Saudi Disad


Link - Shiites in Bahrain



Download 196.65 Kb.
Page6/17
Date18.10.2016
Size196.65 Kb.
#2942
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   17

Link - Shiites in Bahrain



Supporting the Shia rebellion in Bahrain would collapse US-Saudi relations

Bhalla, July 2011 (Reva, journalist for STRATFOR; Geopolitical Weekly: "The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics", http://www.rightsidenews.com/2011071914093/world/geopolitics/the-us-saudi-dilemma-irans-reshaping-of-persian-gulf-politics.html; SRM)
Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia is greatly unnerved by the political evolution in Iraq. The Saudis increasingly will rely on regional powers such as Turkey in trying to maintain a Sunni bulwark against Iran in Iraq, but Riyadh has largely resigned itself to the idea that Iraq, for now, is in Tehran’s hands. This is an uncomfortable reality for the Saudi royals to cope with, but what is amplifying Saudi Arabia’s concerns in the region right now — and apparently nudging Riyadh toward the negotiating table with Tehran — is the current situation in Bahrain. When Shiite-led protests erupted in Bahrain in the spring, we did not view the demonstrations simply as a natural outgrowth of the so-called Arab Spring. There were certainly overlapping factors, but there was little hiding the fact that Iran had seized an opportunity to pose a nightmare scenario for the Saudi royals: an Iranian-backed Shiite uprising spreading from the isles of Bahrain to the Shiite-concentrated, oil-rich Eastern Province of the Saudi kingdom. This explains Saudi Arabia’s hasty response to the Bahraini unrest, during which it led a rare military intervention of GCC forces in Bahrain at the invitation of Manama to stymie a broader Iranian destabilization campaign. The demonstrations in Bahrain are far calmer now than they were in mid-March at the peak of the crisis, but the concerns of the GCC states have not subsided, and for good reason. Halfhearted attempts at national dialogues aside, Shiite dissent in this part of the region is likely to endure, and this is a reality that Iran can exploit in the long term through its developing covert capabilities.

Link - Appeasing Iran


US-Iran deal collapses relations with Saudis

Bhalla, July 2011 (Reva, journalist for STRATFOR; Geopolitical Weekly: "The U.S.-Saudi Dilemma: Iran's Reshaping of Persian Gulf Politics", http://www.rightsidenews.com/2011071914093/world/geopolitics/the-us-saudi-dilemma-irans-reshaping-of-persian-gulf-politics.html; SRM)

The Saudis cannot fully trust U.S. intentions at this point. The U.S. position in Iraq is tenuous at best, and Riyadh cannot rule out the possibility of Washington entering its own accommodation with Iran and thus leaving Saudi Arabia in the lurch. The United States has three basic interests: to maintain the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, to reduce drastically the number of forces it has devoted to fighting wars with Sunni Islamist militants (who are also by definition at war with Iran), and to try to reconstruct a balance of power in the region that ultimately prevents any one state — whether Arab or Persian — from controlling all the oil in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. position in this regard is flexible, and while developing an understanding with Iran is a trying process, nothing fundamentally binds the United States to Saudi Arabia. If the United States comes to the conclusion that it does not have any good options in the near term for dealing with Iran, a U.S.-Iranian accommodation — however jarring on the surface — is not out of the question.


Link – Egypt


Saudis are fighting against the Muslim Brotherhood

LA Times, 2011 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM)

In Egypt, while U.S. officials urge reform, Riyadh has given Cairo $4 billion to maintain the status quo and to counter the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, a powerful Islamist organization. The Saudis fear the group could challenge the religious doctrine that provides legitimacy to the Saudi monarchy.

A/T: Relations Resilient – Oil



Oil won't sustain relations - Saudi shift to Asia

Bloomberg 2011 (July 17, "Arab Spring Pits Saudi Security Against U.S. Support for Change" http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/arab-spring-pits-saudi-security-concern-against-u-s-support-for-uprisings.html; SRM)

Saudi Arabia’s independence from U.S. foreign policy “is not just from the Arab Spring, but also from the fact that oil demand has shifted from the U.S. to China more and more each year,” said Sullivan at Georgetown University. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC)’s Chief Executive Officer Mohamed al-Mady said in May that the world’s largest petrochemical maker, plans further expansions in China. King Abdullah, 86, picked China as the first destination on his maiden foreign tour in January 2006, months after becoming king.
The drive for Saudi dominance trumps relations concerns

LA Times, 2011 (June 19, "U.S., Saudis in Mideast tug of war; Quest for greater influence intensifies as uprisings in the region further drive a wedge between the longtime allies." LEXIS, SRM)

The United States and Saudi Arabia are drifting apart on energy too. For decades both countries saw mutual benefit in holding down oil prices. But now, with Riyadh stepping up foreign aid and embarking on a $130-billion domestic subsidy program to prevent internal unrest, it needs steeper oil prices. "In the old days, you could call them and ask them to do something about high oil prices," said Herman Franssen, former chief economist at the International Energy Agency, a 28-nation organization that seeks to ensure stable energy supplies. "They are not going to be dictated to by the United States anymore." This month, the Saudis announced that they would break from OPEC's consensus by increasing their oil output. Their motive was not, however, Obama's repeated public calls for price relief, but their own need for revenue, experts say. U.S. officials are clear that they intend to tread lightly because of their appreciation that upheaval in the world's largest oil exporter could upend a fragile world economy. Yet diplomatic delicacy will accomplish only so much to repair the relationship, and analysts expect to see the Saudis strike out again on their own.
Interference in the Arab spring crushes US-Saudi relations, overwhelms oil ties

Bloomberg 2011 (July 17, "Arab Spring Pits Saudi Security Against U.S. Support for Change" http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/arab-spring-pits-saudi-security-concern-against-u-s-support-for-uprisings.html; SRM)

A day before Mubarak ceded power to the military, Saudi Arabia denounced the “flagrant interference of some countries” in the internal affairs of Egypt, the Saudi Press Agency said, citing Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal. Since then, the officials in Riyadh have said little publicly about Egypt or Syria, where the government this month said the U.S. was trying to incite rebellion against President Bashar al-Assad. Clinton said on July 11 that Assad had lost his legitimacy to rule amid a crackdown on dissenters. The changing relationship with the U.S. is also a reflection of how Saudi Arabia has increasingly turned toward Asia to tap new oil markets and for business expansion. About 65 percent of the kingdom’s 2009 daily exports of 6.27 million barrels went to Asia and the Pacific, while North America received 17 percent, OPEC said in its 2009 statistical bulletin. In 2008, Asia received 58 percent of Saudi exports, while North America got 22 percent.




Download 196.65 Kb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   17




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page