The Role of the Courts Madisonian Democratic Values and Political Questions
Viewed government as its own science
Governments failed when they fail to understand the role of Factions
If you don’t acknowledge factions, they’ll explode and take over
Wanted to IMPLODE factions and direct them to a central source
Congress / Federal Government
Tripartite government
Encouraging factions to occur w/in the system
Mixing constituencies and tenures gave different branches different interests, encouraging “fighting” for their constituents’ interests
Judicial deference Greatest danger to Madisonian system –
when judges want to be “both president and congress”
Formalism Fierce notion of judicial neutrality and deference
Courts should not engage in determining what law should be rather than what it is or says
Common Law’s accommodation of the civil code
A series of canons
Meant to avoid bias in a judge
Actually promoted bias because judge just chose which canon to apply
Legal Realism Karl Llewellyn, Felix S. Cohen, Arthur Linton Corbin, Jerome Frank, etc.
Rejection of formalism
Acceptance of the indeterminacy of the law
Spawned all other lines of thought
Allowed judges to explain why they chose that line of case
Allowed for an appeals process
Legisprudence and the Public Choice School
Hart and Sachs:
Adherence to legal procedures to achieve “institutional settlement” through “regularized and peaceable methods of discussion”
Make sure branches of government do nothing more than they’re supposed to
A.C. Pigou – The economics of Welfare
Market failures
Not achieving the social result that we want / not fast enough
Doesn’t value some things well enough
Public Choice School – opposed to Hart and Sachs
Mancur Olson, Jr. – The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
Small groups have more power than large groups in our govt.
E.g. lobbyists
More concentrated interest than large groups
Large groups have “free riders”
Small groups have fewer free riders and more money
Frank Easterbrook and Dealism No way to know there’s particular gaps in legislation
Should treat legislation like a market People go to congress to buy and sell legislation
Jonathan Macey and Public Regarding Purpose Against Easterbrook
When faced w/ a gap in legislation, follow the public regarding the purpose of the law
Take congress at its word
Schools of Thought Lockean / Neo-Lockean John Locke and the labor theory
“Every man has a property in his own person” and is entitled to whatever he “removes out of the state of nature” and “mixes his labor with” – 2nd Treatise of Govt.
Importance of property as a right derived from God state of nature as a pre-law society where everything was in common
Huge impact on the framers
Locke’s Proviso
“Enough and as good left in common for others John Rawls
Principle of spoilage
Violates god’s design
Utilitarianism John Stewart Mills – “Utilitarianism” 1861
At this time, it was a market-driven system
Contractarian period
Bentham questioned the social injustice caused by contractarian nature of law
“The greatest good for the greatest number” – “Principles of Morals and Legislation”
amounted to an introduction of social welfare programs / institutions
Critical Legal Studies Relies on the Frankfurt school and engages in deconstruction of legal principles
Found that most tort law came out of ecclesiastic law
Church created its own courts when King John started taxing them
Started dealing w/ secular issues that touched the courts
Discovered by Duncan Kennedy Questioning why property had such exclusivity / absolute aspect to it
Class-based critique
Wealth distribution and class justice
Argued to recognize unequal bargaining power and to gravitate towards those results that bring greater economic justice to society
Critique: judges and courts should not engage actively in redistribution of wealth
Feminism Gender based critique
Challenging false neutrality of the law
Susan Estridge – “Real Rape”
Patriarchal Bias
What “silent bias” was written into the laws by middle-aged white guys?
