Gulf War Air Power Survey
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| A Chronology of the Gulf War, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), Mar 1992 (draft).
105 (S) Annex D, p D-6, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88. 106 (S) Appendix 10, Annex D, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88. 107 (S) Annex D, p D-6, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88. 108 (S) Annex D, p D-5, COMUSCENTAF OPLAN 1021-88. 109 (S) Ibid, p 74 110 (S) USCINCCENT 1131215Z Aug 1990 Message, Logstat No. 001. 111 The CINC's position was in direct contrast to that of the more robust warfighting CINCs such as CINCEUR with headquarters in the AOR, large, dispersed regional support staffs, and assigned forces. 112 (S/NF) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90 Draft, Annex D. 113 (S/NF) USCENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90 Draft, Annex D. 114 Title V Report to Congress Chapter K. 115 The staff was later increased to 314 positions in the MEFPAK portion of the WMP 3 at the time of the conflict. The Headquarters UTC was 9AABAA (the CENTAF AFFOR) and other augmenting UTCs. 116 (S/NF) Intvw, Dr. Theodore R. Jamison, with Maj Gen Charles J. Searock Jr, SAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, subj: “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Aug 1990 to Mar 1991,” 4 Mar 1991, pp 11-12. 117 The three exercises were • Coronet Warrior I (F-15s), July-Aug 1987. • Coronet Warrior II (F-16s), May-June 1988. • Coronet Warrior III (A/OA-10s), Apr-May 1989. This Coronet Warrior discussion is based on brfg, “Coronet Warrior: A WRSK Flyout,” Maj Gen Henry Viccellio, Jr., Hq TAC/LG, ca Sept 1987; Hq TAC/LG Brfng “Coronet Warrior II: An F-16 WRSK Flyout,” ca Aug 1988; Hq TAC/LG Brfg, “Coronet Warrior III: An A-10/OA-10 WRSK Fly-Out,” 24 Jul 1989; telephone intvw, Mr. James A. Forbes with Mr. Ed Merry, Hq ACC/LGY, 6 Jan 1993. 118 Notation for the three lines is as follows: “D0-29 Demands” is the fully mission capable (FMC) rate as predicted by Dyna-METRIC based on demand data in the Air Force's D0-29 supply system. The “CW demands” line is the model prediction based on the actual demand rates experienced during the exercise. “Actual” is the experienced FMC rate. To oversimplify only slightly, the difference between the D0-29 and CW lines is demand rate effects; the difference between the CW and actual lines is repair rate effects. 120 (S/NF) William T. Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, Center for Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington, DC, 1992, p 25. 121 Or most stringent Unit Type Code (UTC) requirement for a non-flying unit. 122 After the conflict, the GAO criticized SORTS for not being realistic, real-time, flexible or practical in its report Operation Desert Storm: War Highlights need to Address Problems of Nondeployable Personnel, GAO Code 391145. 123 United States Transportation Command History, 1989, p 6. 124 Ibid. 125 General Johnson categorized ships, skilled mariners and shipyards as part of sealift as a capability. United States Transportation Command History, 1989, p 6. 126 United States Transportation Command History, 1989, p 7. 127 Ibid. 128 Schwarzkopf, General Norman H., Witness Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 20 Apr 1989. In Air War College Associate Materials, Volume II, 2nd ed, Lesson 32, pp 98-102. 129 Schwarzkopf, pp 98-102. 130 According to the Schwarzkopf statement, a deficit of ready reserve crews, decline of shipyard facilities and skilled workers, and the decline of the Merchant Marine will double to 22% by the year 2000. 131 Schwarzkopf, pp 98-102. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 (S) Global War Game (GWG -1990), Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Section III Part 3. 136 (S) Ibid. 137 (S) Ibid. 138 (S) Ibid. 139 (S) William T. Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, The USAF and the Desert Shield First‑Phase Deployment 7 Aug‑8 Nov 1990, (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, Center for Air Force History, 1992), pp 29-30. 140 (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 2, 57. Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command 1 Jan - 31 Dec 1990 (Offutt AFB, NE: HQ SAC/HO, 1991), p 339. 141 A TPFDD is the computer-supported database portion of an OPLAN and contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the OPLAN. Information includes in-place units, prioritized arrival of units deployed to support the OPLAN, routing of forces to be deployed, movement data associated with deploying forces, estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces, and estimates of transportation requirements. Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991 (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, Armed Forces Staff College, 1991), pp I-34, -35. 142 AFSC Pub 1, pp 6-10, -60, -70. 143 Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Apr 1992), p 352. 144 Douglas Menarchik, PowerliftingGetting to Desert Storm; Strategic Transportation and Strategy in the New World Order (unpublished draft manuscript, prepared while a fellow at the Center for International Relations, Harvard University, 1992), pp 82-83. 145 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 57‑58. (U) Intvws and anecdotal evidence suggest that units of all Services deployed more equipment and supply items than would have been specified by a completed CENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90. GWAPS did not undertake a unit by unit comparison of airlift missions actually used for deployment with airlift missions that would have been required by a completed OPLAN. Using a sample of eight bases in the AOR, GWAPS did find that USAF aircraft maintenance personnel actually deployed totalled only two-thirds the number that would have been specified in a completed OPLAN. (See Chapter 8.) 146 Powerlifting, p 85. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 2, 44. 147 Powerlifting pp 83, 91. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 72. 149 (S) History of the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional): Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 2 August 1990 ‑ 2 August 1991 (George AFB, CA: 35 FW/HO, 14 Apr 1992), pp 19-20. (U) A UTC is a code associated with each type of unit and allows the organization to be categorized into a kind or class having common distinguishing characteristics. A unit may have several UTCs to describe its capabilities. Many UTCs reflect a basic capability tailored for a particular task or environment. 151 JULLS NUMBER: 91154‑50811 (00109), submitted by USCENTAF Rear/LG. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 55‑56, 110. [DELETED] 152 Powerlifting, pp 83, 91. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 44. 153 JULLS NUMBER: 21758-46626 (00055), submitted by 306 SW/CC. 154 Powerlifting, p 113. 155 Lt Gen Vernon J. Kondra, Operation Desert Shield‑Desert Storm: The Vernon J. Kondra Notes, 24 August 1990‑31 May 1991, transcribed by Clayton Snedecker, 21st Air Force Historian (McGuire AFB, NJ: 21st Air Force, 1992), pp 16-17. Then-Maj Gen Kondra served initially as MAC DCS/Plans and then as MAC DCS/Operations during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. 156 (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 43. Spain initially required a 48-hour lead time for each diplomatic clearance request. Eventually, the requirement was reduced to 24 hours. Telecon with Mr. Tom Wellmon, 9 Dec 1992. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Mr. Wellmon worked for the 21st Air Force DCS/Operations and was the individual principally responsible for requesting diplomatic clearances for MAC missions. 157 Powerlifting, p 113. John Lund and Ruth Berg, Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm: An Assessment of Operational Efficiency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND WD-5956-AF, 1992), p 34. (The second source is a working draft. Wherever it is cited in this chapter, the material has been reviewed by the Air Mobility Command staff and no exceptions taken.) 158 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp 381, 387. There is not universal agreement on the start date for PHASE II. In (S) The Eagle and the Scorpion, Y'Blood identifies 9 November as the last day of Phase I. TRANSCOM and MAC have identified midnight, 10 November 1990, as the end of Phase I. This chapter uses 8 Nov, the date from Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. 159 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp 34-35. 160 (S) Military Airlift Command, MAC History 1990, Chapter 3 (Scott AFB, IL: HQ MAC/HO, 1991), pp 12‑13. 161 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 13. 162 Dave Davis and Orson Gover, Operation Desert Shield Desert Storm MAC Logistics (2nd draft) (Scott AFB, IL: Headquarters Military Airlift Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Engineering, 15 Mar 1991). An ALCE provides en route support as well as command and control for airlift flows at stations not normally frequented by MAC. The manpower and equipment packages needed to support an off‑line location are tailored to meet its specific requirements. An ALCE cadre comes from an airlift wing's Airlift Control Squadron. Its purpose is to supervise the deployed augmentees. The augmentees are detailed from among the various functions within an airlift wing as deemed necessary for a particular deployment. ALCEs typically range in size from 10 to 350 people with accompanying equipment. 