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GGIS (2010) 1 Strasbourg, 16 April 2010 Workshop on the certification of e-voting systems 26 -27 November 2009 Council of Europe, Palais de l’Europe Strasbourg REPORT OF THE MEETING AND CONCLUSIONS prepared by Jordi Barrat Esteve, University of Alicante Rapporteur of the Workshop 0 – METHODOLOGY The paper intends to provide an overview of the presentations and subsequent debates of the first workshop on e-voting certification. Its structure will be the same as that of the initial discussion paper so that the following statements may be framed within the broader scenario depicted in the first document. Thus, both papers should be analysed together. Appendix 1 and 2 present the Workshop programme and the list of participants respectively. I – WHAT DOES “CERTIFICATION” MEAN? Establishing a shared definition of certification arose as a common concern for the meeting participants. In addition to the remarks on this made in the discussion paper, other features should be taken into account. For instance, to certify is not to evaluate nor to inspect or to confirm. These three terms refer to three different procedures. According to the Swiss delegation, an evaluation may be provided by any body with sufficient access to the technical details whilst a certification can only be bestowed by an institution which has been given prior authority to do so. Furthermore, confirmation and/or inspection bodies are not exactly the same as a certification one. The Austrian A-SIT, for instance, took part in the implementation of e-voting mechanisms although it only has the status of a confirmation body (in accordance with European legislation on e-signatures) and of an inspection body (ISO 17020). Moreover, there are other terms with meanings that are more or less close to certification, these include accreditation, validation, observation, assessment, audit and homologation. II – WHY IS “CERTIFICATION” SO IMPORTANT FOR E-VOTING DEVICES? The Estonian delegation stressed the importance of determining the aim of a certification process. Indeed, the precise methods should only be set up in a second stage, after having agreed on the aim of the process. In their opinion, certification should guarantee secure and reliable devices that enable fair elections. III – WHO SHOULD CONDUCT THIS TASK? The chairman of the meeting suggested the accreditation of the certification, i.e. the procedure used to select a given auditor, may be as essential as the certification. National legislation may directly entitle a given body to undertake a certification; this is the case in Austria. Otherwise, the decision as to who should be commissioned for certification will be taken by the vendors themselves, normally among a limited number of testing authorities previously authorised to do so, or by the electoral administration. This latter solution, used for instance in California, may avoid some conflicts of interests. Likewise, the question of who is actually paying for the certification process also generates debate. Those countries who decide to develop the software by public means will probably use specific certification procedures because, although citizens will also need some evidence of the security of the voting devices, private vendors, that is to say, profit organisations, would not be involved and thus the conflict of interests might be solved in a different way. The workshop also analysed the involvement of relevant NGOs, for example in Estonia, or other special bodies such as the Belgian Collège des Experts. The Belgian delegation underlined that its members are appointed by the Belgian parliamentary assemblies and that federal and sub-federal Collèges have almost the same composition. Created to enhance the confidence in e-voting system, the Belgian delegation considers that their task is quite satisfactory so far. Geneva also has a specific committee to analyse the e-enabled electoral processes, in this case composed of both politicians and experts. It has access to some documentation in conjunction with an independent expert. Austria is also involving different players (e.g. INSO / TU Vienna, Federal Computing Centre), but not the public in general and they are granting only partial access to some documents such as the source code and the certification report. Obviously, the best solution would be to assign these tasks to all those who have an interest in the issue although, as stressed by the Norwegian delegation, few people have the skills and knowledge necessary to carry out certification. Such an approach does not replace a real certification, but it might achieve the democratic goal of generating enough confidence in e-voting among citizens. However the easiest way to involve so many people would be to use open Taking into account the pan-European mission of the Council of Europe (CoE), this institution could