Jurispathic v. Jurisgenerative (borrowed from Robert Cover’s “Nomos and Narrative”)
Adversarial process:
Trial by combat knights acted as surrogates for the accused
Jurispathic trial results in “legal death” where the loser “dies” in court
Should develop Jurisgenerative System Allow judges to achieve a compromise
Seen in nuisance claims…
Leslie Bender: No Duty to Rescue Rule
Hegel Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
Property as an extension of personality (“property becomes an expression of the will, a part of personality…”
Turley doesn’t talk about master-slave dialectic, but maybe throw that in if there’s time
Can never really define property in isolation
Personality theory of understanding objects / property to individuals
Place value of object not on the value of the thing itself, but in the pain and suffering caused or the emotional distress caused by depriving the π of that property / object
Socio-Biological John Beckstrom (“Sociobiology and the Law”)
Law and Economics: Judge Richard Posner
Focuses on wealth maximization
Efficiency Definitions
Pareto – change in law or policy that benefits at least 1 w/o making any worse
Efficiency: Pareto Superior / Superiority
Produces at least one winner and no losers
E.g. creation of traffic laws
Optimality
When you can’t make another adjustment w/o producing at least one ‘loser’
What you aim for, but probably won’t get there
Cite pareto efficiency when trying to strike down something like environmental legislation
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Just produce more winners than losers
utilitarian
Cost Externalization / Internalization Externalities: your impact on others
Creates an asymmetrical spike in the RISK associated w/ the activity
Often where torts comes in
Coase Theorem – Unsocial Costs
Coase 1
Most legal disputes concern conflicting uses of common resources
Decision is driven by the market, not the law
Law simply forces a distribution of wealth to one party rather than the other
Party w/ advantage has Legal Entitlement support of the law
Can sell the entitlement if NOT using it is worth more than the entitlement itself
Only exists in a perfect market w/o Transactional Cost
Coase 2
Transactional Costs
costs incurred in making economic exchanges or deals
Transactional costs can flip the result of Coase 1
Result in inefficient industries continuing their activities / taking advantage of the market
Transactional Costs Often hard to quantify
Informational Costs
Does a person fully understand the risk involved and is there enough information available to inform people of the risk?
Ch. 1 – Intentional Torts Physical Harms Trespass to Person, Land, and Chattels Intent
Classic Intent Defined
Meaning to cause offense
With substantial certainty that a particular effect will occur
Garratt v. Dailey – kid pulls out lady’s chair
Unlawful / rule break – intended to break rule that prohibited conduct
Vosburg v. Putney (Wis. 1891) – kid kicks kid under desk
Hackbart case – football player’s career-ending injury
Transferred intent
Necessary intent w/ respect to cause offense to person A will apply to action against any other person who happens to be injured
Talmage v. Smith - ∆ threw stick and hit wrong person
Trespass to Real Property
Intentionally enter π’s land w/o permission
Remains on π’s land w/o right to be there even if entered lawfully
∆ puts an object on π’s land w/o permission
Intent merely to be where you were, not to “trespass”
Dougherty v. Stepp (N.C. 1835) – trespass by surveyors
Trespass to Chattels
Intentional interference w/ a person’s use or possession of a chattel
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (Cal. 2003) – [not] Trespass to server
Loss of possession must be recovered even if possession is returned unharmed - Joyriding
Conversion Intentional interference w/ π’s possession or ownership of property that is so substantial that ∆ shold be required to pay the property’s full value
Intent: intention to take the property
Mistaken ownership does not excuse conversion
Poggi v. Scott (Cal. 1914) – Wine Barrels
Moore v. Regents of U. Cal. (Cal. 1990) – genetic material
Ways to commit:
Acquiring possession – bona fide purchaser still a converter
Transfer to 3rd person – e.g. deliver a package to the wrong peson
Emotional and Dignitary Harms – the Intentional Torts Assault §21 Apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive touching (battery)
Intent
Intent to put π in apprehension of a battery
Actually putting π in apprehension of the battery
Mere words do not constitute assault
Need to be aware of the threatened contact
No recovery for threat to 3rd persons
Recovery possible for conditional threats
Offensive Battery §18 Intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive bodily contact Intent to touch (subjective)
Intended touch is harmful or offensive (objective)
Actual touch (direct or indirect)
Actual touch was harmful or offensive (objective and subjective)
π need not be aware of the contact at the time it occurs
Alcorn v. Mitchell (Ill. 1872) – spitting in court
False Imprisonment Intentional infliction of a confinement Intent to confine
∆ knew w/ substantial certainty that π would be confined
Future threat is not false imprisonment – if you leave, I’ll kill you later
