The [first/next] off-case position is the india da: First, us-india relations are high and driven by mutual distrust towards China
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- Indo-Pak war goes nuclear — leads to famine and eventual extinction
- US-facilitated Indo-Pak cooperation key to prevent Indo-Pak war
- Indo-Pak nuclear war escalates quickly and causes extinction – computer models prove.
- Indo-Pak war would happen soon; new second-strike capabilities increase risk
- Indo-Pak nuke war will happen; historic resentment and lack of preparation make it worse
- Growing divide makes indo-pak war likely.
- Indo-Pak war is probable — tech developments and no institutional checks.
Indo-Pak War ImpactsIndo-Pak War — 1NCUS-India relations prevent Indo-Pak war.Sieff 10 — Martin Sieff, correspondent for The Asia Pacific Defense Forum and Senior Fellow at The American University in Moscow, former senior foreign correspondent for the Washington Times and United Press International, three-time nominee for the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting, former Chief Analyst at The Globalist, M.A. in Modern History from Oxford University, 2010 (Shifting Superpowers: The New and Emerging Relationships between the United States, China and India, Cato Books, January 2010, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ProQuest ebrary) Bush strategists also believed that a relationship with India, similar to the one Nixon and Kissinger forged with China, would do more to avert either conventional or nuclear war on the subcontinent than would the pious exhortations of arms-control treaties. An India that would look on Washington as its protector against China, the thinking went, would be far more likely to heed American calls for restraint in the development of nuclear weapons. In Pakistan, too, where U.S. influence had been declining, the Bush administration believed that American calls for compromise would have more impact if U.S. support for Islamabad against Delhi could no longer be taken for granted. Indo-Pak war goes nuclear — leads to famine and eventual extinctionGhosh 13 — Palash Ghosh, business journalist, 2013 ”India-Pakistan Nuclear War Would Kill 2 Billion People, End Civilization: Report,” December 10, Available Online at http://www.ibtimes.com/india-pakistan-nuclear-war-would-kill-2-billion-people-end-civilization-report-1503604 Accessed 07-22-2016, PAM) A nuclear war between South Asian rivals India and Pakistan would trigger a global famine that would immediately kill 2 billion people around the world and spell the “end of human civilization,” according to a study by an anti-nuclear group. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) also warned that even a limited nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan would destroy crop yields, damage the atmosphere and throw global food markets into chaos. China, the world’s most populous country, would face a catastrophic food shortage that would lead to enormous social convulsions. “A billion people dead in the developing world is obviously a catastrophe unparalleled in human history,” said Ira Helfand, co-president of PSR and the study's lead author. “But then if you add to that the possibility of another 1.3 billion people in China being at risk, we are entering something that is clearly the end of civilization.” Helfand explained that China’s destruction would be caused by longstanding tensions between its neighbors, India and Pakistan, two enemies that have already fought three wars since 1947. Moreover, given the apocalyptic power of contemporary nuclear weapons – which are far more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 – the impact of an India-Pakistan war would be felt across the globe. “With a large war between the United States and Russia, we are talking about the possible, not certain, but possible, extinction of the human race,” Helfand said, according to Agence France Presse. “In this kind of war, biologically there are going to be people surviving somewhere on the planet, but the chaos that would result from this [South Asian nuclear war] will dwarf anything we've ever seen.” Specifically, the study noted, a nuclear war in South Asia would release black carbon aerosol particles that would cut U.S. corn and soybean production by 10 percent over a decade. Those particles would also reduce Chinese rice production by an average of 21 percent over a four-year period and by another 10 percent over the subsequent six years. Even more devastating, China’s wheat crop would drop by 50 percent in just the first year after the hypothetical Indo-Pak nuclear war. CNN reported that there are at least 17,000 nuclear warheads (other reports suggest that there are perhaps as many as 20,000) around the world, which present a far greater threat than the current obsession with Iran’s nascent atomic program. Most of these warheads are currently owned by the United States and Russia, while India and Pakistan are believed to have “only” about 100 warheads each. But given the state of endless enmity between India and Pakistan, they are more likely to launch a nuclear war than the superpowers who possess far more and far deadlier nuclear weapons. Helfand told CNN that in an India-Pakistan nuclear war scenario, more than 20 million people would be dead within one week from the explosions, firestorms and immediate effects of radiation. “But the global consequences would be far worse,” he said. Indeed, the firestorms produced by this imaginary South Asian war “would loft 5 million tons of soot high into the atmosphere, blocking out sunlight and dropping temperatures across the planet. This climate disruption would cause a sharp, worldwide decline in food production.” The subsequent global famine would place the lives of 870 million people in the developing world at immediate risk of starvation. Indo-Pak War — LinksUS-facilitated Indo-Pak cooperation key to prevent Indo-Pak warPerkovich and Dalton 14 (George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues, and on South Asian security, Toby Dalton is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his research focuses on cooperative nuclear security