163 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 14. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 53. (U) Crew members on BRAVO standby are given 12 hours of pre‑standby crew rest and then can be alerted. A crew must be capable of launching within approximately three hours after alert. 164 In mid-October, Brig Gen Edwin E. Tenoso, Vice Commander of 22d Air Force, became the COMALF. General Buckingham returned to 21st Air Force to assist in the management of the airlift flow. Intvw, HQ MAC and HQ TRANSCOM staff, Scott AFB, IL, Feb 1992. Chapter 4 will provide more details on the COMALF, ALCC, and intratheater airlift. 165 Oversize cargo is air cargo that exceeds the usable dimensions of a 463L pallet loaded to the design height of 96 inches, but it is air transportable on C-130, C-141, DC-10, Boeing 747, C-5, or C-17 aircraft. Outsize cargo exceeds the dimensions of oversize and requires the use of a C-5 or C-17 aircraft. 166 JULLS NUMBER: 91055‑65325 (00141), submitted by HQ MAC CAT Director. 167 Ibid; Kondra Notes, p 2. 168 AFSC Pub 1, p 6‑80. 169 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p 375. 170 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 58‑59. JULLS NUMBER 31959‑04622 (00352) and JULLS NUMBER 31962‑13204 (00353), both submitted by HQ ATC/LGT, highlight problems associated with airlift aircraft arriving with little or no advance notice. 171 JULLS NUMBER: 91055‑65325 (00141), submitted by HQ MAC CAT Director. Kondra Notes, p 2. Powerlifting, p 86. FLOGEN is being replaced by ADANS (Airlift Deployment Analysis System). 172 Maximum number of aircraft on the ground, or MOG, is a commonly referenced measure of throughput capacity. MACR 55-28 defined MOG as “the highest number of aircraft being used in an operation which will be allowed on the ground during a given span of time based on simultaneous support.” 173 Bruce Babb, “Desert Shield: Experiences on the MAC Crisis Action Team,” Airlift, Winter 1990‑1991, reprinted in Air Mobility School Supplemental Reading Text, 21st edition (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility School, 1992), p 409‑2. 174 “Desert Shield: Experiences on the MAC Crisis Action Team,” p 409‑2. 175 This prepositioning of crews is called “staging.” Staging is essential to keep aircraft moving without interruption, and it requires several crews for each aircraft. Aircrew stages normally operate on a directional basis. With some exceptions, crews are alerted in sequence of arrival time, provided missions are available during the period when the crews can be alerted. The concepts of directional and nondirectional stages can be illustrated with an example based on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The stages in Europe were nondirectional. Crews were prioritized for alert and assigned to missions as they became available without regard for direction. Some crews arriving from the CONUS returned to the CONUS without shuttling to the AOR. Other crews made multiple shuttles to the AOR before returning to the CONUS. If the stages in Europe had been directional, crews arriving from the CONUS would have entered an eastbound stage and would have normally flown to the AOR next. Crews arriving from the AOR would have entered a westbound stage and would have normally flown to the CONUS next. A nondirectional stage provides greater flexibility in manning missions. A directional stage ensures a more uniform distribution of workload among crews and facilitates cumulative flying time management for the entire aircrew force. 176 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 22‑23. 177 Normal crew duty time limitations (unless otherwise specified in the governing OPORD/OPLAN) are 16 hours for a basic crew and 24 hours for an augmented crew. 178 An augmented crew normally requires an additional pilot who is at least first pilot qualified, an additional loadmaster, and a more highly qualified complement of flight engineers. 179 Normally, crew members are not scheduled to fly or perform crew duties when they will exceed flying time limitations of AFR 60‑1 (125 hours per 30 consecutive days and 330 hours per 90 consecutive days). 180 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 23‑25. The requirement to have all crews on BRAVO standby was later relaxed. 181 (S) Ibid. 182 (S) Ibid. 183 Kondra Notes, p 3. 184 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 25. 185 Kondra Notes, pp 8, 34. 186 JULLS NUMBER: 91055‑85701 (00059), submitted by HQ MAC, CAT Director. 187 (S) HQ TAC/DOXRB briefing, 12 Apr 1991. Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Figure 8, pp 31‑32. 