File Title space weaponization good 2
Space Debris 2NC --- ASATs
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- ASATs substantially increases space debris
- Their evidence is based on US ASATs, but other nations wouldn’t restrain themselves
Space Debris 2NC --- ASATsSpace weapons will be shot down by ASATsKrepon and Clary 3 – Michael Krepon, served as the president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Christopher Clary, Research Assistant for the Weaponization of Space Project at the Stimson Center, April 2, 2003, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space,” Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/spacebook.pdf The quest for preemptive space warfare capabilities alongside dominant conventional military capabilities is therefore bound to be viewed in worrisome terms by potential adversaries. The flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry is thus likely to generate low-cost blocking action, comparable to the countermeasures likely to be employed by states fearing the viability of prospective U.S. missile defenses. Space weaponry, like missile defenses, can be designed and sized for the limited purpose of dealing with maverick leaders. Both need not be confined to specific locations; they can go where directed. Additional deployments can be added rather quickly from covert stocks. Moreover, the goal sought by advocates of U.S. space weaponry, as well as missile defenses, is not deterrence but dominance. Space weapons have another thing in common with missile defenses: They are both vulnerable to countermeasures. The deployment of dominating, yet vulnerable, capabilities by one state will not go unanswered by potential adversaries with access to space. Therefore, the deployment by the United States of satellite killers or battle stations in space would naturally generate company in the form of space mines or other countermeasures. Space would thus become a mixed venue, populated by satellites and satellite killers. Because of their presumed military value and because of trailing space mines, deployed space weapons would require considerable protection against attack, like the screening by surface combatants and submarines that accompany aircraft carriers at sea. An alternative to this expensive panoply of defensive measures could be to attack preemptively space mines before their deployment, but this would not only constitute the “appropriation of space” that is prohibited by international law and customary practice, it would also constitute an act of warfare against a space-faring nation or consortium claiming to exercise legitimate rights protected—or at least not prohibited—by international law. Space warfare capabilities and preemption strategies are therefore linked, as well as inferentially advertised by the Bush administration’s national security strategy. Because the prospective military utility of preemptive strikes from space, added to U.S. terrestrial strategic capabilities and prospective missile defenses, is sufficiently great to threaten the viability of the Chinese and perhaps the Russian nuclear deterrents, countermeasures could be expected. Preemption capabilities would thus become a two-way street in space. The weaker adversary would be able to gain only temporary advantage by the first use of ASAT weapons, but this would be better than ceding all advantage to the side with stronger space and terrestrial warfare capabilities. The hair trigger that characterized nuclear deterrence during the Cold War would be elevated to the heavens through the deployment of ASAT weapons. As one close observer of U.S. space policy, Bruce DeBlois of the Council on Foreign Relations, has asked, “Will this generation’s legacy be to provide a constant threat of space weapons, just as the constant threat of nuclear weapons has diminished?”43 ASATs substantially increases space debrisKaufman, Hertzfeld, and Lewis 8 – Richard Kaufman, member of the board of directors and a vice chair of Economists for Peace and Security and Director of Bethesda Research Institute, Henry Hertzfeld, Senior Research Scientist at the Space Policy Institute of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, September 2008, “Space, Security and the Economy,” http://www.epsusa.org/publications/papers/spacesecurity.pdf It is known that the satellite that China destroyed was failing and would have been destroyed of its own accord when it entered earth’s atmosphere. Its destruction by a missile is a matter of great concern because of what it suggests about space policy and because of the problem of space debris. The impact created thousands of large pieces of debris that will remain in orbit in the most densely utilized portion of space for decades. Given the speed that space debris travels, any satellite in its path is endangered.8 It is estimated that a piece of debris in low earth orbit would strike a satellite with the force of a one-ton object that fell off a five-story building.9 At some point the buildup of debris from such events could threaten the safety of space operations. In 2007 there were about 13,000 pieces of debris in orbit large enough to damage or destroy spacecraft. This includes objects of various sizes. If other nations conduct their own ASAT tests causing the weapons or the satellites to break up, the debris problem will become much worse. This issue is contributing to the increasingly serious issue of space traffic management because of the growing number of space launches by government and non-government organizations and the positioning of satellite constellations, among other factors.10 Their evidence is based on US ASATs, but other nations wouldn’t restrain themselvesKrepon and Katz-Hyman 5 – Michael Krepon, president and CEO of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Michael Katz-Hyman, research assistant at Stimson, July 2005, “Space Weapons and Proliferation,” Stimson Institute, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Space_Weapons_and_Proliferation.pdf Because of the potential dangers posed by debris to US and friendly satellites, the Pentagon now proposes to focus on offensive space warfare capabilities featuring temporary and reversible effects. There are, however, no guarantees that adversaries would engage in space warfare using similarly polite rules. Dictating the rules of warfare has not been easy for the United States on the ground, and may be no easier in space. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
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