initiatives and the management of nuclear challenges in South Asia and East Asia, “India and Pakistan: A Thin Line Between War and Peace,” June 3rd, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/03/india-and-pakistan-thin-line-between-war-and-peace) aj An early dividend of Narendra Modi’s election as India’s prime minister appeared on May 26, when Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited New Delhi for the inauguration. In his winning election campaign last year, Sharif had declared, “If India takes one step for good relations, Pakistan will take two. We even want to put an end to visa requirements between the two countries...We want peace with India.” Now the two South Asian leaders are mutually pledged to resume a peace process that Sharif and then-Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had begun in 1999. However, the hoped-for peace process could turn to war—with huge implications for the United States—if militant actors in Pakistan attack India in hopes of provoking Modi to overreact. Something like this happened in 1999. Then, Pervez Musharraf and several colleagues in the Pakistan Army launched a clandestine incursion into the Kargil region of Kashmir, which triggered a limited, hard-fought war that India won, with diplomatic assistance from Bill Clinton. Today, the likely instigators would be the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups who wish to divert the Pakistani state from cracking down on them. Many Pakistanis loathe Modi as a belligerent anti-Muslim Hindu fundamentalist. What distinguishes the militants from other Pakistanis is an interest in provoking Modi into military action that would unite Pakistanis in a war against India instead of against the militants themselves. Given Modi’s reputation and self-image as a strongman, it is difficult to imagine he would not respond forcefully to violence emanating from Pakistan. As one of his top advisors put it recently, “Modi will have to respond to an attack or he will lose all his credibility.” During the last major crisis following the November 26, 2008 attacks in Mumbai by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba militants, India’s leaders responded only with minimal political sanctions. This restraint was perhaps wise policy, as world and domestic opinion in Pakistan turned against the terrorists and their sponsors. But the lack of a cathartic military response left many Indians, including some senior figures in the armed forces, frustrated that the Pakistan Army did not suffer enough for harboring (if not authorizing) the terrorists. These circumstances make it extremely difficult to see how another major terrorist attack on India would not escalate to war. And, if Modi did respond militarily, Pakistan Army leaders would feel that allowing him to “win” would reinforce the dangerous notion that Hindu belligerence pays, and that the already beleaguered Pakistan Army does not deserve the power and privileges it has long enjoyed. Humiliation would leave the Pakistani Army unable to claim the capability and authority to protect the country against its challengers abroad or at home. Facing such a prospect, the Army would feel hard-pressed to use every quiver in its arsenal, including its nuclear weapons. Fortunately, Modi and Sharif, along with their electorates, understand that both countries would be much better off if they could expand mutual trade and other forms of peaceful interaction. Both societies and governments recognize that the perpetrators of violence and perpetual conflict are a small minority that threatens the internal well-being of each country as well as security and prosperity between them. Thus, the challenge for Indians and Pakistanis—and for the U.S. government, which inevitably would be impelled to mediate a new conflict—is to take steps now to prevent major terrorist attacks on India and to prepare modalities to manage consequences if prevention fails. The United States needs to be more forthcoming than it has been in the past in sharing intelligence with India on possible threats and holding Pakistan to account for its ambivalent counterterrorism performance concerning India. Indian leaders need to correct longstanding inadequacies in their intelligence and counterterrorism organizations, and prepare contingencies for responding to attacks that take full account of the risks of escalation. Pakistani leaders, especially in the Army and Inter-Services Intelligence, need to open genuine lines of communication with their Indian counterparts and demonstrate that they are doing everything they can to prevent future Mumbai-like attacks. Cooperation like this must occur before an attack if there will be any chance of mitigating risks of escalation after one occurs. The stakes could not be higher. The United States cannot publicly orchestrate such cooperation, but it can (and should) work behind the scenes at high levels to facilitate it. Indo-Pak War — ImpactsIndo-Pak nuclear war escalates quickly and causes extinction – computer models prove.GSN 10 — (Global Security Newswire, 3/16/2010, “Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100315_4193.php) Computer modeling suggests a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would block out the sun with large amounts of airborne debris, disrupting global agriculture and leading to the starvation of around 1 billion people, Scientific American reported in its January issue (see GSN, March 4). The nuclear winter scenario assumes that cities and industrial zones in each nation would be hit by 50 bombs the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in World War II. Although some analysts have suggested a nuclear exchange would involve fewer weapons, researchers who created the computer models contended that the panic from an initial nuclear exchange could cause a conflict to quickly escalate. Pakistan, especially, might attempt to fire all of its nuclear weapons in case India's conventional forces overtake the country's military sites, according to Peter Lavoy, an analyst with the Naval Postgraduate School. The nuclear blasts and subsequent blazes and radiation could kill more than 20 