188 Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p 32. 189 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 110‑111. 190 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 18. Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p 29. 191 Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Figure 6, p 30. 192 Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p 32. 193 Intvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMAC/CV, Arlington, VA, 30 Nov 1992. (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 59-60. 194 A channel mission provides common-user airlift service on a scheduled basis between two points. A requirements channel serves two points on a scheduled basis depending on the volume of traffic. A frequency channel is based on mission essentiality and moves on a scheduled basis regardless of traffic volume. 195 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 68. JULLS NUMBER: 00344‑ 63454 (00091), submitted by AFLC/DSTTX. 196 JULLS NUMBER: 31952‑58451 (00218), submitted by Jerry Riffe. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 68. Kondra Notes, p 67. 197 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 15‑16. 198 (S) Ibid, Ch 3, p 20. 199 (S) Ibid, Ch 3, p 26. 200 Source: Military Air Integrated Reported System (MAIRS) data. MAIRS is a subsystem of the MAC Integrated Management System (MACIMS) and thus a part of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). MAIRS is used to follow missions and aircraft, determine schedule deviations, and evaluate mission execution. Data recorded in Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Table 6, p 36. 201 Powerlifting, p 102. Also (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 17 and Kondra Notes, p 3. 202 Davis and Gover, MAC Logistics. Lt Gen Kondra recalls that on one day, MAC had 28 aircraft on the ground awaiting fuel. Kondra Notes, p 3. 203 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 17. 204 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 16. (U) Air refueling was not an option for every mission. Due to budget constraints, not all strategic airlift aircrews were air refueling qualified. Intvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMAC/CV, Arlington, VA, 30 Nov 1992. 205 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 69. Davis and Gover, MAC Logistics, entry for 21 Aug 1990. 206 Because of its proximity to the seaport at Ad Ammam, Dhahran remained the Army's airport of choice for cargo and passengers. On 10 December, despite the fact that Dhahran was already operating at maximum capacity, the Army was still validating 75 percent of all its cargo for that destination. It was difficult to convince the Army that closure would be expedited by sending some passengers and cargo to other destinations and then moving them over land to Dhahran. Kondra Notes, p 68. Similarly, it was difficult to convince the Army to use all available seats on every C‑5 departing Europe during the heavy passenger airlift portion of Phase II. Kondra Notes, p 79. 207 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 21. 208 Intvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMAC/CV, Arlington, VA, 30 Nov 1992. 209 MAIRS data recorded in Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, p 36. 210 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 74, 81‑82. 211 (S) Ibid, p 82. 212 (S) Ibid, pp 59‑60. 213 Lt Col Bill Dudley, “Desert Shield and Desert Storm Strategic Airlift,” briefing for Air War College Course 6328, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2 Apr 1992. 214 Lt Col Bill Ewing and Lt John Walker, Eight Months of Desert Shield/Storm (Scott AFB, IL: HQ MAC Command Analysis Group, Jun 1991), pp 10, 43-44. 215 This chart does not mean that MAC sometimes flew more aircraft than were mission capable. Differences in accounting systems are responsible for this appearance. 216 Letter, 24 Jun 92, HQ AMC/XPB to HQ AMC/XPY, Subject: RAND Study, “Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm: An Assessment of Operational Efficiency” by John Lund and Ruth Berg. Powerlifting, pp 80, 94. Kondra Notes, pp 6-8. Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp 27‑28. Achieving planned wartime airlift aircraft flying hours normally requires that all aircrews be available. For each active duty strategic airlift unit, there are slightly fewer than two line-assigned active duty basic crews for each primary authorized aircraft, and slightly fewer than two Associate Reserve basic crews. For each unit-equipped Air Reserve component strategic airlift unit, there are slightly fewer than two Air Reserve component basic crews for each primary authorized aircraft. Using all augmented crews instead of all basic crews reduces by approximately a third the total aircraft flying hours the crew force can provide. 