Imminent threat IS false imprisonment – if you leave, I’ll kill your sister (now)
“Three walls do not a prison make”
Confinement – held w/in certain limits, not prevention from entering certain places
Bird v. Jones (K.B. 1845) – trying to cross a highway
Basis for determining false imprisonment:
Time – how long person was held
Place – where person was held
Manner – how person was held
Coblyn v. Kennedy’s, Inc (Mass. 1971) – Old man’s ascot
IIED – Extreme and Outrageous Conduct §46 Intentional or reckless infliction, by extreme and outrageous conduct, of severe emotional or mental distress, even in the absence of physical harm
Intent:
Desire to cause emotional distress
Substantial certainty
Reckless disregard of high probability
e.g. mishandling of corpses
Wilkinson v. Downton (Q.B. 1897) – joke of husband’s injuries
Defenses Consensual defenses Scope of Defense
Implied in fact – objective standard
Lack of Capacity – infant, unconscious, intoxicated
Exceeding scope of consent:
Mohr v. Williams – Ear surgery on wrong ear – not implied consent – “personal autonomy…”
Sports injury cases – Hackbart case – where injury is caused outside scope of rules of sport
Implied as a matter of law:
π is unable to give consent
immediate action is necessary to save π’s life or health
no indication the π would not consent if able
reasonable person would consent in the circumstances
Express Consent – “go ahead, hit me”
Emergency Rule
Substituted judgment
Hudson v. Craft (Cal. 1949) – Illegal Prize fighting of minor – cannot consent
Athletic injuries in formal / informal settings
Insanity McGuire v. Almy (Mass. 1937) – patient hits nurse – intent to cause harm
Self-Defense Reasonable force to prevent any threatened harmful or offensive bodily contact and any threatened confinement or imprisonment Reasonably believes there’s a real threat
Cannot retaliate
“Defense cloaked in a privilege” – only wearable at time of offense
Cannot escalate the threat – must be the same degree of force
No duty to retreat unless it’s to use deadly force (w/ exceptions)
“Make my day”
Castle doctrine – allowing lethal force when someone invades your domicile –
as opposed to common law – “lay gentle hands upon”
Mistaken self-defense
Courvoisier v. Raymond (Colo. 1896) – accidentally shoots cop
Defense of 3rd parties
Defense of Property May use reasonable force to defend property, both land and chattels
Deadly force can never be used
Bird v. Holbrook (C.P. 1825) – spring guns
Recapture of Chattels Must be exercised promptly, in “hot pursuit”
“Not w/ a strong hand, but w/ a peaceable and easy fashion” – no deadly force
privilege exists only if property was wrongfully taken
Kirby v. Foster (R.I. 1891) – pocketed $ for “help”
Necessity Public Necessity
Necessary to prevent great harm to the community or to many poeple
General Average Contribution – during time of emergency, all treated as joint owners of property in question
Govt. may use or destroy property of another for public necessity
Not required to compensate, but US Govt. does (generally)
Private Necessity –
Owner may not resist where there is actual necessity
Ploof v. Putnam (Vt. 1908) – Docking of a sloop
π must pay for damages caused (in contrast to self defense or public necessity)
Vincent v. Lake Erie Trans. Co. (Minn. 1910) – steamship damages dock during storm
Ch. 2 – Strict Liability and Negligence Formative Cases Basis for liability in tort
The Thorns Case (1466) – chops down tree that lands on neighbor’s bush
Weaver v. Ward (K.B. 1616) – soldier accidentally shoots another
Inevitable Accident
Smith v. Stone (K.B. 1647) – carried onto property by another
The Forms of Action Trespass and Case Scott v. Shepherd (K.B. 1773) – throwing of lighted Squib
Breakdown of the Forms
Strict Liability and Negligence in last half of 19th C. Development of Negligence in USA
Brown v. Kendall (Mass. 1850) – dog owner accidentally hits other owner
Non-Natural Use of land in England
Fletcher v. Rylands (Ex. 1866) – Blackburn, J. – strict liability for water leakage
Brown v. Collins (N.H. 1873) – horse knocks lamp – no strict liability
Powell v. Fall (Q.B. 1880) – train spark ignites rick
Strict Liability and Negligence in Modern Times Bolton v. Stone (A.C. 1951) – cricket ball (overturning previous strict liability)
Crit view: “strong class accent” establishing favorable standard for cricket
Hammontree v. Jenner (Cal. App. 1971) – epileptic seizure causes crash into bike shop
Ch. 3 – The Negligence Issue – “The Ultimate Jury Area” 4 elements of negligence Duty – requiring ∆ to conduct himself according to certain standard to avoid risk to others
Breach – failure of ∆ to conform his conduct to this standard
Causation – sufficiently close causal link between ∆’s act of negligence and harm suffered by π
Cause in fact
Proximate causation (legal causation)
Damages – actual damage suffered, unlike some intentional torts (trespass)
Reasonable Person Objective standard of “a reasonable person of ordinary prudence”
Vaughan v. Menlove (C.P. 1837) – “stupid farmer’s” spontaneous combustion destroys neighbor’s property
Variable Standards: Beginners and Experts / Adult and Child activities Robert v. Ring (Minn. 1919) – old guy hits kid when he’s going 5 m.p.h.
