Dear Delegates
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- Navigate this page:
- Background on DISEC
- Topic I: Chemical and Biological Weapons
- Questions to Consider
- Suggested Research
- Topic II: Effectiveness of UN Program on Small and Light Weapons
- Additional Resources
- Topic III: Towards an Arms Trade Treaty
Dear Delegates, Welcome to the 2011 University of Georgia Model United Nations Conference (UGAMUNC). My name is Christian Conroy and I will be your Director for General Assembly I, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). I am a sophomore at the university and this will be my second year at UGAMUNC. I previously served as the Assistant Director for GA-6, Legal Committee. This is my first year directing a committee, and I am so excited for the opportunity. Due to the caliber of the topics for this committee and your level preparation, intelligence, and creativity, you will remember the 2011 UGAMUNC DISEC as one of your greatest Model UN experiences. Before proceeding I would like to introduce myself. I am double majoring in Political Science and International Affairs here at the University of Georgia. Besides Model UN, I also participate in numerous on-campus activities. I serve on the School of Public and International Affairs Advisory Council, actively contribute to the UGA chapter of Interact, and participate in a number of different events with the Sigma Nu Fraternity. I was born in the small town of Cary, Illinois and have been a die-hard Chicago sports fan ever since I came out of the womb. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have Jennifer Cross as my Assistant Director for DISEC. Jennifer is a freshman at UGA and this is her first year on the Model United Nations team. Jennifer is originally from Roswell, GA and is majoring in International Affairs. Outside of the classroom, Jennifer enjoys playing piano. Allow me to remind you that the Background Guide is only a starting point for your research and preparation. I strongly encourage you to do independent research to better understand the issues, your respective countries’ positions, and the range of possible solutions. I am very excited for this year’s committee and I look forward to meeting you in November. I wish you the best of luck with your research. Sincerely, Christian Conroy Director, GA-1, DISEC christianmconroy@gmail.com Background on DISEC
Topic I: Chemical and Biological Weapons Since ancient times, many countries, city-states, and insurgencies have proliferated and utilized chemical and biological weapons in warfare. The earliest known use of chemical and biological weapons dates back to the 400s BC when the Spartan Greeks used sulfur fumes against their foes. In World War I, poisonous gas resulted in 100,000 deaths and 900,000 injuries1. Although the Hague Convention in 1907 prohibited chemical weapons, they continued to be employed in Germany during World War II and in Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf War.2 While international treaties and regional initiatives helped to mitigate the spread of chemical and biological weapons, their use by both state and non-state actors continues at the of cost human lives. Because chemical and biological material has permissible purposes, it is difficult to identify the countries that possess chemical and biological weapon stockpiles3. The term biological weapon refers to the use of biological pathogens including bacteria, viruses, fungi, and toxins. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) categorizes chemical weapons into four classifications: blister agents, nerve agents, choking agents, and blood agents. Blister agents (i.e. mustard gas) refers to those agents which cause blistering of the skin.4 Nerve agents (i.e. tabun, sarin, soman, GF, and VX) refer to those agents which enter the system through the respiratory tract and inhibit acetylcholinesterase. Choking agents (i.e. chlorine and phosgene) also enter through the respiratory tract, causing chest constriction and death by asphyxiation. Blood agents (i.e. hydrogen cyanide and cyanogens chloride) refer to those chemicals which poison the intracellular respiratory chain.5 Chemical and biological weapons can be dispatched by ballistic missiles, rocket launchers, aircrafts, and manual dispersion.6 While many methods of chemical and biological weapons dispersion require the technological expertise of national armed forces, there are several methods employable by a relatively small group and at a relatively low financial cost. O  ne of the greatest dangers the international community currently faces is the threat of biological and chemical weapon use by non-state actors. This danger is even further exacerbated by the fact that several governments sponsored terrorist groups in past conflicts, providing the financial backing needed by the insurgency groups. Non-state actors are constantly seeking chemical and biological agents and were successful in those efforts several times during the 20th century. On 20 March 1995, the Japanese militant group Aum Shinrikyo opened containers of liquefied sarin on five different Tokyo subway cars, killing 12 people.7 Several years after the poisoning occurred, U.S. officials discovered that members of a cult founded by Guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh in Oregon spread salmonella bacteria over salad bars and coffee creamers in various Oregon restaurants, injuring 700 people8. Many foreign governments suspect the Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda to be maintaining chemical and biological labs at facilities throughout the Middle East. As the threat of terrorism increases, so does the threat of chemical and biological warfare. The first mechanism to prohibit the use of bacteriological agents in warfare was the Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in war of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol). Entering into force on June 17th, 1925, the Geneva Protocol banned the use of biological and chemical agents in war, but did not put into place any mechanism for ensuring compliance.9 Because there was no direct prevention mechanism, the protocol did not have a significant effect