Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte)

The roots of the Tamil plight and the inspiration for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) run deep in the history of Sri Lanka. Since the end of the British colonial era of Sri Lankan history, the Tamil population inhabiting the northeastern quarter of the island has been disenfranchised by the Sinhalese majority. The British, having empowered the minority ethnicity during its domination of the island, upset the Sinhala population, resulting in their lasting resentment toward the Tamils. Excluded from the composition of the country’s first constitution, the Tamils found that Sri Lanka lacked feasible avenues for minorities to voice their political desires and submit policy recommendations to the parliament. When Solomon West Ridgeway D. Bandaranaike became Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in 1956, he attempted to give rights to the Tamil minority to the dismay of the Sinhalese majority. Subsequent ethnic riots mobilized the Tamil population to form many groups to fight for their civil rights. The LTTE, headed by Supreme Leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran, rose in 1978 to actively promote the interests of the Tamil population; by taking up arms, the group sought to coerce the government into conceding political rights to this minority ethnic group.

Made up of over 15,000 men and women at its peak, the Tamil Tigers found that attacks by ground, sea, and air all contributed to the organization’s military preeminence in the northern and eastern areas of the island, especially after the Kalmunai police massacre of 1990.¹ In addition, the Black Tigers, or elite suicide squad, conducted a number of attacks, including the political assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Premadasa in the early 1990s. The LTTE was one of the only militant separatist groups to have operated a comprehensive pseudo-military force. Using funding from Tamils across the world, the Tigers successfully acquired and maintained control over the northeastern region of the island until the late 2000s when the Sri Lankan government regained the territory after a series of failed peace negotiations. The assassination of Prabhakaran in 2009 led to the defeat of the LTTE, though the core ethno-nationalistic ideology remains among many Tamils who still lack political rights. By maintaining its military domination of the island and including minority rights and a proportional system in its counter-terrorism strategy, the Sri Lankan government can ensure that the LTTE or other group will not rise again to take up the Tamil cause.

In part II of this paper, I explain the origins of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka by delving into the fundamental differences among the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority, and the history surrounding the eras of imperialism, independence, and ethnic discrimination in the country. I then give a background on the LTTE’s founder Vellupillai Prabhakaran, and the group’s ethno-nationalistic ideology. In part III, I discuss the organization of the LTTE, the financing assistance it receives from internal collection and the Tamil diaspora, and its strategy of protracted popular war. After examining the evolution of LTTE tactics, emergence of suicide terrorism, and use of specific tactical teams to conduct operations, I describe major the operational milestones of the group along with its relations with the Sri Lankan government and the international community, especially India. Last, in part IV I evaluate and criticize the Sri Lankan counter-terror strategy by discussing the collapse of the LTTE and future of the ethnic conflict. Though the LTTE did not ultimately succeed in providing Eelam, a homeland, to the Tamils of Sri Lanka, it pioneered a range of terrorist tactics for groups in the modern era and captured the attention of the world in fighting on behalf of the alienated minority of the country.

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Part II. Origins of the Conflict

Following the period of British colonialism in (pre-Sri Lankan) Ceylon which favored the Tamil minority over the Sinhalese majority, the newly independent, pro-Sinhalese Sri Lankan government disenfranchised the Tamil population. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam found inspiration to create an independent state for the Tamil population residing in the northeastern quarter of the country due to the rampant ethnic discrimination the government allowed. Vellupillai Prabhakaran rose to power as the leader of the Tamil New Tigers (later renamed the Tamil Tigers), promoting the ethno-nationalist ideology of the organization.

The emergence of the LTTE resulted from the ethnic tensions within the state of Sri Lanka, as the country’s history is colored by continual ethnic accommodation and conflict between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority. Approximately 74 percent of the 21.5 million inhabitants of this island country off the southeastern coast of India are Sinhalese, while the Tamil minority makes up only 18 percent.² According to popular myth, the Sinhalese people originally came to the island from West Bengal and the southern region of India in the 6^th century B.C.E.³ Sinhalese traditional heritage leads the population to believe that they are the first legitimate settlers of the island, fostering a spirit of ethnic superiority over the Tamils who came to the country mainly as traders and invaders from southern India.⁴

Each ethnicity speaks its respective language (Sinhalese and Tamil); sharp differences between the tongues make the ethnic groups easy to distinguish from one another.⁵ Tamils mostly inhabit the northern and eastern shore areas of the island (known today as Tamil Nadu), though their traditional territory included the Jaffna peninsula, the northern Vavuniya district, and the Batticaloa and Trincomalee areas on the eastern coastline; the Portuguese and Dutch colonial occupations of the island crystallized these ethnic boundaries.⁶ Though the Tamil population pales in comparison to the Sinhalese numbers, the minority ethnicity poses a perceived threat to the majority.⁷

The Sinhalese people differ from the Tamils in terms of religion as well as heritage, race, language, and location of residence. The Sinhalese commonly practice Buddhism, while the Tamils and other pockets of the Sri Lankan population adhere to Hinduism.⁸ Though the faiths rarely come into violent conflict with each other (as they both seek peace with the world and other beings), this difference of religious tradition along with the preexisting Sinhalese spirit of supremacy drove a wedge between the ethnicities, never to be bridged culturally or politically.