Daniels v. Evans (N.H. 1966) – kid on motorcycle – standard of care
Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co. – (Wis. 1970) – woman is not Batman
Physical Characteristics: what a reasonable blind man should be able to do
Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen (Wash. 1959) – Blind man falls in hole in street
Calculus of Risk “Snapshot of the scene right before the accident”
what should the person have done/not done in this case
helpful w/ considerations of Calibresi, Cheapest Cost Avoider
Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works (Ex. 1856) – fire plugs un-plug - ∆s not liable
Reasonableness of a given risk Magnitude of risk
Value of importance of Principal Object
The collateral object
Utility of the risk
Necessity of the risk
Eckert v. Long Island R.R. (N.Y. 1871) – saving kid on tracks
Osborne v. Montgomery (Wis. 1931) – opening door hits kid on bike
Activity level v. Care level Cooley v. Public Service Co (N.H. 1940) – noise in phone causes phobia ≠ liability
Hand Formula – Burden < L (injury/liability) x Probability (assuming risk neutrality rather than risk averse / risk taker)
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. (2d Cir. 1947) – bargee should have been there
Emergency Rule – whether standard of reasonableness rises
Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation Services, Inc (Ak. 1996) – van hit truck pulling out of parking lot
Common Carriers Andrews v. United Airlines (9th Cir. 1994) – common carrier needs more than an announcement
Custom Relationship between Custom and Negligence – local custom will not justify negligence
Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co. (Me. 1884) – guy falls down new hole in mine w/o guardrail
The T.J. Hooper (2d Cir. 1932) – needed radios to hear about storm warning
Medical Malpractice / Informed Consent Must act w/ level of skill and learning “commonly possessed by members of the profession in good standing”
Duty of Disclosure informed Consent
Requiring adequate disclosure of risks
Lama v. Borras (1st Cir. 1994) – malpractice in failure to use conservative treatment for complex laminectomy
Canterbury v. Spence (D.C. Cir. 1972) – shouldn’t have voided unattended…
Locality Rule Not as strong w/ modern medical standards (national standards)
Might have greater significance in an area w/o highest technology available
Statutes and Regulations Negligence Per Se When a safety statute has a sufficiently close application to the facts at hand, an unexcused violation of that statute conclusively establishes that ∆ was negligent
Martin v. Herzog (N.Y. 1920) – driving w/o headlights = negligence per se
Protection against Particular Harm
Gorris v. Scott – suicidal sheep – protected harm was for injuries (contagion) to employees, not safety of the sheep
Class of Protected Persons
Brown v. Shyne (N.Y. 1926) – unlicensed chiropractor = not per se negligent
Dram Shop Statutes
Uhr v. East Greenbush Cent. Sch. Dist. (N.Y. 1999) – scoliosis test – no liability
Judge and Jury Judge decides Law
Jury decides Facts
Proof of Negligence Problems of Proof Burden of production – π must show:
what ∆ did
how dangerous it was
∆’s opportunity to discern danger
availability of safer alternatives
∆’s opportunity to know about safer alternatives
Burden of Persuasion – prove to jury that negligence was “More probable than not” - NOT “beyond a reasonable doubt” as is the case w/ crimes
Res ipsa Loquitur §328D. Requirements:
No direct evidence of ∆’s conduct
Harm seldom occurs w/o negligence
Under exclusive control of ∆
Not due to π’s conduct
Evidence more available to ∆ (e.g. Ybarra)
Allows an inference that ∆ was probably negligent w/o precise showing of how ∆ behaved
Only used when there is a “paucity of evidence” – woman killed by flying horse that was struck by a nearby train
Can be rebutted by ∆ - reversal of burden of proof
Res Ipsa is NOT cause-in-fact Proves negligence, not causation
Need separate causation analysis
In most res ipsa, there will be causation, but it’s not automatic
Within the Exclusive control of the ∆
Byrne v. Boadle (Ex. 1863) – barrel rolls out of factory
Non-Delagable Duties
Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Insurance Co. (1st Cir. 1986) – escalator malfunction at airport – non-delagable duty
Exclusive Control
McGonigal v. Gearhart Industries Inc (5th Cir. 1986) – premature grenade
Conditional Res Ipsa Loquitur in malpractice
Cases of mixed law and fact
Acknowledge res ipsa only if they find X preliminary fact
Caused by ∆’s conduct or natural events?
