Katey Van Ort History 600 Paper

History 600 Paper

Baseball’s long history is filled with stories of immense hope, triumphs, and jaw-dropping success stories. At least, these are the parts of the game apparent to the public. However, baseball also has had a darker side, which has played as important a part in the game’s history. This side includes, drug-use, gambling, and other illicit activities that would darken the reputation of the game and its players if they ever became public. One person governs both sides of baseball, the commissioner.

The Commissioner has held a decisive position in the game since the role’s inception in the 1920s.¹ The creators of the office originally intended the Commissioner to act as, an objective leader, who would listen to both the owner and the players without favoring one side over the other.² This principle was enshrined in the famous “best interest” clause of the by-law defining the office’s powers.³

Outlined in the Major League Constitution in 1921, the best interest of baseball clause gives the Commissioner the right to discipline players and owners for any offenses deemed not in the best interests of baseball.⁴ Article 2, Section 3, states,

In the case of conduct by Major League Clubs, owners, officers, employees or players that is deemed by the not to be in the best interests of Baseball, punitive action by the Commissioner for each offense may include any one or more of the following:

(a) a reprimand; (b) deprivation of a Major League Club of representation in Major League Meetings; (c) suspension or removal of any owner, officer or employee of a Major League Club; (d) temporary or permanent ineligibility of a player; (e) a fine, not to exceed $2,000,000 in the case of a Major League Club, not to exceed $500,000 in the case of an owner, officer or employee, and in an amount consistent with the then-current Basic Agreement with the Major League Baseball Players Association, in the case of a player; (f) loss of the benefit of any or all of the Major League Rules, including but not limited to the denial or transfer of player selection rights provided by Major League Rules 4 and 5; and (g) such other actions as the Commissioner may deem appropriate.⁵

This clause gives the Commissioner more power than needed, for he is allowed to implement punishment at his discretion, giving him the ultimate end-word. This discretion gives him the power to take action against the League, the clubs, any party with the MLA, and the players.⁶ It can be likened to the veto power of the president of the United States. Using this immense power, Commissioner Bowie Kuhn led the institution of baseball into a period of powerful growth.

This paper focuses on Bowie Kuhn and his use of the “best interest” clause on three separate occasions. Each Commissioner brought a different understanding and use of the “best interest” clause. Kenesaw Mountain Landis, the first Commissioner of Major League Baseball (MLB), used the “best interest” clause authoritatively. Landis wanted to use the “best interest” clause to remove the negative effects. He said that he wanted to “clean out the crookedness and the gambling responsible for it and keep the sport above approach.”⁷. He used his powers in the 1919 World Series gambling controversy, and as a result of his use of the “best interest” clause, he banned eight players from baseball forever.⁸ Landis asserted absolute authority with his “best interest” power throughout his 24 year reign.

After Landis, Commissioner Chandler retained the absolute authority that Landis used during his commissionership. However, Chandler rarely used the “best interest” clause to assert power.⁹ One instance where Chandler used his “best interest” power was to suspend Leo Durocher, the manager of the Brooklyn Dodgers, for Durocher’s personal actions that reflected poorly upon the game of baseball. Durocher had ties to a film star, George Raft, that many believe gambled and had ties to organized crime.¹⁰ Chandler suspended Durocher from MLB for one year because he did not uphold the standards of a manager of baseball and was detrimental to the integrity of the game.¹¹

Ford Frick became the next Commissioner and did not use the “best interest” clause at will because he believed that the National and the American Leagues could handle most decisions.¹² William Eckert followed Frick as Commissioner. As a retired army general, Eckert had little baseball knowledge.¹³ He did not use the clause because the owners discovered that he would not be a good fit as Commissioner of baseball, and Eckert left baseball shortly after a three-year stint as commissioner.¹⁴

