Gulf War Air Power Survey
Navy Component, Central Command
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- Figure 18 NAVCENT
- Figure 19 CENTAF Aircraft Beddown at End of Phase I
- Figure 20 CENTAF
- Figure 21 CENTAF
- Tactical Air Force Deployment Planning
- Figure 22 CENTAF
- Figure 23 F-4G Air Refueling Track 26 Tactical Air Force Deployment Execution
- Tactical Air Force Basing Decision Impacts
- Figure 24 CENTAF Buildup: SAC Aircraft
- SAC Tanker Deployments to the AOR
Navy Component, Central Command (NAVCENT) Deployments On 2 August 1990, the Eisenhower carrier battle group was in the Mediterranean, nearing the end of a scheduled six‑month deployment. The Independence carrier battle group was near Diego Garcia, just starting a scheduled Indian Ocean deployment. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, both battle groups were ordered to the crisis area. As early as 5 August, the Independence could have launched long-range air strikes. By 8 August, both battle groups were on station, under CENTCOM control, and ready to conduct air strikesEisenhower from the Red Sea and Independence from the Gulf of Oman.252 The Independence and Eisenhower delivered the first U.S. combat aircraft to the AOR, ready for sustained operations upon arrival. Each battle group carried fuel and ordnance for its aircraft plus a complete intermediate maintenance facility with spare parts, test equipment, and maintenance personnel. These carriers provided more than one hundred fighter and attack aircraft plus early warning, electronic warfare, and surveillance aircraft.253 While Air Force combat aircraft began arriving in the AOR on 8 August, and the Air Force ultimately provided the majority of fixed‑wing aircraft, the Navy remained a key element of U.S. air power.254 On D‑Day, six battle groups were on station. Figure 18 depicts the NAVCENT buildup of fixed‑wing aircraft over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. (Totals do not include Marine aircraft, which will be addressed later.) Figure 18 NAVCENT Buildup: Fixed Wing Aircraft 20
(CENTAF) Deployments When Iraq invaded Kuwait, U.S. Air Force presence in the AOR consisted of a small MAC support detachment in Dhahran plus pilots and support personnel assigned to U.S. Military Training Mission-Saudi Arabia. As part of exercise Ivory Justice, two KC‑135 tankers were operating in the United Arab Emirates.255 An advance echelon (ADVON) group led by Major General Thomas R. Olsen, CENTAF deputy commander, left Shaw AFB on 7 August and arrived in Riyadh on 8 August. On 9 August, General Olsen officially established CENTAF Forward headquarters in the Royal Saudi Air Force headquarters building.256 On 8 August, airlifters and deploying U.S. Air Force aircraft began arriving in the AOR. The rapid buildup of combat and combat support aircraft continued throughout August and early September. Phase I deployments were essentially complete in mid-September. Essential to the success of the deployment was $1 billion worth of fuel, ammunition, and equipment that the Air Force had prepositioned in Oman, Bahrain, and aboard three ships.257 Figure 19 shows the beddown of CENTAF aircraft at the end of Desert Shield Phase I. Phase II deployments started in earnest at the end of November. In early December, the Iraqis began test-firing their Scud missiles and intelligence sources reported increased Iraqi forces in Kuwait. CENTCOM and CENTAF developed a stronger sense of urgency concerning deployment of Phase II units. Arrival dates were moved up. On 14 December, CENTAF requested all additional units be in place by 12 January. On 15 December, General Schwarzkopf authorized General Horner to deploy air Figure 19 CENTAF Aircraft Beddown at End of Phase I 21
assets as fast as airlift could support the moves.258 Figure 20 shows the beddown of CENTAF aircraft at the end of Desert Shield Phase II. Figure 20 CENTAF Aircraft Beddown at End of Phase II 22
23 Tactical Air Force Unit Deployments Tactical air force (TAF) units provided the majority of CENTAF combat aircraft. Figure 21 depicts the rapid CENTAF buildup of TAF combat aircraft over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Phase I aircraft deployments, including sixteen tactical fighter squadrons from the CONUS and four from Europe, were essentially complete within four weeks. Phase II aircraft deployments, including six tactical fighter squadrons from the CONUS and six from Europe, began slowly in late November and then picked up sharply toward the end of December. Figure 21 CENTAF Buildup: TAF Combat Aircraft 24