Before the Europeans discovered and claimed Sri Lanka during the period of colonialism in the 16^th century, Sri Lanka was ruled by a series 181 kings starting in the 200s B.C.E. The Portuguese and Dutch were the first powers to settle on the island (then called Ceylon), mainly in coastal areas. The Portuguese controlled the western coast (along with the current capital of the country, Colombo) in the 16^th century until the Dutch replaced them in the next. In 1796, the Dutch ceded the island to British forces. Becoming a crown colony in 1802, Ceylon was fully formed under British rule in 1815. For the next 133 years, Ceylon remained under British colonial domination.⁹

Colonialism in Sri Lanka brought with it religious intolerance and political discrimination in favor of the Tamil population because it was a smaller population, making easier to manage. Once the British gained control of the region, Tamils migrated toward the central and western parts of the island from the north and eastern seaboard in order to take advantage of education and job opportunities provided by the new occupiers. Tamils exploited this British favor and their newfound connections to the Western world’s economy to enhance their professional opportunities and their socioeconomic status generally by pursuing higher education, career paths, and residences previously available only to the Sinhalese.¹⁰

Until World War II, British imperialistic rule in the country contained the discontent among the ethnic groups. However, with the rising threat of a Japanese invasion of the area, Sri Lanka (along with the other southern and southeastern Asian countries) experienced heightened political tension within the country and in the surrounding international community.¹¹ Following the war, Britain imposed constitutional reforms on Ceylon, resulting in mutual feelings of antipathy among the Sinhalese and Tamil populations. Despite British favoritism toward the Tamils, the colonizers proceeded to concede civil rights to the non-elite Sinhalese, including making Buddhism the official state religion and English the language of governmental activity.¹²

In addition, the British sought to install an electoral system which would balance representation of both populations in government. The idea behind the 50:50 Formula was that the Sinhalese and Tamils would have equal representation in the political arena. The minority Tamil Congress favored this system, however unfair it was to the overwhelming Sinhalese majority. The 50:50 Formula was never used in Ceylon; instead, the winner-take-all electoral style was used after the 1948 constitution was written and Ceylon became the independent Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.¹³ Nonetheless, the Sinhalese resented the preferential treatment provided to the Tamils by the British Empire.¹⁴

Sri Lankan independence and anti-Tamil violence, 1948 to 1976

The creation of the Sri Lankan constitution ultimately lacked input from the Tamil population, instead focusing on majority rule. The legislation did not include any formalized protection of minority interests or political rights. Tamils were disenfranchised, and conditions only worsened. True ethnic discrimination by the Sinhalese began after colonial liberation in 1948. Because the Tamils made up such a small portion of the Sri Lankan population, the Sinhalese ignored them and denied the multiethnic and multi-religious makeup of the state.¹⁵ Some Tamil political elite split from the Tamil Congress, making the Federal Party and demanding the reconstitution of Ceylon as a federal state. The Sinhalese, seeing this stipulation as a bid for a separate state, denied all concessions to the party.¹⁶ Thus, a competing sense of nationalism fueled the feud between the two ethnic groups.¹⁷

In 1956, Solomon West Ridgeway D. Bandaranaike, a Sinhala Buddhist, became Prime Minister and later introduced anti-Tamil reform. When he first took office, Bandaranaike gave the Tamils a limited amount of autonomy, to the surprise of the Sinhalese population. Racial riots ran rampant as the Sinhalese protested the rights given to the Tamils. The government quelled the fighting, only to face the Sinhalese mob again two years later. During this second bout of violence, however, over 10,000 Tamils were displaced and sought refuge in Jaffna. Bandaranaike used military policing forces in response to the riots after declaring a state of national emergency. After ending the massacre of Tamils, he ended his promotion of Tamil home rule.¹⁸ The sudden end of Bandaranaike’s support for Tamil political rights only strength-ened support for the Tamil’s separatist cause in the long-run.

The most notable piece of anti-Tamil legislation Bandaranaike promoted and implemented was the Sinhala Only Act of 1956, cementing Sinhala as the state’s sole endorsed language of political proceedings. Bandaranaike also denied funding to teacher training programs for the Tamils. After Bandaranaike’s assassination in 1959, his wife Sirimavo became Prime Minister. She further disempowered the Tamils, blocking avenues they could use to gain access to the Sinhalese-dominated political system, including government jobs like the civil service.¹⁹

Throughout the 1960s, Buddhism rose as the predominant state religion, and the Sinhalese continued their campaign to disenfranchise the Tamils politically. Civil disobedience became the method used by Tamils to garner support for their cause and capture the attention of the Sinhalese government. Tamils sought two main political ends—acknowledgement of the Tamil plight by the Sinhalese Buddhist majority, and egalitarian economic opportunities for the underprivileged classes.²⁰ However, these acts did not result in increased rights for the minority ethnicity. Thus, calls for secession and increased militancy rose among the Tamil population.²¹

By the 1970s, the Tamils had established political parties to support their demands in the electoral system. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party, founded to represent non-Marxist socialism, and other groups like the People’s Liberation Front promoted the Tamil case in civil society.²² Both the Tamil Students Federation founded in 1972 and Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) established in 1976 called for the formation of an autonomous Tamil state outside of the Sinhalese jurisdiction.²³ Hence the idea of Tamil Eelam, a separatist socialist or Marxist state organized and managed solely by Tamils emerged.²⁴ In 1977, the manifesto of the United National Party (UNP) acknowledged the Tamils’ political predicament. When the party gained power after the election, however, violence spread throughout the island. This resulted in the formation of a plethora of Tamil liberation groups, including the LTTE.

