Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China


NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #1—No OBOR Funding



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2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #1—No OBOR Funding



They say OBOR wont be funded, but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]



  1. Extend our RSIS evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their Financial Express evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

Our RSIS evidence is from a peer reviewed, graduate school journal. The authors are from the countries that the OBOR would run through in Southeast Asia. Their evidence is from a business magazine that knows nothing about the politics of the area. Also, our evidence lays our exactly how it would be done step by step, their evidence just says it wont happen.

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]



This matters because: improved relations with the EU lead to OBOR passing. The policy solves multiple impacts that outweigh the aff.

  1. Improved relations guarantee the passage of the “One Belt, One Road” policy



Le Corre, 2015 [ Phillippe, visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. His research focuses on Asia-Europe political and economic relations, China’s foreign policy, and France., “EU-China Summit: What happens when the U.S. isn’t watching”, June 26, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/06/26-china-europe-summit-lecorre]
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the summit will be a statement on China’s potential role in Juncker’s newly created European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), which totals €315 billion. The fund’s aims include relaunching growth and job creation in sectors ranging from innovation to research, education, and transport infrastructure. At Brussels’ request, EU countries have already submitted an initial list of about 2,000 investment projects. In the run-up to the summit, Chinese officials have highlighted complementarity between the Juncker plan and their “One Belt, One Road” initiative. That project would build infrastructure across China, Central Asia, and the Middle East through an 11,000 kilometer “new Silk Road.” Could it go as far as Europe? Chinese leaders say yes, though there are few details as of yet.

2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #2—Case outweighs the DA





  1. Magnitude: Our impact is bigger than their impact because:

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________



  1. Timeframe: Our impact is faster than their impact because: ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________



  1. Probability: Our impact is more likely to happen because: ________________________________________________________________________

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  1. Turns the case: Our impact causes their impact because:

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2NC/1NR EU CP Internal Net Benefit AT #3—EU/China Relations High

They say EU-China Relations are high, but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]


  1. Extend our RSIS evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their Yanyi evidence because:

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

and this reason matters because: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________



  1. Low relations prevent passage of One Belt One Road connecting China and Europe



RSIS, March 2016 [S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies a professional graduate school of international affairs at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS’ mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts at the forefront of security studies and international affairs, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PR160307_China-One-Belt-One-Road.pdf]
However, beyond the trade statistics and new rail connections, the role of the OBOR initiative is still not entirely understood in Europe.33 During the launch of the OBOR initiative, China witnessed a timid reaction among EU officials. A limited number of EU member states pledged support for the initiative. Several EU member states subsequently boasted in the media their respective exclusive roles in the OBOR initiative ranging from German and Polish railway links and Italian historical connections in the ancient Silk Road through Venice and Marco Polo to the Chinese plan under the OBOR to have Greece as the receiving line of the 21st century Maritime Silk Road in Europe at the Piraeus port. EU think tanks and universities have increased the frequency of workshops and seminars on subjects such as “Opportunities and Challenges of the One Belt, One Road: The New Silk Road of the 21st century” and “China in the eyes of the EU, the EU in the eyes of China”. In this regard, the OBOR is considered “good for business”, along with a common critique on its lack of specific projects for European participation. The orientation of the EU think tanks towards the OBOR initiative is still evolving as researchers and scholars study its impact on the EU’s external relations, particularly the EU Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s role in Central Asia. The Eurasian corridor has to be seen not only as a mechanism for enabling the flow of high-value and low-volume products from Europe to China, but also as a means of promoting a broader Eurasian socio-economic integration. Besides the programs delineated by the EU in the High Level Security Dialogue (HLSD) with Central Asian states, Brussels could promote important regional programs to foster human resource education, the rule of law and environmental protection via a more flexible stance towards cooperation with Beijing. At the same time, as China has gradually subtracted Central Asia from the Russian economic sphere of influence, it is slowly but inexorably reaching countries and markets closer to the EU. The “16+1” cooperation framework between China and the CEE countries has clearly shown the potential of Chinese influence creating a significant lobby of pro-China sentiments in the EU and its immediate neighbourhood. In fact, China and the EU also need to address how to operate a relationship which touches on regional security concerns arising from terrorism, drugs and human trafficking as well as other transnational crime. The EU population is still not well aware of the OBOR initiative. They still perceive the Chinese ODI with mixed feelings as there are lingering suspicions that China has broader strategic intent and not just commercial calculations in putting such financial resources across the Eurasian region.34 Furthermore, the EU media narrative is still centred on Chinese mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the EU rather than a broader socio-political analysis of the OBOR initiative and possible cooperation patterns to shape a long-term relationship between the EU and China based on a better understanding of reciprocal values and interests. To a large degree, EU’s approach has remained rooted in a democratisation and human rights paradigm. The focus on purely economic motives and the lack of clarity by China exacerbates the situation. In actual fact, the OBOR initiative can be a platform for both sides to develop a new basis of promoting mutual trust and mutual benefit, even though the EU decision-making process among its institutions and member states can be complicated for the Chinese side.
  1. EU-Chinese relations are low because EU engagement is unconditional and limited



European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009 [April, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR12_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-CHINA_RELATIONS.pdf]
The EU’s China strategy is based on an anachronistic belief that China, under the influence of European engagement, will liberalise its economy, improve the rule of law and democratise its politics. The underlying idea is that engagement with China is positive in itself and should not be conditional on any specific Chinese behaviour. This strategy has produced a web of bilateral agreements, joint communiqués, memoranda of understanding, summits, ministerial visits and sector-specific dialogues, all designed to draw China towards EU-friendly policies. As one senior EU diplomat puts it: “We need China to want what we want”.1 Yet, as this report shows, China’s foreign and domestic policy has evolved in a way that has paid little heed to European values, and today Beijing regularly contravenes or even undermines them. The EU’s heroic ambition to act as a catalyst for change in China completely ignores the country’s economic and political strength and disregards its determination to resist foreign influence. Furthermore, the EU frequently changes its objectives and seldom follows through on them. The already modest leverage that EU Member States have over China, collectively and individually, is weakened further by the disunity in their individual approaches. The result is an EU policy towards China that can be described as “unconditional engagement”: a policy that gives China access to all the economic and other benefits of cooperation with Europe while asking for little in return. Most EU Member States are aware that this strategy, enshrined in a trade and cooperation agreement concluded back in 1985, is showing its age. They acknowledge its existence, largely ignore it in practice, and pursue their own, often conflicting national approaches towards China. Some challenge China on trade, others on politics, some on both, and some on neither.
  1. China exploits country differences in the EU—comprehensive cooperation is low



European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009 [April, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR12_-_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-CHINA_RELATIONS.pdf]
China has learned to exploit the divisions among EU Member States. It treats its relationship with the EU as a game of chess, with 27 opponents crowding the other side of the board and squabbling about which piece to move. As irritating as Beijing finds this at times, there is no question about who is in a position to play the better game. As a neo-authoritarian Chinese academic, Pan Wei, puts it, “the EU is weak, politically divided and militarily non- influential. Economically, it’s a giant, but we no longer fear it because we know that the EU needs China more than China needs the EU.”2 China knows its strength and no longer bothers to hide it. Its new readiness to treat the EU with something akin to diplomatic contempt became apparent last December with the short-term cancellation of the EU-China summit in Lyon, a harsh reaction to French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s plans to meet the Dalai Lama.



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