholar and as a practicing lawyer for more than 40 years. “Stanley Lubman. repositories.cdlib.org/csls/fwp/18” IG)
Any faint hope that narrow and dogmatically negative views of China might be tempered is no more than a whistle in the dark, but the debates that have been quoted here suggest that there is a good deal of darkness in Congress that needs to be illuminated. Unfortunately, the groups in Congress that have been identified here as anti-Chinese gather strength from their numbers taken together, and are more likely than not to continue to join forces, especially on the economic issues that grew prominent in 2003. On these latter issues, moreover, Congressional emotions are understandably fueled by knowledge of the pain of constituents who lose jobs because their employers move manufacturing activities to China or close in the face of competition from China. This article has explored only the surface manifestations of deeper issues that lie beneath the Congressional debates because it has been concerned only with what has been said publicly, for the record. It undoubtedly slights many other members whose spoken words have been few, but who are more temperate in their judgments than some of their more vocal colleagues. More important, relationships with interest groups lie behind the one-dimensional images of China in Congress that have been illustrated here. Labor unions, human rights advocates and anti-abortion groups have been among China’s strongest critics, and there are others less obvious, such as Taiwan-funded lobbyists. The impact of the lobbyists is reinforced, however, by what one veteran of thirty years of China-watching in the US government has noted as “the lack of professional training or experience in dealing with China on the part of congressional staff members critical of administration policy.”40 But when members of Congress reflect uncritically what lobbyists and poorly-informed staff tell them, ignoring the complexities of modern China, they are led into drastic oversimplification of their debate and thought on China policy. It is impossible to differentiate among the reasons underlying the demonizing of China by some in Congress, but some ignorance, willful or not, underlies the words of the demonizers. More than ignorance is involved, of course, and inquiry into the dynamics of Congressional participation in making China policy obviously must go behind the Congressional debate that forms the public record. Whatever other factors are at work, however, the rhetoric that dominates discussions of China by some members of Congress promises to continue to deform not only their personal perspectives, but the contribution that Congress makes to formulation of this country’s China policy. At the very least, administration policymakers are “diverted from other tasks…Much time is spent dealing with often exaggerated congressional assertions about negative features of the Chinese government’s behavior…The congressional critics are open to a wide range of Americans— some with partisan or other interests – who are prepared to highly in often graphic terms real or alleged policies and behaviors of the Chinese government in opposition to US interests.”41 It is difficult not to agree with the conclusion of one recent study, that “the cumulative effect” of Congressional criticism of the China policies under both the first President Bush and President Clinton “reinforced a stasis in US-China relations and slowed forward movement.”42 Of the PNTR debate itself, it has recently been said that “…the rancorous partisanship in both House and Senate during the PNTR process, and the numerous other challenges highlighted by the protagonists – nonproliferation, human rights, trade deficits, and other issues – sharpened the disagreements and laid the ground for future battles… the potential remained for even more controversy and contention over China policy.”43 Indeed, the passage of time and the growing power of economic issues since the PNTR debate underlines the trenchancy of this prediction, as the concluding section of this article suggests.

Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
A change in mindset solves for United States space securitization

Aaron L. Friedberg, an East Asian expert and former deputy national security adviser for Vice President Dick Cheney, Autumn 2005 “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?, The MIT Press International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, JSTOR”



