Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
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- 2AC Affirmative Answers to Taiwan Relations Disadvantage
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- No Link: Cooperating with China does not throw off US-Taiwan relations
- No Impact: A China-Taiwan war would remain regional—the cost of escalation is too high
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Brookings Institution, 2010 [“China’s Growing Strength, Taiwan's Diminishing Options”, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/11/china-taiwan-wang] Rising economic might In 2010, China officially surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy, after the United States. China has become the largest trading partner of many countries in the world; in South Korea, trade with China is larger than the country's trade with Japan and the United States combined. China is now ASEAN’s largest trading partner, bolstered by a free trade agreement. Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America and other parts of the world are gradually changing the international landscape. The Chinese model of development—economic liberalization with tight political control—has a certain appeal to autocrats of the world, as it provides an alternative to the Western model. The size of the Chinese economy has made it one of the key economic locomotives in the world. China quickly emerged from the economic slump following the 2008 global financial crisis, growing at 8.7 percent in 2009, and played a pivotal role in pulling the world economy out of the recession. As Taiwan’s economy faced rising employment and sluggish growth in much of the first decade of the 21st century, the economic opportunity presented by China had a magnet effect on the island. Taiwanese businesses have invested heavily in China, and more than half a million Taiwanese people now live there permanently. Nonetheless, as East Asian countries pursued free trade agreements with each other, there were concerns that Taiwan risked being marginalized in the movement toward the region's economic integration. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect on January 1, 2010, expedited Taiwan's decision to negotiate the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China. For its part, Beijing hoped to use the lure of economic benefits to tie the island closer to the mainland. In the agreement signed on June 29, 2010 in the Chinese city of Chongqing, the “early harvest” list of tariff concessions covered 539 Taiwanese products, valued at $13.8 billion, and 267 mainland Chinese products, valued at $2.9 billion. Taipei hopes that the ECFA will help Taiwan negotiate free trade agreements with other countries. Of late, Singapore has shown interest in such an agreement. Beijing’s strategy for engaging Taiwan’s leaders is to start with the supposedly easier area of economic issues, hoping that the benefits of economic integration will lead to political negotiation on the future status of Taiwan. The dynamics of Taiwan’s domestic politics, however, complicates the matter. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) views the ECFA with suspicion, worrying that the trade deal will push Taiwan into China's orbit and make the island vulnerable to economic coercion. The ruling KMT party, on the other hand, argues that the ECFA will help revitalize Taiwan's sluggish economy and avoid being marginalized in the economic activities of East Asia. The dynamics of “Blue” and “Green” politics will likely create gridlock and constrain any movement toward cross-Strait political talks. Today, no leader in Taiwan can start political negotiations with China without first forming a consensus among the Taiwanese voters. China’s rising economic capabilities also give Beijing extra leverage in its dealings with other countries, though it is not always used wisely. The recent fracas over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, where a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese patrol boat, is a case in point. Beijing reacted angrily to the arrest of the Chinese captain, issuing a series of official denunciations. More importantly, China suspended shipment of rare earth minerals to Japan. Even when the Japanese government appeared to back down and released the captain, Beijing upped the ante by demanding an apology. Beijing’s hard-line tactics sent shockwaves throughout the region, prompting a rethinking of China's role in Asia. 2AC Affirmative Answers to Taiwan Relations Disadvantage
Schreer , March 2016 [Ben, Senior Analyst for defence strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, with Sheryn Lee, “Time to Start Worrying Again? Cross-Strait Stability after the 2016 Taiwanese Elections,” March 22, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=196375 Yet, many voters had also become concerned about greater dependence on mainland China and the associated dangers to Taiwan’s democracy. Misgivings over President Ma’s China-friendly policies had led to mass protests by students and civil activists (the Sunflower Movement) in March and April 2014 after the KMT tried to pass the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. The KMT’s disregard for public opposition to getting too close to China led to its biggest electoral defeat since 1949 in the November 2014 local ‘nine-in-one’ elections, when the DPP managed to win 13 of the 22 cities and counties, while the KMT dropped from 15 to 6. Moreover, the DPP secured 47.6% of the popular vote and the KMT only 40.7%. As a result, President Ma had to resign as chairman of the KMT and the party didn’t recover in time before the presidential elections. In this context, the 2016 election provided an opportunity for many voters to reassert their distinct Taiwanese identity and reinforce the democratic political system. Indeed, long-term socio-political trends demonstrate that a wide majority of citizens