on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons10. On 10 April 1972, 22 states signed The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, or the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which entered into force on 26 March 1975.11 The intended role of the BWC, now ratified by 162 states, was serving a complimentary role to the tenets of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. At the BWC’s inception in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union held the only publicly known biological weapons stockpiles.12 As the name of the convention implies, the BWC’s purpose is to prevent the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons. The BWC seeks to eliminate large quantities of pathogens and toxins and the associated delivery systems. Under the BWC, if a party finds that another state is not complying with the standards of the treaty, they may file a complaint with the UN Security Council.13 Article 12 of the BWC requires a review conference to be held every five years. There have been six review conferences thus far, producing moderate results. At the second review conference in September 1986, BWC state parties adopted Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to increase the effectiveness of the BWC. The CBMs included directives to “exchange information on abnormal outbreaks,” “exchange data on high-containment research centers,” and “promote scientific contact.”14 In response to the threat of biological warfare in the first Gulf War, state parties of the third review conference in September 1991 created a group of governmental experts (VEREX) for the purpose of reaching a consensus on a compliance verification mechanism.15 The creation of an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) in September 1994 to oversee the legal intricacies of a verification regime further reinforced VEREX16. The Sixth Review conference in 2006 set up an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) for the Convention which provided “administrative support and assistance” and “support and assistance for obtaining universality.”17 On 30 November 1992, the UN General Assembly approved the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, or the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC prohibits the “development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.”18 Under the CWC, state parties pledge to create a compliance verification mechanism and pledge to eliminate their chemical weapons stockpiles by April 2007. After further evaluation at mandatory review conferences, state parties have agreed to extend the stockpile elimination date to 29 April 201219. The CWC expands the initiatives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BWC. While the objectives of both the CWC and the BWC enjoy moderate success, many problems still remain. Both the CWC and BWC still lack an effective international compliance verification mechanism.20 Both state and non-state actors still hold existing stockpiles that cannot be identified and destroyed without a verification regime. As with many international treaties, there are also many inconsistencies between the provisions of the CWC, the BWC, and the domestic chemical and biological weapons policy of state parties.21 Both conventions also experienced difficulties in regards to the limits of on-site inspections.22 The state parties of the BWC and the CWC must also find a way to increase Convention membership so that universality is ensured. As advances in biosciences and biotechnology continue to increase the threat of biological and chemical warfare, the international community must work to create effective compliance verification, guarantee full compliance, and ensure universal membership. Questions to Consider:
Suggested Research:
Topic II: Effectiveness of UN Program on Small and Light Weapons The principle agent for limiting the manufacture, possession, stockpiling, and trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW) throughout the world is the United Nations Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small and Light Weapons Notes (UN PoA). The UN PoA commits governments to various global, national, and regional obligations related to reducing the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. The UN PoA came into action after the Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in July 2001.23 While the Program of Action led to some success since its inception in 2001, the international community still faces many problems in the fight against SALW. There are an estimated 640 million SALW in circulation worldwide.24 While civilian users and private permit holders legally utilize the majority of the SALW in use, many non-state actors continue to trade and illicitly employ a significant number of weapons. 46 out of 49 conflicts in the 1990s relied solely on small arms and light weapons.25 As a result of these SALW-dominated conflicts, approximately 300,000 to half a million people die throughout the world each year.26 SALW continue to dominate national and international conflict because of their mobility, cheapness, and durability. As a result of the numerous conflicts throughout the 20th century, SALW fell out of the hands of state armed forces and into the hands of violent militant groups who continue to wage the very same types of conflicts which allowed the SALW to fall into their hands in the first place. Cold War surplus weapons fuel many of the current national and international conflicts. Throughout the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union distributed arms to groups throughout Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua in order to establish what each nation believed was the best method of government and societal organization.27 Although the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the millions of weapons distributed to defend or fight against the communist cause remained to be used in future unrelated conflicts. Similar covert distribution of SALW from governments to insurgent groups in other countries continues to perpetuate the illicit arms trade today. Within unstable regions, the economic incentives of the illicit SALW trade presents otherwise impoverished citizens