The nature of the interactions between two states is not simply the product of objective, material factors, such as the balance of trade or the balance of military power or the structure of domestic institutions. Interstate relations are also shaped to a considerable degree by subjective factors, by the beliefs and ideas that people carry around in their heads and that cause them to interpret events and data in particular ways. The most important of these can be grouped into three categories: "identities" (i.e., the collective self-perceptions of political actors and their shared perceptions of others); "strategic cultures" (i.e., sets of beliefs about the fundamental character of international politics and about the best ways of coping with it, especially as regards the utility of force and the prospects for cooperation); and "norms" (i.e., beliefs not only about what is efficacious but also about what is right or appropriate in the international realm).66 Identities, strategic cultures, and norms are strongly shaped by the prevailing interpretations of a society's shared historical experiences. They are transmitted across generational lines by processes of education and acculturation and, though not cast in stone, they do tend to be highly resistant to change. The primary mechanism by which widely held beliefs evolve and are sometimes transformed is through interaction with others. Such interactions convey new information and ideas that can help to displace prevailing conceptions.67 Because their theoretical perspective causes them to be attentive to the potential malleability of social relationships, constructivists tend to be optimists. If international politics is truly governed by scientific laws rooted in material reality, like the laws of physics, then what people believe about how the world works will matter only to the extent that it conforms to or deviates from reality. A man who chooses to step off the roof of a tall building because he prefers not to believe in the force of gravity will nevertheless fall quickly to the ground. Similarly, in the view of the pessimistic realists, the leader of a dominant state who does not believe that his country's position will be challenged by a rising power (or who believes that such a power can be dissuaded from pursuing its ambitions by gentle diplomacy) is destined to be disappointed. But if relations between nations are shaped above all by beliefs, rather than objective material factors, there is always the possibility that people can change the world by changing how they think. At the most general level, constructivists assert that international politics tends to be competitive and violent, not because some immutable principles of human behavior require that it be so but rather be- cause, across the centuries, national leaders have tended to believe this to be the case. By acting in accordance with their pessimistic expectations, leaders have helped to make them come true. As Alexander Wendt puts it, "Realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy."" Provided that it was widely shared among the world's most powerful nations, a more optimistic assessment of the prospects for, and benefits of, international cooperation could achieve similar status.
China and U.S.’s anxiety about securitization leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy of miscalculation- causes all impacts

Joan Johnson-Freese, Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the US naval War College, 2006 “China Security, http://www.wsichina.org/attach/china_security2.pdf”


Arms race Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to assume that China and others would attempt to block their deployment and use by political and, if necessary, military means.11 Many Chinese officials and scholars believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. This includes negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization plans.12 In responding to any U.S. move toward deployment space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from doing so – as it is advocating presently. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely develop responses to counter and neutralize such a threat. Despite the enormous cost of space-based weapon systems, they are vulnerable to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology ASAT attacks including the use of ground-launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds or space mines. It is reasonable to believe that China and others could resort to these ASAT weapons to counter any U.S. space-based weapons.13 This, however, would lead to an arms race in space. To protect against the potential loss of its deterrent capability, China could potentially resort to enhancing its nuclear forces. Such a move could, in turn, encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s deployment of space weapons.14 Moreover, constructing additional weapons would produce a need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. This impacts China’s participation in the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).15
Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
China threat discourse makes war between the two countries inevitable and emboldens nationalists and hardliners in China. We must reject this kind of security discourse so we can allow better ways of thinking about China in the policy realm.

Pan 2004 (Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, Canberra, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics,” Alternatives 2004, p. 325-326 IG)
I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in main-stream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely. Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to7 make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist. on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.
Kritikal 1AC- Securitization Advantage
Current US stance towards China on space is locked in the mindset of securitization, which can only be escaped by cooperation

Shixiu '07

(Bao Shixiu, Senior Research Fellow at the Academy of Military Sciences, "Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space", 2007, World Security Institute, http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_1.pdf// GH-aspomer)



