The Chinese asat test was a miscalculation – they want to adhere to the rules of the road and a new U. S. offer would give them political cover to do it

Download 73.33 Kb.
Size73.33 Kb.


The Chinese ASAT test was a miscalculation – they want to adhere to the rules of the road and a new U.S. offer would give them political cover to do it

Morrig, 08 (Frank, Aviation Week and Space Technology, “China Appears To Regret Asat Test”, 5/12,
China's leaders miscalculated the international reaction to the country's antisatellite (Asat) weapon test last year, and likely regret that they let their research-and-development bureaucracy carry it out, says a top U.S. expert on the Chinese space program. "The Chinese took very careful aim and shot themselves in the foot with that test," says Joan Johnson-Freese, chairman of the National Security Decision-Making Dept. at the U.S. Naval War College. "I think they now are now recognizing that the international condemnation due them was actually moderated." Testifying before the Senate Commerce space, aeronautics and related sciences subcommittee, Johnson-Freese said it is impossible to know exactly what motivated the test, given the layers of Chinese government secrecy. But she says an emerging consensus among China-watchers holds that it was the logical outcome of an Asat-weapon development program started in response to the U.S. program that tested an air-launched satellite interceptor against a defunct weather satellite. Military research and development is heavily "bureaucratized" and "very stovepiped," Johnson-Freese says, emphasizing that she is speaking for herself and not her government employers. "The engineers who were in charge of that technology development program put it forward as 'it's time to test,'" she says. "I think they severely underestimated international response. I think they now regret underestimating that response." While observers in Beijing believe that Chinese President Hu Jintao authorized the test, they doubt that he had a clear understanding of the threat it would signify for other spacecraft below the 537-mi. altitude of the target Feng Yun 1C spacecraft, which was also an outmoded weather satellite (AW&ST Jan. 22, 2007, p. 24; Feb. 12, 2007, p. 20). "They characterized the debris as an overall increase in debris rather than looking at it in terms of the risk to spacecraft," she says of the test, which was described as the worst satellite fragmentation event in the 50-year history of spaceflight. "It was a lot of bad decision-making on their part." Once the outcry started, government authorities there canceled a planned meeting in China on space-debris mitigation because they didn't want to face the "harsh" condemnation they expected and felt they deserved, Johnson-Freese says, suggesting "they are now deeply regretting the situation that they brought on themselves." A big element of that situation is the ammunition they have given to their military counterparts in the U.S. and elsewhere, who point to the test as evidence of China's aggressive military-space policies.
China opposes space weaponization – they won’t do it unless provoked by the US. Now is key for the US to demonstrate peaceful intentions in space

Baofu, 07. (Wang, a research fellow and deputy director of the Strategic Studies Institute. ‘Outer space not let to overcast with "war clouds"’ People’s Daily Online, 4/3,
The United States is a nation of decisive influence with its future outer space exploration and development. In fact, what the global community is concerned about is not its development trend with its outer space technology but "unilateral hues" of its outer space policy. In August of 2006, the US government promulgated the new "National Space Policy", with an allegation that any country or individual "hostile to the US interest were not allowed to enter into the outer space", indicating its mood or intention to access to outer space resources exclusively. The growth of modern space technology has opened wide prospects for the humankind to know about the outer space and have access to it peacefully. In the meantime, it should also be acknowledged that there has been a tendency of capitalizing on a nation's advantages in its space technology to pursue its own absolute security. For years, many countries have done a lot for the attainment of a grand goal for the peaceful use of the outer space. Since the late 1950s, the UN General Assembly has listed the outer space issue on its agenda and signed a couple of documents, including the "Outer Space Treaty", the "Partial Test Ban Treaty" and the "Moon Treaty", contributing positively to the restrictions on and prevention of weaponization in the outer space. China, with a certain spaceflight capability, has kept to its principled stance of opposing the weaponization of space. Since 1985, its government has time and again reiterated at conferences for disarmament at the UN its firm opposition to the deployment of weaponry system and armed races of any form in the outer space. Furthermore, in view of loopholes in the spheres of outer space weaponization in the existing international treaties, China has for years proposed negotiating agendas at the UN Conference for Disarmament and actively pressed ahead with the formation of a new banning treaty on outer space weaponization along with Russia. As the outer space is the common property of the humankind, it represents a universal aspiration of the international community to use it for peaceful purposes. It remains a thorny issue whether or not the outer space of the future will be a realm of peace to bring happiness to people or be turned into the fourth dimensional battleground of fierce fighting next to those on the land and in maritime waters and blue skies. This tough issue is now indeed at the crossroad with a pressing demand for a quick solution. Either out of its "capabilities" or of its strategic intentions", the United States, beyond any doubt, has a special accountability and obligations in this regard. Faced with severe challenges, it is possible to make the outer space a new sphere or a new realm to benefit the humankind only with pooled consensuses and joint efforts made by the entire global community.
China wants to ban space weaponization – the satellite test was because the US wouldn’t agree

