Small arsenals, self-interest, and ingenuity keep weapons secure
Waltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)
Journal But does the lack of funding for security measures increase the possibility of a miscalculation or an unauthorized launch? Waltz I think large numbers of weapons would raise that concern. But I think we can rely on their self–interest and their ingenuity to prevent accidents.Every country goes through a period where it has relatively crude weapons, although relatively crude weapons are not as crude as they used to be, and where they have small numbers and where there are some questions of vulnerability. But we have managed to get through those periods. The only strikes we’ve hadhave beenat nuclearfacilities before any warheads were produced, with no attacks where there were existing warheads and for good reason: Deterrence works.
AT Civil War/Unstable States
Lower risk of prolif in those states and no escalation.
Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p8 Ajones
What can one say? Four things primarily. First, possession of nuclear weapons may slow arms races down, rather than speed them up, a possibility considered later. Second, for less-developed countries to build nuclear arsenals requires a long lead time. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs require administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain programs of considerable cost that pay off only in the long run. The more unstable a government, the shorter becomes the attention span of its leaders. 'lhey have to deal with today's problems and hope for the best tomorrow. In Countries where political control is most difficult to mainiain, governments are least likely to initiate nuclear Weapons programs. ln such states, soldiers help to mainlaln leaders in power or try to overthrow them. For those Purposes nuclear weapons are not useful. Soldiers who have political clout, or want it, are not interested in nuclear Weapons. They are not scientists or technicians, They like to command troops and squadrons. Their vested interests are in the military's traditional trappings? Third, although highly unstable states are unlikely to initiate nuclear projects, such projects, begun in stable times, may continue through periods of political turmoil and succeed in producing nuclear weapons. A nuclear state may be unstable or may become so. But what is hard to comprehend is why, in an intemal struggle for power, the contenders would start using nuclear weapons. Who would they aim at? How would they use them as instruments for maintaining or gaining control? I see little more reason to fear that one faction or another in a less-developed country will fire atomic weapons in a struggle for political power than that they will be used in a crisis of succession. One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of regime. Those who fear the worst have not shown how those events might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Strikingly, during the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, some group managed to keep control of China's nuclear weapons. Fourth, the possibility of one side in a civil war firing a nuclear warhead at its opponent's stronghold nevertheless remains. Such an act would produce a national tragedy, not an international one. This question then arises: Once the weapon is fired, what happens next? The domestic use of nuclear weapons is, of all the uses imaginable, least likely to lead to escalation and to global tragedy.
AT Crisis Instability
Prolif solves crisis stability – first strike capability.
Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.47]
For crisis stability, the superpowers needed advanced weapons survival technology because they needed to protect a large number of weapons from an enemy with advanced counterforce capabilities. The ideal 'limited means' nuclear proliferator will face an adversary with only a few major population and industrial centers. The "limited means' proliferator will only need rudimentary weapons protection because it only needs to protect a handful of weapons from first strikes. Its adversary will know that its counterforce first strike must be virtually perfect to eliminate the chance that it will be completely destroyed by nuclear retaliation,-and because `perfect' is such a high standard, preemptive incentives will be small.
Prolif creates a perception of second strike capabilities that solves crisis instability.
Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.8]
The essence of crisis stability is second mike capability -- the capability to absorb a first strike and still retaliate with enough nuclear firepower to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary. To be able to inflict unacceptable levels of' damage on an adversary even after suffering a first strike, a state will need some method of protecting its weapons or weapons technology from that strike. If a state’s weapons can be preserved - if its adversary cannot escape unacceptable levels of damage by striking first-then there will be no first strike incentive.The threat of sufficient retaliation will keep adversaries from making the first destructive move; and if the first move is never taken, stable deterrence will not fail.
Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)
The causal mechanism in a proliferation optimist argument like that of Waltz (Sagan & Waltz, 2003), which expects war to be less likely as the number of nuclear actors increases, is connected to a rationalist view of nuclear deterrence (see Zagare & Kilgour, 2000; Huth, 1999). Proliferation optimists implicitly contend that, as the number of nuclear actors in the system increases, the proportion of disputes involving nuclear actors should increase as well.5 That is, all else being equal, the more of any type of actor you add to the playing field of international politics, the more likely that that type of actor will be involved in a crisis. If nuclear weapons increase the prospects of deterrence, then proliferation should result in more crises with restrained actors that are prone to back down instead of escalate.