The U.S. position makes another faulty assumption that national space programs and space assets can be effectively dissected into commercial and civilian uses versus military uses and capabilities. This is out of tune with technological developments and military inevitabilities. China’s space program Under American strategic dominance, a deterrent in space will decrease the possibility of the United States attacking Chinese space assets is not transparent in many respects, but neither is that of the United States. The reality is that many space technologies are inherently dual-use and it is therefore very difficult to distinguish sufficiently and effectively the intentions and capabilities in space. Without some kind of mutual understanding on controlling arms in space, suspicion will dominate relations between China and the United States. U.S. actions seem to support the notion that China’s space program is a threat even if China only develops commercial space assets. On the one hand, the United States has rejected Russian and Chinese proposals to negotiate a treaty banning space weapons and their testing.5 According to official U.S. statements, such a treaty is not necessary as there is no military race in space. In reality, the United States rejects such proposals because it would constrain its freedom of action in space. In effect, this provides the United States with the opportunity to weaponize space at a time of its choosing or at a time of its perceived need. Coupled with the fact that a series of American space reports in recent years have argued vehemently for the development of military capabilities to control and dominate space, from a Chinese perspective it appears that the United States aims to deploy space weapons regardless of China’s developments and intentions in space.6 In this context, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others and afford it the ability to protect U.S. interests. While China is committed to upholding international treaties and norms, it also has its own national interests and cannot subsume them to the interests of another country. China may consider the security problems of the United States, but cannot change its national security considerations at their whim. Hence, China must be prepared to avoid being at the mercy of others in space. China must seek countermeasures to deal with this problem accordingly.
Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
Contention 3: Solvency
Uncertainty within space policy creates securitization and fear- cooperating on space development key to solve

Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
A dialogue of the deaf has resulted in both sides talking past each other -- a scene replayed repeatedly in U.S-China strategic dialogues in areas as sensitive as space -- as the United States seeks to extract information about specific Chinese technologies and programs, while China seeks to comprehend the strategic and tactical purposes of U.S. space programs. Technological transparency is anathema to the Chinese, whose co-mingling of their civil and military programs keeps them under a shroud of opacity, much to the frustration and chagrin of U.S. observers. As for intentions, the United States seems to be almost schizophrenic. One one hand, there are ample official denials of plans to deploy space weapons, denials supported by the very modest sums being invested in such weapons. On the other hand, current doctrine and war games clearly envision space as a battleground and China as the main opponent there. Johnson-Freese also characterizes as hypocritical the arguments made by the United States in which it describes its own pursuit of certain space technologies as non-threatening while alleging “offensive” and “nefarious” intent when the same technologies are pursued by China. Out of this uncertainty, inconsistency, and unpredictability springs the near-universal tendency to err on the side of caution. The prevailing view on both sides, Johnson-Freese concludes in her hard-hitting critique of the state of Sino-American discourse on space, holds that space progress is a zero-sum game in which any advance made by either side is harmful to the security of the other side. In this psychological climate, it is unclear what if any space activity would be considered non-threatening, and the unfortunate effect is to foster an almost irreversible momentum of escalating tensions over space. Before the momentum propels the antagonists across the Rubicon, she recommends that they redouble their effort to convey clear and consistent messages, improve the dialogue, and step lightly into cooperation in the non-threatening area of space science through strategic-level talks about the Bush Moon-Mars Initiative.
Obama can override the provision banning cooperation with China over space missions

Cheng 5/9/11- Dean Cheng, Bachelor’s Degree in Politics from Princeton University and a Doctorate at MIT, Senior Analyst at China Studies division of the Center for Naval Analyses (5/9/11, “Lost In Space: The Administration’s Rush for Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation,” http://heritage.org/2011/05/09/lost-in-space-the-administration%E2%80%99s-rush-for-sino%E2%80%93u-s-space-cooperation/) SP
The Obama Administration appears absolutely intent on engaging the PRC in space cooperation. How else to explain the claim by White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Director John Holdren that the congressional restriction banning U.S.–Chinese space cooperation under just about any circumstances was not, in fact, a ban? According to Holdren, the White House has concluded that the provision doesn’t extend to “prohibiting interactions that are part of the president’s constitutional authority to conduct negotiations.” That includes, he said, a bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation between the two countries that dates back to 1979. One doesn’t need a presidential signing statement to see that the White House is near-desperate to engage the PRC in space cooperation. The problem is that, if the answer is “cooperation,” what is the question? Moreover, the Administration has never satisfactorily answered just what it is that it seeks to cooperate with the Chinese on. Is it still intent on negotiating a space arms control treaty? Is it hankering for a joint manned mission to the moon, Mars, or Pluto?
Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
The U.S. has claimed responsibility for contributing to the defense of allied space system- makes China’s joint space policies fully accounted for by the USFG