Bowie Kuhn became Commissioner of baseball in 1969 and served for 15 years, resigning in 1984.¹⁵ He entered into his role at a time of intensifying labor conflicts within the sport, pitting major-league franchise owners and the players in the newly assertive Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA). As an observer noted, “Bowie Kuhn was in the right place at the right time when major league club owners were searching for a new baseball commissioner.”¹⁶ Kuhn had worked with the MLB as a lawyer for the National League before he became commissioner. In his previous year of working with MLB, Kuhn had made enough of an impression on the owners that all 24 of them voted unanimously to make him the pro-term chief executive of Major League Baseball after they couldn’t make a decision between the American and National League choices for the job.¹⁷ Kuhn’s role was defined as “providing leadership for this committee . . . assume all the traditional duties of the commissionership, but the first priority is to carry out a thorough re-examination and reshaping of baseball’s structure.” As soon as he took office, he started to work on improving the institution of baseball.

¹⁸ Kuhn set out to restore the power of the commissionership to the power asserted by Commissioner Landis.¹⁹ The owners endowed Commissioner Kuhn with the task of maintaining peace and power within MLB. Despite his best efforts to maintain absolute authority, Kuhn’s leadership marked one of the most tumultuous reigns for a Commissioner in baseball. Kuhn’s actions as a powerful Commissioner caused others to challenge his role, which in turn lead him to further assert his power, make decisions, and enact his authority. This feedback loop, resulted in an intense yet powerful rule, which expanded the Commissioner’s role and the game for the better.

Throughout Kuhn’s rule, the MLB constitution was amended several times, each time giving the Commissioner more power. In 1974, the owners amended the Major League agreements giving the Commissioner more exclusive power to act as an arbitrator in the cases against them.²⁰ Kuhn used his “best interest” power to suspend players for ties to gambling and drugs, including Denny McLain, Willie Mays, Mickey Mantle and others.²¹ This uninhibited use of the “best interest” clause allowed the Commissioner to impose serious power, in the name of the best interest clause, to strengthen the game and bring about success in baseball.

This paper focuses on three instances Commissioner Kuhn used the best interest clause in baseball to enforce his role as a strong and powerful leader, creating a powerful institution of baseball with an even more powerful leader. The first example will be on Kuhn’s use of the “best interest” clause against Charlie Finley of the Oakland Athletics. The second will focus on Kuhn’s use of the best interest clause against the Atlanta Braves.²² Then the last focus will be on Kuhn’s best interest pursuits in enacting bans on gambling pursuits. These examples demonstrate the power of the commissioners’ role. His effective leadership in MLB created a strong, powerful, and thriving institution.

Kuhn used the best interest clause against Charlie Finley and the Oakland A’s to assert his power and void Finley’s fire sale of players to keep Finley in check. Kuhn and Finley had an interesting relationship that spanned from their beginning years in baseball. Finley was an owner that pushed boundaries and caused many grievances for Commissioner Kuhn. During Kuhn’s reelection period, Finley voted against the reelection of Kuhn, and he had caused tension in the press.²³ Other owners were wary of him, as well. Bill Veeck, who had his own relationship with Kuhn, told Kuhn, “you better watch Finley. . . he’s trying to peddle his best players for big bucks.”²⁴ Later on Kuhn would find out from John Johnson, the commissioner’s administrator, that Finley had big plans. Kuhn would retell the story in the his book

“Commissioner, I’m sorry to pull you away from the game,” Johnson said, “but I had to tell you this right away—Finley’s made deals with sell Rollie Fingers and Joe Rudi to the Red Sox for two million dollars, and Vida Blue to the Yankees for a million five.” I asked him where he got the information and he said, “Finley.”²⁵
Finley’s actions caused Kuhn to use his “best interest” powers to stop the liquidation of the Oakland Athletics.

