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THE CASE FOR ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE



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THE CASE FOR ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATE

“The laws of morality are not accidental, but are the essentially rational. It is the very purpose of the state that what is essential in the practical activity of men, and in their dispositions, should be duly recognized, that it should have a manifest existence, and maintain its position. It is the absolute interest of reason that this moral whole should exist; and herein lies the justification and merit of heroes who have founded states, however rude these may have been.”

Hegel, “Philosophy of History” (cited above)
What is the relationship between the dialectic and one’s duty to one’s state? The dialectic ensures, however idealistically and artificially, that all things will become synthesized in their due time. This includes the political state, which has come into being for humans as a way to synthesize their contradictory natures.
Hegel believes that the state exists for the ultimate purpose of rationalizing individual and collective life. The “practical activity of men” in an age where societies are as sophisticated as they are, invariably means interaction with other people, and that interaction must be mediated by a rational and powerful authority because each individual person might not themselves be rational enough.

POINTS OF ATTACK

Debaters answering Hegelian philosophy should strive to keep their answers relevant to that portion of Hegel’s thinking which is applicable to debate. There are several flaws in Hegel’s thinking that render him an undesirable source of resolving value conflicts:


1. Hegel’s idealism, that is, the belief that ideas are fundamentally more real than people, is a source of failure for his political philosophy, since it removes us from the real focus of politics: human beings.

2. The “logic” of Hegel’s dialectic is not only unnecessary (traditional logic will suit our needs just fine) but also rather sloppy, and almost never guarantees a genuine logical result.


3. Hegel has an extremely conservative political bias that taints his overall logic.
4. The Marxist critique of Hegel demonstrates the necessity of abandoning idealism and embracing materialism, something Hegelianism cannot do.

HEGEL’S IDEALISM

You may already be feeling excited about dialectical logic. You may think, hey, this Hegel caught onto something. Life is more complicated than black and white. Sometimes both sides are right. And so on. However, what works well in abstract logic will, as we see, fail as a political philosophy, precisely because it tries so hard to accept everything (things like torture, slavery, patriarchy) into its grand scheme.


The main reason for this is something articulated by Marx, and other German philosophers influenced by Hegel but finding themselves on the more radical side of German politics. That reason would become the entire basis of Marx’s critique of Hegel, and his re-adaptation of Hegel’s philosophy to suit dialectical materialism. The reason Hegel’s philosophy, as such, was inevitably repressive, was that this dialectical process involved ideas and ideas alone; these ideas are treated by the Hegelian as real entities, existing somewhere removed from the comipting encounter with human beings.
Hegel’s dialectic works for phenomenal logic, the logic of the interpersonal, or existential existence because ideas might be experienced and concretized individually in a quite consistent manner. The dialectic fails politically because such interpretations of individual ideas are invariably seen as applying to the whole of history, the Hegelian Geist, or Spirit, moving through history.
This is bound to hurt somebody, because the actualization of such ideas in the real world does not follow this neat, and only briefly violent, dialectical formula. As Marx would argue later, history, even dialectical history, is long and bloody.

THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE DIALECTIC

Some people answer Hegel in a different light. The idea that there is more than one kind of logic is a blasphemy to most non-Hegelian or non-Marxist scholars. These scholars have a point, and the point is made in two ways.


First, it makes no sense to think we “need” a dialectical system of logic, a logical method analogous to “normal” Aristotleian logic, to gain anything that traditional logic cannot gain. Marxists, for example, cite the dialectic as necessary to liberate and progress humanity into our collective self-actualization. But why can’t normal logic give us the same conclusion? Consider the following argument:
1. We should reject historically obsolete and oppressive systems

2. Capitalism is a historically obsolete and oppressive system

3. Therefore, capitalism should be rejected
In this case, traditional logic can easily convince us to reject capitalism. Most people can be led to the conviction that historically obsolete and oppressive systems ought to be “rejected,” socially or otherwise. Proving the second premise may be a bit harder, but anti-capitalist authors have already written mountains of pretty impressive books on why capitalism is both oppressive and historically unnecessary.
Perhaps a Marxist might reply that the use of the dialectic in Marxism is necessary not to make the normative judgement that “capitalism should be rejected,” but that capitalism “will’ be rejected, as evidenced by the struggle of opposing, dialectical forces.
But if one of Marxism’s major theses is true, this too is unnecessary. The argument is that historically obsolete societies “will” be rejected, just as they always have in the past (feudalism, slavery, primitive collectivism, etc.). Thus:
1. Historically obsolete systems will be overthrown

2. Capitalism is a historically obsolete system

3. Therefore, capitalism will be overthrown
Or perhaps another Marxist notion can illustrate:
1. Oppressive societies will be overthrown if their oppression becomes unbearable

2. Capitalism results in unbearable oppression

3. Therefore, capitalism will be overthrown
Again, no need to posit the clash of two identities, whether those identities are found in ideas (Hegel) or in economic classes of human beings (Marx). Dialecticians might reply that the form in which a victorious struggle carries with it some old elements is important. While that might be true, there is no reason to assume that such characteristics cannot be found in a conventionally logical manner.
Secondly, opponents of Hegelian logic point out that the actual method of logic in the dialectic is quite loose, *nd that it may be an equivocation to call it “logic” at all. Reading books in which the dialectic is employed to solve clashing disputes is like listening to someone say, “well, there is some good on this side, but there’s also some good on the other side.” The supposed “dialectician” is really only picking out certain characteristics of both ideas, with little justification more than her own conception of which ones are important.
Once again, it may be important to see both sides of the issue, and it may be that a great deal of the statements and declarations we make are somewhat absolutist and in need of criticism. But it does not follow from any of this that normal logic should be rejected in favor of dialectical logic.
In fact, another reason dialectics may be inappropriate, at least in their ultimate sense, for debate itself, is that there is no point in dialectical logic where a definitive decision must be made about a certain side, a certain idea. A truly “dialectical” debate round would have the critic not deciding who is right and who is not, but in re-interpreting what both sides would say in order to produce his or her conception of a higher truth. This type ofjudge is not one we generally desire.



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