assume, according to Mr. Boltz, a new role that would go beyond the approval of guidelines. The United States of America, for instance, has a federal voluntary certification scheme which aims to improve the implementation of e-voting systems. It is managed by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Here, three points should be emphasised: it is a federal initiative, the EAC's involvement is not compulsory for counties and it is a real certification process. That is to say, beyond the operational guidelines approved by the EAC, it also assumes the certification task itself. Thus, it is not a mere theoretical player. Such a strategy could be useful in Europe with a common pan-European certification scheme able to facilitate the vendors’ tasks. Its voluntary basis should also soften some criticisms. This position was noted, but a number of delegations expressed the view that any such arrangement should only be considered at a later stage, i.e. after a possible mandate by the Committee of Ministers for the preparation of guidelines on the certification of e-voting devices and the eventual approval of such guidelines by it. According to the OSCE/ODIHR delegation, certification should not only rely upon the specific electoral culture of each country. Despite the existence of different electoral rules - as underlined by the Belgian delegation - each country should meet minimum international standards. These standards could be identified in a set of guidelines on e-voting certification by the Council of Europe. Other delegations called for the setting-up of e-platforms that would allow fast and continuous exchanges of best practice. In this context, the delegation of the Russian Federation suggested the creation of an Ad-Hoc Committee, which could provide a suitable forum to analyse all such proposals. IV – WHICH ITEMS SHOULD BE ANALYSED? Although a detailed list of requirements might seem at first glance to be a good option towards guaranteeing a correct certification analysis, a tight legal framework might generate paradoxical effects. While the auditors would be subject to more supervision, the vendors might customise their products with the limited goal to only fulfil the requirements of a given electoral administration. The vendors would not look for a real improvement of the product and the electoral administration would have to accept it because they would be bound to their own legal rules. Looking beyond some already known principles on certification, for example the relevant Constitution, the Code of Electoral Good Practices of the Venice Commission and the CoE’s Recommendation on e-voting, it is also important to decide which protocols should be used. At least six different examples were mentioned during the workshop: ISO 9001, ISO 9000-3, IT Grundschutz (regarding operational environment protection and including ISO 27001), k-resilience value for inside threats, CMS and Common Criteria (ISO 15408). ISO 9001 was included in the first theoretical reports in Geneva, but it was finally decided to use ISO 27001 as it is more focused on security rather than quality. ISO 27001 is also used in Norway, where vendors are required to comply with it. At the same time, however, Norway recognises that the scope of this protocol is too narrow because it only addresses procedural and organisational issues, but not the core system, that is to say, the software and similar components. It is for this reason that Norway requires its vendors to comply not only with ISO 27001, but their software also has to meet Common Criteria methodologies. Thus each protocol has its own particular purpose. Common Criteria (CC) arose during the workshop as a suitable methodology for e-voting devices because it provides an analytical framework for security critical software. CC's rules are even used with a non formal profile when, for example, A-SIT undertakes a CC-based risk analysis of the Council of Europe Recommendation on e-voting. CC’s methodology is based on a dialogue between users and vendors with the latter producing detailed requirements adapted to given devices such as i-voting ones. In this case, as recalled by the Swiss delegation, the importance of legal electoral principles should be taken into account and an assessment made of the best way to translate this legislation into the technical language required by CC. The KORA (Konkretisierung rechtlicher Anforderungen or “concretisation of legal requirements”) approach, underlined by Ms. Volkamer, intends to improve and ease such communication between legal and technical points of view. However, some legal concepts are extremely difficult to translate into technical specifications. As mentioned by the Norwegian delegation, should we consider as a breach of secrecy a vote disclosed during 10 milliseconds? Moreover, according to the Estonian delegation, the translation would have to be in both directions as