Charles Finley bought the Kansas City Athletics in the 1960s and moved the team to Oakland, California in 1968.²⁶ Finley built a team that won the World Series from 1972-1974 that featured Reggie Jackson, Catfish Hunter, Rollie Fingers, Vida Blue and many other talented players.²⁷ Finley did not carry out the contract with Catfish Hunter, one of the best pitchers in Major League Baseball, and an arbitrator made Hunter a free agent.²⁸ After Hunter left, the Oakland A’s struggled, and Finley lost to Boston in the 1975 playoffs.²⁹ Finley chose to liquidate his entire team after the 1975 season. Finley chose to believe that he would lose all of his players to free agency, and instead of fighting for the players, Finley sold the players to other teams. In April of 1976, Finley had traded Reggie Jackson, one of the A’s stars, to the Baltimore Orioles before he attempted to fire sale the rest of the team.³⁰

The players were at Finley’s mercy. Finley claimed, “They don’t want to play for ol’ Charlie. They want to chase those big bucks in New York.”³¹ Finley adamantly asserted that he was trying to salvage his team because the players wanted to leave for better opportunities. While this part of Finley’s argument may have been true, Kuhn believed that Finley had the opportunity to sign the players too.³² Many have speculated that Finley did not want to lose the players to free agency without receiving any money in return, hence, his selling of the players.³³

In the end, to protect the integrity of the sport, Kuhn vetoed the sale of Blue, Fingers and Rudi.³⁴ His announcement to the press conveyed his concern for the integrity of the sport: or,

Public confidence in the integrity of club operations and in baseball would be greatly undermined should such assignments not be restrained. While I am of course aware that there have been sales of player contracts in the past, there has been no instance in my judgment which had the potential for harm to our game as do these assignments, particularly in the present unsettled circumstances of baseball’s reserve system and in the highly competitive circumstances we find in todays’ sports and entertainment world.

Nor can I persuade myself that the spectacle of the Yankees and Red Sox buying contracts of star players in the prime of their careers for cash sums totaling $3,500,000 is anything but devastating to baseball’s reputation for integrity and to public confidence in the game, even though I can well understand that their motive is a good faith effort to strengthen their clubs. If such transactions now and in the future were permitted, the door would be opened wide to the buying of success by the more affluent clubs, public suspicion would be aroused, traditional and sound methods of player development and acquisition would be undermined and our efforts to preserve the competitive balance would be greatly impaired.³⁵

The court, the law, and many others have upheld the “best interest” power of the Commissioner. Jerome Holtzman, the MLB’s official historian, said that Finley’s sale would have been detrimental to baseball’s best interest in 1976.³⁷ Holtzman said, “At that time, it would have been the biggest one-day sale in baseball history.”³⁸ In fact, the 1977 Oakland A’s won 63 games that season, with only one winning season in the next 10 years.³⁹ Finley attempted to liquidate his teams assets, and Kuhn was right to impose the “best interest” clause to save not only the integrity of the institution of baseball but also the integrity of the Oakland A’s themselves.

Finley sued Kuhn for voiding his sale, hoping to prove that Kuhn overextended his authority. Kuhn was confident in his baseball law knowledge, as he had worked as a baseball lawyer for 25 years, and knew that Finley would lose.⁴⁰ The trial spanned fifteen-days consisting of 2,059 pages of transcript, 100 exhibits and twenty witnesses.⁴¹ In the end, Judge McGarr ruled

that the Major League Agreement gave me (Kuhn) all the necessary authority. He quoted the pertinent passage, which says the commissioner may: “(a) . . . investigate, either upon complaint, or upon his own initiative, any act, transaction or practice, charged, alleged or suspected to be detrimental to the best interests of the national game of baseball; and (b) To determine, after investigation, what preventative, remedial or punitive action is appropriate in the premises, and to take such action either against Major Leagues, Major League Clubs or individuals, as the case may be.”⁴²

With the ruling, the Finley case bestowed more power to Commissioner Kuhn. The “best interest” clause upheld the power in the Commissioner’s ability to retain the integrity and absolute power of the commissioner. This power allowed Kuhn to use the “best interest” clause against Ted Turner and the Atlanta Braves in the following months after the Charlie Finley cases.

The Atlanta Braves tested Commissioner Kuhn’s power, causing Kuhn to use the best interests clause against the Atlanta Braves, strengthening his power as the commissioner. Kuhn strengthened his role as a powerful figure in baseball through his decision to use the “best interest” clause against Ted Turner and the Atlanta Braves.

