Saudi Disad

1NC Saudi DA

Webster Griffin Tarpley: Well, I think we have to start from the premise that the Saudi royal family is very afraid and they've been afraid of course for decades, but more recently they're very afraid because they've seen the Mubarak government brought down by a US-sponsored colored revolution run by Samantha Powell and Michael McDowell here from the National Security Council in the White House and they're horrified by that. So you could say that Saudi Arabia is in play and that's the big strategic factor at the present time. At the beginning of June we had a very interesting op-ed here in the Washington Post by Prince Turki al-Faisal saying that if the US blocks the creation of a Palestinian state at the UN General Assembly in September there would be disastrous consequences for US Saudi relations. And I take it that you look at Prince Bandar -- his trip to Pakistan and China -- Saudi Arabia is trying to find security solutions, which do not involve the US because they can see that the US is fomenting the troubles in Yemen; that the US has fomented the troubles in Bahrain -- both of those are means to destabilize the kingdom.

James Russell from the Naval Postgraduate School presented an argument that the strategic problems facing Saudi Arabia are causing it to consider acquisition of nuclear capabilities in the context of upgrading and/or replacing its CSS-2 missiles bought from China in the late 1980s. Russell outlined a set of changing strategic circumstances, which are combining to bring the issue of nuclear and/or WMD proliferation into play in Riyadh. First, the U.S. relationship upon which Saudi Arabia’s security has been founded is in an uncertain state. Second, the region environment is becoming more threatening due to Iran’s nuclear aspirations and the prospect of a Shi’a-dominated state in Iraq. Third, internal politics in Saudi Arabia complicate and reduce the maneuver room available to the royal family in addressing its security conundrums. A decision by Saudi Arabia to go nuclear would cause a cascade of regional proliferation. Potential internal instability within the Kingdom also makes Saudi Arabia a particularly dangerous proliferation case. Rumors of Saudi involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear program, in addition to the existing relationship with China through the CSS-2 program are all suggestive of an interest in nuclear capabilities. Finally, U.S. policy options appear limited—the United Stated cannot push Saudi Arabia too far away or hold it too close. Discussions of the issue raised the question, “Are Saudi nuclear noises used as a means to ensure U.S. engagement?

Arms control and non-proliferation regimes have often been criticized for delaying but not preventing proliferation. However, delay may be worth while, as rapid proliferation in principle creates the most dangerous situations. Kenneth Waltz argued, in his famous and controversial |981 article, that more nuclear proliferation might be a better option than less, because the possession of nuclear weapons tends to make the politicians in charge more responsible and reduce the risk of war.” Yet Waltz also argued that rapid proliferation is extremely dangerous, as it encourages pre-emptive strikes in order to prevent the proliferation as well as leaving the nuclear newcomers without the necessary security measures. By 2004, the basic Waltzian argument on the positive effects of proliferation still holds for major powers. However, we have had negative experiences in the Middle East with respect to the use of non-nuclear WMD, and terrorists have appeared on the international stage. Terrorists are actors different from states and governments, and except for nationalist terrorist groups, they do not have territories to defend. They are thus comparatively free to act in the era of proliferation, and a broad range of counter-proliferation measures are therefore to be preferred in addition to the cost-enhancing MD project.