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AT: current treaties solve space weaponization
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- Status quo treaties on space weponization fail- china not involved in current treaties
- Status quo agreements fail explicit initiatives are key to effectively solve
AT: current treaties solve space weaponizationCurrent agreements fail- anti missile defense has expired and others are just too old and have loopholes that can be exploitedJingye 2- Cheng Jingye, is deputy director of the Arms Control Department in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs., Treaties as an Approach to Reducing Space Vulnerabilities, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies [It is true that there have been already several treaties on regulating outer space activities. These treaties have played a positive role in promoting the exploration and peaceful utilization of outer space. However, as they were concluded decades ago, some of them have inherent flaws or loopholes. For example, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty only prohibits deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, but not other weapons. Furthermore, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which prohibited space-based antimissile systems, recently ceased to be in effect. Beginning with the 1980s, having realized the need for strengthening existing treaties, the international community has made unremitting efforts to this end. In 1981, the UN General] Status quo treaties on space weponization fail- china not involved in current treatiesO'Hanlon 11(senior fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy and budgeting, homeland security, Northeast Asian security, and humanitarian intervention. He is also adjunct professor at the public policy school of Columbia University, a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations."[1], Balancing U.S. Security Interests in Space) Some scholars do argue that the Strategic Arms Reduction, Interme-diate-Range Nuclear Forces, and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaties effectively ban the use of ASATs by one signatory of these treaties against any and all others, given the protection provided to satellite verification missions in the accords. But these treaties were signed before imaging satellites came into their own as targeting devices for tactical warfighting purposes, raising the legal and political question of whether a satellite originally protected for one generally nonprovocative and stabilizing purpose can be guaranteed protection when used in a more competitive fashion. Moreover, no one argues that these treaties ban the development, testing, production, or deployment of ASATs.11 Nor do any involve China. Status quo agreements fail explicit initiatives are key to effectively solveBuxbaum 11- Peter A Buxbaum, writing about defense, security, business, and technology for over 15 years. Over 2,000 of his articles have appeared in leading publications such as Fortune, Forbes, Chief Executive, Information Week, Defense Technology International, Jane's Defence Weekly, Military Information Technology, Homeland Security magazine, Computerworld, and dozens of others. He has also developed and taught seminars on international business at Penn State University. Buxbaum earned a JD from Temple University and a BA in political science and economics from Columbia University., Taming the Heavens: The New Space Diplomacy, june 27 2011, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=130360&contextid734=130360&contextid735=130103&tabid=130103&dynrel=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4,0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233 [Laura Grego, a scientist in the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program told ISN Insights that the "Code does not mention space weapons of any kind, nor would it meaningfully limit their development." The senators' attempt at "inhibiting these initial efforts to establish norms is shortsighted and counterproductive," she said. "Norms are a modest step in the right direction," Grego added, "but leave many of the serious problems of space security unaddressed. Without robust constraints on anti-satellite weapons, threats to satellites will continue to proliferate and mature, requiring the United States to expend more effort securing satellites and leading to less predictability and stability in crises."] CP solvo- current efforts didn’t go far enough specific bans are key- us involvement must be substantial in order for it to be effective and avoid negative consequencesBuxbaum 11- Peter A Buxbaum, writing about defense, security, business, and technology for over 15 years. Over 2,000 of his articles have appeared in leading publications such as Fortune, Forbes, Chief Executive, Information Week, Defense Technology International, Jane's Defence Weekly, Military Information Technology, Homeland Security magazine, Computerworld, and dozens of others. He has also developed and taught seminars on international business at Penn State University. Buxbaum earned a JD from Temple University and a BA in political science and economics from Columbia University., Taming the Heavens: The New Space Diplomacy, june 27 2011, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ISN-Insights/Detail?lng=en&id=130360&contextid734=130360&contextid735=130103&tabid=130103&dynrel=4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4,0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233 [The NSSS does not go far enough, in Grego's opinion. She criticized the document for failing to emphasize arms control agreements "as part of a larger scheme for keeping space secure" and for failing to recommend that the United States take the lead on space diplomacy. Well-crafted arms control proposals could lower the risk of arms races or conflicts in space or on the ground, Grego said, and protect the space environment from the harmful debris caused when countries deliberately destroy satellites. "A more robust diplomatic initiative that includes the major space-faring countries would have the potential to increase cooperation with countries that are not traditional US military allies," she added, "and spur other countries to develop realistic proposals that could ensure a safe and sustainable future in space. Diplomatic engagement could help relieve suspicions among countries, reduce incentives for building anti-satellite systems and other space weapons by establishing negotiated limits, and avert space disputes." The UCS released a report last year which called for the US government to "declare that the United States will not intentionally damage or disable satellites" and "press other space powers to make the same pledge." The report recommended that the US make satellites "more resistant to interference and develop ways to quickly replace them or compensate with other measures if they are disabled." The report also called for the US to assemble an expert negotiating team and to "engage in international discussions on space." "The United States should play an active and leading role in engaging the international community to further develop space laws and norms and to keep space free of weapons," said Grego. "A Code of Conduct provides a useful but preliminary standard for responsible space conduct. It should be a first step, but not the last."] Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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