Ted Turner bought the Atlanta Braves from Bill Bartholomey.⁴³ Turner was the president and chief executive officer of Turner Advertising, which he later turned into Turner Communications Group in 1969.⁴⁴ Turner was known for his controversial movie channel. First, he bought old black-and-white motion pictures and played them on his television channel. Then he attempted to turn the black-and-white films into color films, causing outcry at his defamation of the integrity of the movies.⁴⁵

In 1976, Bill Bartholomey, the owner of the Atlanta Braves, sold the Atlanta Braves to Ted Turner.⁴⁶ Kuhn and Major League baseball knew that Turner wanted to make his station, WTBS, a superstation.⁴⁷ Turner had bought a television channel that was losing money and he tried to resurrect the channel through his black-and-white movies, called WTBS.⁴⁸ By making WTBS a superstation, his channel would be broadcasted across the country through satellite signals, infringing upon other existing TV contracts.⁴⁹ To assure that he would not create a superstation, according to Kuhn, Turner wrote a letter to the Bartholomey that said, “it is Turner Communications’ and my personal intention to comply with the best interest of baseball in all matters including baseball’s collective posting on cable television.”⁵⁰ This letter assured the National League that Turner would be a good replacement owner of the Atlanta Braves.

The Atlanta Braves were losing money and needed new influence to help the team rise again. In 1975, the team was struggling and below .500 for wins, attendance for the entire season reached 534,672 for the entire season, and the club needed new leadership to resurrect the team.⁵¹ Ted Turner took over the Atlanta Braves and caused excess trouble, allowing Kuhn to use his “best interest” power to make Major League Baseball a better institution.

Kuhn’s relationship with Turner was strenuous and tumultuous. Because Turner created a superstation that broadcast the Atlanta Braves baseball games to the entire country, acting against his word, later in 1976, Kuhn never fully trusted Turner’s actions.⁵² In 1976, the FTC approved an application by Southern Satellite Systems to carry the WTBS signal nationally, birthing a super station.⁵³ Ted was dishonest about his intentions with the team, and he admitted to Kuhn that he had “pulled the wool over the eyes of the National League.”⁵⁴

The instances that led up to the suspension of Turner on the basis of the “best interest” clause allowed Kuhn to assert his ultimate power to allow baseball and its integrity to thrive. Ted Turner’s first offense against Kuhn came through his dishonesty in creating the WTBS-Atlanta superstation in his first year as owner. His second came in 1977, when the general manager of the Braves, John Alevizos, tampered with a San Francisco player named Gary Matthews.⁵⁵ The Braves asked Matthews about joining the Atlanta Braves before his free agency was up. After the 1976 World Series, Turner then confronted Bob Lurie, owner of the Giants, and said that he would pay whatever was necessary to sign Matthews.⁵⁶ This violated the directive that prohibits owners from speaking to players before the free-agency draft.⁵⁷ Kuhn issues a series of warnings in a directive. The first directive speculated on what the potential amount of 1216 free agents would be paid to sign, also stating that club personnel could not be tampered with.⁵⁸ The second directive warning issued said

(3) There should be no direct contacts of any kind with potential free agent players on another club without the prior written consent of their current club, which should not be sought or given without the advance approval of this office.

(4) The indirect contacts which are prohibited include (A) conversations between a club and the player through his representative or other third party intermediary; and (B) public comments which would indicate an interest in signing any such player.

Kuhn punished Turner and the Braves for directly violating the directive. The Commissioner fined the Braves $10,000 and took away the first-round draft pick in the 1977 free-agent draft of amateur players for Alevizos’ actions.⁶⁰ Not only had Turner and the Braves disregarded the directive, but they made it hard for Lurie of San Francisco to resign Matthews. Matthews ended up signing with the Atlanta Braves.