Tactical air force units contributed a much smaller percentage of CENTAF combat support aircraft. Figure 22 depicts the lower numbers and the slightly slower CENTAF buildup of TAF combat support aircraft over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Principally as the result of RF-4C arrivals, the number of TAF combat support aircraft in the AOR doubled in the first two weeks of January.259 Tactical Air Force Deployment Planning Tactical Air Command/XPX had peacetime responsibility to develop TPFDDs for U.S. tactical air force deployments. Because of the close-hold nature of Desert Shield initial planning, XPX had negligible involvement before C‑Day. After C-Day, Generals Horner and Olsen were both in the AOR, and no general officers were at CENTAF Rear. Plans anticipated that as the CENTAF staff deployed, reserve personnel from 10th Air Force would be activated to backfill CENTAF Rear positions. The expected reserves were not activated. TAC and CENTCOM agreed to move CENTAF Rear to Langley AFB, where TAC/XPX assumed the unfamiliar responsibility for both building and executing a TPFDD for a contingency in progress.260 Figure 22 CENTAF Buildup: TAF Combat Support Aircraft 25
TAC subordinate units had access to JOPES terminals. These units could make authorized changes to their databases; they could also make inadvertent or unauthorized changes to the TPFDD.262 Consequently, XPX maintained one JOPES database that subordinate units could access and another that was frozen daily for XPX planning. Each day, XPX would use the frozen data to develop a deployment plan for the next seven‑day window. When units added to their deployment packages without realizing that XPX no longer updated their JOPES database, they sometimes ended with less airlift than they needed. This led to partially deployed ULNs, which JOPES could not track. TAC estimated that over half of its TPFDD consisted of nonstandard UTCs reflecting cargo left behind by units which were otherwise considered closed.263 XPX tried to plan deployments seven days in advance so it could coordinate airlift, tanker support, and diplomatic clearances. At the start of the deployment, XPX's efforts were thwarted by inability to obtain clear planning factors concerning daily apportionment of airlift and by CENTCOM's continually changing priorities. Changing priorities also meant that not all deploying units received the type of airlift aircraft for which they had planned their loads. Many deploying units had difficulty finding out types of aircraft and arrival times for their airlift support.264 TAC/DOXD was responsible for all TAC peacetime deployment exercises. During this deployment, DOXD prepared flight plans, arranged tanker support, and obtained diplomatic clearances for all TAC fighter aircraft as well as for U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) and Marine aircraft. DOXD began drawing up tentative routes on 5 August, and TAC settled on a single route for the majority of Phase I deployments. The single route simplified air refueling planning by allowing SAC tanker task forces to operate from the same locations. The nonstop route from CONUS to the AOR minimized requirements for diplomatic clearances and overflight rights. Most deploy- ing fighters overflew Egypt only, but A‑10s and Marine fighters made an en route stop in Spain. Nonstop flight times from the CONUS were fifteen to sixteen hours.265 Fighters normally deployed with a load of armament; the extra weight and drag necessitated refueling more frequently than normal. F‑4Gs were the most difficult deployment to plan, with each aircraft requiring fifteen air refuelings between the East Coast and the AOR. Fifteen was the maximum number the TAC air refueling flight planning system could handle. Fortunately, it was also the maximum number used by any squadron on a single day. The TAC flight planning system did not interface with air refueling planners at either at Headquarters SAC or SAC numbered air forces. Even so, TAC and SAC planners usually required no longer than twelve to fourteen hours to agree on air refueling plans.266 To illustrate the principal fighter deployment route from CONUS to the AOR, Figure 23 shows the F‑4G refueling plan, with four refuelings between George AFB and Seymour Johnson AFB, then fifteen more on the nonstop leg to the AOR. A goal of Phase II deployment planning was to place less demand on the tanker force. No CONUS-based aircraft were initially scheduled to deploy nonstop to the AOR. A‑10s were to stop for a day at both Lajes and Sigonella. Other fighters were to stop for a day at Moron. USAFE-based A‑10s deploying to the AOR were to stop for a day at Sigonella, but other USAFE-based fighters were to deploy nonstop to the AOR. Not all fighter deployments went as initially planned. In early December, an F‑117 squadron deployed nonstop from Langley to Saudi Arabia, requiring ten additional KC‑10s on the Atlantic Bridge and ten more KC‑135Rs in the AOR.267 Figure 23 F-4G Air Refueling Track 26