with greater chances of survival in regions with unequal access to rights and resources.28 While governments of the UN PoA members made strong efforts to eliminate existing stockpiles and halt SALW manufacturing, non-state actors continue to violate both international mandates and domestic law. S  mall arms are weapons which can be carried or operated by a single individual. This fairly broad definition refers to a multitude of weapons including revolvers, carbines, assault rifles, submarine guns, self-loading pistols, rifles, light machine guns, and all corresponding ammunition.29 The term light weapon includes weapons which can be carried or operated by two or three people. There are many light weapons used throughout the world such as heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank guns, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, and mortars of a caliber less than 100 millimeters30. Blast, fragmentation, direction fragmentation, and bounding anti-personnel mines are also encompassed under the term light weapons.31 The UN PoA commits member states to carry out the following: identify and destroy stocks of surplus weapons; establish a national coordination agency on small arms; keep track of officially-held guns; disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR) of ex-combatants; and maintain records of gun manufacture32 The greatest achievement of the UN PoA is the development of the International Instrument on Tracing. Gaining a stronger knowledge of where SALW are and how many are circulating throughout the world increases the effectiveness of the efforts of the international community to eliminate existing stockpiles and reduce the illicit arms trade.33 There is also much progress in nations’ information-sharing and other collaborative assistance, but these improvements are occurring at a very slow pace. The UN PoA, as its mandate intended, led to the growth of regional SALW conventions and workshops. In 2000, the Organization of African Unity adopted the Bamako Declaration which set out various national and regional SALW to mitigate the illicit “proliferation, circulation, and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.”34 In 1998, members of the Organization of American States (OAS) signed the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials.35 In June 1999, the European Union (EU) adopted the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms.36 By centralizing SALW reduction efforts, UN PoA state parties can implement the UN PoA with greater productivity. As the fifth biennial review conference approaches, many flaws of the UN PoA still remain. The most persistent problem of the UN PoA is the inconsistency of the domestic laws of member states and the international mandates of the PoA. In many of the UN PoA state parties, violation of the mandates of the UN PoA is not a criminal offense.37 Even in areas where the violations are criminal offenses, policing is so weak in those regions that transgressors often go unprosecuted. There is also a data collection and information sharing problem. There is no international mechanism for monitoring progress, compliance, or insufficiency.38 While regional organizations helped to spread programs, share information, and provide coordinated action, an international mechanism is still needed to ensure efficient elimination of illicit SALW. The fundamental existence of the UN PoA also indirectly creates issues. Because of the increased costs of stockpiling and maintaining SALW, non-state actors see greater economic incentives in trading and retaining SALW. While the issue is highly complex and pragmatically difficult, the international community must promote programs which seek to reduce the demand for SALW. Both state and regional actors have attempted various initiatives including: buy-back programs, exchange, amnesty, and collective development39. By providing incentives for ex-combatants to lay down their weapons, these programs can effectively reduce the number of illicit SALW. While the UN PoA achieved moderate levels of success through regional centralization and greater implementation of tracing mechanisms, many obstacles remain to be resolved. The domestic laws of the UN PoA state parties continue to be in conflict with the intentions of the international standards. The use of SALW in conflicts throughout the world continues to increase the demand for SALW, leading to even more conflict. Though many members of the international community signed the UN PoA, many countries need greater incentives to encourage them to join the program. The international community must act urgently and decisively in order to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small and Light Weapons. Questions to Consider:
Additional Resources:
Topic III: Towards an Arms Trade Treaty Member states of the United Nations have a long history of trying to reduce conflict and alleviate tensions between other countries and militant groups. Many member states agree that a key goal towards this end is an Arms Treaty. In the past, the United Nations created treaties to regulate weaponry. Some of these historical treaties include The Partial Test Ban Treaty, Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and at least a dozen more. Still, even with this abundance of treaties, the world is still plagued with violence and illegal weaponry. For this topic, the committee will focus on creating an Arms Treaty. United Nation estimates that two thousand people die every day because of armed conflict. According to the Red Cross ninety percent of the deaths in conflict areas come from small arms. These deaths occur because somehow legally made weapons make it into the hands of violent groups. The main questions remain of ‘how did these people get these weapons?’ and ‘what can this committee to prevent this?’ According to the Geneva Convention the main goal of the United Nations is to protect the civilian population. Taking into account that these violent organizations are not bound to any state, national, or international laws, and the majority of the people who are being hurt by these weapons are civilians, it is imperative that something must be done to mitigate this tragedy. 