The LTTE broke off from the Tamil New Tigers separatist group in 1978 under the leadership of the nationalist Vellupillai Prabhakaran who called for complete secession and independence from Sri Lanka.²⁵ The next year, the government created the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979 which allowed the army and police to hold terrorist suspects in custody for any length of time up to eighteen months without a trial. The PTA, aiming to mitigate Tamil violence against the Sinhalese majority, outlawed all discriminatory action but failed upon implementation.²⁶ Ethnic riots targeting the Tamil population irrupted again in 1983. In “Black” July, Sinhalese massacred over 40 Tamil inmates at Welikade prison in Colombo.²⁷ In addition, Sinhalese groups launched a three day wave of anti-Tamil violence throughout Tamil communities, looting, pillaging, and razing Tamil homes, factories, and businesses.²⁸ Discriminatory violence plagued the Tamils as Sinhalese fighters burned captured LTTE soldiers, slaying some with knives traditionally used for swine. These hate crimes fueled the LTTE forces that rose against the Sinhalese, radicalizing them to the point of suicide terror.²⁹

After 1983, the Tigers gained many supporters among the marginalized population that resented second-class status and the increasing masses of internally displaced people. Anti-Tamil violence caused a mass exodus of more than 150,000 Tamil refugees to Tamil Nadu in India from northern Sri Lanka.³⁰ Internally, Tamils residing in the southern parts of the island migrated back toward their original homes in the north and east.³¹ Following the massacres and retaliatory efforts by the LTTE in 1983, the Sri Lankan government passed the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution banning the TULF from Parliament.³² However, under these repressive circumstances, the LTTE thrived. Although over 40 Tamil separatist groups formed since the 1970s, only a handful remained the active by the 1990s.³³ All of the groups vied for control over and support from the Tamil population. However, the LTTE comprised the most extreme nationalist organization, and was the most predominant of the groups. Starting in 1987, the Tigers out-competed the other groups by using more extreme methods, like suicide terror, to achieve its political ends. By 2002, no other groups vying for political presence existed to “spoil the peace” the Tigers desired.³⁴

Vellupillai Prabhakaran, head of the LTTE

The son of a tax commissioner from northern Sri Lanka, Vellupillai Prabhakaran was born on October 26, 1954.³⁵ Throughout his childhood, he was influenced by stories of the bloody history and plight of the Tamil people in the Sinhalese dominated country. As he journeyed through his teen years in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Prabhakaran increasingly favored the use of violence to achieve political ends due to the lack of government response to more peaceful acts of civil disobedience.³⁶

As riots broke out and the Sinhalese mercilessly massacred Tamils, Prabhakaran was attracted to the militant Tamil New Tigers, a radicalized offshoot of the TULF.³⁷ Prabhakaran joined the group formed by Chetti Thanabalsingham in 1974, and was quickly promoted to second-in-command under the founder because of his many successful attacks against the Sinhalese in the 1970s.³⁸ In 1975 he conducted TNT’s first political assassination by shooting Alfred Duriappah, the Tamil mayor of Jaffna. Because Duriappah was compliant with the Sinhalese legislation and rule over the government, Thanabalsingham thought him to be a traitor to the marginalized Tamils. The next year, Prabhakaran raided a bank in Puttur, stealing over half a million rupees for TNT.³⁹

Shortly after this second successful large-scale TNT operation, Thanabalsingham was arrested by the Sinhalese government and Prabhakaran assumed his place as the leader of the outfit. Renaming TNT the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Prabhakaran aimed to transform the organization into the most elite, efficient, and professional fighting force in the country. “Prabhakaran insisted on keeping [the LTTE’s] numbers small, maintaining a high standard of training, [and] enforcing discipline at all levels. The end result was a cadre that was unswervingly dedicated to winning a Tamil homeland, Tamil Eelam.”⁴⁰ By 1980, he succeeded in making his LTTE the foremost political and military body among Tamil population, and by some measures, in the entire state.⁴¹

The LTTE ideology emerged from the political marginalization of the Tamil ethnic population in Sri Lanka. Although the Sinhalese and Tamils adhere to different faiths (Buddhism and Hindu-ism, respectively), the conflict between the groups is not traced back to religious tensions.⁴² Instead, the history of Sri Lanka reveals that each group came to see the other as the enemy due to mutual exclusivity and bouts of favoritism, especially during the British colonization of the island from the 18^th to 20^th century. Characterized by differences in race, religion, and origin, the groups had only shared the history of the island country Ceylon. However, the Tamil minority gained political power and commercial success merely because the British endowed it upon them. The Tamils, having lost their political and economic prowess after independence in 1948, sought to reassert their influence over the country by forming pro-Tamil coalitions to participate in political activities and organizations to perform acts of civil disobedience and later violence.

Many Tamils found inspiration from the Marxist-Leninst ideology since the creation of the Sri Lankan state.⁴³ Outside of the Marxist-Leninist tradition, however, little is to be said of the LTTE’s ideology.⁴⁴ The organization was made to empower its members to act in society to promote the Tamil need for (at least) increased civil rights and decreased economic marginal-ization in the country. The LTTE is more often characterized as a separatist movement because many of its members believed that the Tamil people will only receive the political and economic rights they deserve when they have their own government outside of Sinhalese fascist reach.⁴⁵

This national liberation movement sought to establish home rule or complete autonomy to rid the Tamil population of the institutionalized discriminatory violence allowed under corrupt Sinhalese authority via armed struggle.⁴⁶ As Anton S. Balasingham states, “The political objective of our movement is to advance the national struggle along with the class struggle, or rather, our fundamental objective is national emancipation and socialist transformation of our social formation.”⁴⁷ In addition, Wayland notes that “caste, education, and religious affiliation and other ‘identity markers’ among Tamils in Sri Lanka have been replaced by a more unified Tamil identity that is rooted in the ethno-nation.”⁴⁸ Thus, the Tamil ideology can most accurately be described as ethno-nationalistic.