Tactical Air Force Deployment Execution Unlike the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), most fighter units did not get all the airlift they requested. The experience of the 23d TFW from England AFB, which deployed closer to the end of the Phase I fighter surge, was more typical. The first squadron of A‑10s departed on 27 August and arrived at King Fahd on 31 August. The second squadron departed on 29 August and arrived on 2 September. Airlift support for the first squadron was fairly timely; the second squadron waited seven to ten days for its airlift to close.268 The 35th TFW from George AFB experienced changes in its departure date, airlift availability, and beddown location. In addition, the wing did not know until the last moment whether it would be the host unit or a tenant at its beddown locationand whether the beddown location would be a bare base. Airlift for the wing was spread out between 16 August and 16 November. During the period, George AFB personnel loaded fourteen C‑141s, seven C‑5s, one DC‑10, and one L‑1011. Both commercial passenger aircraft arrived on 20 August with almost no prior notification. To deal with the unpredictable airlift schedule, base personnel set up a cargo loading plan with C‑141 and C‑5 silhouettes on the ramp. When aircraft dropped in unannounced, base personnel simply filled the corresponding silhouette with the appropriate pallets from the “shopping row” cargo marshalling area.269 Tactical Air Force Basing Decision Impacts Some units were informed of their beddown bases just before departing for the AOR; beddown locations for others had changed while the units were en route. Changes to beddown bases complicated unit deployment preparations and airlift prioritization. Beddown changes resulted from host-nation sensitivities, ramp congestion, and mismatches between aircraft, munitions, and support equipment.270 On 9 August, a squadron of F‑15Es from the 4th TFW left Seymour Johnson AFB for Seeb, Oman. While over the Mediterranean, the squadron was told to divert to Dhahran. The fighters and three of the C‑141s carrying squadron equipment landed at Dhahran. After two hours, they were on the move to Thumrait, Oman. The airlifters carrying the remainder of the squadron's personnel and support equipment received more timely notification and went to Thumrait. Additional logistics efforts were required when base support equipment at Thumrait did not match what had been expected at Seeb.271 Similarly, a squadron of F‑16C/Ds from the 363d TFW at Shaw AFB had its destination changed in midflight from Sharjah to Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The squadron arrived on 10 August; another followed on 11 August. While the two squadrons were soon declared combat‑ready, they were short on air‑to‑ground munitions, corrosion prevention fuel additives, materials to build living quarters and squadron facilities, and drinking water.272 Concerned over the conditions at Al Dhafra, General Olsen instructed his logistics planners to send a Prime BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Forces) team there immediately. He delayed arrival of additional people and equipment while expediting two C‑141s and sixteen C‑130s carrying Harvest Falcon assets. Due to uncertainty over other beddown locations, and to give MAC time to finish missions supporting earlier deployments, CENTAF also delayed additional unit departures for three days.273 SAC Unit Deployments SAC designated Brigadier General Patrick P. Caruana, commander of the 42d Air Division at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, as Commander, STRATFOR.274 On 7 August, General Caruana and the rest of his team left Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, aboard four 2d Bomb Wing (BMW) KC‑10s. En route to Riyadh, the tankers performed a dual mission of escorting and refueling the initial group of