some technical issues, such as how to confront massive attacks, will probably need specific legal measures. Any acceptable method should also guarantee a comprehensive and proactive analysis, but many of the proposals considered only have partial scopes. For instance, the CC’s approach presented at the workshop focused on Internet voting and security issues, but excluded other e-voting platforms and other risks. Thus supplementary protocols are needed, e.g. IT Grundschutz for operational environment and k-resilience value for insider threats. It is also not uncommon to find so-called certification procedures that are only checking procedural issues. They verify that the relevant stakeholders are correctly following a protocol, but they are not assessing the quality of this protocol as such. Regarding software, a similar situation arises since many so-called certifications only verify that the application performs what the vendor says it should perform. It is therefore merely a passive inspection. Good certification would need adversarial supervision whereby, in addition to the indications of the vendors, the auditors would decide which items would be analysed. In California, for instance, a proactive Top-to-Bottom Review (TTBR) discovered several flaws in e-voting devices previously certified and this led to their immediate decertification. Regarding the scope of the certification, the Estonian delegation recalled that it should encompass all the components, that is to say, software, hardware and also people. Given that the client software used during Internet voting often remains outside the certification boundaries, the Estonian delegation suggested that voter awareness-raising, education campaigns and the subsequent civic engagement seem the only feasible measures. A-SIT also admitted that these residual risks could not be directly addressed, but its speaker referred to a 2008 regulation in Austria that requires the certification, or rather confirmation, of the client and voting server software 60 days before the election. Other participants, for example the representative of Belgian Brussels Capital Region, underlined that some countries use different electronic means to vote, to tally and even to distribute the parliamentary seats. Thus the certification scheme should include all these steps. The post-certification phase is also important as regards the appropriate re-certification sequence. In the USA, for instance, the Quality-Monitoring Program foresees a permanent supervision of the implementation of certified devices. Finally, socio-political certification was also seen as an important complement to the current meaning of certification. The meeting agreed that, in addition to computer-based analyses, other parameters should also be assessed. For example, the suitability of the legal framework for the application of e-voting should be checked within a certification procedure and a similar approach should be applied on socio-political issues, although, as recalled by the Belgian delegation, those countries with compulsory voting would, by definition, not be able to detect major changes. Once a reliable technical system is in place within a sound legal framework, the socio-political factors could condition citizen confidence and become a main challenge. Thus complete and nuanced knowledge of the expectations of society and of political actors is needed. To take the e-enabled election of the Austrian Students Union as an example, according to A-SIT, the Austrian debate was much more about fundamental principles than about technical issues. Some research which intends to standardise socio-political certification procedures (e.g. e-voting readiness indexes and several surveys) is already underway. Nevertheless, the experts from Geneva felt it was important to realise that, regardless of which methods are used, only a reasonable assurance of the system’s reliability can be achieved. We might be able to generate much evidence, but there is no possibility of a definitive bullet-proof system. According to the Belgian delegation, paper based elections cannot provide 100% security either. V – HOW SHOULD THE DATA BE TREATED? This section principally addresses analysis of the treatment of the final outcome. However, it is useful to also examine the previous stage, that is to say, how the technical data are delivered to the auditors. It is this parameter that will allow us to assess the actual trustworthiness of the above-mentioned measures. The Polish delegation recalled that some procedures of certification foresee a minimum timeframe or only allow the supervisors of an e-enabled election to read the source code. Therefore, a sound certification should guarantee some given details regarding the amount of data delivered to the auditors and the way to handle this sensitive material. An analysis of the Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) signed