If former, was ∆ negligent?
Ybarra v. Spangard (Cal. 1944) – combating conspiracy of silence…
Ch. 4 – Plaintiff’s Conduct Contributory Negligence Basic Doctrine A π who is negligent and whose negligence contributes proximately to his injuries is totally barred from recovery
Held to same reasonable person standard as the ∆
Not applicable to intentional torts
Last Clear Chance Limits contributory negligence
If ∆ had an opportunity to prevent the harm and the π did not have such an opportunity, the existence of this opportunity wipes out the effect of π’s contributory negligence
Helpless Peril ∆ must have actual knowledge or should have known of π’s helpless state at time of the accient
clearly sees an unconscious person in the middle of the road while driving
Inattentive Plaintiffs Must show that ∆s actually knew that the πs were inattentive
E.g. seeing someone wandering drunk down the road
Comparative Negligence – 46 states Modified / Partial Comparative Negligence – 50% Rule
Any πs that were more than 50% at fault would be barred from recovery as though contributory negligence applied
Otherwise, if less than 50%, damages reduced by a proportion equal to the ratio by his contributory negligence
Pure Comparative Negligence – about 13 states
Only 13 states
Asks only a jury to assign relative liability or responsibility between ∆ and π
Assumption of Risk When π voluntarily consents to take her chances that harm will occur
Complete bar from recovery at common law
Implied
Inferred by π’s conduct when no explicit agreement takes place
Requirements:
Knowledge of the risk in question
Must be actually known
Voluntarily consented to bear risk
Primary Assumption
When ∆ is never under any duty to π in the circumstnace
e.g. foul balls at a baseball game
Secondary Assumption
∆ would ordinarily have a duty to π, but π’s assumption of risk causes duty to dissipate
when π asks ∆ for a ride to the hospital when π knows ∆’s car has bad brakes
Eliminated in most states that adopt comparative negligence doctrine
Express
E.g. signing a release to go bungee jumping
Vicarious Liability Respondeat Superior If an employee commits a tort during the scope of his employment, his employer will be liable (jointly with the employee)
Does not apply to independent contractors
Scope of Employment: Trips from home to work are NOT w/in the scope
Courts are split on trips from work to home
Frolic and detour
If the deviation was reasonably foreseeable, employer could be liable
Not liable if it is a significant departure from employee’s duties
Forbidden acts
Liable if it is within scope of employment
Gun store clerk loads gun even though prohibited from doing so, it goes off and injures customer employer still liable
Intentional Torts employer liable
UNLESS it’s committed through personal motives with no intent to further ∆’s business
Ch. 5 – Joint, Several, Liability Generally
If more than one person is a proximate cause of π’s harm, and the harm is indivisible, under the traditional approach each ∆ is liable for the entire harm joint and several
Modern trend cuts back on this in jurisdictions w/ comparative negligence
Hybrids:
Hybrid J&S w/ Reallocation
If one ∆ turns out to be “judgment proof” the court will reallocate the damages to the other parties (including the π) in proportion to their comparative fault
Hybrid J&S based on threshold percentage
Tortfeasors who bear more than a certain threshold e.g. 50%, remains jointly-and-severally liable
Those less than that threshold are merely severally liable
Hybrid based on type of damages
Remains J&S for economic damages, but not for non-economic damages
Pure Several Liability – 16 states
A ∆, regardless of the nature of the case, is liable only for her share of total responsibility
Indivisible v. Divisible harms
Only applies to where π’s harm is indivisible
Not capable of being apportioned between or among the ∆s
Rules on Apportionment
Concert of Action
If two ∆s acted in concert, each will be liable for injuries caused by the other
No apportionment
Successive Injuries
Able to apportion harm when there are successive injuries separated by substantial periods of time
There may be overlapping
∆1 can be liable for both his and ∆2’s actions, but ∆2 might be only liable for his own actions
e.g. pollution – private nuisance cases
Indivisible Harms
When harms are indivisible, each co-∆ is each jointly and severally liable for the entire harm in a jurisdiction following tradition approach to J&S liability
