U.S. Army Relations with the Militia & Governor Stevens – issues, personalities, and consequences
The difficulties faced by the U.S. Army in establishing its authority over territorial militia of Oregon and Washington were considerable. The Pacific Division’s Commanding Officer was General John Wool, who was based out of San Francisco Bay. General Wool had assumed command in 1854 with very few troops at his disposal to cover the entire Pacific coast, let alone inland settlements. With almost a half century of experience on the frontier, General Wool was a prudent, conscientious officer. Richard Kluger the author of “The Bitter Waters of Medicine Creek,” characterized General Wool as follows,
An old warhorse and a decorated veteran of many a campaign dating back to the war of 1812, Wool strongly disapproved of civilians serving as volunteer soldiers, answerable only to state or territorial authorities who were not professional military men. He considered militia enlistees little better than vigilantes, generally ill-trained and poorly disciplined, who posed a greater threat to the peace than irritable Indians did and often took their empowerment as a license to kill, plunder, and profiteer. As second ranking officer in the U.S. Army, Wool, like his sole superior, General Winfield Scott, had an outsized ego, but was no witless blowhard. Even now, past seventy, Wool maintained his reputation as honest, public-spirited, and highly professional. [Kluger, pp.151-2]
The General would soon face a challenge to his authority in the persons of the territorial governors of Oregon and Washington. The Democrats were in the White House and their appointees as territorial governors reflected their populist national agenda including expansion and a particularly harsh approach to race relations - be it blacks back east, or out west, the Indians, mixed-bloods, and now the Chinese immigrants. Once the shooting started in October of 1855, the Washington militia was initially placed under command of U.S. Army, while the much larger Oregon territorial militia never was. Subordination of the Washington volunteers to the Army’s authority would be withdrawn in short order.
In the newly created Washington Territory, General Wool faced an ambitious West Point graduate named Isaac Stevens. Two generations separated the much younger Stevens from General Wool. For most of his Army career Stevens had been responsible for building coastal fortifications along the Atlantic. He had met his future wife while building Fort Adams in Newport, Rhode Island. He had also been in and out of Washington, D.C. during much of his service and had become increasingly engaged in politics. When Franklin Pierce entered the White House in 1853 Stevens successfully sought an appointment. He was not only appointed Governor of the new territory of Washington, but also its Superintendent of Indian Affairs. In addition, while on the way to his new post he would head the northern railway survey. Stevens had the energy and temperament to handle all three positions simultaneously.
Kent Richard’s, in his biography of the first of Washington’s many territorial governors, “Isaac I. Stevens: A Young Man in a Hurry,” characterized Stevens’ antagonist, General Wool, and his view of the frontier along these lines,
Although he was seventy years old in 1854, Wool remained a vigorous, capable officer – apparently the logical choice for the large politically sensitive Department of the Pacific. He proved to be capable of running the huge department with as much efficiency as circumstances allowed, but he was less suited to handle political problems. Thoroughly professional, completely honest, and imbued with a sense of public service, Wool believed that the Army was in the best position to deal with various problems caused by American expansion. The general would brook no interference from outside sources – which included state, territorial, and local officials within his broadly conceived sphere of influence. ... His critics called him pompous and arrogant. But criticism did not deter Wool. He was not concerned with public relations; he would do his duty as he saw it….
When General Wool arrived at Benecia (on the Sacramento River) to assume command, he was already convinced that Indian hostilities usually resulted from actions by the whites that provoked retaliation. His observations during his first months on the West Coast confirmed that opinion. [Richards, pp. 238-9]
Given his character, Governor Isaac Stevens was inclined to move quickly in consolidating the nation’s tenuous hold on its northwest corner. There would be no tolerance for delay in implementing the program. Arriving in the fall of 1853 to assume his responsibilities as the territory’s governor, within 18 months he was leading his small party on a treaty-signing Blitz across the Columbia River basin toward the Rockies. For purposes of economy, to make matters worse, he was under orders form the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to consolidate the widely scattered tribes into a small number of reservations. Resorting to strong-armed tactics to get closure at the Walla Walla Treaty negotiations, the Stevens party immediately moved further inland for the next such event, leaving in their wake numerous resentful Indians. Land was being taken both by the terms of the treaty and, in fact, by settlers, with only promises of eventual compensation. Miners were also on the move with gold discoveries in the Colville Valley drawing them inland. Furthermore, there were no uniformed authorities in sight. The first U.S. Army unit would not show in the Walla Walla valley for another year. In fact, it would be another four years before the treaties would be ratified in 1859. Into this void would move the territorial militia.
Meanwhile, in addition to the challenges of removing the surviving Indians from their lands to make way for settlers, this settler community itself was by no means homogenous. A cultural contest continued between the earliest settlers and their missionaries as to national and ethnic loyalties. The missionaries and their flocks were divided roughly along the lines of the competing newer demographic elements – English-speaking American Protestants, now ascendant, versus the older settler group of les Canadiens, who were predominantly French-speaking Catholics. Issues along these lines had involved accusations of Canadian Catholic priests and Canadian mixed-bloods instigating the Whitman Massacre in 1847, resentment over the greater success of the Catholics in converting Indians, and other suspicions that triggered Governor Stevens declaration of Martial Law in the spring of 1856. Martial Law was subsequently overturned in the territorial courts after much public posturing and mutual threats of arrest among the handful of territorial officials - including Stevens’ actual detention of a territorial judge arrested by one of his posses. This was followed by further manipulation of the court system in the prosecution and hanging of Nisqually chief Leschi - an abuse of the process resisted by the Army at Fort Steilacoom to Leschi’s last day on earth. Caught in an uncomfortable position between the Americans on one side, and their Indian in-laws, cousins, neighbors, and friends on the other, most Canadiens felt compelled to pick sides. Others, however, were able to maintain an uneasy neutrality. This posture was totally unacceptable to Governor Stevens and his constituents.
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