Zissis. 2007. (Carl, Feb. 22. “China’s Anti-Satellite Test” Council on Foreign Relations
What is the diplomatic reason for China's test? Beijing has joined with Moscow in its longtime efforts to convince the United States to sign a treaty banning the deployment of weapons in space. The two nations drafted an outline presented in Geneva in 2002 that made little headway. A month after conducting the January 11 test, Beijing called for talks on a space weapons treaty. Uncomfortable with Washington's de facto dominance of space, efforts by Moscow and Beijing “to impose some kind of weapons-free zone is designed largely to restrict U.S. activities in space,” Martel told in a recent podcast on U.S. space policy.

A space code of conduct solves for ASAT deployment

Krepon and Heller, 04 *co-founder of The Henry L. Stimson Center and Director of the Center's Space Security Project AND ** Research Assistant on the Stimson Center's Space Security Project (Michael and Micheal, Disarmament Diplomacy, “A Model Code of Conduct for Space Assurance”, May/June,
The last flight test of an ASAT during the Cold War occurred nineteen years ago. Rudimentary ASAT systems that were once deployed have long ago been dismantled or mothballed. No military establishment other than the Pentagon appears eager to resume ASAT testing. A simulated ASAT test, the XSS-11, is scheduled for this fall, and another ASAT program, NFIRE, has tests scheduled for early 2006. The door would then be open for other nations to follow suit. Space Assurance would be severely impaired by the flight testing and deployment of ASATs. There is a near-term alternative to this mistaken course. It will take many, many years for an international convention banning space warfare activities to be negotiated and to enter into force. In the mean time, construction is needed to raise barriers against the flight testing and deployment of ASATs and other space warfare devices. One approach advocated by the Henry L. Stimson Center's Space Security Project is the negotiation of a code of conduct between space-faring nations to prevent incidents and dangerous military activities in space. Key activities to be covered under such a code of conduct include avoiding collisions and simulated attacks; creating special caution and safety areas around satellites; developing safer traffic management practices; prohibiting anti-satellite tests in space; providing reassurance through information exchanges, transparency and notification measures; and adopting more stringent space debris mitigation measures. Codes of conduct are widely accepted in international relations. They have gained new currency to deal with the threats posed by proliferation and terrorism. During the Cold War, the United States entered into executive agreements with the Soviet Union to prevent dangerous military practices at sea, on the ground, and in the air. The 1972 US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement has served as an effective model for comparable agreements signed by more than thirty other navies. The 1989 Prevention of Dangerous Military Practices Agreement signed by Washington and Moscow continues to have great value. Space also deserves "rules of the road" to help prevent incidents and dangerous military practices. If we are to choose space assurance instead of space weapons, space-faring nations might well consider negotiating a code of conduct that allows everyone to continue to reap the national security, civil, commercial and scientific benefits that space now provides.
Mining would revolutionize the world and spur space explaration

Bright 07—editor of eastfeild

[James, 9/26, Helium 3 could revolutionalize the world,]

