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NC — Asia Pivot Advantage
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- 2. Other issues distract from the Pivot — Syria and Ukraine.
- 4. No escalation — China and the U.S. have overwhelming economic incentives to avoid conflict.
1NC — Asia Pivot Advantage1. Pivot fails – budget cuts mean deterrence is impossible.Gaskell ‘14 Stephanie Gaskell is deputy editor and senior reporter for Defense One. She previously covered the Pentagon for Politico, “Can the U.S. Military Really ‘Pivot’ to Asia?” March 25, http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2014/03/can-us-military-really-pivot-asia/81247/#.UzLC5LS1xLU.twitter Military commanders in the Pacific have quite a wish list of things they need to carry out the Pentagon’s much-publicized pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. More follow-on forces, more submarines, more amphibious ships.¶ Budget constraints are clearly affecting President Obama’s plan to beef up the military’s presence in Asia, and just how much is starting to become clearer. Adm. Samuel Locklear, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, and Gen. Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, laid out several things they need to carry out the mission at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. Scaparrotti said, “The forces in the theater have been fully resourced, despite the budget constraints that we’ve had. I’m happy with that and appreciative of it.” But he said, going forward, he’s concerned about the “readiness of follow-on forces” in the region – forces that would be necessary to back up troops in the event of a crisis or attack. “In our theater, given the indications and warnings, the nature of this theater and the threat that we face, I rely on rapid and ready forces to flow into the peninsula in crisis.”¶ Locklear said he’s asked for more “amphibious lift” for the five amphibious readiness groups in the region. “The reality is, is that to get Marines around effectively, they require all types of lift, they require the big amphibious ships, but they also require connectors,” he told the committee, referring to craft that take Marines from ship to shore. “I have asked for additional amphibious lift to be put into the Pacific, and that request is under consideration.”¶ And Locklear said his requirement for attack submarines are “not all being met.” Under current budget plans, the military’s attack submarines will decline from 55 in fiscal year 2013 to just 42 in 2029, according to Sen. Kelly Ayotte, R-N.H.¶ Locklear and Scaparrotti pointed out gaps in coverage to an area of the world that is a dominant part of Obama’s military strategy, despite continuing conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, and new challenges with Russia. And their comments come on the heels of a controversial admission by a top Pentagon official that the pivot to Asia “can’t happen” because of budget cuts.¶ Earlier this month, Katrina McFarland, the assistant secretary of defense for acquisition, told a conference in Arlington, Va., that “right now, the pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it can’t happen.” McFarland quickly backtracked her statement, saying through a spokesperson that “the rebalance to Asia can and will continue.”¶ But Locklear and Scaparrotti said the region has special needs, because of the makeup of its geography and the nature of the threat. Pacific Command’s geographic region, or “area of responsibility,” according to Locklear, makes up 50 percent of the world’s surface. Of that 50 percent, 17 percent of it is land and 83 percent is water. Six out of every 10 people alive live on that 17 percent of land.¶ And the threat from China and North Korea is a different kind of threat than in other areas of the world, and would require a swift and strong response. “On the Korean Peninsula, the nature of the fight is potentially high-intensity combat, and the time and space factors also present a tough problem for us. So the delivery of ready forces on a timeline is important,” Scaparrotti said. 2. Other issues distract from the Pivot — Syria and Ukraine.3. Pivot’s Alliance-building strategy won’t moderate China. They’ll push territorial claims either way.Hiebert ‘14 Murray Hiebert is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at CSIS, “China’s Push in the South China Sea Divides the Region,” May 16, http://csis.org/publication/chinas-push-south-china-sea-divides-region ASEAN foreign ministers issued a rare standalone statement expressing “serious concerns” about developments in the sea and calling for quicker action in negotiating a code of conduct between China and the grouping. Vietnam and the Philippines undoubtedly hoped for stronger support from their neighbors, two of which—Malaysia and Brunei—have their own overlapping claims with China in the South China Sea, which serves as a major international shipping route, has rich fishing grounds, and is believed to hold deposits of oil and gas. The diverse ASEAN grouping probably did about as much as could be expected considering that it is consensus driven and that it has struggled in the past reaching a joint stance on tensions in the South China Sea. Two years ago, ASEAN foreign ministers failed for the first time to issue a statement at the end of their summit in Cambodia because Phnom Penh refused to include any reference to a discussion of the sea disputes. Many Southeast Asian countries are reluctant to challenge China because it has become their largest trading partner and it is the largest aid donor to nations like Cambodia and Laos. On top of that, the major points in the chairman’s statement summing up the leaders’ meeting had reportedly been agreed upon before China parked the oil rig as it became clear that no senior leader