As a result of the actions of the Braves, Commissioner Kuhn was forced to impose his power through the best interests of baseball clause. According to Kuhn, Turner did not want to lose the deal with Matthews and pleaded to be suspended.⁶¹ Matthews was not at fault in any of this, and as a result, Kuhn let the trade stand.⁶² Kuhn announced the suspension of Turner and the deprivation of the Braves first round draft pick on December 30, 1976.⁶³ This ruling asserted the power of the Commissioner to make decisions that were in the best interest of baseball. In Turner’s case, the best interest of baseball was preserved because other owners could not do what Turner did, especially directly defy the Commissioner’s directive. Disobeying the Commissioner’s directive would show a complete lack of respect for the law and authority of the commissioner. However, despite Turner begging for a suspension, he asked for a hearing to appeal Kuhn’s decision.⁶⁴

Turner did not understand that he defied the direct orders of the Commissioner and questioned his direct authority. According to Kuhn in the January hearing, Turner acted like he thought he was Sitting Bull and Kuhn was Custer.⁶⁵ Turner risked suspension with a repeat violation after his first tampering with q22Matthews and Alevizos, and he did. His impunity caused baseball’s rules to mean nothing, according to Kuhn.⁶⁶ Turner then sued Kuhn, prolonging his suspension from MLB. Only a month before the Turner trial, McGarr ruled that Kuhn had the authority to cancel the sales in the case against Finley, which set up precedent for Kuhn against Turner.⁶⁷

Judge Newell Edenfield upheld the broad authority of the Commissioner against Turner.⁶⁸ Newell and the court concluded, “To the extent this cases involves a violation of the Major League Agreement, the court has no hesitation in saying that the defendant Commissioner had ample authority to punish [the] plaintiffs in this case, for acts considered not in the best interests of baseball.”⁶⁹ Newell upheld the suspension of Turner, and even said that the Commissioner could easily have concluded that multiple tampering violations concerning the same player require harsh discipline, which is up to the Commissioner’s discretion.⁷⁰

The court determined that Kuhn’s actions were not of an “arbitrator” but acting under the separate authority “to INVESTIGATE, either upon complaint or his own initiative, any act . . . alleged or suspected to be not in the best interests of the national game of Baseball.”⁷¹Then Judge Edenfield determined that the Major League Agreement did not give the Commissioner the power to revoke Atlanta’s first round amateur draft pick,⁷² meaning the Commissioner had power to intervene but his punishment must fit the crime.

While Ted often threatened the power of the Commissioner, he gave way to the Commissioner’s authority in the end. Through Turner’s defiance of authority, he allowed Kuhn to expand his powers in baseball. The court cases allowed the law to interpret the by-laws and expand Kuhn’s powers, allowing him to set precedent and punish in the “best interest” of baseball. Kuhn utilized his powers to act as baseball’s supreme authority to protect the integrity of the institution of baseball, allowing conditions for baseball to thrive.

In June of 1968, Kuhn’s first year as commissioner, he first came across the issue of gambling in baseball. Several club owners, Bill Bartholomey, John Louis, Del Coleman and Charlie Finley were involved with the Parvin-Dohrmann Company, a company that owned three casinos in Las Vegas.⁷³ Gambling is not in the best interests of baseball, as seen in the 1919 World Series, when Landis banned eight players for overthrowing the series. This tarnishes the reputation of baseball, cheapening the sport. Although Kuhn didn’t use the best interest clause in this case, he would exercise the best interest clause many times in the face of gambling.

Kuhn used the “best interest” clause freely to ban players, writers, and owners from gambling or other activities as a way to strengthen the game, restoring its integrity. The first player Kuhn investigated was Denny McLain of the Detroit Tigers.⁷⁴ Unfortunately, this was not the first nor the last time players were linked to gambling. The Commissioner ordered an investigation into McLain’s history and suspended him from the sport until the investigation was completed.⁷⁵Using his powers, Kuhn suspended many players, owners, and officials for ties to gambling.

