Setting a lasting end to the military conflicts with armed groups on South Sudanese Territory.
Achieving a more effective implementation of Comprehensive
Peace Treaty/Naivasha Treaty.
Facilitating south Sudan’s foreign relationships with neighboring countries by ending the discussion about control over the ABYEI Region.
The situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestine Question.
Letter from the Executive Board
It is with great pleasure that I present the study guide for the simulation of the United Nations Security Council. The study guide should be a great starting point for research. It will help to become familiar with the topics and attain a better understanding of the problems that will be discussed throughout the conference.
Furthermore we encourage all delegates to develop a general understanding for the assigned country, for its foreign policy and its standpoint with regard to the agenda topic. In some cases exact and topic related statement may not be found which apply exactly to the committee topics, wherefore a general understanding of the county's culture and politics provides a framework for specific country position. With this, I wish you all the very best for the upcoming conference, with a hope to have a collectively enriching experience and debate.
Mohammad Shahrukh Ali
Suggested Pattern for Researching
Researching and understanding the United Nations and the Committee/Council being simulated – Its Mandate, including understanding historical work done on the agenda.
research on the allotted country. Understanding its polity, economy, military, culture, history, bilateral relations with other countries, ideological position on various other relevant issues related to the agenda etc.
Comprehending the Foreign Policy of the allotted country. It includes understanding the ideology and principles adopted by the country on the agenda. It further includes studying past actions taken by the country on the agenda and other related issues –specifically analyzing their causes and consequences. Reading the background guide thoroughly.
Researching further upon the agenda using the footnotes and links given in the guide and from other sources such as academic papers, institutional reports, national reports, news articles, blogs etc.
Understanding policies adopted by different blocs of countries (example: NATO, EU etc.) and major countries involved in the agenda. Including their position, ideology and adopted past actions.
Characterizing the agenda into sub-topics and preparing speeches and statements on them. It is the same as preparing topics for the moderated caucuses and their content.
Preparing a list of possible solutions and actions the UNSC can adopt on the issue as per your country’s policies.
Assemble proof/evidence for any important piece of information/allegation you are going to use in committee and keeping your research updated using various news sources.
Lastly, we would expect all the delegates to put in serious efforts in research and preparation for the simulation and work hard to make it a fruitful learning experience for all. Feel free to contact if you have any queries or doubts.
ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. Calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The Security Council also recommends to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and the admission of new Members to the United Nations. And, together with the General Assembly, it elects the judges of the International Court of Justice.
You are also advised to look into the practice of the UN Security Council and how the Charter affects the same. This will be highly informative as to the inner workings of the SC and hence, debate on it.
PROOF/EVIDENCE IN COUNCIL
Evidence or proof is from the following sources will be accepted as credible in the committee:
1. News Sources
a. REUTERS – Any Reuters’ article which clearly makes mention of the fact stated or is in contradiction of the fact being stated by another delegate in council can be used to substantiate arguments in the committee. (http://www.reuters.com/ )
b. State operated News Agencies – These reports can be used in the support of or against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any country as such but in that situation, they can be denied by any other country in the council. Some examples are,
i. RIA Novosti (Russia)http://en.rian.ru/
ii. IRNA (Iran) http://www.irna.ir/ENIndex.htm
iii. Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (P.R. China)
2. Government Reports: These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country. However, a nuance is that a report that is being denied by a certain country can still be accepted by the Executive Board as credible information. Some examples are,
i. Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America http://www.state.gov/index.htm or the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm
ii. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India (http://www.mea.gov.in/) or People’s Republic of China (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/).
iii. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Reports http://www.un.org/en/members/ (Click on any country to get the website of the Office of its Permanent Representative.)
iv. Multilateral Organizations like the NATO (http://www.nato.in t/cps/en/natolive/index.htm), ASEAN (http://www.aseansec.org/ ), OPEC (http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/ ), etc.