from Thailand, in the midst of a months-long political crisis, would be able to attend the summit and sign off on major revisions. Still, reading between the lines of the ASEAN statements, leaders clearly spent considerable time discussing developments in the South China Sea and China’s latest moves have them worried. The leaders also anticipated that this would not be their last word of the year on China’s increased assertiveness. In early August, the ASEAN foreign ministers can count on the backing of the foreign ministers of the United States, Japan, India, Korea, Australia, and others when they meet for the ASEAN Regional Forum in Myanmar. This will be followed in November by the East Asia Summit, attended by the leaders of the United States, Japan, and India, among others. ASEAN officials recognize that they will not need to take the lead in discussions with China about the South China Sea at these meetings. Foreign Minister K. Shanmugan of Singapore, on a visit to Washington right after the ASEAN meeting, told Foreign Policy on May 13 that “we want to see a code of conduct created; we want to see this resolved peacefully through the Law of the Sea, through arbitration, through any other means, but not direct confrontation and aggressive action.” But he added that “ASEAN’s ability to deal with or reduce tension on any given incident is not significant.” The U.S. response to the latest Chinese move was quick. Secretary of State John Kerry had a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China on May 12, and a spokesman reported that he described China’s introduction of an oil rig in waters disputed with Vietnam was “provocative.” President Barack Obama visited the Philippines shortly before China moved its rig into an area claimed by Vietnam. “We believe that international law must be upheld, that freedom of navigation must be preserved, and commerce must not be impeded,” Obama said during his visit. “We believe that disputes must be resolved peacefully and not by intimidation and force.” In the weeks leading up to the president’s visit to Asia, U.S. officials had publicly challenged the legitimacy of China’s nine-dash line claims to most of the South China Sea and had warned Beijing not to impose an Air Defense Identification Zone over this sea as it had in the East China Sea near Japan late last year. Many U.S. analysts suggest that Beijing moved the rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone to signal to Washington and the capitals of ASEAN that China plans to test the U.S. commitment in its rebalance to Asia to stand by its allies and friends in the face of stepped-up Chinese assertiveness. “China is saying to its neighbors ‘You sure you want to sign on to the U.S. rebalance?’” one China expert says. Much of Washington’s strategy focuses on building international support to challenge China’s assertiveness in such forums as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, while developing closer ties with the Southeast Asian disputing parties, particularly the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. It is also seeking to improve military ties with the goal of helping boost the military domain awareness of these countries. And since the dispute began, the U.S. Navy has renewed its offers to bolster ties with Vietnam, including offering more ship visits. The United States and at least some ASEAN countries hope increased international pressure will nudge China to explore compromises built around global rules such as the UN law of the sea. Manila last year mounted a challenge to China’s sovereignty claims by asking an arbitration tribunal to rule on whether Beijing’s nine-dash line has legal standing. China has refused to participate in the case, but some observers anticipate that Beijing might feel some pressure if other countries—say, Vietnam—were to launch similar actions. But it’s far from certain that this policy will work, at least in the short term. “From China’s perspective, they aren’t paying a very high price,” says China foreign policy expert Bonnie Glaser, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who visited Beijing just after the news of its oil rig broke. “My sense from discussions in Beijing is that the Chinese are determined to assert their claims and are willing to tolerate a degree of tensions with their neighbors.” China recognizes that it cannot challenge Washington militarily any time soon, but it is convinced that it holds a huge edge over the United States in its economic ties with China’s neighbors. Glaser said the Chinese “believe that the benefits that their neighbors gain from China economically will prevail [and that] the region will eventually accept Chinese dominance in the South China Sea. A statement by ASEAN expressing ‘serious concern’ isn’t going to change China’s calculus.” (Note – SCS means “South China Sea”… ASEAN is an international organization of Southeast Asian Nations.) 4. No escalation — China and the U.S. have overwhelming economic incentives to avoid conflict.5. Turn — Containment:A - China and ASEAN will peacefully resolve claims now. Strengthening the Pivot only makes conflict more likely.Beijing Review – June 12th 2014 – Editorial Staff for the Beijing Review – “Viet Nam's Worrisome Stance” – NO. 24 JUNE 12, 2014 – http://www.bjreview.com.cn/print/txt/2014-06/09/content_623303.htm The situation in the South China Sea has been peaceful for decades. Thanks to the collective efforts of China and other countries whose coastlines touch the South China Sea, a coordination and communication mechanism has been established to resolve territorial disputes peacefully. However, the waters have become troubled in recent years as the United States carries out its "pivot-to-Asia" strategy. The Philippines were the first to make an offensive move against China's