217 JULLS NUMBER: 91335‑10118 (00216), submitted by HQ MAC, CAT Director. JULLS NUMBER: 31450‑27300 (00088), submitted by HQ USAF/LGT. Shoring is material placed under cargo to prevent damage to the aircraft. A common example is plywood placed under small wheels so that item weight is distributed over a larger area rather than being concentrated at a few points on the floor. 218 JULLS NUMBER 92155‑13673 (00023), submitted by USCENTAF Rear/LG. Intvw, MAC logistics and operations staffs, Scott AFB, IL, 1 Oct 1991. 219 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 51. Kondra Notes, p 46. JULLS NUMBER: 31540‑01700 (00089), submitted by HQ USAF/LGT. 220 Paper concerning aerial port limitations, Lt Col Emmet Lung, HQ MAC/XORP, 27 Sep 1991. 221 Ibid. JULLS NUMBER: 02536‑86362 (00063), submitted by HQ MAC, CAT Director. 222 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 65. 223 (S) Ibid, Ch 3, p 34 and Table 3‑6. 224 (S) Ibid, Ch 3, pp 26‑27. 225 (S) Ibid, Ch 3, p 27. 226 (S) Ibid, Ch 3, p 27. 227 During August 1990, average flying time was 94.7 hours for line‑assigned active duty C‑5 aircrew members and 50.9 hours for Associate Reserve C‑5 aircrew members. During September 1990, average flying time was 67.5 hours for line‑assigned active duty C‑5 aircrew members and 93.6 hours for Associate Reserve C‑5 aircrew members. After September, the highest monthly average for either category was 77.6 in January 1991 for active duty aircrew members. The highest monthly average for the entire period for line‑assigned C‑141 aircrew members was 78.1 in August 1990 for active duty aircrew members. Data were not available for unit equipped Air Reserve Component squadrons, but averages are estimated comparable to Associate Reserve squadrons. (These averages are not broken out by crew position and do not focus on the limiting crew positions for each type aircraft. They include crew members who were not flying because they were detailed to perform nonflying duties. While these averages do not tell a complete story, they are useful as general trend indicators.) Eight Months of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Appendix E. 228 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p 413. 229 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 79. 230 Kondra Notes, p 29. These are primarily MAC's observations. See Chapter 5 for SAC's observations on using KC‑10s as airlifters. Activation of Air Mobility Command should eventually lead to a single perspective on this issue. 231 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 53‑56. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp 415-416. 232 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 56. Kondra Notes, p 96. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p 416. (U) Some transportation experts contend that the need for Desert Express type of missions could be obviated by a better system for assigning priorities to cargo coupled with better in‑transit visibility over cargo once it enters the transportation system. Intvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMAC/CV, Arlington, VA, 30 Nov 1992. 233 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 51. 234 (S) Ibid, Ch 3, pp 51‑52. 235 GWAPS, Statistics of the Gulf War, Chapter 3. 236 Source: Military Air Integrated Reported System (MAIRS) data recorded in Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Table 6, p 36. 237 Kondra Notes, pp 101-102. 239 USTRANSCOM/TCHO briefing chart, “Desert Shield/Desert Storm Strategic Lift Summary Passengers and Cargo (As of 10 Mar 1991),” updated 21 Apr 1992. 240 Kondra Notes, pp 33‑34. (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, p 28. 241 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, Table 3‑6. 242 Intvw with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMAC/CV, Arlington, VA, 30 Nov 1992. 243 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp 416-417. 244 GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 245 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. p 420. 246 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 69-74. 247 Kondra Notes, pp 10, 55, 90. Interview with Lt Gen (Ret) Anthony J. Burshnick, former CINCMAC/CV, Arlington, VA, 30 Nov 1992. 248 Kondra Notes, pp 84, 111, 114. Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp 22‑23. 249 Kondra Notes, pp 99‑100. Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp 13‑14. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p 389. 250 Kondra Notes, pp 97, 123. Strategic Airlift in Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, pp 13‑14. 