Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit
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Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit Ion v. Chevron USA, Inc., No 12-60682 (5th Cir., 9/26/13); http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/12/12-60682-CV0.wpd.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary judgment was reversed:
Summary by the appellate court: Todd W. Ion, a former employee of Appellee Chevron USA, Inc., appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Chevron. Ion alleges that Chevron terminated him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The district court held that, while Ion had established the existence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact regarding Chevron’s motivation, Chevron had established as a matter of law that it would have terminated Ion despite any retaliatory motive. We disagree and, therefore, REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Title VII: gender stereotyping, same-sex harassment, supervisor, sexual desire – motive irrelevant Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., No.: 11-30770 (5th Cir., 9/ 27/13); http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cpub%5C11/11-30770-CV2.pdf; [enhanced lexis.com version]. Many state human right acts expressly prohibit gender identity stereotyping and discrimination. Federal statutes don’t expressly prohibit that, but there is a trend in federal cases to interpret Title VII to include gender stereotyping. This is another Title VII decision by ten of the sixteen judges in an en banc panel [Wikipedia – en banc is “. . . a legal term used to refer to a case heard or to be heard before all judges of a court – in other words, before the entire bench – rather than by a panel selected from them”]. Sexual desire need not be a motive; offensive misconduct is sufficient, e.g., the supervisor purportedly was lewd and vulgar to the employee on a daily basis, including:
Summary by the appellate court: This Title VII case arises out of alleged sexual harassment by Chuck Wolfe, the superintendent of an all-male crew on a construction site operated by Boh Bros. Construction Company (“Boh Brothers”). During a three-day jury trial, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) presented evidence that Wolfe subjected Kerry Woods, an iron worker on Wolfe’s crew, to almost-daily verbal and physical harassment because Woods did not conform to Wolfe’s view of how a man should act. The jury found in favor of the EEOC on its hostile-environment claim, awarding compensatory and punitive damages. Boh Brothers appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial. Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we must, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [Comment: Apparently Wolfe is unaware of a growing number of professional athletes announcing their sexual status.] Title VII: gender, adverse employment action, promotion denied, insufficient qualifications Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Frederick v. Metropolitan State University of Denver Board Of Trustees, No. 12-1505 (10th Cir., 10/3/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-1505.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. No discrimination was found because Elizabeth Frederick did not have the requisite qualifications for the promotion she sought. Courts review these cases to decide on whether there was unlawful discrimination, not whether the employer made a good professional or business decision. Summary by the appellate court: Elizabeth Frederick appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan State University of Denver Board of Trustees (Metro) on her claim that she was denied a promotion on the basis of her gender in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., commonly known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. Religion: contraceptive prescriptions, health plans, injunction, Hobby Lobby case, abatement Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Newland, et al,. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1380 (10/3/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-1380.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case is abated [on hold] pending decision in the Hobby Lobby case currently in the United States Supreme Court. ORDER AND JUDGMENT Before KELLY, LUCERO, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), appeals the district court’s order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of an HHS regulation requiring employer-provided group health plans to cover certain contraceptive drugs and services. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we affirm.
Hercules Industries, Inc., a for-profit Colorado corporation, and five of its controlling shareholders and/or officers (collectively, the “Newlands”) brought suit in Colorado district court seeking an exemption from an HHS regulation requiring that employer-provided health plans cover all contraceptive drugs and services approved by the Food and Drug Administration (the “Regulation”). 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a). Hercules and the Newlands contend that compliance with the Regulation would violate their sincerely held religious beliefs about contraceptives. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring HHS from enforcing the Regulation against them, claiming that the Regulation substantially burdens their religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 . The district court granted the preliminary injunction, and HHS timely appealed. * * * III. CONCLUSION We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction to Hercules. We therefore affirm and remand to the district court. Given the pending petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby, the district court is instructed to abate further proceedings until the Supreme Court completes its consideration of the Hobby Lobby case. At that time, the abatement may be lifted and the court may undertake all proceedings necessary to resolve the issues remaining before it. Finally, appellees' motion to hear this matter with the Hobby Lobby proceeding is denied as moot. FMLA: interference, policies – attendance – notice of absence – failure to comply, adverse employment action, legitimate business reason, no pretext, summary judgment dismissal Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Barnes v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., No. 13-3043 (10th Cir., 10/4/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3043.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: It is uncontroverted that Spirit terminated Mr. Barnes because he failed to comply with its attendance and notice-of-absence policies, and Mr. Barnes has not come forward with any evidence to contradict Spirit’s explanation for his termination or call into question the legitimacy of its policies. Spirit was therefore entitled to summary judgment on the interference claim. ADA: reasonable accommodation, essential function, no connection, designated parking place, dismissal reversed Retaliation: poor performance, valid business purpose, no pretext, dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit Citations:
The request by an Assistant Attorney General for accommodation of a designated parking place didn’t need not be related to the essential functions of her job. She had an access problem because of her knee condition. Viewed from the perspective of the ADA’s job and public access requirements, the decision makes sense. In the interactive accommodation process, remember these factors: 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires; or (ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment . . . that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position; or (iii) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities. Summary by the appellate court: Pauline G. Feist, a former assistant attorney general for the Louisiana Department of Justice (“LDOJ”), claims that LDOJ (1) discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by declining to provide a free on-site parking space to accommodate her disability (osteoarthritis of the knee), and (2) violated the ADA and Title VII by terminating her employment in retaliation for charges she filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The district court granted summary judgment on Feist’s discrimination claim, holding that she failed to explain how the denial of on-site parking limited her ability to perform the “essential functions” of her job. Feist filed timely appeal, arguing that the ADA does not require a link between a requested accommodation and an essential job function. The district court also granted LDOJ’s motion for summary judgment on Feist’s retaliation claim, finding that Feist was dismissed for poor performance and holding that Feist produced no evidence that, but for a retaliatory motive, LDOJ would not have dismissed her. Feist appeals, claiming that she has evidence that any performance-based justification is mere pretext, intended to disguise the retaliatory dismissal. Because we find an error in the district court’s analysis of the discrimination claim, we vacate summary judgment in part and affirm in part. Severance pay: employment contract, troubled bank, “federally funded institution”, “golden parachute” – 12 U.S.C. § 1828(k)(4)(A) – refusal to pay Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Martinez v. Rocky Mountain Capital, No. 11-8076 (10th Cir. 10/4/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-8076.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Joe F. Martinez had been entitled to a severance payment and benefits, but the settlement agreement was set aside for impracticality as defined under federal law. Summary by the appellate court: Joe F. Martinez, a former president and regional vice-president of Rocky Mountain Bank and Rocky Mountain Capital (collectively, “Bank”), sued the Bank to recover his severance pay. The Bank settled but later refused to pay under the terms of the settlement agreement because federal regulators deemed the payment a prohibited “golden parachute.” Mr. Martinez asked the district court to enforce the agreement anyway, but the court denied his motion and granted in part the Bank’s motion for a judgment of impracticability, excusing the Bank’s duty to perform under the settlement agreement. The court then entered a Rule 54(b) certification, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and Mr. Martinez appealed. We affirm. Hacking: public sector rights, social media, whistleblower, grievance process, adverse employment action, boss – misconduct Jurisdiction: Oklahoma Murphy v. Spring, No. 13-cv-96-TCK-PJC (N.D. Okla. Sept. 12, 2013). Resources:
From time to time an important trial court decision is published that merits attention, and this case and Molly DiBianca’s excellent article about it are noted here as important resources and study guides for practitioners. Briefly: An administrative assistant noted improprieties in the athletic program that appeared to have “endangered the health and safety of students” and had “misappropriated funds.” Issues covered and analyzed are:
Torts: employee accident, course and scope of employment, personal errand, incidental benefit, employer, imputed liability – respondeat superior Jurisdiction: California Moradi v. Marsh USA, INC., B239858 (Cal.App.Dist.2,Div.1, 9/17/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B239858.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. This is a personal injury (tort) case, but often in statutory discrimination litigation, tort claims are also included. Often that raises issues of all might be liable for the actions of company personnel, so this case is noted to refresh recollection of some of the considerations involved. This side trip may provide some helpful insight into related areas of the law. This case also alerts executives, managers and supervisors generally, about how misconduct by anyone in the company in the scope of their employment might subject the company or agency to imputed liability. The employee was required to use her personal vehicle for many company duties, and the slight deviation for personal use was held not to change the incidental benefit to the employer of having the employee use her personal vehicle to travel to and from the office and other destinations. FEHA:
Jurisdiction: California Alamo v. Practice Management Information Corp., No. B230909 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2,Div.7, 9/5/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B230909A.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. In accordance with Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203 (Cal. 2013), the plaintiff must prove her pregnancy was a “substantial motivating reason” for her termination rather than merely a “motivating reason”. Title VII:
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Salazar v. City of Commerce City, et al., No. 12 - 1390 (10th Cir., 9/23/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-1390.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Background by the appellate court: Ms. Salazar was the Director of Economic Development (“ED”) for the City from August 29, 2005, until her termination effective July 16, 2008. She filed a complaint in district court alleging gender and national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII; national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection and her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. In addition to the City, Ms. Salazar named four individual defendants: Gerald M. Flannery, City Manager; Tom Acre, Deputy City Manager and Ms. Salazar’s direct supervisor ; Heather Olson, n/k/a Heather Spencer, Human Resources Director; and Paul Natale, Mayor. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted their motion as to most of Ms. Salazar’s claims. The court denied summary judgment on her claims against the City, Mr. Flannery, and Mr. Acre, alleging retaliatory termination in violation of Title VII and § 1981. Those claims proceeded to trial, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of the defendants. In its verdict, the jury concluded that Ms. Salazar’s opposition to discrimination based on gender and/or race was not the determinative factor that caused the City, Mr. Flannery, or Mr. Acre to terminate her employment. Ms. Salazar is not appealing the jury’s verdict. * * * III. Conclusion The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The court’s orders dated April 26, 2013, and May 14, 2013, provisionally directing that portions of the appendix would remain under seal, are hereby made permanent as to Volumes IV, VII, and VIII, which will continue to remain under seal. Unemployment benefits: adverse employment action, car required, unable to repair Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania Bell Socialization Services v. UCBR, Pa. Commw. Ct., No. 414 C.D. 2013 (8/29/13) [enhanced lexis.com version]. This intermediate appellate court decision affirmed the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (UCBR) of an award of unemployment compensation to an employee earning $9/hr. who could not afford to repair her vehicle. She was fired because the employer required having reliable transportation. The appellate reasoning was that she had “good cause” for violating that requirement. Policy: Civil litigation: separate entity, capacity to sue, by-laws – unilaterally amended Health care: professional service for patients
Summary by the appellate court: This case presents two compelling and (in this case) competing policy interests. On one side is the interest of hospital management in controlling hospital operations and providing a safe environment for patients through bylaws governing the medical staff. On the other side is the interest of a medical staff in carrying out its obligations to patients by controlling how it organizes itself and how it influences the formation of and compliance with its bylaws. Although both sides raise persuasive policy arguments, we conclude that under Minnesota law a medical staff does not have legal capacity to sue and that the medical staff bylaws are not an enforceable contract. Therefore, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the hospital. [Note: Even though the health care providers were denied being allowed to sue, better practices would indicate that management would be prudent to pay attention to such problems.] NLRA, LMRA: secondary boycott, sham litigation, proscriptions expanded, work centers, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 187 Jurisdiction: 4th Circuit Waugh Chapel South, LLC v. UFCW (4th Cir., 9/26/13); http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/121429.P.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Despite finding that sham litigation violated NLRA secondary boycott proscriptions, it:
DIAZ, Circuit Judge: Waugh Chapel South, LLC, WCS LLC, WCS Properties Business Trust (collectively “WCS”) sued the United Food and Commercial Workers Union Locals 27 and 400 (“ UFCW”) and the Mid-Atlantic Retail Food Industry Joint Labor Management Fund (the “Fund”) under the Labor Management Relations Act ( the “LMRA”) , 29 U.S.C. § 187, which provides a cause of action for victims of “unfair labor practices” as defined by the National Labor Relations Act ( the “NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4). In its complaint, WCS alleges that the defendants orchestrated fourteen separate legal challenges against their commercial real estate project in order to force WCS to terminate their relationship with a non-unionized supermarket – conduct that WCS alleged was an illicit “secondary boycott” under § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) . The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, claiming that their First Amendment right to petition the courts insulated their litigation activity from liability. Alternatively, the Fund moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it was not a “labor organization” under the NLRA. The district court agreed with both arguments and granted the motions to dismiss. This appeal followed. We agree with the district court that the Fund is not a “labor organization” under the NLRA, but conclude that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not (at least at this stage) spare the remaining defendants from the allegations of the complaint. Although the courts are a medium by which citizens may exercise their First Amendment right to petition their government, the act of petitioning those courts may not serve as the means to achieve illegal ends. Cal. Mot or Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972) . Under this “sham litigation” exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, we hold that the pleadings and the concomitant record evidence in this case, if credited by a factfinder, are sufficient to show that the unions have abused their right to petition the courts beyond the point of constitutional protection. We therefore affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand to the district court for a determination of whether the unions waged a secondary boycott in the manner alleged in the complaint . CAFA: Class Action Fairness Act, removal to federal court, out-of-state defendants, amount in controversy, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), Lowdermilk Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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