Gdi 2011 Gemini Lab China qpq cp

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GDI 2011

Gemini Lab China QPQ CP

China QPQ CP

China QPQ CP 1

1NC (1/2) 2

1NC (2/2) 3

**Solvency** 4

Say yes – General 5

Say yes - Space 6

Say yes - Space 7

Say yes - Space 8

Say yes – Tech Affs 9

Say yes – Development Affs 10

Say yes - Demilitarization 11

Say yes - Demilitarization 12

Say yes - Demilitarization 13

Say yes - Demilitarization 14

Say yes - Demilitarization 15

Say yes - Demilitarization 16

Say yes - Cooperation 17

Say yes - Cooperation 18

Say yes - Cooperation 19

Say yes - Cooperation 20

Say yes – U.S. Unilateralism 21

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves 22

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves 23

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves 24

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves 25

A2: Plan = Modelling – Formality Solves 26

A2: Plan = Modelling – Transparency Solves 26

A2: Plan = Modelling – Spillover 28

CP Solves – Militarization 29

CP Solves – Verification 30

CP Solves – Globally 31

Impact—Extinction 32

Impact—Heg 33

Impact – Relations 34

A2: Politics Link 35

A2: Politics Link 36

A2: Heg Turn 37

A2: Heg Turn 38

**Aff work** 39

Say no – Space 40

Say no – Space 41

Say no – Space 42

Say no – Space 43

Say no – Space 44

Say no – Space 45

No Solvency – Cheating 46

No Solvency – Cheating 47

No Solvency – Cheating 48

No Solvency – Cheating – Impacts 49

No Solvency – Cheating – Impacts 50

No Solvency – Cheating – Impacts 51

No Solvency – Verification 52

No Solvency – Verification – Impacts 53

No Solvency – Arms Control Fails 54

No Solvency – Arms Control Fails 55

No Solvency – Arms Control Fails 56

No Solvency – Space Law 57

No Solvency – Formal Treaty Bad 58

No Solvency – Formal Treaty Bad 59

No Solvency – Formal Treaty Bad 60

No Solvency – Bilateral Bad 61

No Solvency – No Multilateral Spillover 62

No Solvency – Space treaties fail 63

CP links to politics 64

CP links to politics 65

CP links to politics 66

Turn – Relations 67

Turn – Heg 68

Turn – Heg 69

1NC (1/2)

Counterplan text: The United States federal government will [plan] if and only if The People's Republic of China signs the PAROS negotiations.
The CP solves militarization
Blazejewski 8 (Kenneth, received his master’s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD degree from the New York University School of Law, " Space Weaponization and US-China Relations." Spring,, AD 6/29/11) AV

Third, the United States should demand greater transparency in Chinese military planning, especially with regard to ASAT and space-focused programs. Such transparency, long sought by US defense officials, would reduce the likelihood of potential conflicts over speculative intelligence and give the United States greater insight into how military decisions are made (and whether China indeed suffers from a stovepiped bureaucracy). I argue that progress in each of these three areas would represent a greater security gain than proceeding with the weaponization of space. If the United States is able to negotiate a quid pro quo in one or all of these areas in return for a commitment not to weaponize outer space, the agreement would represent a clear US net security gain.

China will say yes – The plan is a bargaining chip for tech modeling and free-riding
Tellis 8 (Ashley, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, " China’s Space Capabilities and U.S. Security Interests." October,, AD 7/1/11) AV

Third, China’s space efforts are focused in multiple ways. To begin with, although some Chinese activities are intended to procure symbolic benefits that enhance the control or legitimacy of Communist rule, these gains are usually conceived of as positive externalities that derive from some other material benefits of exploiting space for specific economic, political or military aims. To that degree, Beijing’s space investments are in fact conservative. Given its relative under-development, China has consistently sought to avoid frittering its resources on showcase projects that provide few tangible gains, preferring instead to invest in those activities that provide highest value within what are acknowledged fiscal constraints. Given the desire to secure the most while spending the least, even more controversial initiatives such as the manned space program have been authorized mainly because it is expected that this effort would push the frontiers of innovation, create a new quality control culture across the space program, generate new demands for technical education, and produce spin-offs that would benefit the economy more generally. China’s space program is focused in other ways as well. Beijing abundantly recognizes that for all its impressive space achievements in recent years, it still operates in a milieu characterized by emerging political competition with a technologically dominant United States. Consequently, given the differences in cultural ethos, political systems and comparative advantage, the Chinese space program has deliberately avoided either replicating the American endeavor or attempting to compete with it across the board. Rather, Beijing’s space efforts have been characterized by two different orientations in this regard. To the degree that raising its technological standards to American levels is judged necessary, China has embarked on a quite calculated “buy, copy, or steal” approach in regards to procuring various critical technologies. Where competing with the United States is deemed necessary, China has focused its space programs not on mustering any comparable superiority but by aiming at Washington’s "soft ribs and strategic weaknesses ". In any event, and irrespective of the endeavor in question, Beijing’s space efforts have been marked by deliberation and purposefulness.

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