Kueter 10- Jeff Kueter, President of the George C. Marshall Institute (July 2010, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy: Continuity and New Priorities,” http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/900.pdf) SP
The Obama policy calls for the U.S. to work more closely with its allies on space issues. The policy says the U.S. will employ measures to “… defend our space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems…” Elsewhere, it discusses leveraging allied space assets to assist U.S. efforts to perform missions or aid reconstitution of capabilities. These are important additions to U.S. space policy and fill a void left by the Bush policy. In our evaluation of the Bush policy, we called for the creation of an alliance strategy for space.13 In considering steps the U.S. might take to improve the security of its space assets, allies and their growing space capabilities are a natural source of complementary capabilities in pursuit of shared interests.14 How the Administration pursues this objective warrants close observation, for it implies fundamental shifts in how the U.S. develops space systems and performs space operations. Many of those existing practices are products of a bygone era when our allies lacked useful space capabilities. That is no longer the case. Moving forward the U.S. will require greater attention to improving and enabling the interoperability of its space systems with allies technically as well as operationally. Planning, preparation, and conduct of joint space operations will be required. U.S. space organizations will have to become more accepting of working with allies (and other partners) which will require organizational culture and process changes.
Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
Space securitization policy influences the majority of the bilateral relations between China and the U.S.- cooperation solves

Space Daily, Xinhua, 5/18/11, "Wolf Clause" betrays China-U.S. cooperation, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Wolf_Clause_betrays_China_US_cooperation_999.html, dk

Obviously, the "Wolf Clause" runs counter to the trend that both China and the United States are trying to push ahead their exchanges and cooperation in science and technology. During the third round of the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S and ED) held in Washington earlier this month, the two sides published accomplishments of the dialogue, which includes the cooperation in science and technology. Moreover, China and the U.S. this year renewed their bilateral agreements on scientific and technological cooperation. The Obama administration also attached importance to the current development and trend of scientific and technological cooperation between China and the U.S. and realized the nature of mutual benefit brought about by such cooperation. John P.Holdren, director of the Science and Technology Policy Office of the White House, has told Xinhua that the cooperation on science and technology was one of the most dynamic fields in bilateral relations between China and the United States. The "Wolf Clause" exposed the anxiety of hawkish politicians in the United States over China's peaceful development in recent years, and it also demonstrated their shortsightedness to the whole world.


Dual-use capabilities ensure that solving space security spills over to other sectors such as the military

Roger Handberg, professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida, 10/7/2010 “Dual-Use as Unintended Policy Driver: The American Bubble, http://history.nasa.gov/sp4801-chapter18.pdf”



Out of this mishmash of goals and motivations, the concept of dual-use arose as one primary methodology by which all space-related technologies could be evaluated as to whether they possessed significant military implications. This concept created a truly artificial distinction since the only real difference between military and civilian or commercial uses was, at its essence, user intent. The technology remained basically the same but its purposes varied. Military technologies were often more robust in terms of their survivability (i.e., military specifications or “milspecs”), but the central application remained the same for both.

Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
The plan initiates fissures in the security framework between the U.S. and China

Burke 02 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Alternatives 27)

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available - and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired - which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse who we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries ... by doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels - that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly, and Moria Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics" - an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves" - a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.
Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
Making choices based on higher magnitude creates a policy paralysis, making their impacts inevitable

