Prolif good – War



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Risk of Prolif O/W



Even if the risk is relatively low the consequences are too high to risk.


Allison ‘7 (Graham, Douglas Dillon Prof. Gov. and Dir. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs – Harvard U. JFK School of Government, National Interest, “Symposium: Apocalypse When?” November/December, L/N)

Mueller is entitled to his opinion that the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is "exaggerated" and "overwrought." But analysts of various political persuasions, in and out of government, are virtually unanimous in their judgment to the contrary. As the national-security community learned during the Cold War, risk = likelihood x consequences. Thus, even when the likelihood of nuclear Armageddon was small, the consequences were so catastrophic that prudent policymakers felt a categorical imperative to do everything that feasibly could be done to prevent that war. Today, a single nuclear bomb exploding in just one city would change our world. Given such consequences, differences between a 1 percent and a 20 percent likelihood of such an attack are relatively insignificant when considering how we should respond to the threat. Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb who Enrico Fermi once called "the only true genius I had ever met", told Congress in March that he estimated a "20 percent per year probability [of a nuclear explosion--not just a contaminated, dirty bomb--a nuclear explosion] with American cities and European cities included." My Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn has created a model in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science that estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over a ten-year period to be 29 percent--identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005. My book, Nuclear Terrorism, states my own best judgment that, on the current trend line, the chances of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade are greater than 50 percent. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has expressed his own view that my work may even underestimate the risk. Warren Buffet, the world's most successful investor and legendary odds-maker in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic events, concluded that nuclear terrorism is "inevitable." He stated, "I don't see any way that it won't happen."



Err massively against proliferation – the catastrophic nature of our impacts demand 100% certainty before you would vote against us

Busch ‘4  (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “ No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 313)

While abstract theorizing can be found on both sides of the debate, it is especially common among the optimists. Rather than asking how NWSs actually do act, optimists have begun with theories of how states should act—that is, in accordance with supposedly “realist" rational-actor models-—and predicted the actions of states on that basis. One need only recall Waltz’s confident statement, “We do not have to wonder whether they [NWSs] will take good care of their weapons. They have every incentive to do so.”“° On the contrary, the proper approach to theory would begin with wonder about whether states do, in fact, always act with such rational incentives in mind. As the present study has demonstrated, there is little empirical support for such an optimistic position where nuclear proliferation is concerned. While realist theories may be useful for explaining certain types of state actions, they are inappropriate models for predicting specific policies and actions that NWSs will take. Having oversimplified the causes and motivations of state action, the optimists make highly inappropriate policy recommendations regarding nuclear proliferation. Indeed, those recommendations go beyond what the optimists’ own theories could possibly support. In a context other than the proliferation debate, Waltz argues that his theories cannot predict specific policies or particular actions by individual states; instead, he maintains, they can predict only general trends."‘ But, as Jeffrey Knopf has pointed out, when one is advocating a further proliferation of nuclear weapons, predicting general trends is not enough: one must be certain that one’s theories are correct all of the time."* It is likely that a certain awareness of the special dangers attending nuclear weapons policy leads Waltz to misapply his own realist theory and predict that NWSs will act rationally without exception. But that awareness must be replaced by fully conscious practical reasoning. Empirically grounded theories, combined with the prudence of the policymaker, would lead to policy recommendations that are more sound.



Prolif Bad – Accidents




Proliferation creates significant accidental and unauthorized nuclear risks -- India and Pakistan prove they won’t take sufficient protective measures.