251 GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Table 20, ”Gulf War Strategic Lift Summary by Transportation Mode Plus Cargo Type,” Chapter 3. 252 Department of the Navy, The United States Navy in “Desert Shield” “Desert Storm” (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 May 1991), pp 7, 11. 253 Ibid, p 12. 254 Ibid, p 13. 255 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp E‑21,22. 256 (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 40-41. 257 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, pp E-14,15. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 24. See Chapter 2 of this volume for a discussion of the Air Force prepositioning program and Chapter 4 of this volume for a discussion of distributing prepositioned materiel within the AOR. 258 (S) William T. Y'Blood, Sharpening the Eagle's Talons, The USAF and the Desert Shield Second‑Phase Deployment Nov 9, 1990-Jan 17, 1991 (Draft) (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, Center for Air Force History, 1992), p 18. 259 GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Table 6. 260 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 105‑107. Intvw with HQ TAC staff, Langley AFB, VA, May 1992. (S) JULLS NUMBER: 41028-63422 (00380), submitted by RAND PAF. 261 Documented in detail by MAC in JULLS NUMBER: 91055-83676 (00129), submitted by HQ MAC, CAT Director. 262 Intvw with HQ MAC and HQ TRANSCOM staff, Scott AFB, IL, Feb 1992. JULLS NUMBER: 32365-38550 (00360), submitted by PACOPS/DOU. 263 Intvw with HQ TAC staff, Langley AFB, VA, May 1992. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 55, 110. 264 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 110. (U) Intvw with HQ MAC and HQ TRANSCOM staff, Scott AFB, IL, Feb 1992, substantiated that this problem was widespread. Essentially the same problem is pointed out in JULLS NUMBER: 90737‑22888 (00123), submitted by OC‑ALC/IG. 265 Intvw with HQ TAC staff, Langley AFB, VA, May 1992. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 104-105, 108‑109. See this Chapter 5 of this volume for a more extensive discussion of the “Atlantic Bridge.” 266 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 109. 267 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 355‑356. See Chapter 5 for further discussion of air refueling operations. 268 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 111. 269 (S) History of the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing (Provisional), pp 9, 12‑13, 19. 270 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 112. 271 (S) 4th Tactical Fighter Wing in Southwest Asia, p 18. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, pp 16‑18, 111‑112. 272 (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 51‑52. 273 Ibid, pp 52‑54. 274 STRATFOR (Strategic Forces Advisor) was a staff planning group consisting of people knowledgeable in conventional operations. 275 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 331‑332. 276 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, p 337. 277 (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 39. 278 JULLS NUMBER: 21443‑56794 (00169), submitted by HQ SAC/LGXX. AFRES expressed a similar complaint about JOPES deployment in JULLS NUMBER: 03057-60563 (00371), submitted by HQ AFRES/LGXP. 279 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, p 345. 280 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 346‑347. GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Table 6. 281 (S) Ibid; (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 99. 282 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 347, 349. 283 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 197, 199, 460. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 100. 284 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, p 199. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 100. 285 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, pp 582‑584. 286 (S) Ibid, p 585. 287 (S) Ibid, p 589. 288 (S) Ibid, pp 586‑587. 289 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 102. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 28. 290 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 102. 291 GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 292 (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 37-38. 293 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, p 467. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 103. 294 GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 295 (S) History of the Strategic Air Command 1990, p 342. 296 (S) Ibid, pp 342-343. 297 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 97. 298 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 38-39. 299 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, pp 39-40, Table 3-10. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 54-55. (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 86. 300 (S) 1630 TAW(P), History of Airlift in the Desert: Circumventing the Iraqis (Al Ain AB, UAE: 1630 TAW(P)/HO, 23 May 1991), p ix. (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, Table 3-10. Y'Blood, (S) The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 81-82. 301 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, Table 3-10. Y'Blood, (S) The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 108. 302 (S) MAC History 1990, Ch 3, Table 3-10. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 108. 303 GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 304 JULLS NUMBER: 03054‑86057 (00101), submitted by HQ AFRES/LGXP. 305 Air Force Special Operations Command, Air Force Special Operations Command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Draft) (Hurlburt Field, FL: HQ AFSOC/HO, 1991), p 4. 306 Air Force Special Operations Command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Draft), p 4. 307 Ibid, pp 5‑6. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, p 73. 308 Air Force Special Operations Command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Draft), p 8. 309 (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 73, 97. 310 Air Force Special Operations Command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Draft), p 7. (S) Y'Blood, The Eagle and the Scorpion, pp 73 ‑74. 311 GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 3. 312 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, p E‑21. 313 (S) RAND, Assessment of Desert Shield Deployment, p 109. 314 (S) GWAPS, Statistical Compendium, Chapter 2, Allied Air Order of Battle. Totals are as of 1 Dec 1990. 315 NDTA Fourth Transportation Symposium Oct 1991, Airlift and Sealift Panels. (Presentations made by Lt Gen Vernon Kondra [then Maj Gen Kondra], MAC DO during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and Vice Admiral Frank Donovan, Commander, Military Sealift Command during Desert Shield/Storm.) Also, (S) rpt MAC Historian, Operation Desert Shield Desert Storm, Scott AFB, IL, p 165. 316 Department of the Air Force, Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force In The Gulf War (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, Sep 1991); and HQ USCENTAF/Logistics Plans (LGXM). Also, see Appendix 4A for a list of prepositioned Air Force equipment in the theater. 317 Source: MAC Military Air Integrated Reporting System (MAIRS). 318 (S/NF) OPLAN 1002-90, Mobility and Transportation, Appendix 4 to Annex D, 18 Jul 1990, U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, FL, pp D-4-9, D-4-10. 319 Intvw, with Lt Col Robert E. Edmisten, Director of Transportation, HQCENTAF, Shaw AFB, SC, 8 Aug 1992. 320 See Appendix 4B for a discussion of the Airlift Control Center. 321 Harvest Falcon and Harvest Eagle assets are two of the Air Force's three bare base systems. For more information, refer to Chapter 2. 322 Col David Davis, MAC/LEMM; Mr. Orson Gover, MAC/LERW; Operation Desert Shield Desert Storm MAC Logistics History, Headquarters, Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, IL: 15 Mar 1991 (2d Draft). 323 For example, the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing out of Pope AFB, NC, deployed about one-third of the total wing organization to the AOR. Once in the AOR, the unit had to be augmented. Source: Briefing, by Col Maxwell C. Bailey, Commander 317th Tactical Airlift Wing, to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 19 Jul 1991. 324 AFP 400-77, “USAF Wartime Logistics Organization and Decision Making,” Revision 1, 2 Jan 1990. p 6-A-6. 325 Refer to Appendix 4B for more information on theater airlift management. 326 MAC used Unit Type Codes (UTCs) on airlift manifests to deploy individuals to the Gulf theater, as opposed to organizational codes because entire organizational units did not deploy. Therefore, when the individuals arrived in theater, they were placed in partial units which had deployed, but did not have organizational identity. CENTAF had operational control but not administrative or disciplinary control over these units. 327 MAC History, pp 45, 46. 328 Material handling equipment (MHE) is the term for cargo handling equipment used to load and offload cargo aircraft. It may be forklifts for small airlift loads, or it could be 40K loaders, which are the large 40,000 pound capacity self-propelled loaders used to handle large cargo aircraft such as C-141s, C-5s, and CRAF cargo aircraft. 329 GWAPS Statistical Compendium, USCENTAF Bases and Units, HQ TAC/XPM, as of 15 Jan 1991. Also, refer to Appendix 4C for definitions of provisional units. 