Otec aff/neg otec aff
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- B) Economics
- C) Indian no-first-use and regional CBMs
- D) Fallout blow-back
- No extinction – impact is local
No Indo-Pak WarNo Indo-Pak WarA) DeterrenceTellis 2 [Ashley, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 24-5] In the final analysis, this situation is made objectively "meta-stable" by the fact that neither India, Pakistan, nor China has the strategic capabilities to execute those successful damage-limiting first strikes that might justify initiating nuclear attacks either "out of the blue" or during a crisis. Even China, which of the three comes closest to possessing such capabilities (against India under truly hypothetical scenarios), would find it difficult to conclude that the capacity for "splendid first strikes" lay within reach. Moreover, even if it could arrive at such a determination, the political justification for these actions would be substantially lacking given the nature of its current political disputes with India. On balance, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a high degree of deterrence stability, at least with respect to wars of unlimited aims, exists within the greater South Asian region. B) EconomicsTellis 2 [Ashley, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Orbis, Winter, p. 19] In any event, the saving grace that mutes the potential for exacerbated competition between both countries remains their relatively strong economic constraints. At the Pakistani end, these constraints are structural: Islamabad simply has no discretionary resources to fritter away on an open-ended arms race, and it could not acquire resources for this purpose without fundamentally transforming the nature of the Pakistani state itself—which transformation, if it occurs successfully, would actually mitigate many of the corrosive forces that currently drive Islamabad’s security competition with India. 21 At the Indian end, these constraints may be more self-imposed. New Delhi commands a large pool of national resources that could be siphoned off and reallocated to security instruments, but the current weaknesses of the central government’s public finances and its reform program, coupled with its desire to complete the technological modernization programs that have been underway for many decades, prevents it from enlarging the budgetary allocations for strategic acquisitions at will. 22 With these constraints on both sides, future nuclearization in India and Pakistan is more likely to resemble an "arms crawl" than a genuine Richardson-type "arms race." The strategic capabilities on both sides will increase incrementally but slowly—and in India will have further to go because of its inferior capabilities compared to China’s. This slowness may be the best outcome from the viewpoint both of the two South Asian competitors and the United States. C) Indian no-first-use and regional CBMsMalik 3 [Mohan, The Stability Of Nuclear Deterrence In South Asia, Asian Affairs, Fall] Regarding the technical requirements of stable deterrence, questions about command, control, and safety procedures continue to be raised. Both Pakistan and India claim to have maintained tighter controls over their arsenal-it is not in their own interests to see antistate actors gaining control of nuclear technology. Both India and Pakistan publicly have declared moratoriums on further nuclear tests, and India's adherence to no-first-use (NFU) posture and confidence-building measures-such as prenotification of missile tests and an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear installations-promotes crisis stability. Devin Hegarty argues that this is responsible behavior in stark contrast to U.S.-Soviet nuclear options, including "deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, bombers flying on 24-hour alert status, and the nuclear safety lapses that characterized the superpower arms race."25 Post-September 11 measures to promote greater security and control over nuclear weapons and materials have been accorded the topmost priority. India's nuclear arsenal is firmly under the control of civilian leadership, and the Pakistani army always has retained the real authority over its country's nuclear weapons, regardless of who is head of state. Pakistan's military chain of command appears intact despite internal turmoil and reshuffling at the top of the government.26 The United States reportedly is considering offering assistance to ensure the physical protection of sensitive nuclear assets with vaults, sensors, alarms, tamperproof seals and labels, and other means of protection, ensuring personnel reliability and secure transport of sensitive items.27 D) Fallout blow-backCohen 2 [Stephen, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South Asia: An Unknowable Future, May, http://www.brook.edu/views/speeches/cohens20020501.pdf] There will be little likelihood of a preemptive attack by India against Pakistan or against India by Pakistan or China, in part because the numbers will make such an attack difficult, and in part because of mobile basing. In the India-Pakistan case, both sides will be worried about miscalculations and, as the numbers increase, the possibility of significant fallout on one’s own country from even a successful attack will increase, thus enhancing self-deterrence. No extinction – impact is localDyer 2 [Gwynne, Ph.D. in War Studies – University of London and Board of Governors – Canada’s Royal Military College, “Nuclear War a Possibility Over Kashmir”, Hamilton Spectator, 5-24, Lexis] For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be largely confined to the region. The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout. 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