sovereignty in the South China Sea, but gained little from the incident aside from becoming a client state for the U.S. military. Unlike the Philippines, Viet Nam relies heavily on China for its economic development. If Viet Nam continues to act provocatively in the South China Sea, it will find its national reputation deeply damaged. Seeing as Viet Nam has set offshore oil and gas development as a focus for its economy, escalating disputes and an attempt to claim these resources in the South China Sea would be beneficial to it. Viet Nam officially admitted China's sovereignty over the Xisha Islands until the 1970s. Even earlier, in 1956, it explicitly agreed with China in 1956 and stated that the Xisha Islands belonged to the latter. The Chinese Government announced a distance of 12 nautical miles as its territorial waters in 1958 and indicated that the breadth of its territorial waters applies to all Chinese territories including the Xisha Islands. On the 10th day after China made the announcement, then Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong delivered a diplomatic note to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stating that the Vietnamese Government recognized and respected the announcement on the breadth of territorial waters made by the Chinese Government. For a long time following, all governmental documents, textbooks and maps published by Viet Nam identified the Xisha Islands as Chinese territory. Against the backdrop of the "pivot-to-Asia" policy of the United States, Viet Nam might think there is an opportunity to steal the Xisha Islands. It distorts history and denies facts to try and meet these ends. B - Plan build alliances. That causes war by emboldening new US partners and making China feel contained.Heath – June 11th 2014 – Timothy R. Heath is a senior China analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group – “China and the U.S. Alliance System” – The Diplomat. The Diplomat is the premier international current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region. June 11, 2014 – http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-u-s-alliance-system/ The sources underpinning China’s growing opposition are deep and structural. They have little to do with the personal preferences of PRC leaders. Nor do they stem from reactions to statements by individual leaders or U.S. policies, such as the rebalance, although these may aggravate Chinese frustrations. Criticism of U.S. “hegemonism” and “Cold War mentality” has a long history, but for years it was aimed at specific policies, such as Taiwan arms sales. The latest criticism, by contrast, is more specifically aimed at the structural obstacles to China’s pursuit of regional security and the nation’s development. In the eyes of PRC leaders, those structural obstacles are defined in large part by the U.S.-led system of security alliances and partnerships in Asia. At the CICA summit, Xi criticized alliances as unhelpful for the region’s security. He stated that “It is disadvantageous to the common security of the region if military alliances with third parties are strengthened.” Commentary in official media has been even blunter. A typical Xinhua article observed that strengthening U.S. alliances can “achieve nothing other than buttress an unstable status quo” (May 21). The drivers underpinning this view consist of three types, expressed as concerns that: the current U.S.-led order enables U.S. containment of China; the nature of alliances emboldens countries to challenge China on sovereignty and security issues; and the alliance system led by the United States is incapable of providing lasting security for the region. The fear of a U.S. ambition to contain China is deep and pervasive. China views U.S. promotion of liberal democratic values, human rights, and Western culture as driven in part by a desire to constrain PRC power. Moreover, Beijing is well aware of U.S. historical successes in activating its network of alliances to defeat aspirants for preeminence in Europe or Asia. The growing competition between China and the United States, manifest in friction points across policy topics from cyber to the South China Sea, and in the U.S. decision to adopt the rebalance itself, makes this threat all the more real and pressing. PRC leaders appear unconvinced by the incessant statements by senior officials in Washington that the United States has no intent or desire to pursue containment. But even if U.S. leaders could persuade Beijing of this fact, the mere existence of the security architecture allows the possibility of pursuing containment in the event bilateral relations sour. China also objects to the alliance system as a threat to its security and sovereignty. This is especially true of U.S. alliances with countries that have antagonistic relations with China. Beijing finds the U.S. alliance with Japan more problematic than it does the U.S. alliance with countries like Thailand, with which China enjoys far more stable relations. In China’s eyes, an alliance with the United States emboldens countries to provoke Beijing on sovereignty disputes, threatening instability and potentially conflict. Antagonism with neighboring powers like Japan and the Philippines also threatens to escalate into a war that could draw in the United States, a disastrous possibility Beijing dreads. Reflecting these frustrations, a typical Xinhua commentary article bitterly noted that “the United States has not taken any concrete measures to check its defiant allies from confronting China.” U.S. efforts to reassure its allies through the rebalance and through criticism of China for “provoking instability” merely intensify these anxieties. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 359.89 Kb. Share with your friends:
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