by the stakeholders could be a good way to check these issues. The rules regarding the disclosure of the final report become essential so that the overall procedure can achieve its two goals, that is to say, the technical one, guaranteeing secure and reliable devices, but also the democratic one, that is to say, citizens’ confidence. Although full transparency can always be envisaged, it is also true that e-voting has to face very different scenarios and therefore the appropriate answer may be significantly different. For instance, in Belgium, many people believe that the most sceptical stakeholders are the politicians (rather than the citizens) and therefore the strategy to generate enough confidence amongst this group should be nuanced and might not only depend on the degree of openness. The Belgian delegation also stressed the role of the public institutions. Given that full disclosure of the certification report could endanger some legitimate interests (e.g. the software used by the auditing company), the intervention of the electoral administrations could be sufficient, at least in some countries, to build up a trustworthy scenario. Within a genuine democratic system, there would be no justification for strong scepticism of relevant institutions that are actually working to support the overall democratic system. On this point, the Rapporteur recalled that this reasoning does not fulfil one of the main goals of constitutionalism, that is, to build up a political scheme based on a permanent and healthy distrust of the political power. Furthermore, the Estonian experience strengthens this point of view since its e-voting initiative was not lead by the Ministry of Interior, which was not trusted by the population, but by the Central Electoral Commission. Mr. Boltz recalled that the absence of in-house IT expertise was a major problem for counties in the USA and this undermined their capacity to generate greater citizen confidence. Any publication on the issue of e-voting certification would need to take account of extremely varied situations. In Belgium, for instance, any citizen can download the source code after the elections. In Estonia, although the audit reports are theoretically available, they are only disclosed upon specific request. In California, the names and CVs of the auditors are published so that they do their utmost to protect their academic reputation. VI - CONCLUSIONS 1. The workshop examined definitions of certification and confirmed that there are a variety of terms with meanings that are more or less close to this including accreditation, validation, observation, assessment, audit or homologation. The relationship between these concepts needs to be clarified. 2. When considering certification of e-voting, the first step is to clarify the aim of the certification process which should include ensuring that the software and procedures used in (non-remote as well as remote) e-enabled elections are secure and robust. The entire electoral process should be covered. 3. Ideally, the entire e-voting system should be built with a certification perspective from the outset. The objective would be complete openness to third party review, or at least to have non-disclosure agreements (NDA) to which all stakeholders can agree. Furthermore, the state must assume the ultimate responsibility for the functioning of e-voting systems and is thus the principal regulator. 4. In addition to technical certification, the importance of socio-political certification should be addressed to be able to take into account citizens’ expectations and the effects of new voting channels on electoral behaviour. 5. It is of crucial importance that the legal and democratic principles of elections (including those listed in Rec (2004) 11 on e-voting and other internationally agreed texts), and taking due account of variations between countries, are transformed into technical requirements as used by CC and comparable procedures. Moreover, ways need to be devised for measuring the fulfilment of such requirements. 6. The delegation of the Russian Federation suggested that the Committee of Ministers should be asked to set up an Ad-Hoc Committee on the subject of e-voting. In the shorter term, other delegations called for the setting-up of an e-platform by the Council of Europe that would allow fast and continuous exchanges of best practice. 7. The work on certification of e-voting systems should be placed in the light of the Utrecht declaration (MCL-16(2009)12 Final) in which the right of citizens to participate in affairs of local authorities was established. 8. The workshop concluded that it could be very useful to take stock of existing approaches to the certification of e-voting systems and, on this basis, to prepare a set of guidelines on the subject. 9. There was broad agreement that the reporting on this meeting should form the basis on which the way forward may be discussed, possibly at another workshop to be held in 2010. . Appendix 1: Programme of the Workshop on the certification of e-voting systems Thursday 26 November 2.00 pm Opening of the meeting Introduction of participants Introduction by the Secretariat Certification of e-voting systems. discussion paper Mr. Jordi Barrat, Spain, Rapporteur of the Workshop