3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered are credible information or evidence for the Executive Board of the UNSC.
i. UN Bodies like the UNSC (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/) or UNGA (http://www.un.org/en/ga/).
ii. UN Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (http://www.iaea.org/ ), World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/ ), International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm ), International Committee of the Red Cross (http://www.icrc.org/eng/index.jsp ), etc.
iii. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System (http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm ), the International Criminal Court (http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC )
South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011 did not resolve internal conflicts in either country. Sudan’s war in Darfur never stopped, and in the months surrounding South Sudan’s independence, war broke out in Sudan’s disputed Abyei, as well as
South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Since the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the international community has disregarded democratization in both, settling for a peaceful split. After independence, the ruling parties in Khartoum and
Juba were more reluctant than ever to make concessions to political foes or marginalized communities. Armed groups on both sides of the border remained interconnected. At independence, South Sudan’s army still had divisions in Sudan, and Khartoum retained links with southern armed groups. Many southern militias are now part of the armed opposition in South Sudan, while others made deals with Juba before the outbreak of war, and most Sudanese rebels are allied to the Juba government. A history of tangled relationships and competing individual and group interests explain how, within
days, the conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan merged and suggest how dangerous it would be to leave them unaddressed.
While this report includes recommendations that relate to both the interconnected wars, its descriptive sections focus on the outbreak of the South Sudan conflict, in particular the fighting season from December 2013 to mid-June 2014, during which the major cross-border alliances were formed. It comes after a series that analysed Sudan’s spreading conflicts, as well as a body of research examining other elements of South Sudan’s civil war.In less detail, all discussed the conflicts’ cross-border dimensions and issued still relevant recommendations, notably with respect to the peace processes.
South Sudan profile - Timeline
A chronology of key events
1899-1955 - South Sudan is part of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, under joint British-Egyptian rule.
1956 - Sudan gains independence from joint British-Egyptian rule.
First civil war 1962 - Civil war led by the southern seperatist Anya Nya movement begins with north.
1969 - Group of socialist and communist Sudanese military officers led by Col Jaafar Muhammad Numeiri seizes power; Col Numeiri outlines policy of autonomy for south.
1972 - Government of Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiri concedes a measure of autonomy for southern Sudan in a peace agreement signed in Addis Ababa.
1978 - Oil discovered in Unity State in southern Sudan.
Second civil war
1983 - Fighting breaks out again between north and south Sudan, under leadership of John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), after Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiri abolishes South Sudan's autonomy.
1988 - Democratic Unionist Party - part of Sudan's ruling coalition government - drafts cease-fire agreement with the SPLM, but it is not implemented.
1989 - Military seizes power in Sudan.
The second Sudanese civil war lasted from 1983-2005
2001 - Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan Al-Turabi's party, the Popular National Congress, signs memorandum of understanding with the southern rebel SPLM's armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Mr Al-Turabi is arrested the next day.
2002 - SPLA and Sudanese sign agreement on six-month renewable cease-fire in central Nuba Mountains - a key rebel stronghold.
Talks in Kenya lead to a breakthrough agreement between southern rebels and Sudanese government on ending the civil war. The Machakos Protocol provides for the south to seek self-determination after six years.
North-south peace deal
2005 January - North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ends civil war; deal provides for a permanent ceasefire, autonomy for the south, a power-sharing government involving rebels in Khartoum and a south Sudanese referendum on independence in six years' time.
2005 July - Former southern rebel leader John Garang is sworn in as first vice-president. A new Sudanese constitution which gives the south a large degree of autonomy is signed.
2005 August - South Sudanese leader John Garang is killed in a plane crash. He is succeeded by Salva Kiir Mayardiit. Mr Garang's death sparks deadly clashes in the capital between southern Sudanese and northern Arabs.
2005 September - Power-sharing government is formed in Khartoum.
2005 October - Autonomous government is formed in South Sudan, in line with the January 2005 peace deal. The administration is dominated by former rebels.
Fragile peace 2006 November - Hundreds die in fighting centred on the southern town of Malakal - the heaviest between northern Sudanese forces and former rebels since the 2005 peace deal.
2007 October - SPLM temporarily suspends participation in national unity government, accusing Khartoum of failing to honour the 2005 peace deal. Returns to government in December.
2008 March - Tensions rise over clashes between an Arab militia and SPLM in the disputed Abyei area on the north-south divide - a key sticking point in the 2005 peace accord.
Tension over Abyei 2008 May - Intense fighting breaks out between northern and southern forces in disputed oil-rich town of Abyei.
2008 June - Southern Sudanese leader Salva Kiir and Sudanese President Omar Bashir agree to seek international arbitration to resolve dispute over Abyei.