Willie Mays, a baseball great, had ties to a casino in Atlantic City.⁷⁶ Willie Mays was a Hall of Fame right-handed center fielder that played for the San Francisco Giants.⁷⁷ As a hitting coach, Mays represented the New York Mets, and Kuhn felt that if Mays accepted a position at the casino, his ties to the casino would not good for the image and reputation of MLB. Kuhn told Linda de Roulet, president of the Mets that he “had a real problem overlapping jobs between casinos and baseball.”⁷⁸ Mays accepted the position as a greeter at Bally’s Park Place Hotel and Casino in Atlantic City. ⁷⁹ This caused Commissioner great concern over the reputation of baseball. Upon meeting with Lee MacPhail, Chub Feeney and Sandy Hadden, the four concluded that Mays could not maintain his job at Bally’s and be the batting instructor for the Mets at the same time.⁸⁰

Kuhn had to maintain a strong and unified stance on gambling in baseball. If Kuhn gave a strong anti-gambling position, he had to maintain the same staunch and hard line for Mays, as well. This inconsistency would lessen the reputation of institution of baseball to a degree that would cause baseball to seem inconsistent. With prior rulings that were anti-gambling, Kuhn asked Mays to leave the sport of baseball in a telegram:

I have been informed that you are about to sign a long-term contract with Bally, in which you are rendering services to promote that company’s casino gambling interest. While I appreciate the motivations leading you to this association, it has long been my view that such associations by people in our game are inconsistent with its best interests. Accordingly, while I am not happy at the prospect of losing your active participation in baseball, I must request that you promptly disassociate yourself from your contract with the New York Mets.⁸¹

This marked the start of Mays suspension from baseball and continuation of Kuhn’s absolute authority as Commissioner of baseball.

Despite the letter saying Mays needed to distance himself from the institution of baseball, Mays and the press took it that he was banned from baseball. Kuhn did not suspend Mays from baseball, but rather asked him to distance himself from it. Kuhn issued a press release to clarify his position

I think there is a clear conflict of interest between working for Baseball and working for an organization which operates gambling casinos.

I would be extremely sorry if Willie Mays chooses to go to work for Bally, but the choice would be completely his and he would make it with advance knowledge of my position on the conflict. There is no implication intended that he has been guilty of any wrongdoing. On the contrary, he has always been a great asset to our game. Nor am I saying he would not be welcome at such events as Old Timers’ games. Obviously, he would.

My position is simple: he can continue with us or work for Bally—but not both. I certain he has to wrestle with a tough problem which apparently involves his own long-term financial interests and security.

I would personally be very distressed if he made the choice to join Bally and would still be hopeful that even now he would elect to remain in Baseball.⁸²

A few months later, Kuhn would maintain the same position for Mickey Mantle, another star Major Leaguer. In 1983, Mickey Mantle received an offer to work at the Claridge Hotel in Atlantic City.⁸⁵ This caused Mantle and Mays to be on the “permanently ineligible” list, or so some had deemed the situation.⁸⁶ After Kuhn retired in 1985, his successor Ueberroth made an exception and reinstated Mantle and Mays.⁸⁷ Kuhn quotes Mantle from the Associated Press in 1986, “ The lifting of the ban is important to me because now I can attend the Yankees’ Old Timer’s game this year. . . .”⁸⁸ Mantle and Mays were never banned from attending the events, but refused to attend them because of the “suspension” from Kuhn.

Because it had long been established that gambling or illegal activity is not tolerated in MLB, it is unsurprising that Commissioner Kuhn had to invoke the best “interest” clause against George Steinbrenner several times. The first time that Steinbrenner was fined and barred from Major League Baseball was in 1974.⁸⁹

Steinbrenner had been caught giving illegal contributions to presidential candidate Richard Nixon in 1972.⁹⁰ Kuhn suspended Steinbrenner from Major League Baseball and any proceedings with the institution of baseball for two years because Steinbrenner did not act within the best interests of baseball.⁹¹