Busch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 289)

As these accounts suggest, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use could be very high in emerging NWSs, particularly during nuclear crises or periods of domestic instability. The prospects for proliferation are therefore especially disturbing because emerging NWSs will tend to be more unstable than the established NWSs have been.3° For example, all three of the emerg-ing nuclear powers examined in this study—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—have had significant risks of domestic instability. Although Saddam Hussein proved able to crush any opposition, he did experience a number of coup attempts (the most serious in 1992), as well as repeated riots and uprisings (in 1991, 1995, 1996, and 2000) during his time in power.31 And once an external invasion took place, all central authority evaporated quite rapidly.32 The risks of regime-threatening upheavals are much greater, however, in North Korea and Iran than in Ba'athist Iraq. As we have seen, neither of these countries has great prospects for political stability in the near- to mid-term.33 In the event of severe upheavals or regime collapse, they could experience a rapid deterioration of their central controls over their nuclear weapons and related materials. Nor is it clear that simple command structures in emerging NWSs will significantly reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use, as Seng and Karl contend. Indeed, as several analysts have argued, the rudimentary command-and-control structures in India and Pakistan increase the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized use, particularly during crises. The Indian military currently has little experience in handling nuclear weapons. If India's nuclear weapons were given to the military during a crisis, they would be as inexperienced in preventing their use as they would be in using them.34 Moreover, because Pakistan currently lacks an enunciated nuclear doctrine, reliable decision-making or communications systems, or explicit targeting information, there is an increased likelihood that Pakistan's own troops might undertake strikes on their own.35 These are risks that any emerging NWS would likely experience as they worked to develop nuclear weapons, formulate use-doctrines, and establish command-and-control systems. But since many of the countries most likely to develop nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future would have to consider the chances of preventive strikes as quite high, they might choose to deploy (or be forced to deploy) their nuclear weapons before they have all these issues sufficiently worked out. In these instances, the simple command structures would not necessarily prevent accidental or unauthorized use, and in fact could increase these risks.


Prolif causes states with hair trigger responses – it’s key to their survival – guarantees accidental nuclear war

Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)

The performance of forces in our illustrative and hypothetical case is also influenced by the command and control systems that connect political and military leaders with force operators, and with one another. Although command and control variables have not been built into the model, the implications for command decision making, and for the problem of control during crisis management, are clear enough. The forces most dependent on land based ballistic missiles show the most discrepancy between hair-trigger and slow-trigger responses. On the other hand, states with balanced forces such as Russia, or with major reliance upon sea based as opposed to land based missiles (Japan), are comparatively less reliant on jumpy warning and fast firing. If hair trigger responses are necessary for survivability, then policy makers and commanders will have few minutes in which to make life and death decisions for entire societies. And missiles of theater or shorter range offer even fewer minutes of decision time than ICBMs, whose intercontinental reach requires 20 minutes or so from silo to silo. Faced with this analysis, states might decide to supplement vulnerable and potentially provocative land based ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Cruise missiles can be based in various environments; on land, at sea and in the air. They can be moved on relatively short notice and can attack from various azimuths with high accuracy. Other states cannot have failed to notice the U.S. use of cruise missiles to great effect during the Gulf War of 1991 and in punitive strike campaigns throughout the 1990s, as well as during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Cruise missiles can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads: the choice obviously depends on the target and mission, and the decision whether to arm the missile with nuclear or non-nuclear munitions affects its operational range. But it is certainly conceivable that various states in our mix will turn to ALCMs (air launched cruise missiles), SLCMs (sea launched), and ground launched (GLCMs) as weapons of choice for high priority conventional, or nuclear, missions: the absence of air defenses of any consequence, in many states, invites their opponents to explore this option if they can.

Prolif causes an arms race – accidental nuclear war


Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)

The five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: 1 some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; 2 states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate, but unauthorized, launch by rogue commanders; and 3 faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other's defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption. To this point, we have discussed the problem of an Asian nuclear arms race as an abstract, albeit sufficiently alarming, problem. In the sections of the article to follow, we want to pin down the concept by detailed interrogation of one hypothetical scenario: an eight-sided nuclear polygon of force structures and, therefore, of probable operational performances in deterrence, in crisis management and, if necessary, in war. Before being scenario specific, however, we need to resolve, or at least address, matters of “philosophy of analysis” or analytic points of departure, pertinent to this study.




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