330 SMSgt James R. Ciborski, “History of Airlift in the Desert: Circumventing the Iraqis,” 23 May 1991, Al Ain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), pp 26, 27. 331 Brig Gen Edwin E. Tenoso, “A COMALF Perspective,” speech at Air Force Association Briefing Session VII, St Louis, MO, 2 Aug 1991. 332 Ibid. 333 See Chapter 7 for more discussion on supplying the force. 334 Briefing, by Lt Col Brad Christy, USAF ACP, 27 Nov 1991. Also, Department of Defense, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Apr 1992), Appendix F, p F-19. 335 “A COMALF Perspective.” 336 Lt Gen Vernon L. Kondra Notes, “Operation Desert Shield - Desert Storm, 24 Aug 1990 - 31 May 1991.” pp 33, 68. (Lt Gen Kondra, then Maj Gen, was the MAC Director of Operations during the period of his notes.) After much negotiation, Cairo West was offered to MAC as a stage base. However, it was rejected when the MAC DO was told that MAC would have to vacate within twenty-four hours after the war started. 337 “A COMALF Perspective.” 338 MAC History, p 214. 339 Kondra notes, p 68. The COMALF coordinated the installation of lights and other facility standards with the TAC and SAC host base commanders in order to obtain a twenty-four hour airlift operational capability. 340 When the Desert Express C-141 landed (normally in the late afternoon), the cargo was quickly downloaded, resorted for final destinations, pelletized, and loaded aboard the first C-130, which departed within one hour and thirty minutes after the C-141 landed. A C-130 departed every thirty minutes after the first C-130 departure until all Desert Express cargo was on its way. These flights were all primarily night missions to accommodate the C-141 schedule. 341 “A COMALF Perspective.” 342 Lt Col Robert E. Edmisten, Headquarters USCENTAF, Director of Transportation,” USCENTAF Desert Shield/Desert Storm Transportation: Milestones in the Sand,” Defense Transportation Journal (Jun 1991), p 58. 343 Bailey briefing. Utilization rate is the hour per day flying time utilization of the C-130 fleet. The numbers given were averaged out over the reporting periods. The planned wartime utilization rate is 4.0. One of the reasons that the overall Desert Storm utilization rate is relatively low in spite of hours flown, is that low casualty rates made 36 C-130s apportioned to the air evacuation role by COMALF relatively unproductive. 344 Kondra notes, p 30 345 Bailey briefing. 346 “A COMALF Perspective.” (See Chapter 7 for more discussion on the priority system.) 347 Kondra notes, p 46. 348 U.S. Army Aviation Center, Operation Desert Shield/Storm After Action Report, Fort Rucker, AL, 22 Nov 1991. 349 Department of the Navy, “The United States Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm” (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 May 1991), p 31. 350 Ibid. 351 Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, Combat Service Support Operations in Southwest Asia, Battle Assessment Interim Report #1, edited by Lt Col Robert T. Forte (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Operations Analysis and Assessment Group, 28 Aug 1991), p 81. 352 GWAPS Statistical Compendium. Also, Kondra Notes, p 82. 353 Airland is the airlift term for flying to an airfield and landing before discharging passengers and cargo as opposed to air dropping the passengers and cargo. 354 “A COMALF Perspective.” 355 Ibid. 356 This is the term given to completion of transporting a unit or organizational entity and its equipment from one point to another. 357 Bailey briefing. 358 Gen Boomer is referring to the sharp turn in the demarcation line between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Also, David L. Dittmer, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” Vol: “Overview and Summary”: Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, VA, Aug 1992, p 20. 359 “A COMALF Perspective.” 360 Ibid. 361 Ibid. 362 Ibid. 363 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Desert Shield/Desert Storm After Action Report, Volume II: Main Report, Sep 1991, U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, p VII-Employment-101. 364 U.S. Army Center for Military History, Gulf War History of U.S. Army Operations, edited by Mr. Mickey Shubert, ND, p 3-17. 365 Gulf War History of U.S. Army Operations, pp 3-25, 3-26. 366 “AFLC Operations in Desert Storm,” Air Force Logistics Command white paper, Jul 1991. 367 Intvw, with Lt Col Robert E. Edmisten. 368 USCENTAF “Milestones in the Sand,” p 58. 369 Intvw, with Lt Col Robert E. Edmisten; Kondra notes, p 35. 370 Bailey briefing. 371 USCENTAF “Milestones in the Sand,” p 58. 40 Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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