2008 October - Allegations that Ukrainian tanks hijacked off the coast of Somalia were bound for southern Sudan spark fears of an arms race between the North and former rebels in the South.
2009 June - Khartoum government denies it is supplying arms to ethnic groups in the south to destabilise the region.
2009 July - North and south Sudan say they accept ruling by arbitration court in The Hague shrinking disputed Abyei region and placing the major Heglig oil field in the north.
Independence referendum 2009 December - Leaders of North and South reach deal on terms of referendum on independence due in South by 2011.
Numerous rebellions arose in the run-up to South Sudan's independence
South Sudan's enemy within
2010 January - President Omar Bashir says he will accept referendum result, even if South opted for independence.
2011 January - The people of South Sudan vote in favour of full independence from Sudan.
2011 February - Clashes between the security forces and rebels in southern Sudan's Jonglei state leave more than 100 dead. Fighting breaks out near Abyei.
2011 March - Government of South Sudan says it is suspending talks with the North, accusing it of plotting a coup.
2011 May - North occupies disputed border region of Abyei.
2011 June - Governments of north and south Sudan sign accord to demilitarize the disputed Abyei region and let in an Ethiopian peacekeeping force.
New state born 2011 9 July - Independence day.
2011 August - UN says at least 600 people are killed in ethnic clashes in the state of Jonglei.
2011 September - South Sudan's cabinet votes to designate Ramciel - a planned city in Unity State - as the future capital.
2011 October - President Salva Kiir makes historic first visit Khartoum since independence. South Sudan and Sudan agree to set up several committees tasked with resolving their outstanding disputes.
At 75 people are killed when rebels of the South Sudan Liberation Army attack the town of Mayom, in Unity State.
2011 November - South Sudan blames Sudan for the aerial bombardment of a refugee camp in Yida, in Unity State; Sudan's army denies being responsible.
2012 January - South Sudan declares a disaster in Jonglei State after some 100,000 flee clashes between rival ethnic groups.
2012 February - Sudan and South Sudan sign non-aggression pact at talks on outstanding secession issues, but Sudan then shuts down the South's oil export pipelines in a dispute over fees. South Sudan halves public spending on all but salaries in consequence.
2012 April - After weeks of border fighting, South Sudan troops temporarily occupy the oil field and border town of Heglig before being repulsed. Sudanese warplanes raid the Bentiu area in South Sudan.
2012 May - Sudan pledges to pull its troops out of the border region of Abyei, which is also claimed by South Sudan, as bilateral peace talks resume.
2012 July - Country marks first anniversary amid worsening economic crisis and no let-up in tension with Sudan.
2012 August - Some 200,000 refugees flee into South Sudan to escape fighting between Sudanese army and rebels in Sudan's southern border states.
2012 September - The presidents of Sudan and South Sudan agree trade, oil and security deals after days of talks in Ethiopia. They plan to set up a demilitarised buffer zone and lay the grounds for oil sales to resume. They fail however to resolve border issues including the disputed Abyei territory.
2013 March - Sudan and South Sudan agree to resume pumping oil after a bitter dispute over fees that saw production shut down more than a year earlier. They also agreed to withdraw troops from their border area to create a demilitarised zone.
2013 June - President Kiir dismisses Finance Minister Kosti Manibe and Cabinet Affairs Minister Deng Alor over a multi-million dollar financial scandal, and lifts their immunity from prosecution.
2013 July - President Kiir dismisses entire cabinet and Vice-President Riek Machar in a power struggle within the governing Sudan People's Liberation Movement.
2013 December - Civil war erupts as President Salva Kiir accuses his ex-Vice-President, Riek Machar, of plotting to overthrow him.
2014 January - A ceasefire is signed but broken several times over subsequent weeks, and further talks in February fail to end the violence that displaces more than a million people by April.
2014 April - UN says pro-Machar forces sack the oil town of Bentiu, killing hundreds of civilians.
2014 May - UN envoy Toby Lanzer says conflict has resulted in slaughter of thousands, displacement of more than a million and five million in need of humanitarian aid.
2014 July - UN Security Council describes the food crisis in South Sudan as the worst in the world.
2014 August - Peace talks begin in Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa and drag on for months as fighting continues.
2015 February - General elections due in June are called off because of the ongoing conflict.
China announces the deployment of an infantry battalion on a UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.