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Part III. LTTE Activity

The LTTE utilized an organizational structure reliant on Prabhakaran and his close kin, along with local organizations to strengthen support from the Tamil population in Sri Lanka. In addition, financing from external and internal sources alike fueled the Tamil Tigers as they pursued their strategy of Maoist protracted popular war throughout their nearly 30 year campaign against the anti-Tamil government. Using tactics like suicide terror and employing a number of specialized teams such as the Sea Tigers, Air Tigers, Black Tigers, and the Charles Anthony Regiment, the LTTE gradually eroded the capabilities and resolve of the government forces. Intermittent relations with the Sri Lankan government were to little avail as violent conflict rose time and again throughout negotiations during the 1990s and early 2000s. During its years of operation, the LTTE influenced the Sri Lankan political arena, and also affected other states in the vicinity, particularly India.

As the Supreme Leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Vellupillai Prabhakaran exercised direct control over almost every facet of the organization. He demanded the highest degree of loyalty to himself and the purposes of the organization from the soldiers and other men and women serving the Tamil cause in the LTTE. Prabhakaran, a strong-willed, charismatic leader, guided the organization in a ubiquitous manner. The lives of individual soldiers were not their own after they committed themselves to the LTTE. For example, sexual contact or and intercourse with an unmarried soldier was strictly prohibited and severely punished. Marriage was only permitted once cadre reached an age determined by Prabhakaran himself; even then, the man or woman had to request permission from his or her commander. Cadres were required to reaffirm their allegiance to Prabhakaran (not the LTTE or Tamil people or homeland) daily. Prabhakaran’s egotism further radicalized the group; the LTTE’s “brand” as the elite armed force of Sri Lanka, the defenders of the Tamils, greatly relied on the individual soldiers’ fanaticism.⁴⁹

Directly under Prabhakaran, the Central Governing Committee was made up of Pottu Amman, the Chief of Intelligence, and B. Nadesan, the Supreme Leader’s political advisor. These two individuals represented the two major branches of the LTTE organization under Prabhakaran’s watchful eye— the military, intelligence, and research and development wing, and the subordinating political wing. Under these wings were subdivisions. The military wing, led by Amman, was made up of a variety of specialized operational forces, including but not limited to the Sea Tigers, Air Tigers, Charles Anthony Regiment, and Black Tigers. Also included was a secret intelligence group that collected information regarding the Sri Lankan military forces, assets, weaponry, and camp locations. The political wing, on the other hand, contained subdivisions focused on propaganda, communications, financing, and public relations. For example, one important political entity was the International Secretariat who monitored the organization’s worldwide network. This position was particularly important considering the diaspora of Sri Lankan Tamils around the globe which resulted from the ethnic riots and persecution seen throughout the 1970s and 1980s.⁵⁰

Starting with Prabhakaran and a small, highly trained group, the LTTE expanded after the 1983 ethnic riots sparked a season of recruitment. At its peak, the Tamil Tigers claimed to have had over 15,000 fighters in its ranks. Of that force, over 2,000 were women. The LTTE’s numbers are especially intimidating for the Sri Lankan state, as its military is of roughly equal size. When the Sri Lankan government confronted the Tamil Tigers during the 1980s and 1990s, the army contained approximately 20,000 men while the navy only had a force of 3,000.⁵¹

During the LTTE’s strongest years between the mid-1990s and 2006, the organization controlled 25 percent of the island.⁵² The Tamil Tigers formed shadow governments in the regions it acquired, establishing pseudo-state institutions such as police forces, judicial systems, and public services organizations (which included humanitarian assistance using local taxes to benefit members of society facing economic hardship).⁵³ The weak Sri Lankan army could not resist such a powerful foe; devoid of proactive leadership, decent wages, and success, government forces found themselves plagued with despair, demoralized by the danger of opposing such an organizational behemoth. Sri Lankan intelligence revealed little regarding the group and its size, funding, and future operations. State forces had to fight blindly, insufficiently trained and equipped, lacking necessary knowledge of the group and motivation to oppose it.⁵⁴

Although the LTTE had an organizational structure superior to other separatist groups in Sri Lanka (and arguably the Sri Lankan government forces as well), it could not provide all of the services needed to sustain a healthy Tamil population in localities, especially after the tsunami that devastated many communities along the eastern coast in 2004.⁵⁵ To fill this vacuum, the Tamil Tigers permitted pro-Tamil non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to operate in the territories they acquired.⁵⁶ However, the LTTE allowed only some of these groups to provide health and social services. NGOs not affiliated with the LTTE seeking to provide the Tamils with avenues to voice dissent against the Tamil Tigers and solve their local disputes found that local LTTE leaders denied them freedoms to provide these and other useful services.⁵⁷

A local NGO the LTTE operates is the Tamil Relief Organization, which acted as the group’s social services arm to the public.⁵⁸ Formed in 1985, the TRO offered services to Tamils in southern India and northeastern Sri Lanka. By providing immediate relief to people affected by the conflict and rebuilding individual communities, the TRO strengthened the Tamil population and served as a refuge for a war-weary people.⁵⁹

Financing from internal sources and international diaspora

Having been a relatively small terrorist organization, the LTTE was surprisingly well-funded by both external and internal sources. The worldwide Tamil diaspora (and specifically Tamils originally from the Jaffna peninsula) assisted the LTTE in responding to the ongoing Tamil plight, as previous members of Tamil communities in Sri Lanka fed funding to the organization via covert and even overt Tamil NGOs and LTTE offices around the globe.⁶⁰ For example, some organizations made under the guise of supporting Sri Lankan victims of the 2004 tsunami surreptitiously funneled money to the Tamil Tigers.⁶¹ Tamils residing in developed countries acquired great wealth and donated it to the LTTE’s cause via international organizations which provided money to the group without making predetermined demands regarding its use. During the LTTE’s peak years between 1995 and 2007, the group received approximately $2 million U.S. dollars monthly from external sources including refugees and Tamil sympathizers.⁶²

