Even if Iran gets nukes, US anti-prolif credibility would hold; Saudi prolif would kill this and result in rapid global spillover
Russell 2005 (Richard l, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East: Strategic Contest p. 118 google books.)
The easing of a Saudi nuclear weapons program’s opacity could occur gradually over time – after it is firmly established and protected from potential preventive or preemptive strikes – behind the scenes in diplomatic exchanges and in subtle public references. The Saudis would want to plant in the minds of potential rivals the suggestion that Riyadh is not to be diplomatically and militarily intimidated or coerced. Recent leaks to the media of unconfirmed reports of Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation, in fact, work toward this end. A Saudi nuclear deterrent could more blatantly be revealed in the midst of a future Gulf military crisis, perhaps one involving military posturing by Iran against the Gulf states. Eithier way, public awareness of a Saudi nuclear deterrent will put the West, and particularly the United States, in an awkward position. The United States would lose some prestige in light of a security partner choosing a policy course in direct opposition to the American policy to contain and stem the international proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Washington in the aftermath of revelations of a Saudi nuclear deterrent would be under strong domestic and international pressure to take measures to show its displeasure with Riyadh. The United States, however, must avoid steps that would completely rupture American-Saudi security ties: both Washington and Riyadh share the grand strategic interest of seeing that no one power ever grows to dominate the Gulf. The United States needs to recognize that Saudi Arabia will continue to be a major player in the regional competition for power in the greater Middle East region. More broadly, the recognition of a Saudi nuclear deterrent would be a major blow against international proliferation regimes. The global community would be forced to see that despite the best of intentions and efforts, the “nuclear genie” will not be put back into its bottle The West and the United States will have to face the fact that weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles will be an ever-present reality of the post-11 September world. Despite the arguments from some quarters that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will enhance international security by bolstering deterrence and lessening the chances for inter-state war, prudent statecraft would assume that deterrence in practice is unlikely to be as effective as envisioned in theory.
We control the internal link to prolif; Key players won’t seek nukes unless they lose trust the US Alliance
McInnis 2005 (Kathleen j. researcher @ csis “extended deterrence: the us credibility gap in the middle east” Washington quarterly 28:3 acc proj muse)
U.S. relationships in the Middle East, however, have a strikingly different character, more akin to hesitant engagement than to Washington's well-established partnerships in Asia. A rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism, coupled with growing anti-U.S. sentiment, has strained these tenuous relations. As then-Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton recently stated, "Iranian nuclear capabilities would change the perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the [United States] in terms of deterrence and defense."3 One such challenge is the prospect of multiple nuclear powers emerging in an already volatile Middle East. The outcome of this scenario depends in part on the capacity and credibility of U.S. strategic capabilities, including the nuclear deterrent. Ultimately, if key "nuclear dominos" in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, decide that U.S. security guarantees are insufficient, they may be tempted to acquire their own nuclear weapons. A U.S. extended deterrent policy in the Middle East would lack credibility, not due to a lack of physical capability or presence in the region, but rather as a result of the fragility of U.S. relations with its allies in the region, creating a uniquely dangerous situation.
Iran Prolif Good
Turn - Iran Prolif is key to middle east stability
Weinberger 2009, Professor of International Relations and Political Philosophy at the University of Puget Sound (Seth, October 2, “Why does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?”, http://securitydilemmas.blogspot.com/2009/10/why-does-iran-want-nuclear-weapons.html)
The good news, however, is that Iran proliferating may not be such a problem. If Iran's main motivation is defense, proliferating may in fact stabilize the regional situation, as a state not fearful for its continued existence can be a more rational and well-behaved state. Indeed as Thomas P. M. Barnett notes: if history is any guide, both the United States and Israel are looking at the first real chance for a durable regional security architecture to emerge (now that you should expect a nuclear Saudi Arabia and Turkey to show up at the negotiating table, too). Yes, the hotheads on all sides seem desperate to freak out over this prospect, but, again, read your history: With the exceptions of our allies in Britain and France, the U.S. has looked down upon every rising power to ever get the bomb as constituting a loose canon capable of all manner of nefarious acts and strategic stupidity. And yet we're the only one that's ever pulled the trigger. Of course, a nuclear Iran may be a more dangerous Iran, especially if you're skeptical about the ability of the US to develop an effective deterrent relationship with a regional power like Iran (as I am). However, if Iran can't be stopped and if Iran's primary motivation is defense, the deterrence question lessens, especially as Israel will likely be able to create regional deterrence.
Turn - Israel
A. Iranian nuclearization doesn’t cause war and prevents Israeli strikes
Morrison 2009 (David Morrison. political officer for the Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign. “The elephant in the room: Israel's nuclear weapons” The Electronic Intifada, 29 June 2009. http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article10621.shtml)
Rulers of Iran don't want their cities devastated and they know that if Iran were to make a nuclear strike on Israel, it is absolutely certain that Israel would retaliate by making multiple nuclear strikes on Iran and raze many Iranian cities to the ground -- so Iran won't do it. Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal, and the ruthlessness to use it, that is more than adequate to deter Iran from making a nuclear strike on the country. Likewise, it is unimaginable that Iran would attack the US, or US interests abroad, for fear of overwhelming retaliation. However, taking account of the elephant in the room puts a very different perspective on the impact of a nuclear-armed Iran. The significance of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is not that Iran would become a threat to Israel and the US, but that Israel and the US would no longer contemplate attacking Iran. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons of self-defense -- a state that possesses nuclear weapons doesn't get attacked by other states. One thing is certain: attacking Iran, ostensibly to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, would make the case for it acquiring them like nothing else. It would then be abundantly clear that Iran could not protect itself by other means -- and it can be guaranteed that it would then make a supreme effort to acquire them.
B. The impact is global war.
Ivashov 2007 (General Leonid Ivashov vice-president of the Academy on geopolitical affairs. He was the chief of the department for General affairs in the Soviet Union’s ministry of Defense, secretary of the Council of defense ministers of the Community of independant states (CIS), chief of the Military cooperation department at the Russian federation’s Ministry of defense and Joint chief of staff of the Russian armies. “Iran: the Threat of a Nuclear War” Global Research April 9, 2007. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5309)
What might cause the force major event of the required scale? Everything seems to indicate that Israel will be sacrificed. Its involvement in a war with Iran - especially in a nuclear war - is bound to trigger a global catastrophe. The statehoods of Israel and Iran are based on the countries' official religions. A military conflict between Israel and Iran will immediately evolve into a religious one, a conflict between Judaism and Islam. Due to the presence of numerous Jewish and Muslim populations in the developed countries, this would make a global bloodbath inevitable. All of the active forces of most of the countries of the world would end up fighting, with almost no room for neutrality left. Judging by the increasingly massive acquisitions of the residential housing for the Israeli citizens, especially in Russia and Ukraine, a lot of people already have an idea of what the future holds. However, it is hard to imagine a quiet heaven where one might hide from the coming doom. Forecasts of the territorial distribution of the fighting, the quantities and the efficiency of the armaments involved, the profound character of the underlying roots of the conflict and the severity of the religious strife all leave no doubt that this clash will be in all respects much more nightmarish than WWII.
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