Imagine a world that is not dependent on petroleum and fossil fuels, a world which has taken a giant leap forward towards space colonization. Although this may seem like an impossibility, this utopia is getting closer to becoming a reality and I welcome it with open arms. Currently The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space Colonization Technical Committee is developing plans to have a moon base established as early as 2015 according to a position statement on Aside from the obvious interest of lunar colonization, a rare type of Helium called Helium 3 could be mined from the surface of the moon and then transferred by shuttlecraft to Earth. H3 is what powers our Sun. Particles of the element are pushed off from the sun and then bombarded by cosmic rays which knock neutrons out of the Helium particles. The particles then combine, forming H3. The benefits of H3 are unquestionable. The compound can be used a safer fuel for nuclear reactors. Just the concept of safer nuclear power plants excites me. But unfortunately there are only small amounts of H3 on Earth. There is enough to be studied but not be utilized.The Earth-bound H3 burns up in the atmosphere, where as the moon has no atmosphere and is therefore literally coated with the compound. The reason we would want to harness the power of H3 is due to its incredibly low rate of radioactivity. The dangers of a nuclear fusion reactor would be reduced to only minor threats according to H3 will not wear down nuclear reactors as fast as Uranium, therefore reducing the cost needed to replace the reactors. My question is, why are we not publicizing this? It's a great idea. The ability to colonize the moon and reduce the use of our depleting fossil fuels is an invaluable resource. As long as our Sun exists we would never run out of H3. For the first time the world would be looking at an infinite supply of energy. Aside from the elimination of highly-radioactive reactors and reduction of the use of fossil fuels the moon mining would create a whole new section for the global economy. The AIAASCTC's document asks for the United States to set up the lunar colony with the help of other international space agencies, so a free-market economy would be created for the area of mining and scientific research. This process would narrow the dividing lines between our country and other countries with space-exploration programs. I just hope we as a people are able to put our greed aside. This new development would be a major step forward towards global peace and understanding because of the need for several countries to work as one. Lastly, this would take us closer to the possibility of deep space exploration. It would be the first steps towards colonizing Mars. Telescopes could be set up on the surface of the Moon to view deeper parts of space with out any interference from an atmosphere. For these reasons, lunar colonization would launch us into a new area of progress for our economy and civilization.

Limitations on research and development of space weapons are good—most countries can’t weaponize now, but a US move to develop new technology will cause our enemies to copy our technology—thus ensuing space arms race would tank hegemony. The counterplan’s conditional offer provides an adequate hedging capability

Karl Mueller, Analyst @ RAND, March 27, 2002 (Is Weaponization of Space Inevitable?

2. Enlightened Self-Interest. The second scenario assumes that space weapons do in fact prove to be fairly useful and cost-effective. In this case, there is a good chance that U.S. security in particular would be best served by perpetuation of the space sanctuary for purely nationalist reasons: as the leading spacefaring state and the country most dependent upon satellites for its military power and economic wealth, the United States has the most to lose if those satellites become more vulnerable to attack. In addition, having invested vast resources in developing a preponderance of land, sea, air and unweaponized space power, a true space weapon revolution that wiped the clean the slate of military competition might well represent a net power loss for the United States relative to its rivals (as the steam, ironclad, and Dreadnought revolutions each did in turn for the Royal Navy).[40] One approach to dealing with this problem would be for the United States to announce a policy of conditional unilateral restraint in space weaponization: that it will not be the first nation to weaponize space, although it will continue to develop the relevant technologies in order to be prepared to respond in kind should other states violate the sanctuary. In this scenario, such an approach would not be motivated by an idealistic belief that eschewing space weapons would inspire or shame other states to do the same. Instead, it would be based on a hard-nosed, realist calculation: U.S. space weaponization would not only encourage other states to follow suit, but would greatly assist them in doing so, since they would be able to exploit the advantages of backwardness after the United States had paid the costs of trailblazing the new technologies. With the United States not leading the way, yet threatening to lift its self-restraint in the absence of reciprocity from its rivals (thus denying them the hope of establishing hegemony in space), other states might well find insufficient value in initiating space weaponization to justify its costs.
Only a space code of conduct solves the risks of weaponization and de-escalates the drive towards a space arms race