now identify as ‘solely Taiwanese’ and that there’s hardly any support for reunification with China.4 Moreover, the incompatibility between the political systems across the Taiwan Strait has grown. The 2016 election was the third peaceful transfer of power in Taiwan and a reaffirmation of the vitality of its democratic system. Not only did Taiwan elect a female president for the first time, but 38.1% of its legislators will be women, ranking the Republic of China (ROC) 10th in the world on the issue of female parliamentary participation. The 2016 election therefore reflects a fundamental shift in Taiwanese political attitudes and goes beyond mere dissatisfaction with President Ma’s pro-China policies. The result was consistent with a generational shift among Taiwanese voters who have little or no cultural affinity for the mainland.5 This shift is likely to change the balance of power within Taiwan and will make it very difficult for any future party to advocate policies seen as too China-friendly and as undermining Taiwan’s identity and democracy. It also means that China’s goal of peaceful unification on its terms (that is, the reintegration of the ‘renegade province’) becomes a very distant prospect. Since China’s strategy rests on the expectation that Taiwan must become part of the mainland, the election outcome could contribute to renewed tensions across the strait. A return to instability? While the 2016 election introduces a new dynamic in cross-strait relations, it’s too early to predict how things will evolve. A case can be made that despite the DPP’s victory the relationship between the ROC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will remain manageable and stable. There’s some evidence that the President-elect will seek a pragmatic course that refrains from steps consistent with a move towards a declaration of independence, such as the development of a new Taiwanese constitution. During her election campaign, Tsai promised a ‘consistent, predictable, and sustainable cross-strait relationship’, a pledge she repeated in her victory speech. She also emphasised that ‘both sides of the strait have a responsibility to find mutually acceptable means of interaction that are based on dignity and reciprocity. We must ensure that no provocations or accidents take place.’6 Tsai has very good reasons to maintain the status quo across the strait. The mainland is Taiwan’s most important trading partner, and most of its outbound foreign direct investment flows to China. Given its struggling economy, Taipei needs stable relations with Beijing. Moreover, Tsai very likely remembers that during the previous DPP government of President Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008) his pro-independence rhetoric not only angered both Beijing and Washington, Taipei’s principal security partner, but also raised fears among many Taiwanese voters about increasing the risk of war with the mainland. In other words, the new Taiwanese government wouldn’t want to cross a clear red line set by Beijing, possibly triggering a war that the island nation is unlikely to win. The strong expectation that the US would withdraw its support in such a scenario should act as an additional deterrent. At the same time, however, Tsai is likely to seek a different foundation for the cross-strait relationship. In her victory speech, she stressed the importance of ‘protecting this country’s sovereignty’ and emphasised the need for China to recognise Taiwan’s democratic political system. She also stated that the future cross-strait relationship had to be based on: the Republic of China constitutional order, the results of cross-strait negotiations, interactions and exchanges, and democratic principles and the will of the Taiwanese people ... The results of today’s election showcase the will of the Taiwanese people. It is the shared resolve of Taiwan’s 23 million people that the Republic of China is a democratic country. Our democratic system, national identity, and international space must be respected. Any forms of suppression will harm the stability of cross-strait relations.7 In a signal to Beijing, Tsai stated after the election that she ‘understands and respects’ the historical fact that Taiwan and China held talks in 1992—known as the ‘1992 Consensus’ between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the ‘One China’ formula. Following the DPP win, Beijing had urged strongly that the 1992 Consensus needed to remain the political foundation underpinning the relationship. Tsai also stated that the accords reached during President Ma’s government should be continued. At the same time, however, she insisted that Taiwan’s democratic constitution and the will of the people had to be an integral part of the cross-strait political relationship.8 In sum, Tsai seems prepared to reach a new accommodation between Taipei and Beijing that recognises both sides’ interests but that impresses upon her Chinese interlocutors that a new ‘Taiwan consensus’ must guide the relationship. That is, even interim steps such as a semi-autonomous status for Taiwan (similar to Hong Kong’s situation) won’t be acceptable for the DPP leadership and, indeed, the vast majority of Taiwanese people. Therefore, the big question is whether the communist leadership in Beijing can accept that the political landscape in Taiwan has fundamentally changed and that this requires a more flexible approach. At present, China’s leadership seems yet to figure out how to respond to the DPP’s win. China’s first official response to Taiwan’s election results predictably reiterated the position that the 1992 Consensus must be the basis for the cross-strait relationship. It also warned Taiwan of any move towards formal independence, referring to China’s 2005 Anti-Secessionist Law, which makes clear that such a development would lead to war.9 A few days after the election, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also staged