2015 March - Rebels free 250 child soldiers following negotiations with Unicef, which says 12,000 child soldiers are involved in current conflict.
2015 August - Despite "reservations" and under threat of UN sanctions, President Salva Kiir signs an internationally-mediated peace deal under which rebel leader Riek Machar will return as vice-president.
Political Malfeasants in the SPLM
To make sense of what was going on within the SPLM prior to the violence, it is appropriate to explore a number of factors that include power structure within the party, the weak institutional
restraints on excessive power in the hands of a few individuals, lack of adherence to the party constitution, and the growing number of factions and power centers within the SPLM. Despite the signing of the CPA and subsequently becoming a ruling party, the SPLM seems to have maintained its pre-CPA politico-military high command hierarchy. For example, when the time came in 2005 to structure the SPLM-led national government, giving positions seems to
have been done on the basis of seniority in the Movement. This was demonstrated evidently when the positions of the president, vice president and the speaker of the National Legislative
Assembly followed the order of this seniority. This may also explain why a number of senior party officials working in the government prefer to use their military titles instead of the official designations associated with their current positions. In the interest of maintaining discipline, order, strategic vision, and direction after the untimely death of Dr. John Garang, the longtime leader of the SPLM, it certainly made sense to follow the established structure and hierarchy as a
preventive measure. While keeping the Movement’s hierarchy was seen as strategic, it now presents a challenge to civilian leadership, which should be built on individual aspirations, experience, merits, and integrity. This liberation hierarchy undercuts democratic values of free and competitive politics. The state of affairs within the SPLM certainly exemplifies this reality. With the understanding that leadership can only be accessed on the order of wartime seniority,
this clearly means that officials can only ascend to the top of the ladder by toeing this dictatorial line. This is proving unsustainable.
Being that most members of the party leadership are aging, and each of them eyes an opportunity to ascend to the top, the wait in the superficially long line is becoming unbearable for some, leading to uncompromising political behavior. Arguably, the growing number of
factions and tensions within the party can be partly attributed to this rigid structure. When access to the top of party leadership is determined hierarchically, it seems to go contrary to the democratic ideals championed and popularized by the SPLM itself during over two decades campaign for liberty and freedom in the Sudan. This poses a clear danger to the future of the party, especially if it deprives itself of youth and new ideas. One would expect a party with philosophy so entrenched in the fight against injustices and misrule from successive regimes in Khartoum to have loosened its grip on old dysfunctional party structures that were appropriate for wartime and adopted a new party structure that corresponds to the democratic aspirations and expectations of the people of South Sudan. Looking at how the political crisis evolved, it is apparent that the party had no mechanisms for restraining individual powers. The president, the former vice president, and the former secretary general of the party had come out publicly against each other and it appears there is no mechanism within the party to reprimand and restrain these individuals from taking an internal dispute to the streets. This public airing of grievances seems to be deeply rooted in ill-defined communication loops and channels of accountability within the party. The formal platforms through which the party should debate and address critical issues of governance seem, at the very least, minimal. Confronted with this ostensible lack of avenues to channel redress, party officials were forced to go public on matters that could otherwise have been handled internally. This attitude may also have had something to do with Riek and Pagan’s rather arrogant view of the president as less educated or that he lacks capacity as head of state. What is more, despite claims of the need for democratic reforms within the party, Riek Machar, based on a number of interviews with party officials, wanted to cut a political deal with Salva Kiir that will make him the next chairman without necessarily going through the convention. The deal he sought was described as similar in nature to Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s agreement
where Blair won the elections, but allowed Brown to complete the term. The failure of Salva Kiir to grant an endorsement to that effect partly explains the current crisis. Even though the changes advocated for in the SPLM constitution were accepted, they were not going to apply in the upcoming party convention, because the convention would need to endorse the changes first before these become effective, a situation that was only going to happen after the convention. Since there was impatience within the rank and file, the contenders did not really want to follow the party constitution to the letter and spirit. Partly, because the incumbent chairman intended to
squeeze his opponents out of the party, a situation that was seen by his opponents as a threat against their political careers.
Political and Socio-economic Factors
As narrated in the foregoing sections, the crisis developed strictly as a political issue within the party, but there were underlying post CPA social issues that had not been addressed. Particularly, there are three main social factors that could have played a significant role in escalating what strictly speaking, was a political dispute into an open war. These include the history of the liberation process induced ethnic rivalry, disequilibrium in the army, and poor social indicators.