Nixon’s attorney introduced Steinbrenner to Kalmbach, the general counsel of the American Shipbuilding Co, in 1972.⁹² Kalmbach was involved with an illegal scheme to raise money for Nixon, and Steinbrenner fell into the trap. Steinbrenner was instructed to write 33 different checks for $3,000 and another one for $1,000; however, Steinbrenner wrote two or more checks for $3,500, which alerted the Watergate investigators.⁹³ Steinbrenner could have written a check for $100,000, but instead he involved his company AmShip Company, which caused the whole debacle.⁹⁴ To simplify the complexity of the case, Steinbrenner wanted support Nixon in his reelection. He took bad advice from Kalmbach, which he did not follow, because he wanted to involve his company AmShip, which he built, as a way of supporting President Nixon’s reelection. Steinbrenner could have just written a check for $100,000, but instead he did not, so he ended up banned from baseball for two years, and luckily faced no jail time.

Steinbrenner pleaded guilty to a serious felony and was fined; Kuhn said that if he had been sentenced to jail, Steinbrenner would have been permanently suspended.⁹⁵ Because this was illegal, Kuhn used his power within the best interest clause to shut down Steinbrenner’s involvement in baseball. Kuhn announced this suspension

Attempting to influence employees to behave dishonestly is the kind of misconduct which, if ignored by baseball, would undermine the public’s confidence in our game. Ignoring this conduct could easily lead to suspicion that such conduct may occur within the game itself and affect play on the field. . . . I have decided to place Mr. Steinbrenner on the Ineligible List for a period of two year. In accordance with this decision, Mr. Steinbrenner is hereby declared ineligible and incompetent, for the specified period, to manage or advise in the management od, the affairs of the New York Yankees.⁹⁶
Steinbrenner did not sue or question his suspension. However, Kuhn reinstated Steinbrenner after 15 months of suspension on March 1, 1976 for good behavior and he felt that he had served his sentence.⁹⁷

1. 
   My November 1974 decision was designed to assure public confidence in the integrity of professional baseball. I think that purpose has been achieved.
   
2. 
   Nearly two years have elapsed since April 1974 when Mr. Steinbrenner voluntarily removed himself from the daily affairs of the Yankees.
   
3. 
   The management and financial problems of the Yankees asserted in support of Mr. Steinbrenner’s reinstatement would be significantly alleviated by his reinstatement and attendant benefits to the team and Yankee fans.⁹⁸
   

Kuhn’s reinstating of Steinbrenner showed that he was serious about the best interests of baseball, but if the punishment was served, then they could go. Commissioner Kuhn’s crackdown on gambling and instances where players, coaches, or owners were involved, helped maintain the value and honesty of the institution of baseball. His actions helped to create a better baseball society and set precedence for baseball to follow.

Through the best interest clause, Kuhn was able to protect the integrity of baseball and create an institution that values integrity, as a greater reflection of society. Through his consistent and vigilant actions and use of the best interest clause, baseball thrived. It became viewed as an honest institution that society deemed punisher of cheaters and gamblers, conveying the game’s commitment to integrity and upholding the image of the sport.

Kuhn increased MLB’s integrity through his crackdown on Charlie Finley, Ted Turner, and gambling. Commissioner Kuhn successfully defended the position of Commissioner as well as maintained the absolute integrity of the institution of baseball. Corruption spreads from the inside, and Kuhn did not allow Major League Baseball to falter in its integrity.

Kuhn maintained a balance between representing the owners, baseball, and the players. Although according to Korr, “Bowie Kuhn would have probably described himself as employed not by the owner, but ‘by baseball.’ He asserted, ‘it was never my job to side with the players or the owners, but rather to bring the two together.’”⁹⁹ Kuhn acted with the best interests of the owners and players to maintain the integrity and propel Major League Baseball into the forefront of American life. According to Bud Selig, Commissioner Emeritus of Baseball, Major League Baseball is held to a higher standard than any other sport.¹⁰⁰ This means every decision and action is scrutinized more than any other sport. Kuhn managed to uphold the integrity of the sport, and leave it in a better place than it was when he inherited the role of Commissioner in 1968. Major League Baseball thrived and the sport grew immensely under Bowie Kuhn’s Commissionership and brought the sport power and respect.

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