The most active overseas organizations formed to provide the LTTE with financial support were the World Tamil Association, the World Tamil Movement, the Federation of Association of Canadian Tamils, the Australian Federation of Tamil Associations, the Swiss Federation of Tamil Associations, the French Federation of Tamil Associations, the Illankai Tamil Sangam in the United States, the Tamil Coordinating Committee in Norway, and the International Federation of Tamils in the United Kingdom.⁶³ These organizations promoted the LTTE and its cause via political propaganda, fundraising events, and arms procurement.⁶⁴ By 1988, the Tamil Tigers established offices and cells in over 50 countries. Despite anti-terror measures taken by countries like India, Malaysia, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and the United States, the LTTE was able to use support from Tamils in those countries to obtain cash money through the late 1990s.⁶⁵ Such funding also enabled the LTTE to accumulate a store of arms and ammunition to effectively confront the Sri Lankan military.⁶⁶

Because initial funding was not collected from the Tamil population in Sri Lanka, the LTTE was not directly bound to the will of the people it claimed to represent.⁶⁷ In addition, foreign currency increased the LTTE’s purchasing power in wealthy foreign countries, gaining higher returns from monies collected than from funds that could be acquired via more legitimate public taxation and commercial dealings.⁶⁸ However, Bloom notes that “the source of funding for the organization shifted from external donors to internal extraction once LTTE funding ran dry because of legal and financial limits placed on their Diaspora contributions in North America, Australia, and Europe.” ⁶⁹ Until the group dissolved, the LTTE collected funds from civilians in occupied territory via taxation, extortion, tolls, and transport charges in the northern and eastern regions of the island.⁷⁰

The ultimate objective of the LTTE was to attain independence from the pro-Sinhalese government of Sri Lanka via a strategy of protracted popular war, also referred to as prolonged armed struggle.⁷¹ David Galula notes that such a strategy is “conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”⁷² Originating in the days of Mao Zedong, such a people’s war required public support and a militant force in order to usurp the status quo and successfully win power over the party in power, or the government itself.⁷³ The LTTE professed that sustained guerilla warfare was the hallmark of the true people’s war, and the only effective means by which to acquire a separate Tamil state.

Integrating a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program, the LTTE targeted political leaders, activists, and Sri Lankan police, intelligence, and military personnel along with both Sinhalese and Tamil civilians.⁷⁴ It posed a significant threat to the Sri Lankan government because of its popularity and unrelenting military forces. Sri Lanka lacked the ability to effectively coercive the Tamil Tigers to prevent them from causing further harm to the Sinhalese and Tamils. The country had a limited capacity to quell nonviolent political protest, let alone terrorist or guerilla attacks. In addition, the government’s intelligence gathering apparatus failed to collect needed information to counter LTTE activity.⁷⁵

Evolution of LTTE tactics

From the mid-1970s until the groups demise, the LTTE engaged the Sri Lankan government in a series of four Eelam Wars. In the first phase of the Eelam War I (mid-1970s to March 1990), the Tamil Tigers combined political and military strategies by using riots and guerilla tactics, motivating the Tamil population to support its cause. These tactics also served to wear down the Sri Lankan government, testing the resolve of forces on the ground. During the second phase of the first Eelam War beginning after the ethnic riots of 1983, the LTTE fought against the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) allied with the Sri Lankan government in the Tamil-inhabited northern and eastern provinces. The resilient LTTE forces prevented the IPKF from making any lasting progress territorially, socially, and politically among the Tamil population; the Sri Lankan government lost popular support as the Tamil Tigers more strongly asserted their domination over the area. The IPKF removed their peacekeepers from the Tamil provinces in early 1990.  After the LTTE’s successful guerrilla war against the IPKF, it acquired sophisticated military equipment and transformed itself into a conventional force.⁷⁶

During the Second Eelam War from roughly 1990 to December 1994, the LTTE began targeting government security and military forces more directly.⁷⁷ The LTTE sparked this conflict by massacring more than 600 Sri Lankan military and security personnel in Kalmunai on June 11, 1990. The Sri Lankan government responded by using scorched-earth tactics against Tamil populations and LTTE strongholds.⁷⁸After a few years’ lull, the LTTE revived hostilities in April 1995 when they attacked two Sri Lankan naval vessels stationed in Trincomalee harbor. Attacks became more frequent as the conflict progressed; bombings of human targets, especially civilians, and physical infrastructure like the central rail system made up the LTTE’s main offensive repertoire.⁷⁹

The Third Eelam War from 1995 to 2002 saw the increased use of targeted assassinations by the LTTE. Those targeted included Sinhalese, Indian, and local Tamil political leaders who were not associated with the group, accused of providing intelligence to the Sri Lankan government, or simply passively opposed to the LTTE’s mission. Paradoxically, the LTTE killed many more moderate Tamil political figures than it did Sinhalese representatives. 24 of the 37 politicians the LTTE targeted and assassinated were Tamil, while only 9 were Sinhalese.⁸⁰ The Tamil Tigers also bombed cultural and religious sites and conducted hit and run raids to inspire the anti-Sinhalese public and deter individuals and groups from opposing its cause. In February 2002, the LTTE and Sri Lankan government signed a Memorandum of Understanding resulting in a short-lived ceasefire arrangement. The LTTE quickly resorted back to a campaign of assassinations targeting political figures and intelligence recruits.⁸¹ By the last Eelam war waged from 2006 until the group’s defeat in 2009, the Tamil Tigers almost solely used air strikes and suicide bombings to weaken the Sri Lankan government and infrastructure.