Another consideration for this topic is the safety of United Nations Peacekeepers and other groups present in these unstable areas whose goal is to help the endangered civilian populations. These educators, doctors, builders, and protectors encounter a significant about of danger upon entering these locations because of the transfer of illegal weapons. Therefore, it can be concluded that not only civilians are in danger but United Nations workers, government organizations, and non-government organizations are also in harm’s way because of the illegal arms trade. As of 2005, over one hundred and forty aid workers were either injured or killed due to the violence occurring in the area where they were offering assistance. The sale of weapons is both a private and public industry. Estimates are that over 1 trillion dollars are spent in the defense business every year. The most common types of weapons sold are small arms and other land-based weapons. The United States is the number one vendor of weapons to other countries. Unfortunately the regulations on these weapons is not very strict so they end up getting in the wrong hands or stolen. 
A current problem with weapons regulation today is that there are no universal standards on appropriate buyers of small weapons. Also, there are few regulations on making sure that the weapons that are sold and delivered to the intended customers. Finally, even if two countries are trading under the same rules, for example the members of the European Union, the laws and standards can be interpreted differently, causing even further confusion. A  good example of the legal complications of illegal arms trafficking is in the case of Lenoid Mimin. Mimin sold weapons to West African countries illegally for years, but because there are slight differences in the laws of different countries no international group was able to charge him with any actual crime. If there were some sort of arms treaty, this kind of situation would not happen. The Italian police force had him under surveillance for eight years before Italian law enforcement was able to arrest him.
In 2006 the UN General Assembly decided to start negotiations involving an arms treaty; it passed with only one no vote and several abstentions. The one no vote was from the United States, and several Middle Eastern Countries and China abstained. Even today these countries have not found an answer to negotiating an arms treaty. In 2008 the General Assembly voted to move forward with the main components of an arms trade treaty. "This big UN vote moves the world closer to an Arms Trade Treaty that could include respect for human rights at its heart," said Brian Wood from Amnesty International¹. An arms trade treaty would set up a system that would allow people to “determine the legality of an arms transfer on a case-by-case basis, based on the likelihood the weapons would be used to harm civilians or in some way other than national defense or law enforcement.” It would also be an agreement saying that other countries would enforce the pre-existing laws, and make them universal so there is less border conflict. The Millennium Development Goals already adopted by the United Nations include ending poverty and hunger, universal education, gender equality, child health, maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, environmental sustainability, and global partnership. These goals are inhibited by the constant violence that plagues our world due to the spreading of illegal weapons. By stopping the illegal arms trade we would be able to create a safer and more stable world allowing people to help people in need of assistance. Some countries may not be in favor of actions towards an arms treaty because they export or import these weapons for various reasons. Some countries may claim these kinds of regulations may put a restrain on their economy. Other objects may arise from the fact that some countries feel that regulations should be left to the individual countries instead of one international group. Further debate concentrates on whether this arms treaty should be legally binding so that all signatories must follow its rules or if it should be a non-binding political agreement where countries can enforce the treaty as they see fit. African and South Americans tend to favor an international arms treaty because they (typically) are the nations with the most serious problems with out of control arms trade, but these countries lack the monetary and political capability to enforce their own security sector. Drug and human trafficking name just a couple of the problems that these groups have to face concerning illegal weapons. Some countries that are more suspicious of a United Nations group regulating the arms trade are Middle Eastern nations. These countries fear that this treaty may infringe on their national sovereignty. This is especially a concern when they want to supply military assistance to non-state oriented groups. Questions to Consider:
Additional Resources:
1 Grossman, Zoltan. "History of Biological Weapons." HLSS - Social Sciences. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 2 Tucker, Jonathan B. "The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Challenges and Solutions." Monterey Institute of International Studies, Apr. 2001. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 3 Kerr, Paul Korski. "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends." Federation of American Scientists, 20 Feb. 2008. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 4 "Century of Biological and Chemical Weapons." BBC News - Home. 25 Sept. 2001. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 5 "Biological and Chemical Terror Agents." NMSU. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 6 Kerr, Paul Korski. "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends." Federation of American Scientists, 20 Feb. 2008. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 7 "Century of Biological and Chemical Weapons." BBC News - Home. 25 Sept. 2001. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 8 Goebel, Greg. "[4.0] A History Of Biological Warfare (2) / CB Terrorism." Vectorsite. Greg Global Public Domain. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 9 "PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS, OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE (GENEVA PROTOCOL)." Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 10 "The Great Chemical Weapons Hoax." Internationalist Group -- Reforge the Fourth International! Web. 01 Nov. 2010. 11 "BTWC: Text of the Convention." The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 12 "The Bio Weapons Convention." CDI - Center for Defense Information - Security Policy Research Organization. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 13 "The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) At A Glance | Arms Control Association." Arms Control Association | The Authoritative Source on Arms Control since 1971. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 14 "PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS, OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE (GENEVA PROTOCOL)." Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 15 "Biological Weapons Convention." Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 16 "Biological Weapons Convention: Executive Summary." Defenselink. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 17 "Sixth Review Conference of the State Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention." United Nations Office at Geneva, Nov. 2006. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 18 "BTWC: Text of the Convention." The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 19 Kerr, Paul Korski. "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends." Federation of American Scientists, 20 Feb. 2008. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 20 Tucker, Jonathan B. "The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Challenges and Solutions." Monterey Institute of International Studies, Apr. 2001. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 21 Goebel, Greg. "[4.0] A History Of Biological Warfare (2) / CB Terrorism." Vectorsite. Greg Global Public Domain. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 22 Tucker, Jonathan B. "The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Challenges and Solutions." Monterey Institute of International Studies, Apr. 2001. Web. 10 Oct. 2010. 23 "UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons." IANSA the International Voice against Gun Violence. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 24 Pampell Conaway, Camille. "Small Arms, Light Weapons, and Landmines." Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. Hunt Alternatives. Web. 7 Oct. 2010. 25 Boutwell, Jeffrey. "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War | Arms Control Association." Arms Control Association | The Authoritative Source on Arms Control since 1971. 1998. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 26 Shah, Anup. "Small Arms- They Cause 90% of Civilian Casualties." Global Issues: Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues That Affect Us All. 21 Jan. 2006. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 27 "The Global Threat of Small Arms and Light Weapons -- A Primer." Federation of American Scientists. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 28 Pampell Conaway, Camille. "Small Arms, Light Weapons, and Landmines." Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. Hunt Alternatives. Web. 7 Oct. 2010. 29 Small Arms and Light Weapons: Selected United Nations Documents. New York: United Nations, 2008. Print. 30 "NATO - Topic: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Mine Action." NATO - Homepage. Web. 01 Nov. 2010. 31 "The Global Threat of Small Arms and Light Weapons -- A Primer." Federation of American Scientists. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 32 "Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects." United Nations. Web. 33 Maze, Kerry. "Searching for Aid Effectiveness in Small Arms Assistance." UNIDIR.org. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2010. Web. 7 Oct. 2010. 34 "Bamako Declaration on an African." Global Policy Forum. Dec. 2000. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 35 "INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST THE ILLICIT MANUFACTURING OF AND TRAFFICKING IN." OAS - Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development. 1998. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 36 "EU Programme for Preventing and Combating..." Federation of American Scientists. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 37 Wood, Bryan. "Strengthening Enforcement of UN Arms Embargoes." International Action Network on Small Arms. Amnesty International. Web. 7 Oct. 2010. 38 Shah, Anup. "Small Arms- They Cause 90% of Civilian Casualties." Global Issues: Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues That Affect Us All. 21 Jan. 2006. Web. 08 Oct. 2010. 39 Pampell Conaway, Camille. "Small Arms, Light Weapons, and Landmines." Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. Hunt Alternatives. Web. 7 Oct. 2010. Download 66.16 Kb. Share with your friends:
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