As discussed previously, the SPLM right after its founding experienced many internal tensions, including the split between the unionists and separatists and the 1991 split. These splits have in one form or another pitted the Dinka community against that of the Nuer and this political rivalry had gotten worse over the years. Deadly wars have been fought between these two communities and planted bitterness and hatred. The 1991 split more than any other incident
drove the two communities apart, especially after the well-known “Bor Massacre” in which thousands of Dinka civilians were killed allegedly on orders from Riek. These political feuds were turned ethnic and became a duel of superiority of one ethnic group over the other. Despite a number of massacres, the thing that was most damaging to the social glue between the two communities was the fact that the whole area of Upper Nile region covering the three states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper was completely isolated from the rest of the country. Over 30 militia groups carved out territories within the Nuer nation and kept those territories isolated. As a result,
the region did not benefit from any central administration over those years and the citizens grew divergent views from the rest of the country. Even after the CPA almost all the rebellions came
from Upper Nile region. The Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal regions, which were under SPLA control over a long period of time, seem more stable.
Ethnic rivalry and poor provision of social services make for a deadly combination. Many areas in the Upper Nile region are inaccessible because they are remote and vast, further isolating communities. The government did little in the rural areas to demonstrate its seriousness in improving people’s lives. Many young people, who essentially became the white army, had not had access to formal education or jobs, and it became very easy to arouse their frustrations with the government and provided a fighting force for the rebellions. Had there been jobs and schools
and good living conditions, ethnic rivalry would not have engulfed the whole population as quickly as it has been the case throughout this crisis. So it is fair to say that while political rivalries
started the conflict, they may have only functioned as a trigger to social and economic issues that had built up over many years.
One other key issue that could have contributed to the violence is the issue of disproportionately higher representation of the ethnic Nuers in the army. As mentioned previously, during the civil
war and particularly after the split in the SPLM/A, the Nasir faction under Riek Machar splintered into many armed ethnic militias and controlled a number of territories. Some of these militias were either allied to the Government of Sudan, the SPLA or were independent. After the signing of the CPA, President Salva Kiir in what became known as the Juba Declaration essentially invited all the militia groups to join the government and the SPLA in the name of
peace. The poorly planned integration of these militias into the SPLA basically created a loophole within the rank and file of the SPLA and the fighting force became overwhelmingly ethnic Nuers. This disproportionate representation of the Nuers in the army is alleged to have fanned ethnic-based violence, as many of the militia commanders were absorbed at inflated ranks, putting them above their former foes in the SPLA. Apart from the aforementioned social factors, which might have possibly drove the current violence gripping the South Sudanese state, there are also political and economic issues that could explain the eruption of the conflict. Politically speaking, it is not an exaggeration to state
that South Sudan is practically a one-party state. This reality stems from the fact that the liberation movement turned-political party has unparalleled loyalty from the masses, thanks to its
sustained focus of leading the liberation struggle for over two decades. Given this SPLM dominance, it has not been possible for any other political party to pose a strong challenge to South Sudan’s ruling party, and this means that SPLM top leaders vying for the top seat in the party could afford to vigorously compete with each other internally as there is no significant external competition. In other words, lack of a strong opposition to the SPLM from without ensured that power contest among SPLM leaders intensified, as getting the party chairmanship automatically guarantees one’s aspiration to occupying the highest office in the land, that of the president. Since the signing of the CPA in 2005, economic and political power have been concentrated in the hands of the ruling class, and this undoubtedly by and large left the public susceptible and
vulnerable to the whims and machinations of some political entrepreneurs who would do anything to get to or remain in power. A quick look at the way public expenditure was conducted during the interim period leading into the post-independence period reveals that Juba was literally taking over eighty per cent of the national budget alone. It goes without saying, therefore, that the ten states and seventy-nine counties combined have had to share less than twenty per cent to run their affairs. In a country where there is a vibrant private sector, this might not be particularly problematic. However, given the fact that the South Sudanese economy had to
largely depend on the public sector, and this gave the same political elite unrivalled influence to direct things as they see fit even when this implies preying on vulnerable youth. In a sense, understanding the nexus between youth unemployment and insecurity lies here.