Over the course of the four Eelam wars, the LTTE built up a formidable pseudo-military force. Mobilizing marginalized Tamils from the northern coast and recruiting from small communities dispersed throughout the island, the group claimed to represent the entire Tamil population.⁸² The LTTE developed many useful tactics for capturing public attention while inflicting damage on human populations and the infrastructure of the Sri Lankan state. The Tamils Tigers used guerilla warfare against military and police forces in the countryside, terrorist activities to harm civilians, and targeted assassinations of political officials of Sinhalese, Indian, and Tamil origin to garner public support and intimidate foes. Air strikes and suicide bombings characterized the final years of the organization.

Emergence of suicide as a means to attract the public eye

The Tamil Tigers was one of the first terrorist organizations to employ suicide tactics in its overall strategy of protracted popular war. For many years, the group claimed the greatest number of attacks of any organization in the world.⁸³ From 1987 to 2001, the LTTE used a number of suicide volunteers, later known as the “Black Tigers,” to maximize the number of casualties yielded from each attack.⁸⁴ The Tamil Tigers utilized this versatile tactic against a variety of cultural and religious sites, as well as people. Suicide bombers were sent to military and economic centers, and targeted civilians and political leaders.⁸⁵ By 2004, LTTE forces conducted over 200 suicide attacks, at least 19 directed against the Sri Lankan state navy.⁸⁶

Two instances in particular gave rise to the widespread practice of suicide terrorism among the Tamil Tigers. First, Ponnudarai Sivakumaran of the Tamil New Tigers chose to commit suicide via cyanide capsule rather than accept capture by Sri Lankan forces in 1974.⁸⁷ Being the first martyr for the Tamil cause, Vellupillai Prabhakaran remembered this honorable action and later included cyanide capsules in the standard issue uniform for all LTTE cadres.⁸⁸ Seen as a symbol of dedication to the LTTE, glass vials were distributed to new recruits at the end of their training during their official swearing-in.⁸⁹ In addition, the 1983 suicide attack on the U.S. Marine Corps compound in Lebanon by Hezbollah forces impressed Prabhakaran to the extent that he decided to implement the tactic in his organization.⁹⁰

Suicide attacks served multiple purposes, all of which ultimately promoted the Tamil cause. Such offensive actions attracted attention from politicians in Colombo and in localities, especially after media coverage of the events. People became more familiar with the Tamil Tigers and their activity as they sought to perform attacks that could be translated into public spectacles by news media, internet, and other communications. In addition, these attacks were highly effective by inflicting psychological and physical damage to Sri Lankan forces.⁹¹ Gordon Weiss notes the following on suicide bombers in the LTTE:

The use of suicidal attackers is an efficient deployment of resources, the poor man’s tactical weapon or smart bomb … The aim of the attackers was not to commit suicide, but rather to achieve a political or military gain. However tempting, it is misleading to think of suicide attackers as mad, bad, or irrational. Far from being cowards, those who engage in suicide warfare exhibit a high degree of bravery that is difficult to match for even the most committed of regular troops.⁹²
The Tamil Tigers effectively justify and promote suicide tactics by drawing on the Tamils’ Hindu traditions regarding the glory of martyrdom. Self-sacrifice and asceticism, embedded in the ritual of Tamil society, is sacred amongst the members of the LTTE. In fact, martyrs are celebrated throughout Tamil territory, especially in the Jaffna peninsula. Hundreds of shrines dedicated to those who sacrificed their lives for the promotion of others’ rights and Tamil liberation can be found in the area to this day.⁹³

Specialized tactical teams

At its peak, the Tamil Tigers had over ten major branches in its military wing led by Pottu Amman. These subdivisions acted much like the branches of a state’s conventional armed forces, making the organization even more formidable in light of the fact that its ranks nearly matched those of Sri Lanka’s military.⁹⁴ The LTTE had four distinct capabilities, aptly named to reflect their missions. Those include the elite suicide squad called the “Black Tigers,” naval “Sea Tigers,” “Charles Anthony Regiment” infantry unit, and sky-dwelling “Air Tigers.”⁹⁵

First, the squad known as the Black Tigers conducted suicide attacks against guarded targets like military installations and political leaders.⁹⁶ These Tigers were not a stand-alone group within the Tamil Tigers; instead, these elite suicide fighters were integral members within the other specialized tactical teams. The term “Black Tiger” was attributed to any Tamil Tiger operative who intentionally set out to sacrifice his life as a martyr to benefit the operations of another unit. The Black Tigers first emerged in 1987 during a suicide operation involving a truck filled with explosives.⁹⁷ Most recruits selected as suicide bombers were young men and women under the age of 18 because they could more easily avoid detection by government forces.⁹⁸

Created in 1984, the Sea Tigers used a fleet of small assault craft and swimmer-fighters who acted as precision missiles against the Sri Lankan naval forces.⁹⁹ The use of suicide bombers and these human torpedoes was effective on many occasions. Such asymmetric strategies allowed the Tigers to combat the government’s larger conventional forces, leveling the playing field and in some cases tipping the scales in their favor.¹⁰⁰ Later, the Sea Tigers acquired fiberglass and aluminum crafts used for surface, submarine, and suicide missions.¹⁰¹

The battles of Elephant Pass (the location of an abandoned 16^th century Portuguese outpost in the Northern Province) in the early 1990s and in 2000 are their most cited joint operations with infantry units, though each attempt to claim the area ended in failure.¹⁰² The Sea Tigers often conducted operations with the Charles Anthony Regiment. This elite brigade, named after Prabhakaran’s son, was founded in 1991 and constituted the main infantry unit of the LTTE. Military official Balraj headed this elite fighting wing until his death in 2008.¹⁰³

The Air Tigers were revealed in full after an attack in March 2007 on Katunayake Air Force Base north of Colombo.¹⁰⁴ This group was uncannily formidable, especially considering it only employed 100 pilots at a time and only used small micro light aircraft and helicopters during operations. Until the mid-2000s, the Air Tigers had only acquired three converted Czech civilian light aircraft which inflicted minimal damages on the Sri Lankans.¹⁰⁵ The LTTE remains to this day the only internationally-recognized militant group to field aircraft.