Mr. Patrick Trouveroy Expert informatician to the Local Authorities Administration Ministry of the Brussels Capital Region, Belgium Auditing of the Internet voting system: Estonian case Ms. Ülle Madise Member of the National Electoral Committee of Estonia
Mr. Michel Marti State of Geneva, Switzerland
Mr. Daniel Konrad IT-Security Expert, A-SIT Secure Information Technology Center Austria
9:00 am Evaluation & Certification of (Internet) Voting Systems regarding Security Requirements Ms Melanie Volkamer University of Darmstadt Germany E-vote system certification in the USA Mr. Ingo Boltz Technical Consultant for Electronic Voting Systems and Biometric Voter Registration in Latin America
Conclusions and how to proceed 1:00 pm End of the meeting Appendix 2: List of participants REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMBER STATES/ REPRESENTANTS DES ETATS MEMBRES ARMENIA/ ARMENIE Mr Atom Mkhitaryan Sebastia St. 12 - 33 AM - Yerevan 0065 Tel : +374 91200798 Fax : +374 10581891 / +374 10528676 E-mail : mkhitaryan@yahoo.com BELGIUM/ BELGIQUE M. Paul-Henri Philips Adjoint au Directeur Général de l'Administration des Pouvoirs Locaux du Ministère de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, City Center Offices 20, boulevard du Jardin Botanique B - 1000 Bruxelles Tél. : 0032 (0)2.80032.77 Fax : 0032 (0)2.800.38.00 E-mail : phphilips@mrbc.irisnet.be Cell phone: 0032(0) 949 588 105
Department of Mathematics Vice Dean of the Faculty of Transport Engineering University of Architecture Civil Engineering and Geodesy (UACEG) BG - 1046 Sofia Tel : +359-2-9635245, Ext. 250 Fax : +359-2-9403527 E-mail : mmk_fte@uacg.bg or misho.konstantinov@gmail.com CZECH REPUBLIC/ REPUBLIQUE TCHEQUE Ms Petra UHLIROVA Ministry of the Interior General Administration Department Elections and Associations Unit Czech Republic Section Elections e-mail: uhlirova.p@mvcr.cz
Chief Election Officer Ministry of Social Welfare Holmens Kanal 22 DK - 1060 Copenhagen K Tel. +45 33 92 90 00 Direct: +45 33 92 92 66 Mobile: +45 25 16 12 06 E-mail: nnm@hism.dk
Member of the Estonian National Electoral Committee Lossi pl 1a EE - 15165 Tallinn Tel : +372 6900 726 Fax : +372 6316541 E-mail: ylle.madise@vpk.ee
Ministry of Justice / ICT Service Centre PO BOX 620
E-mail: marita.kolehmainen@om.fi FRANCE/FRANCE M. Mathieu DUHAMEL Bureau des Elections et Etudes politiques Direction de la Modernisation et de l'Action territoriale du Ministère de l'Intérieur E-mail: Mathieu.DUHAMEL@interieur.gouv.fr GEORGIA/GEORGIE Mr. Levan TARKHNISHVILI Chairman of the Central Election Commission of Georgia #1 Alexidze str. Tbilisi
E-mail: levan@cec.gov.ge GREECE/ GRECE Mr Angelos KOULOS Directorate of Informatics and Electronic Data Processing Department of IT Development and Support Section Tel: +30 213 13 61 196 E-mail: akoulos@ypes.gr LITHUANIA/ LITUANIE Mr. Algirdas RADUSYS Central Election Commission 53 Gedimino pr. 01109 Vilnius Lithuania Tel: +370 616 19183 E-mail: alradu@vrk.lt MALTA/ MALTE Mr Edward GATT A.C.I.S. Chief Electoral Commissioner Electoral Office Evans Building St Elmo Place Valletta M - VLT 2000 Tel: +356 2123 6380 E-mail: edward.r.gatt@gov.mt MOLDOVA/ MOLDOVA Ms Renata LAPTI Deputy Chair of the Central Electoral Commission Tel: + 373 22 251455 Mobile: +373 68361313 e-mail: renata.lapti@cec.md
Ms Dorothea LAURENT Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Postbus 10451 NL - 2501 HL Den Haag The Netherlands Tel : +31 70 361 3110 E-mail: chantallaurent@bprbzk.nl NORWAY/ NORVEGE Mr Christian BULL Assistant - project manger e-vote 2011 The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development Postbox 8112 Dep. N - 0032 Oslo Tel: +47 22246876 Mobile: +47 997 00 090 E-mail: christian.bull@krd.dep.no POLAND/ POLOGNE Mr Miroslaw KUTYLOWSKI Advisor
Ministry of Interior Wroclaw University of Technology Tel: +48 3202109 Fax: +48 3202105 E-mail: miroslaw.kutylowski@pwr.wroc.pl
Member
Central Election Commission of Russia 9 B. Cherkassky per. Moscow 109012
Head of section International Department CEC of Russia 9 B. Cherkassky per. Moscow 109012
Head of Federal Center of Information Technologies under the CEC of Russia Mr Maksim PONOMARENKO Head of section Center of Information Technologies under the CEC of Russia Mr Ilya SUBBOTIN First Secretary Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe il77@yahoo.com Mr Konstantin PETRENKO Interpreter SERBIA/ SERBIE Mr Igor TODOROSKI Coordinator of e-Government Development Mınıstry of Public Administration and Local self-government Bircaninova 6 11000 Belgrade Serbia