Wright, 7 - co-director of the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists (David, Boston Globe, “Protecting our future in space”, 10/3,
So, in looking forward, we need to figure out how to protect these space assets. And to do that, we must recognize that the space environment has changed dramatically since the Soviets launched a 2-foot-wide metal ball back in October 1957. First, space is now multinational. For decades, the United States and Soviet Union dominated space, but today more than 50 countries own satellites or a share in one, and nine countries have successfully launched satellites. People in nearly every corner of the globe now depend on the services satellites provide. As a result, space is getting crowded. Over the last five decades, the number of objects in space has increased dramatically. Today, more than 850 operating satellites and nearly 700,000 pieces of debris larger than a marble orbit the Earth. A collision with such a piece of debris could damage or destroy a satellite. Laws and "rules of the road" to guide operations in space, and controls on the production of space debris are increasingly necessary. Meanwhile, some resources are at a premium: Slots in the highly sought-after "geostationary band," the part of space where satellites can remain over a given point on Earth, are assigned by the International Telecommunications Union on a first-come, first-served basis. Many developing countries are concerned that slots won't be available when they are ready to use one. Second, space is in danger of becoming weaponized. While space has long supported military forces through reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellites, there currently are no weapons based in space. The Bush administration, however, has been pushing to develop weapons to deny other countries the use of space; these include space-based interceptors, which could be used to attack satellites. Meanwhile, China's successful test of an antisatellite weapon last January dramatically demonstrated that satellites are already at risk. Left unchecked, the fear that controlling space may afford a decisive military advantage threatens to trigger a space arms race. That would divert economic and political resources from other pressing issues, and hinder international cooperation necessary to make progress on such problems as nuclear nonproliferation and terrorism. In addition, increasing reliance on satellites for crucial military functions could cause instability in a crisis. Military war games suggest that the loss of important satellites, such as reconnaissance satellites, could spark a quick escalation in a conflict. Increased congestion and the threat of weaponization pose an important challenge: How do we continue to reap the benefits of space and avoid conflict? That requires a new model for space. Long over are the "Wild West" days when most viewed space as sparsely populated with little need for laws and rules, and so vast that no one was worried about degrading the environment. This new model must reflect our modern, interconnected world. It requires a legal framework to regulate space traffic, allocate limited resources equitably, and provide ways to resolve disputes. Particularly important are limits on potentially harmful or destabilizing technologies, such as a ban on testing and use of weapons that destroy satellites, and verification measures to instill confidence in and strengthen adherence to the regime. Forty years ago this month, the Outer Space Treaty entered into force. The treaty bans stationing weapons of mass destruction in space and extends the UN Charter to cover space operations. It lays out the fundamental principles for governing space, which should be used to create a legal framework that addresses today's issues and technologies. To do this, international negotiations are urgently needed. Some steps have been taken, but much more work is needed, especially on military issues. Since 1994, a handful of countries, including the United States, has blocked efforts to begin international negotiations on space arms control. Given its long history in space, the United States, which owns more than half of the active satellites orbiting today, instead should be promoting negotiations to protect our future in space as well as security on Earth.

AT Perm

Attempts to reassure allies will fail if we pursue militarization.

Krepon 01 (Michael Krepon, President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center and Co-Editor of Global Confidence Building: New Tools for Troubled Regions, “Lost in Space; The Misguided Drive Toward Antisatellite Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2001, lexis)

As the Rumsfeld report signifies, pressure is now mounting on the Bush administration to reassess U.S. space policy. Washington must choose one of two paths: dominance, which means putting more and better weapons in space or on earth than anyone else can afford, or reassurance. Because of the threat of asymmetrical warfare, dominance would be very hard to achieve and would have many adverse effects. The best way to protect space commerce and U.S. national security, therefore, is to avoid ASATs and weapons in space in the first place. An arms race in space was avoided during the Cold War due in part to the assumption that the Kremlin would compete with and nullify American moves. Now the sole remaining superpower may be tempted to slough off treaty constraints and to seek protection through unilateral initiatives. If this strategy is pursued, it will no doubt be couched in flexible and reassuring language. But U.S. allies and potential adversaries will see it as something else: the hubris of imperial overstretch. And they will react accordingly.

1NC AT: Generic WMD Terrorism

Gaza conflict causes Massive Terrorism- Spills over

Soltan 2007 (Gamal A. G senior research fellow at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and professor of political science at AUC, “Keeping Hamas at arm's length,” Bitter Lemons 12-17

The militant stronghold in Gaza could also facilitate terrorist activities across the borders with Egypt. The terrorist attacks in Egypt's Sinai over the past two years could not have been possible without direct assistance from across the border in Gaza. The irony here is that the threat of trans-border terrorism is likely to increase should Hamas' control over Gaza be weakened and should the organization's coherence be jeopardized under the pressures of its foes.

1. No WMD terrorism- they see it as counterproductive.

Brad Roberts, Inst Dfnse Analyses, and Michael Moodie, Chem & Bio Arms Cntrl Inst, ‘2 (Defense Horizons 15, July)

The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins' famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when." The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal. But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged--militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States--and much of the rest of the international community--to the annihilation of the perpetrators.
2. High risk aversion means no motivation.