a live-fire exercise close to islands controlled by the ROC, most likely as a reminder about China’s willingness to use force if required. The ROC Special Forces responded by holding a small-scale military drill.10 At the same time, in early February 2016 the mainland’s annual Taiwan Affairs Work Conference recommended the further promotion of cross-strait economic integration, strengthening the protection of Taiwan business people’s rights and interests, and increasing people-to-people exchanges and exchanges with parties and groups in Taiwan that uphold the One China principle.11 However, it’s far from guaranteed that this positive momentum will be maintained and there are reasons to caution against too much optimism. President Xi Jinping has taken a strong stance on the issue of sovereignty and stressed on one occasion that he doesn’t wish the issue of unification to be ‘passed on generation after generation’. This statement was widely interpreted as a signal to Taiwan’s leadership that under his leadership Beijing would press for a political dialogue that focused on concrete steps towards unification, a direction which met with strong opposition in Taipei.12 Moreover, like his predecessors, Xi would wish to avoid domestic criticism for going so on Taiwan. For the CCP, Taiwan remains a symbol of enormous national prestige and its future status as an integral part of the Mainland is one of China’s declared ‘core interests’. Furthermore, in the context of increased tensions over maritime disputes in the East China Sea and SCS, the political stakes for Beijing when it comes to unification with Taiwan are even higher. Upholding and, if necessary, enforcing its territorial sovereignty claims is fundamental to protecting the CCP’s political legitimacy, and Taiwanese independence would be an existential threat to its survival. In more recent times, a more nationalistic public has only added pressure for the leadership to remain firm on Taiwan. Therefore, the Chinese leadership could adopt a tougher approach towards Taiwan, guided by the belief that long-term political trends in Taipei and the closeness of US–Taiwan relations will be against its interests and that a military attack could alter the trajectory of those trends.13 One indication of this direction would be if Beijing suspends official exchanges or tries to ‘steal’ some of the ROC’s remaining 22 diplomatic allies. In that case, the DPP government would face domestic pressure to retaliate, creating a negative spiral in cross-strait relations that could be very difficult to reverse.14 Therefore, while alarmist assessments of future cross-strait relations should be avoided, there’s no reason to become complacent about the possibility of serious conflict. Indeed, aside from the potentially complicating political dynamics between the ROC and the PRC, additional strategic factors could contribute to a worsening of the situation.
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Gons, 2011 [Eric Stephen, former RAND-U.S. Air Force Academy Superintendent’s Fellow, current consultant at the Boston Consulting Group, Access Challenges and Implications for Airpower in the Western Pacific, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2011/RAND_RGSD267.pdf] Despite this impasse, it seems for now that both China and Taiwan realize that they have more to gain by cooperation than confrontation. However, bumps in this relationship will occur. Managing their differences requires open communication and a willingness to engage. Unfortunately, these attributes are largely absent in the relationship. China and Taiwan have limited formal communications channels, and thus no formal mechanism to resolve crises. This means that there is the very real and ongoing potential that a small problem could quickly become a big problem. In crises of the past, both governments have tended to use the United States as an intermediary, but this method is far from perfect. First, the United States is not up to the role of impartial mediator – it too has much at stake in any Taiwan-China crisis. Second, the United States has only limited sway with either side. Third, the PRC government tends to close itself off in the midst of crises. The communication problems are very worrisome, and hold the greatest potential that the PRC and Taiwan will be in conflict with each other.93 Bad decisions may result from bad information, miscalculation of costs and benefits, a mis-estimation of the likelihood of success, or just plain old irrationality. Unfortunately, there are many opportunities for misperceptions to complicate the decision chain in a Taiwan crisis. The inherent U.S. participation in any cross-strait dialog is both calming and concerning. It is calming because the United States can act as an unofficial communication channel between two parties who tend to communicate poorly, if at all. It is concerning because the existence of a crisis triangle compounds the opportunities for bad information – now each actor must not only understand his own capabilities and likely reactions, he must know the capabilities and reactions of two other actors, and must know that they know the capabilities and reactions of the other two actors, and so forth. Beyond the simple volume of information that each actor needs to process, we can identify some characteristics of the Taiwan situation that make perfect information hard to obtain. Some potential areas of misunderstanding include: Taiwan may overestimate the probability that the United States will intervene in a crisis, skewing their decision calculus towards crossing a Chinese “red line,”94 assuming China will be deterred by the prospect of U.S. intervention. China may not understand U.S. commitment or the conditions under which the United States will intervene. An estimate of Taiwan’s will to fight is also critical to China’s decision calculus. The United States may underestimate PLA capabilities or Taiwan’s will to