million people in India and Pakistan, according to the article. Assuming that each of the 100 bombs would burn an area equivalent to that seen at Hiroshima, U.S. researchers determined that the weapons used against Pakistan would generate 3 million metric tons of smoke and the bombs dropped on India would produce 4 million metric tons of smoke. Winds would blow the material around the world, covering the atmosphere over all continents within two weeks. The reduction in sunlight would cause temperatures to drop by 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit for several years and precipitation to drop by one-tenth. The climate changes and other environmental effects of the nuclear war would have a devastating effect on crop yields unless farmers prepared for such an occurrence in advance. The observed effects of volcano eruptions, smoke from forest fires and other events support the findings of the computer modeling, the researchers said. "A nuclear war could trigger declines in yield nearly everywhere at once, and a worldwide panic could bring the global agricultural trading system to a halt, with severe shortages in many places. Around 1 billion people worldwide who now live on marginal food supplies would be directly threatened with starvation by a nuclear war between India and Pakistan or between other regional nuclear powers," wrote Alan Robock, a climatology professor at Rutgers University in New Jersey, and Owen Brian Toon, head of the Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences Department at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Indo-Pak War — LikelyIndo-Pak war would happen soon; new second-strike capabilities increase riskHussain 16 — Tom Hussain, journalist and Pakistan affairs analyst based in Islamabad, 2016 (“Are India and Pakistan Heading for a Nuclear Showdown?,” Al Jazeera, March 3, Available Online at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/india-pakistan-heading-nuclear-showdown-160303053541342.html, Accessed 07/25/16, JZ) Or so it might seem, from the headlines. Almost unnoticed by the global media, the Indian subcontinent is on the verge of establishing itself as the indisputably most dangerous strategic theatre in the world. Already bristling with about 200 warheads, divided more-or-less equally between India and Pakistan, the theatre had been limited to "single-strike" capacity, because both sides were reliant on land-based missiles and warplanes to deliver nuclear warheads. Strategic stalemate Technological capabilities being roughly equal, a strategic stalemate of mutually assured destruction has prevailed since the two countries conducted tit-for-tat nuclear weapons tests in May 1998. That will change when the Indian Navy completes the final trials, ongoing in the Bay of Bengal, of its first nuclear-armed submarine, INS Arihant. When these are conducted, very soon, India will possess, for the first time, a platform that would survive a land-based nuclear exchange and give it "second-strike" capability. India has not yet mastered submarine-launched ballistic missile technology, but rapid advances in its land-based programme over the past two years indicate that it soon would. Indo-Pak nuke war will happen; historic resentment and lack of preparation make it worseHussain 16 — Tom Hussain, journalist and Pakistan affairs analyst based in Islamabad, 2016 (“Are India and Pakistan Heading for a Nuclear Showdown?,” Al Jazeera, March 3, Available Online at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/india-pakistan-heading-nuclear-showdown-160303053541342.html, Accessed 07/25/16, JZ) That is reflective of the mindset the two countries share. Indians and Pakistanis, while essentially the same people divided by a line on a map, have been brought up on a rich diet of hate-inciting propaganda that casts the other as evil, inferior and deserving of subjugation, if not elimination. In fact, the governments of India and Pakistan have never sought to educate their citizens about the dangers of a nuclear exchange or, for that matter, developed any infrastructure such as fall-out shelters. Thus the nuclear arsenal of either country, generally speaking, is publicly seen as cause for celebration, rather than an existential threat. Unless there is a highly improbable radical change in diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, history suggests that a nuclear exchange in South Asia is merely a matter of time. Growing divide makes indo-pak war likely.Khalid and Hussain 14 — (Iram, Prof of Political Science @ Punjab University and S. Shahbaz, PhD in Political Science @ Punjab University “Challenges and Opportunities for Pak-China Security Environment in the perspective of United States India Strategic Partnership”)Journal of Political Studies, Summer, Proquest. Pakistan and India are two atomic powers in South Asia. Both nations have different perspective on all diverse issues in the regional and international power politics. They have different stands on all political issues and defense issues. One of the major bones of contention between Pakistan and India is the long standing Kashmir issue which could not be solved through United Nations resolutions, third party mediations and even through bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. Because of the complex and complicated relations of both the atomic powers of the regions, the South Asia is most insecure and capricious regions in the world. Both atomic Powers Pakistan and India have political antagonism lasted for more than sixty years and there is possibility in future a potential nuclear clatter between the two nations. In order to maintain a balance of power in the region Pakistan conducted its 1st nuclear test in response of Indian nuclear tests in May, 1998. After 9/11, the United States has originated an anti- terrorism war. The main focus of war against terrorism is on this region which made the Kashmir issue more complicated. These momentous changes in regional politics scenario has increased the distance between Pakistan and India which may lead to one more conflict between the two countries of South Asia. The security situation is more dangerous because