Tel: +381648135038 Fax: +381112686808 İgor.todoroski@mduls.gov.rs
Chef du Service de la Coopération Electorale/ Head of Electoral Cooperation Unit Sous-direction Générale de Politique Intérieure et des Processus électoraux Ministère de l'Intérieur. Tel : +34 915371310 Fax : +34 915371463 E-mail: aclopez@mir.es et pielecciones@mir.es
Université de Valladolid Centre des Etudes Politiques et Constitutionnelles Professeur de Droit Constitutionnel E-mail: javier@der.uva.es
Conseiller en Technologies de l’Information et des Communications/ ICT Adviser Ministère de l’Intérieur DG de la Politique Intérieure E-mail: paradela@mir.es et pielecciones@mir.es
Chancellerie fédérale Palais fédéral ouest CH - 3003 Berne Tél. : +41 31 322 06 10 Fax : +41 31 322 58 43 E-mail : ardita.driza-maurer@bk.admin.ch Mme Anina WEBER Juriste Projet de vote électronique Chancellerie fédérale Sektion Politische Rechte Taubenstrasse 16 CH - 3003 Bern Tel. +41 31 322 39 64 Fax +41 31 322 58 43 E-mail: anina.weber@bk.admin.ch Mr Michel CHEVALLIER Chancellerie d’Etat Case postale 3964 CH - 1211 Genève 3 Tel: +41 22327049 E-mail: michel.chevallier@etat.ge.ch TURKEY/ TURQUIE Mr Ayhan OKURER Deputy Diretor General Directorate of Electoral Register Supreme Board of Elections of Turkey Yüksek Seçim Kurulu Başkanlığı Kızılırmak Cad. No:9 , 06640 Küçükesat Ankara - Turkey Tel: +90 312 410 93 44 Fax: +90 312 419 10 49 E-mail: ayhan.okurer@ysk.gov.tr UKRAINE Mr Sergiy GONCHARENKO Doctor of Law Head of the Department of International Law and Human Rights The Academy of Advocacy of Ukraine SPEAKERS/ INTERVENANTS Mr Jordi Barrat Esteve University of Alicante Cta. Sant Vicent del Raspeig s/n 03690 Sant Vicent del Raspeig (Alicante) Spain E-mail: barratj@tinet.org Mr Ingo BOLTZ Technical Consultant for Electronic Voting Systems and Biometric Voter Registration La Paz, Bolivia Mobile: +591 72 50 50 35 E-mail: ingo.boltz@gmail.com Skype: ingo.boltz
A-1040 Wien Austria Tel: +43 1 5031963-50 Fax: +43 1 5031963-50-66 E-mail: daniel.konrad@a-sit.at Ms Ülle MADISE Member of the Estonian National Electoral Committee Lossi pl 1a EE - 15165 Tallinn Tel : +372 6900 726 Fax : +372 6316541 E-mail: ylle.madise@vpk.ee
République et canton de Genève DCTI - CTI sécurité 64-66, rue du Grand-Pré adr. postale : CP 2285 - 1211 Genève 2 Suisse Tel:+41 (22) 388 13 62 (direct) - +41 (22) 388 13 61 (secrétariat) E-mail: michel.mima.marti@etat.ge.ch M. Patrick Trouveroy Informaticien-expert auprès de l'Administration des Pouvoirs Locaux du Ministère de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale City Center Offices 20, boulevard du Jardin Botanique B - 1000 Bruxelles Tél. : +32 (0)2.800.38.77 Fax : +32 (0)2.800.38.00 E-mail : ptrouveroy@mrbc.irisnet.be
Center for Advanced Security Research Technical University of Darmstadt Mornewegstraße 32 64293 Darmstadt Germany
E-mail: Volkamer@cased.de OTHER COUNCIL OF EUROPE BODIES/ AUTRES ORGANES DU CONSEIL DE L’EUROPE Secretariat of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice commission)/ Secrétariat de la Commission Européenne pour la démocratie par le droit (Commission de Venise) Mr Pierre GARRONE Head of Division Division of Elections and Referendum Tel: +33 (0)3 88 41 29 38 E-mail: Pierre.garrone@coe.int
Mr Alexander BARTLING Secretary of the Committee of Culture and Education Tel: +33 (0)3 88 41 29 70 E-mail: alexander.bartling@coe.int
Mr. Zoltán SZABÓ Hungarian National Assembly
Tel: +36 1 441 00 00 E-mail: zoltan.szabo@parlament.hu
Head of Elections Department OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Aleje Ujazdowskie 19 PL - 00-557 Warsaw E-mail: Nicolas.Kaczorowski@odihr.pl Mr Jonathan STONESTREET Election Adviser OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Aleje Ujazdowskie 19 PL - 00-557 Warsaw E-mail: Jonathan.Stonestreet@odihr.pl INTERNATIONAL IDEA Mr Peter WOLF Technical Manager Electoral Processes International IDEA Strömsborg SE - 103 34 Stockholm Tel: +46- 8 698 37 00/56 Fax: +46- 8 20 24 22 Mobile: +46- 70 429 37 56 E-mail: p.wolf@idea.int
Director of Democratic Institutions Mr Michael REMMERT Project Manager/ Chef de Projet « Good Governance in the Information Society / Bonne gouvernance dans la société de l’information »
Progamme adviser/ Conseiller de programme « Good Governance in the Information Society / Bonne gouvernance dans la société de l’information »
Project Assistant/ Assistante de Projet « Good Governance in the Information Society / Bonne gouvernance dans la société de l’information »
Project Assistant/ Assistante de Projet « Good Governance in the Information Society / Bonne gouvernance dans la société de l’information » Directory: dgap -> goodgovernance -> Source Source -> Cahde(2007) 4 e symposium on e-democracy: new opportunities for enhancing civic participation Download 131.87 Kb. Share with your friends:
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