Maerli (Science Program Fellow, Center for Int’l Security &Cooperation, Stanford Univ.) 2K [Morten Bremer, “Relearning the ABCs: Terrorists and “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer, pp. 108-119// -delo]

Furthermore, a group’s interest in ABC weaponry is not the same as obtaining such capabilities. Before any decision to deploy either conventional or non-conventional weapons, a terrorist group will have to judge its competence to use the weapon effectively. This will involve practical assessments of the level of training, skills, and technical and logistical capabilities requires. Terrorists are dependent on success, as failure could threaten the cohesiveness or the very existence of the group. This creates an environment of risk aversion where known and proven tactics will be preferred. Surely, if the stakes are high, terrorists , as others, can accept further risks. But there have always been enormous gaps between the potential of a weapon and the abilities and/or will to employ it by terrorists. Most terrorist groups, even those pursuing suicidal ends, protect their resources. Wasting personnel and money will inevitably harm the group and its long-term goals. Consequently, new means and methods of violence with unknown outcomes would be less appealing.

3. They prefer conventional weapons.

Craig Whitlock, Washington Post Foreign Service, July 5, 2007, The Washington Post, “Homemade, Cheap and Dangerous: Terror Cells Favor Simple Ingredients In Building Bombs,”

Counterterrorism officials have warned for years that Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction, such as a nuclear device or chemical or biological weapons. In response, U.S. military and intelligence agencies have invested vast amounts of money to block their acquisition. So far, however, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have relied almost solely on simple, homemade bombs crafted from everyday ingredients -- such as nail-polish remover and fertilizer -- when plotting attacks in Europe and the United States. The makeshift bombs lack the destructive potential of the conventional explosives that rake Iraq on a daily basis. They are also less reliable, as demonstrated by the car bombs that failed to go off in London last week after the culprits tried to ignite them with detonators wired to cellphones. But other attempts have generated plenty of mayhem and damage, including the kitchen-built backpack bombs that killed 52 people in the London public transit system on July 7, 2005. "It makes no difference to your average person if somebody puts a car bomb out there that is crude or one that is sophisticated," said Chris Driver-Williams, a retired British major and military intelligence officer who studies explosive devices used by terrorist groups. "If it detonates, all of a sudden you've got a very serious device and one that has achieved exactly what the terrorists wanted." The advantages of homemade explosives are that they are easy and cheap to manufacture, as well as difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect. According to one expert, the peroxide-based liquid explosives that an al-Qaeda cell allegedly intended to use to blow up nine transatlantic airliners last summer would have cost as little as $15 a bomb.
4. Their evidence relies on a misinformation campaign.

Adam Dolnik, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ‘3 (Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26.1)

Groups Motivated Predominantly by Islamist Ideology (al Qaida, PIJ). Groups in this category are even less discriminatory in their suicide bombings than those of the preceding category. But despite the religious justifications that allow them to dehumanize civilians more effectively, the CBRN involvement of thes e groups remains on the level of declared interest. And even though many open-source reports and court testimonies document Al Qaida’s attempts to acquire CBRN agents, no hard evidence of Al Qaida’s CBRN capabilities exists.91 Further, the fact that Al Qaida’s attempted acquisition of CBRN is public knowledge suggests that not much effort was invested into concealing this information; quite the contrary. Under Lesson 9 subsection d) of the Al Qaida training manual, the group’s members are instructed exactly on what to say when captured and interrogated. 92 It is quite possible that the existing claims of CBRN activities by the group’s members are part of a deliberate misinformation campaign designed to spread fear and to divert the U.S. government’s attention from other forms of attack. In terms of agent selection, it is interesting to note that these groups tend to claim possession of all types of CBRN weapons.
5. The most comprehensive study concludes Neg.

John Parachini, policy analyst at RAND, Fall 2003 (Washington Quarterly, l/n)