The Tamil Tigers have historically been characterized as the most effective terrorist organization in the world due to its use of guerilla tactics and acquisition of more conventional military assets.¹⁰⁷ Other than the previously noted LTTE operations in earlier sections, highlighted here are a few of the most prominent attacks conducted by the Tamil Tigers between its founding in 1976 and its sudden defeat in 2009.¹⁰⁸

One of the first large operations the LTTE conducted took place at a Colombo bus station in 1987; the LTTE detonated a car bomb killing 113 people, causing the Sri Lankan government to wage an “all-out offensive” on the Tamil-inhabited Jaffna Peninsula.¹⁰⁹ This attack set a trend of car and bus bombings for LTTE operatives. In 1990, the LTTE became the first non-state actor to obtain and detonate a weapon of mass destruction. Tigers released chlorine gas on hundreds of security personnel during the assault of a Sri Lankan military base in the Jaffna region; 60 people sustained injuries.¹¹⁰ Following this watershed attack, the Black Tigers conducted an assassination operation in 1991, killing Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who sent IPKF troops into Sri Lanka in an attempt to end the Tamil conflict.¹¹¹ In 1993, the Tamil Tigers also assassinated Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa who approved of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accords in 1987.¹¹² Five years later, the Tamil Tigers targeted one of the most sacred Buddhist temples in the country at Tooth in Kandy in an attempt to break Sinhalese will to fight. This religious and cultural center represented Sinhala tradition; attacking this core site struck at the heart of the majority ethnicity.¹¹³

In addition, one of the most notable Black Tigers suicide missions was the 2001 Bandaranaike Airport attack which had a profound impact on Sri Lanka’s military, economy, and airline industry. Ten Sri Lankan aircraft were destroyed, and another fifteen were damaged in this suicide attack.¹¹⁴ Following the attack, a team of Norwegian facilitators oversaw a ceasefire agreement between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. This gave great hope to the Sri Lankans and the Tamil population, as Tamil home rule seemed within reach. However, by late 2003 such optimism lay in shambles. The slow negotiation process and complexities of the deep issues lying at the source of the Tamils’ quandary unraveled the peace talks. In fact, these efforts led to no lasting policies or plans to address the core grievances which sparked Tamil militancy.¹¹⁵

In 1978, the Sri Lankan parliament established its first piece of legislation directed against the Tamil Tigers. The Proscription of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Other Similar Organizations outlawed the LTTE and any person who publicly supported the group via speech, publication, meeting, or other communications.¹¹⁶ In addition, the parliament passed the all-inclusive Prevention of Terrorism Act which condemned any act that disrupted or undermined the authority of the Sri Lankan government.¹¹⁷ Regardless of this political initiative to delegitimize the LTTE, years of turmoil and violence ensued. Upon assuming office in 1989, former Sri Lankan President Premadasa noted that he “faced all three major categories of threats any state could face: a threat to national independence and sovereignty; a threat to its territorial integrity; and a threat to the state apparatus and to state power itself.”¹¹⁸

Peace negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE first began in the late 1980s, resulting in a short-lived ceasefire that the Tigers broke off by 1990. Sri Lanka declared a unilateral ceasefire starting in 1995 under President Kumaratunga’s administration, though it quickly reneged on the decision as Tiger attacks increased in frequency.¹¹⁹ 1998 saw the promises of renewed dialogue between the government and the Tigers disintegrate as the Sri Lankans refused to provide the Tamils with their own province with home rule.¹²⁰ Negotiations again failed in the early 2000s.¹²¹ However, as Ganguly notes,

Several key developments made it increasingly difficult for the LTTE to say no to peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. First, the December 2001 elections brought in a new government in Colombo and with it a new willingness to negotiate with the LTTE ... Second, as a result of the new political alignments caused by the 2001 elections the Tamil Tigers found new political clout in Colombo ... Third, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the LTTE to sustain a high level of fund-raising in Western countries, especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US-led “global war on terror”... Fourth, there were clear indications that the Sri Lankan military was actively seeking weapons and counter-insurgency training from a number of sources ... [And] fifth, it was reported that the Tamil Tigers were suffering from war fatigue and facing problems in recruiting new personnel in order to sustain their military campaign.¹²²

Most of the LTTE’s connections with international actors were for fundraising and procurement of weapons.¹²³ In addition, attention gained from the public media earned some level of legitimacy for the movement, although many countries denounced the organization because of its terrorist activity.¹²⁴ However, the LTTE often interacted with India for a variety of other reasons. First, Tamil refugees from the northeastern region of Sri Lanka fled to the Tamil sanctuaries in the southern parts of India (Tamil Nadu) during the early 1980s when ethnic riots broke out.¹²⁵ Tamil sympathizers in India (and among Palestinians) also provided the LTTE with vital intelligence regarding Sri Lankan military movement and capabilities.¹²⁶ After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, however, the LTTE’s relations with India soured.¹²⁷