F‑15s sent to Saudi Arabia. General Caruana's contingent arrived in Riyadh on 8 August.275 Figure 24 depicts the buildup of SAC bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and tankers over the course of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. SAC Deployment Planning Special access restrictions limited the number of SAC staff members involved in deployment planning. On 9 August 1990, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the deployment of U.S. forces to Southwest Asia as Operation Desert Shield and downgraded the classification to Secret. Removal of special access restrictions allowed participation of the full SAC staff and subordinate units.276 Figure 24 CENTAF Buildup: SAC Aircraft 27
CENTCOM based most of its planning on its OPLAN 1002‑90, but SAC had made limited inputs to this plan. SAC began initial aircraft movements based on SAC OPLAN 1002‑88, a regional support plan for Southwest Asia operations that included sections dealing with prepositioned assets and employment of aircraft from Diego Garcia. OPLAN 1002‑88 had a JOPES database that planners could use and update, and it listed intended lead units, aircraft types, and forward operating locations. Most actual Desert Shield assignments differed from OPLAN 1002‑88, but the plan nevertheless provided a valuable starting point.277 JOPES did not extend down to the unit level in SAC. Headquarters used AUTODIN and telephone to transmit TPFDD information to deploying units. This was a lengthy process and much information was out of date by the time the unit received it. Units could not update the TPFDD, causing airlift problems. MAC sometimes arrived at an installation only to find cargo had already been moved.278 SAC Tanker Deployments to the AOR During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, SAC successfully performed a juggling act with its tanker force to meet strategic commitments, support CENTCOM air refueling and airlift requirements for deployments to the AOR, and provide air refueling support for CENTCOM training and combat operations within the AOR. Tanker deployment orders changed daily in August as various commanders and staffs established force deployment priorities, levels of logistics support, and beddown locations. Different fighters had different refueling requirements, and their order of deployment affected the number of tankers needed on the Atlantic Bridge and in the AOR.279 On 12 August, SAC identified a growing need for KC‑10s to support planned B‑52, F‑117, A‑10, F‑4G, and AV‑8 deployments. With MAC heavily committed to Army unit movements, the KC‑10 cargo capacity could be put to valuable use moving fighter en route maintenance packages. MAC and TRANSCOM agreed that KC‑10s should be employed in their dual-role capacity; SAC therefore requested JCS to release KC‑10s from the AOR. When JCS approved SAC's request on 14 August, forty-two KC‑135s and ten KC‑10s were in the AOR. The JCS approval also authorized SAC direct liaison with CENTCOM for future tanker requirements. This gave SAC greater influence and flexibility in meeting tanker requirements in the AOR. SAC retained operational control of the tankers while SAC, STRATFOR, and CENTCOM worked together to resolve basing issues. The KC‑10s were out of the AOR by 16 August, but the KC‑135 total continued to grow as more bases became available. In addition, six KC‑10s returned to the AOR at the end of September. By the end of Phase I, the USAF tanker force in the AOR totaled 116 KC‑135s and 6 KC‑10s.280 By the end of Phase II, the USAF tanker force in the AOR had grown to 202 KC‑135s and 24 KC‑10s. Planning for this expansion was a daunting task for SAC and STRATFOR. Since SAC forces did not typically deploy to the AOR as complete units, SAC designated “lead tanker units” at each beddown base to provide most of the support personnel and equipment.281 In the early days of the deployment, SAC dealt with limited basing options by placing its most capable tankersKC‑10s and KC‑135 Rsin the AOR. The KC‑135R has better takeoff performance and fuel offload capability than other model KC‑135s. It also requires less logistics support than KC‑135As. When the KC‑10s were withdrawn from the AOR in mid-August, they were initially replaced by KC‑135Rs. As more bases became available, KC‑135Rs were in turn replaced by greater numbers of KC‑135As and KC‑135Es. [DELETED]282 Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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