fight.95 Decreased ambiguity would aid the decisionmaking of all parties. U.S. policy should encourage cross-strait dialog, including establishing permanent communications channels. Any intentional ambiguity in policy necessarily raises the risks involved in a crisis management chain. Most notably, the intentional American strategic ambiguity regarding its commitment to Taiwan carries with it serious risks should the Taiwan situation devolve into crisis. The U.S. position is intentionally ambiguous – intending to deter China from aggressive action while avoiding giving Taiwan free reign to declare independence.96 It thus serves a useful diplomatic purpose, carefully balancing competing commitments. However, the United States must be prepared to clarify its strategic ambiguity quickly should an emergency arise. Failure to do so would obfuscate the decisionmaking of China and Taiwan, and increase the risk of an unintentional war which the United States may be compelled to enter. Other measures may further increase information available to other actors – for example through increased military-military contacts, open communication channels, etc. U.S. policymakers must be realistic about PLA capabilities, and the prospects for victory in a war over Taiwan. While it is evident that the United States possesses the most advanced military in the world, the PLA has advanced systems as well, many of which specifically exploit U.S. weaknesses. Given PLA strategic depth and the enormous access challenges the United States faces in the western Pacific, many typical U.S. advantages may be nullified. Further, pursuing a deterrent strategy like deploying large concentrations of aircraft to forward bases may actually have an effect the opposite of intended deterrence. A large concentration of USAF assets within easy range of PLA ballistic missiles may be too tempting a target to pass up. If Chinese decisionmakers feel the situation is deteriorating anyway, preemptive action may be their best option to achieving their goals. In this way, U.S. misunderstanding of PLA capabilities would be disastrous to crisis stability. This prospect should motivate U.S. policymakers to either take steps to address weaknesses, or change foreign policy to accomplish the feasible.
Global Ethics Network, 2015 [Carnegie Council group focused on international relations publications, “The Future of Taipei- Washington Relations: The Wire Dancer and the Wire”, April 29, http://www.globalethicsnetwork.org/profiles/blogs/the-future-of-taipei-washington-relations-the-wire-dancer-and-the] However, we have to note that profound economic and political changes have taken place both in China and Taiwan and probably in the nature of the relationship between them, so the cross strait relations is no longer a zero-sum game and there are many elements involved and now both countries seek to cooperate economically. US, China and Taiwan relation forms a strategic triangle. US announced “pivot to Asia” or “rebalancing” while China put forward “a new model for relations between great powers”. Taiwan has always been a loyal ally, welcomed and affirmed US’s Asia-Pacific strategic because we all know US- Taiwan relation has been Taiwan’s lifeline. Nowadays Taiwan has been a wire dancer. The US is the wire, once it falls off the wire, it may lose its life. Taiwan is looking to strike a balance between them while at the same time seeks to get its own voice. The interaction between the two superpowers shows that they are both try to keep order; China hopes to keep domestic order while the US wants to maintain international order. In the foreseeable future, America will remain the number one superpower, China’s priority will be continue to create a favorable environment for its economic development and to focus on keeping domestic order, Taiwan, on the other hand, is searching for international space, which means the right to survive legally and the right to participate in global affairs
White, 2015 [Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra, “Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?”, May 5, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808] These are the questions America's leaders would have to confront in considering military action to defend Taiwan, and their answer would very likely be that the status of Taiwan is not worth risking nuclear war or economic collapse over. And that means American leaders and policy analysts must confront these questions now, as they decide whether to maintain the old commitments to defend Taiwan. The promises that America was willing and able to keep in 1979 might not be ones it is willing or able to keep now. What about America's allies and friends in Asia? Wouldn't they help America defend Taiwan, if only because they are so worried themselves about China? Many Americans seem to assume they would. But even Australia, America's most reliable ally in Asia, is uncertain about this. And if Australia is uncertain, it is pure wishful thinking to expect the likes of India, Singapore, Vietnam or even the Philippines to offer anything more than mild diplomatic support to America over Taiwan. The exception is Japan, which under Shinzo Abe might be expected to join the fight, especially after last week's visit to Washington. But does Mr. Abe really speak for Japan? Will future Japanese leaders take the same view? And even if they did, how exactly would that help America? How would Japan's support change the answers to the hard questions posed above, and increase the chances that America would indeed come to Taiwan's aid? So no one should lightly assert that America or its allies would help defend Taiwan from China. But should they? This is a big subject. Suffice to say here that the question is not answered simply by using the word “appeasement” to invoke the memory of Munich. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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