The Sri Lankan government also collaborated with India to combat the LTTE militarily and politically. The first peace talks between Sri Lanka and India regarding the LTTE began in 1985. The introduction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) resulted from the negotiations which produced the Indo–Sri Lanka Accords of 1987. IPKF forces aimed to neutralize the LTTE and Tamil sympathizers in order to restore Sri Lankan authority. India, seeking to prevent the assertion of Tamil identity in Sri Lanka and among Indian Tamil Nadu, did not fully succeed in eradicating nationalist sentiment among the Tamils in either location.¹²⁸

***

Following the assassination of Supreme Leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran in 2009, the LTTE fractured and collapsed because of the power vacuum left behind. However, though the Sri Lankan government destroyed the LTTE’s strongholds in the northeastern part of the island and decimated its forces, the Tamil Tigers’ mission still has the potential to inspire other groups. To this day, the Tamil population remains disenfranchised and has received no political authority over its territory. By addressing the core problem of marginalization among the two main ethnic identities in the country, the Sri Lankan government could have ensured that world would not see the resurgence of the LTTE or similar organization.

After 2002, the LTTE began to approach political negotiations more often and with the expectation of achieving their end goals of political autonomy outside the Sri Lankan state. Between 2006 and 2009, however, the LTTE continued to assert its military prowess by gaining control over large tracts of traditional Tamil territory in the north.¹²⁹ Toward the end of the organization’s domination of the northeastern sector of the island, the LTTE retreated to a small area of the Jaffna Peninsula in order to regroup and prevent Sri Lankan forces from defeating isolated Tiger units. The LTTE hid among the civilian population as a last effort to preserve fighters, and keep official government forces at bay due to fear of attacking noncombatants instead of rebels. Sri Lankan forces did often attack areas where civilians and LTTE fighters resided, however; the LTTE thought to capitalize on this and create a humanitarian crisis to which the international community would respond. Regardless, this strategy did not prevail against advancing Sri Lankan forces.

On May 18, 2009, Sri Lankan forces successfully assassinated the LTTE’s Supreme Commander, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, marking the perceived end of the Tamil Tigers. Tamils idolized their leader, mourning his death as they realized that the first protracted war for their independence was coming to a close. Most of the organization’s top-tier military and political leaders reportedly died in battles waged by the Sri Lankan government forces throughout the first half of 2009, resulting in the surrender of thousands of Tigers.¹³⁰ Kumaran Pathmanathan, the Tamil Tigers’ new leader, was captured in August 2009 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia after a worldwide manhunt.¹³¹

The armed forces of the Sri Lankan government besieged the last guerilla strongholds, reasserting military control in the northeastern region of the island for the first time in a quarter century. The government’s counterinsurgency also included plans to reduce the political legitimacy of the group among Tamils on the island, and internationally among sympathetic states and the diaspora. Overall, the fall of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam can be partly attributed to the structure and actions of the organization itself alongside the counterinsurgency measures taken by a sometimes inept government.

Despite the Sri Lankan government’s perceived victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, all efforts by political figures and military forces failed to address the problem of marginalization and disenfranchisement among the Tamil population. The Sri Lankan state lacked true legitimate power over the Tamil territory in the northeastern quarter of the island, and remained weak politically and militarily throughout the thirty year conflict. Consequently, governmental measures taken to quell the Tiger threat failed repeatedly. Despite numerous bouts of negotiations with the Sri Lankan government regarding the home rule of Tamils, violent conflict continued to rise to the fore throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

The only true victory the Sri Lankan government won was the physical reclamation of the northern region of the island. This element of the Sri Lankan government’s counter-terror campaign was essential to defeating the Tigers. However, the Tamil Tigers’ ideology has not been eradicated from the population. Today, Tamils are discouraged and continue to live without political representation in Colombo. There is great need for minority rights to benefit this isolated people. With a proportional representation system in place, the Tamils would have the opportunity to voice their political concerns and vote in accordance with Tamil interest and Hindu tradition.

In order to maintain political and physical control over the northeastern region of the island, the Sri Lankans must make political sacrifices to appease the Tamil population. This effort would be supported by international actors promoting democracy, and could help the government gain blessing from powers like the United States. Allying with democratic powers could also help the country as a whole economically. Though radical segments in the population may still desire an independent Tamil homeland, Eelam, much opposition to the federal government would be subdued.

To reduce the possibility of LTTE resurgence or the emergence of other similar groups, the Sri Lankan government must ensure these minority rights. The Tamils may be discouraged now, but they may take up arms once they recover and organize under a few large ethno-nationalist groups when they realize that they still lack a voice in the Sri Lankan government. In the end, Sri Lanka must take proactive political measures “win the peace now that it has won the war against the LTTE.”¹³²

***

The historical imbalance of power in Sri Lanka during the British colonial era and consequent independence of the country led to the development of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and their ethno-nationalist ideology. Disenfranchised Tamils sought to gain political rights via nonviolent means, but found that the best way to pursue this goal was by military coercion. The LTTE emerged in 1978, conducting ground, air, and sea-based attacks against the federal government’s military installations, political leaders, and civilian populations as part of its strategy of protracted popular war. In addition, the Tamil Tigers became known through the media as the leading suicide terrorist organization. Sri Lanka defeated the Tamil Tigers by defeating it militarily and reclaiming the northeastern territory. However, the government should enhance its counter-terror strategy to include more political reforms like guaranteeing minority rights to the Tamils and altering its electoral system from first-past-the-post winner-take-all votes to a more proportional style to prevent another terrorist organization with the same ethno-nationalist ideology from materializing. By addressing the root problem of ethnic tension and alienation of minority populations, the Sri Lankan government can effectively preclude the rise of a group similar to the Tamil Tigers.

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(accessed December 14, 2012).

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