of the Nuclear Proliferation in the region and this make Kashmir dispute more treacherous. An assessment made by the Institute for Science and International Security about the nuclear warheads of Pakistan and India. It was assessed that Indian capacity of production of warheads is 45-95and on the other hand Pakistan's production capacity is 30-50 (http://www.isis-online.org?). According to the report published in The New Scientist,10 minor warheads would exterminate more than three million individuals if Pakistan and India has a partial nuclear war in the region (www.newscientist.com?). So there is a great concern in the nations of the world that India and Pakistan nuclear war can lead to a possible first nuclear war. Indo-Pak war is probable — tech developments and no institutional checks.Sempa 16 — Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century and America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National Security, Geopolitics and War. He has written on historical and foreign policy topics for Orbis, Strategic Review, Joint Force Quarterly, The University Bookman, the Asian Review of Books, the New York Journal of Books, Presidential Studies Quarterly, the Claremont Review of Books, American Diplomacy, The Diplomat, and the Washington Times. He is an attorney, an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University, and a contributing editor to American Diplomacy, 2016 (“The Growing India-Pakistan-China Nuclear Rivalry,” The Diplomat, July 8, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/the-growing-india-pakistan-china-nuclear-rivalry/, Accessed 07-25-2016, AB) On June 22, 2016, the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute released a 60-page monograph analyzing the major trends in India’s nuclear posture and thinking in the increasingly challenging geopolitical environment of the Indo-Pacific region. India’s Evolving Nuclear Force and its Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Asia-Pacific is the work of three scholars who have written widely on India and Asia security topics: Yogesh Joshi, a PhD candidate at the Jawaharlal Nehru University whose work has appeared in Asia Policy and India Review; Frank O’Donnell, a lecturer in strategic studies at the University of Plymouth at Britannia Royal Naval College; and Harsh V. Pant, a professor of international relations at the India Institute at King’s College, London. Their work is a timely and important reminder that recent events in the East and South China Seas, which dominate the headlines of major news organizations, are only one aspect of a changing strategic environment in the region. The authors focus on the evolution of India’s nuclear force structure and strategic doctrine in the face of recent nuclear developments in Pakistan and China, and the implications of these developments for regional security. Since 1998, India has adhered to a nuclear doctrine called Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) that emphasizes no first use of nuclear weapons and massive or assured retaliation to deter potential nuclear opponents. But recent trends and planned weapon systems in India’s nuclear force structure are leaning in the direction of a war fighting capability and a rethinking of its strategic doctrine. India is developing a new generation of land-based nuclear missiles with greater range and payload (the Agni V and Agni VI missiles), improving its aircraft-based nuclear capacity, and planning a larger sea-based (including submarine-based) nuclear force—a strategic triad of nuclear capabilities. It is also researching MIRVs (multiple independent reentry vehicles) and improved short-range missiles (Shourya, Prahaar, and Brahmos). These developments coincide with comparable moves by China and Pakistan, India’s historic and most likely adversaries in the region, including naval nuclear capabilities that portend an increasingly nuclearized Indian Ocean. The authors warn that a regional nuclear arms race is underway without a potentially modifying disarmament dialogue or regime in place. The authors cite Indian analysts who advocate the need to revise the country’s nuclear doctrine, calling for an end to massive retaliation, more proportionality in force structure and strategic response, and more “ambiguity” about its “no first use” pledge. This debate in India is reminiscent of the debate in the 1950s in the United States, which pitted the Eisenhower administration and its adoption of massive retaliation against its critics who advocated “flexible response” to avoid overreliance on nuclear weapons. Analysts and policymakers in India also sense the need for a closer defense relationship with the United States to provide balance against the Sino-Pakistani defense axis. There is a concern that India’s force structure, rather than a realistic threat assessment, is driving the rethinking of nuclear doctrine toward a war-fighting scenario instead of pure deterrence. Officially, however, India’s government has proclaimed that there is no shift in the CMD doctrine and no abandonment of “no first use.” The greatest concern expressed by the authors is that the continuing arms race will lead to misperceptions and/or miscalculations that could result in war, including nuclear war, among India and its longtime regional adversaries. They suggest the creation of a formal trilateral India-Pakistan-China nuclear dialogue with real transparency. The authors spend surprisingly (given the title of the monograph) less ink on the implications for U.S. strategy in the region. India-U.S. defense ties are growing in response to a mutually appreciated threat from a rising China. That will likely continue. The authors recommend that U.S. political and military strategists engage in contingency planning for regional nuclear crises, including in the Indian Ocean. Perhaps most importantly, U.S. leaders need to encourage and foster a dialogue among the regional powers in an effort to avoid the misperceptions and miscalculations that could lead to catastrophic war. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.85 Mb. Share with your friends:
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