A series of 28 case studies, sponsored by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, spanning the last 50 years and compiled by more than a dozen researchers provides an empirical foundation to assess the motivations, behavior, and patterns related to terrorist interest, or alleged interest, in unconventional weapons. The same analytic questions were applied to each case, allowing for comparison across the entire set, n11 and strongly emphasized primary source material. When possible, the authors interviewed the perpetrators and arresting officials, reviewed court documents, and read the writings of the perpetrating groups. Upon this rigorous inspection, several of the empirical cases frequently cited in the media and scholarly literature proved to be apocryphal. n12 The initial set of case studies raised doubts about the alleged claims of terrorist interest in, or use of, chemical and biological weapons. New evidence and a more thorough investigation of old evidence still underscored the difficulty of assessing incomplete and complicated data of sensitive security cases. Considering the entire body of case study work, three other observations provide some conceptual framework for assessing the phenomena of terrorist acquisition and use of unconventional weapons. First, groups that seek to acquire and use unconventional weapons share a few key factors, such as the mindset of the group leaders, the opportunities they seized, and the technical capabilities they possessed. Second, exogenous and internal restraints do prevent some groups that engage in indiscriminate and often mass violence from pursuing unconventional weapons. Several factors inhibit terrorist and insurgency movements from pursuing CBRN weapons as their means of violence. Accounting for and understanding the impact of these restraints and disincentives to terrorist acquisition and use of unconventional weapons is critical. Bolstering the appropriate disincentives may serve as a critical component to a counterterrorism campaign. Finally, although religion in part orients some groups toward extreme violence, it does not necessarily lead groups to use poison, disease, or radioactive material as weapons. Group leaders that pursue unconventional weapons are just as likely to be obsessed with particular types of weapons, such as poison, for unconnected reasons, demonstrating behavior more akin to a serial poisoner than to a mass casualty terrorist. Alternatively, terrorist groups are just as likely to use unconventional weapons to capitalize on what they perceive as a practical opportunity to accomplish a desired end. For example, when the Tamil Tigers ran low on conventional weapons, they took chlorine containers from a nearby paper mill to use in the 1990 attack on an SLAF fort. Their immediate battlefield needs drove their use of toxic material as a weapon, not any unique fascination with chlorine as a weapon. n13 More than anything else, the observations made during these case studies convey that the mindset of leadership, opportunity, and technical capacity are the factors that most significantly influence a group's propensity to seek to acquire and to use unconventional weapons.

US-North Korea War Frontline

North Korean war won’t escalate or go nuclear
Meyer ‘03

(Carlton, Editor – G2 Military, The Mythical North Korean Threat,

Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States.  North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA.  North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive.  A North Korean attack would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army
North Korean conflict extremely unlikely

Meyer ‘03

(Carlton, Editor – G2 Military, The Mythical North Korean Threat,

The chance of a Korean war is extremely unlikely.  North Korean leaders realize they have no hope of success without major backing from China or Russia.  The previous South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, encouraged peace and visited North Korea.  The two countries are reconnecting rail lines and sent a combined team to the Olympics.  Even the United States is providing $500 million dollars a year in food to the starving North Koreans.  The new South Korean President, Roh-Moo-hyun was elected on a peace platform and suggested US troops may be gone within ten years.
Threats of war are a negotiating tactic – no risk of escalation

Schmitt ‘03

(Eric – Staff, NYT, International Herald Tribune, 3-14, Lexis)

North Korea is highly likely to step up its provocations in a bid to gain financial aid and diplomatic attention from the U
nited S
tates, according to the two most senior officers overseeing American military operations in South Korea. The commanders' remarks came as a senior State Department official said North Korea could produce highly enriched uranium as fuel for nuclear weapons within months, not years, much earlier than many experts believed possible. That would mean that North Korea could produce weapons-grade material from both its uranium and plutonium programs in a short period of time. "The enriched-uranium issue, which some have assumed is somewhere off in the fog of the distant future, is not," the official, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday. "It is only probably a matter of months, not years, behind the plutonium" program, he said. The new assessment came amid a string of recent provocations by North Korea that Kelly said were intended to "blackmail" the United States and intimidate its allies into bilateral talks on the terms favorable to North Korea. In recent days, North Korea has started a nuclear reactor that could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, conducted its first missile launching in three years and intercepted an air force reconnaissance plane in international airspace. The two senior military officers, Admiral Thomas Fargo, the commander of American forces in the Pacific, and General Leon LaPorte, the head of allied ground forces in South Korea, said North Korea would probably continue this pattern, perhaps by starting up its nuclear reprocessor, provoking an incident along the demilitarized zone or at sea, or even conducting an underground nuclear test. "It's highly likely they'll continue to politically escalate the situation," LaPorte told a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday. He added that the motive of North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, was to try to "guarantee the survival of his regime and to gain economic assistance for his failed economy." Fargo added, "I would not be surprised to see further provocations of some variety." Neither officer said there were any signs of an imminent attack by North Korean forces, and Fargo said the threat of war right now with North Korea was "low
." The United States has about 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea.