Rescher 83, (Professor of Philosophy, Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh Professor of Philosophy, “Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management” http://books.google.com/books/about/Risk.html?id=VB7FAAAAIAAJ IG)
The stakes are high, the potential benefits enormous. (And so are the costs - for instance cancer research and, in particular, the multi-million dollar gamble on interferon.) But there is no turning back the clock. The processes at issue are irreversible. Only through the shrewd deployment of science and technology can we resolve the problems that science and technology themselves have brought upon us. America seems to have backed off from its traditional entrepreneurial spirit and become a risk-aversive, slow investing economy whose (real-resource) support for technological and scientific innovation has been declining for some time. In our yearning for the risk-free society we may well create a social system that makes risk-taking innovation next to impossible. The critical thing is to have a policy that strikes a proper balance between malfunctions and missed opportunities - a balance whose "propriety" must be geared to a realistic appraisal of the hazards and opportunities at issue. Man is a creature condemned to live in a twilight zone of risk and opportunity. And so we are led back to Aaron Wildavski's thesis that flight from risk is the greatest risk of all, "because a total avoidance of risks means that society will become paralyzed, depleting its resources in preventive action, and denying future generations opportunities and technologies needed for improving the quality of life. By all means let us calculate our risks with painstaking care, and by all means let us manage them with prudent conservatism. But in life as in warfare there is truth in H. H. Frost's maxim that "every mistake in war is excusable except inactivity and refusal to take risks" (though, obviously, it is needful to discriminate between a good risk and a bad one). The price of absolute security is absolute stultification.

Securitization is a state of mind- peaceful intentions in space policy can reorganize a country’s thought processes and actions

Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
Chang and Sui understand that security is as much a state of mind as it is a physical condition, and therefore emphasize, as many Chinese observers often do, the peaceful intention of the Chinese space program. By this logic, capabilities can be controlled, and lose relevance, if one intends to be peaceful. American threat assessments, however, focus almost exclusively on real or potential capabilities. Because intentions can be easily changed, asserting peaceful aims carries little weight for Americans. Such assurances do little to assuage suspicions or downgrade threat projections. Also, since the late 1990s, the predominance of “hawkish” American attitudes toward potential threats has pushed the U.S. intelligence community to adopt extremely conservative criteria for projecting threat -- for instance, by assessing an adversary’s ‘possible capabilities’ instead of ‘likely capabilities.’ This is a throwback to the early Cold War habit of using ‘greater-than-expected’ threats as the basis for building up U.S. nuclear forces. ‘Possible’ threat is even more extreme than ‘greater-than-expected’ threat.
Kritikal 1AC- Solvency
The U.S. Mars initiative could be a starting place for Sino-U.S. space cooperation- it solves for China’s militarization and securitization of space

Blair and Yali 08- President of the World Security Institute, Project Director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (“The Space Security Dilemma,” http://www.chinasecurity.us/images/stories/cs2-editorsnotes.pdf) SP
This tectonic shift three decades ago was allowed by an improving security environment for China, Wu notes. Receding threats to China from the Soviet Union and the United States opened the window of opportunity for economic reform. As both Wu and Hagt explain, this process of forcing the space sector to transform and compete in the marketplace drastically altered the entire Chinese program. The divestment of the military from commercial activities across the board, including the space sector, since 1999 has created new opportunities and incentives for international collaboration. In theory (the editors’), Sino-American space cooperation should have deepened rather than frozen. However, the U.S. Cox Commission report engendered an effort to isolate China’s space program. Wu remains convinced of the benefits of space cooperation. Many Chinese analysts particularly emphasize the U.S. Mars initiative as a new starting place for Sino-U.S. space cooperation. Deeper integration with the international community would help further separate China’s commercial space industry from the military, she contends. Conversely, the continuing isolation of China’s space sector has the opposite effect, and may rejuvenate military influence. And although “China does not have the luxury to engage in a military competition with superpowers in space or in other areas,” Wu believes that “we now stand at the threshold of space weaponization” and urges the international community to act quickly “to establish a system of rules to manage and coordinate space activities.”


Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM




Download 77.57 Kb.

Share with your friends:



The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message
    Main page
united states
soviet union
most important
same level
international community
white house
best ways
obama administration
chinese government
white house office
third round
growing power
greatest risk
social order
enormous cost
only game
potential loss
very possibility
prevailing view
security dilemma
fundamental character
discursive construction
concluding section
atomic energy act