Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Pointer/Gordon/Watts/Samuels Turkey Neg


A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn



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A2: US/Turkey Relations: Opacity Turn


Nuclear-Capable states operate under secrecy because of other states that already have nuclear weapons, not because of the NPT

Leaver 5 (Richard, Prof of Int’l Relations at Flinders U., ‘The failing NPT,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs) KGL

The problem of covert proliferation is, of course, very real. But it is, in my view, much too simple to lay it at the feet of the NPT. There is not one of today’s nine nuclear-capable states that chose to develop their early capacities under anything other than conditions of maximum secrecy. And the reason they all opted against transparency had very little to do with the incentive to cheat created by the NPT. Secrecy was, above all, dictated by the possible reactions of those already in ‘the nuclear club’. So, for example, both the United States and the USSR individually gave thought at different points in time during the 1960s to the possibility of making a preventive strike against China’s embryonic nuclear and missile programs. In both cases, they both drew back from the brink not because of fears of the Chinese response, but primarily because they could not be certain that their superpower adversary would remain passively on the sidelines throughout the exercise. It seems reasonable to think that such experiences can only multiply as the size of the nuclear-armed crowd increases. Equally, it would be shortsighted to think that a world without the NPT would be more transparent about the birth of new nuclear powers.
The NPT makes proliferation more dangerous because it encourages secrecy in proliferating states, which causes regional instability in the Middle East

Wesley 5 (Michael, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59( 3), It’s time to scrap the NPT) KGL

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya)*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original).And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003). As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan network showed, some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been prepared to rely on transnational smuggling networks to gain vital components, materials and knowledge. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to deal with this new form of proliferation (Clary 2004), such non-state networks raise very real risks that for the right price, criminals or other facilitators could pass nuclear

US Turkey Relations Resilient


Turkey-U.S. relations strong: will stay together over Middle East conflict

Walker 10 (Joshua, Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, Foreign Policy, Turkey: still America’s best ally in the Middle East?, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/25/turkey_still_america_s_best_ally_in_the_middle_east)BAF

Listening to the Beltway rhetoric one would think that Turkey is a newly emerging threat to the United States and interests in the Middle East. The speed with which Washington has gone sour on its self-declared "model partner" is astonishing and should be cause for concern. Having just returned from Turkey and with meetings with Turkish officials, it is clear that Turkey has not suddenly "switched sides" but rather still objectively represents America's best ally. Not because Ankara blindly goes along with Western policies or is subservient to America, but because it offers the U.S. more strategic possibilities and support than any other state in the region. Unlike Arab allied governments which lack legitimacy among their own populations and Israel that is besieged on all sides, Turkey is a truly democratic, independent, and powerful ally to be courted, not demonized by the U.S. Today, Turkey represents a critical partner to the U.S. on its three most urgent strategic issues: Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. On Afghanistan, Turkey is better placed culturally and militarily than any other NATO ally to play a leading role in Kabul; in this respect, it is America's ideal partner on Afghanistan. The soft and hard power advantages that the Turks enjoy among the Afghan population offer a sorely needed bright spot in an otherwise dark struggle for America. On Iraq, there is renewed impetus to resolve the long-simmering Kurdish issue given the battle against the PKK and continued incursions into northern Iraq. Without Turkey's constructive engagement, America's vital interests and the future of Iraq cannot be secured. Short of coercive action, Ankara is determined to prevent a nuclear Iran and has been attempting its own trilateral diplomacy with the help of Brasila to deal with Tehran. Unfortunately, these attempts -- which were originally encouraged by the Obama administration -- have led to a divide on the means necessary for the same end goal of a nuclear weapon-free Iran. Given the timing of the Mavi-Marmara incident in the lead-up to the Iran sanction vote at the UN, former friends of Turkey are linking the two events and blaming the AKP's "Islamist" roots rather than looking at the tough domestic realities confronting Turkey's leaders. While the AKP has admittedly gone over the top in its rhetoric given the domestic pressures it faces from a resurgent nationalist movement and upcoming national elections, its actions speak much louder than its words. Diplomatic relations remain intact with Israel despite the killing of nine Turkish citizens (one of whom was a dual American citizen) and Turkey remains actively engaged in all of its Western commitments and institutions.






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