Increased space innovation creates a space bubble, turning case.

Tudor Vieru, Softpedia, “Another 'Space Bubble' Not Impossible,” 9/15/2010,

Space industry analysts believe that we may be heading for another space bubble, as it happened before in the 1990. And they have the official statistics to prove it.

At this point, private spaceflights are considered to be the future of space travel. Companies that aim to provide affordable seats on flights taking passengers to the edge of space are springing up all over the place.

All around the United States, private ventures are making deals among each other, or with local and federal authorities, for constructing new launch platforms or spaceports.

There are already seven federal and eight non-federal launch sites licensed by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and applications for many more are currently pending.

But experts say that the industry may be over-extending, and also overestimating the interest that people have in suborbital spaceflights, Technology Review reports.

Back in the 1990s, when satellite cell phones were all the rage, the space industry estimated that about 1,000 communications satellites will be launched to space over the next decade or so.

Countless start-ups popped up, seeking to meet this demand, which apparently never existed. After about 150 satellites were launched, the industry collapsed.

This happened because more and more communications companies decided to base their networks on land relays, circumventing the need for expensive satellites.

At this point in time, the same could happen to companies such as Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital), Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) and Virgin Galactic, to name but a few.

They are all developing unique spacecrafts, capable of either going to low-Earth orbit (LEO) and meeting up with the International Space Station (ISS), or take several passengers to the edge of space.

The Sierra Nevada Corporation, the Boeing Company, XCOR, PlanetSoace and Blue Origin are additional names from the industry that are producing various spacecraft designs.

But their supplies of ships, trained personnel and spaceports may contribute to creating an artificial growth bubble, that has little to do with the actual demand for such technologies and experts.

Undoubtedly, some private machines are needed, at least in the US, to fill in the void that the retirement of the space shuttles will leave behind. But this many will most likely do more harm than good.

Space travel isn’t possible – 4 reasons.

Nevada Space Grant, “The difficulties of space travel,” 7/27/2010,
Space exploration is a popular subject for science fiction writers. Often, the setting of the story will involve a distant date in the future that is hard for most to contradict as plausible, and capture the wildest fantasies of those who follow the story. Of most interest here, the workings in the plot will often be shaped by the space travel of man to likewise distant worlds which are also inventions of the writer’s yet equally impossible to disprove. While some predictions of future worlds have already failed to come to fruition with the passing of the deadline years predicted in their works, others have yet to be verified or refuted. At present, though, space exploration is a risky business, and most of the information we have collected from our own solar system is not the result of manned space travel but rather the data collection of unmanned probes. There are a number of challenges facing humankind’s transit through outer space today. Below are some of these difficulties:

1. Difficulties of repairs – Previous manned space exploration missions have had their share of problems with needed repairs and failed launches. At worst, spacecraft have failed to get off the ground and people have died; for example, the Challenger disaster occurred in less than two minutes after the initial firing of the rocket boosters. Even in cases where disaster has been avoided, though, it was lucky that the distances traveled were not of considerable length. For space travel missions of considerable distances, there is a great risk that something could go wrong with the spacecraft, but that the crew will not have the necessary resources to fix the problem from space, and it is not as if the craft could easily turn around and come back home.

2. Costs – Federal governments and private investors alike have talked about space exploration and colonization of bodies in our solar system in the near future. However, this would be fiscally feasible for only a select few. Space travel, at present, is immensely expensive, and even short trips would conceivably set the spender back millions of dollars. Certainly, manned exploration of space is a luxury.

3. Sustainability of life There is not a wealth of past precedence for the continual habitation of space. ₪ stopped here at 19:13 ₪ The Space Station Mir has given the world hope that colonization of space is achievable through a small sample size, but space travel of a extended duration may have significant deleterious effects based on radiation levels and cosmic rays. Furthermore, long-term space exploration is dependent on stable living conditions, which are also subject to system failure.

4. Inadequacy of technologyTo travel outside our solar system and reach other galaxies, significant speeds would have to be produced. At current rates/methods of propulsion, however, most people would not survive a supposed intergalactic trip. The distances are simply just too far for even relatively short journeys.

Download 73.33 Kb.

Share with your friends:

The database is protected by copyright © 2023
send message

    Main page