Death
fire
Ch. 6 – Causation Cause in Fact § 26 (RS3rd) – “But For Causation” Generally: π must show that ∆’s conduct was the “cause in fact” of π’s injury
“But For” test: had ∆ not acted negligently, π’s injuries would not have resulted
New York Central R.R. v. Grimstad (2d Cir. 1920) – decedent overboard; no life ring – no certainty that he would have been saved otherwise…
Zuchowicz v. UnitedStates (2d Cir. 1998) – erroneous prescription caused death
Expert Witnesses – Daubter, Frye, and the “Gatekeeper” Function of the Judge
General Electric Co. v. Joiner (US 1997) – expert testimony denied
Lost Chance Doctrine Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative (Wash. 1983) – reducing chance of survival (lost chance)
Joint Causation / Concurrent Cause When two events concur to cause harm, and either one would have been sufficient to cause substantially the same harm w/o the other each is deemed to be the cause in fact
Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. (Wis. 1927) – knowledge of start of only one fire is enough for liability
Alternative Liability / Multiple Fault That each of two or more ∆s was at fault, but only one could have caused the injury
Burden shifts to each ∆ to show that the other caused the harm
Summers v. Tice (Cal. 1948) – can’t tell who shot π
Market Share Liability – fungible products If π cannot prove which of three or more persons caused his injury, but can show that all produced a defective product, court will require each of the ∆s to pay that %age of π’s injuries which that ∆’s sales bore to the total market sales of that type of product
Skipworth v. Lead Industries Assoc. (Pa. 1997) – no market share liability
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (Cal. 1980) –DES as fungible product – market share liability imposed
Proximate Cause (Herein of Duty) Generally Policy determination that a ∆ should not automatically be liable for all the consequences, no matter how improbable or far-reaching, of his act
Whether there should be liability even though the ∆ did cause the injury
Addressed AFTER a finding that ∆ was unreasonable and act of unreasonableness caused the injury
Determining Liability Reasonable Person defined
Calculus of Risk determined
Factual causality
Proximate causality – question of foreseeability / is society prepared to hold ∆ liable for the injury?
Unforeseeable Harm
Polemis – liberal rule
Wagon Mound – narrow rule
Unforseeable Plaintiffs
Cardozo – narrow
Adrews – liberal
The Jurisdictions – Polemis, Palsgraff, and Wagon Mound:
In Re Polemis Jurisdictions:
Liberal in terms of proximate causation – snapshot doesn’t apply
Test:
act of negligence COULD cause damage
∆’s negligcen caused that damage
negligence was DIRECT CAUSE of the injury or accident (as opposed to foreseeable cause)
Wagon Mound Jurisdictions
Rejected Polemis
Direct result/cause is too vague
Foreseeability of ∆ in consequences of his actions
When you can see a “change in harm”, the question is whether the change in harm was the actual foreseeable danger by the initial act of the ∆
Juries can still find that it was in fact foreseeable
Palsgraff Jurisdictions
Cardozo, J.
Zone of Danger unforeseeable πs
Can’t be responsible for something that remote
Need to cut off liability at end of the line of the zone of danger
Andrews, J.
More like Polemis
Duty is imposed to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone.
Physical Injury Ordinary and Natural result of ∆’s Negligence Liable for ordinary and natural result of ∆’s negligence
Liable for proximate consequences, but not “remote” consequences
Ryan v. New York Central R.R. (N.Y. 1866) – spread of fire from train spark – only 1st house beyond epicenter is recoverable
Different rule when talking about Forest Fires unlimited chain of causation where State tries to recover…
Coincidence and Causation No such things as “but for” legal causation – can’t foresee a coincidence
Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough (Pa. 1899) – tree falls on car in storm
Deliberate Intervention by 3rd Parties - §448, 449 RST General Rule: Criminal act or intentional tortious act cuts off liability by third parties
Superseding intervening cause
If those tortious acts are foreseeable, it’s up to the jury
Brower v. New York Central & H.R.R. (N.J. 1918) – recover of stolen barrels after crash
Rescue Doctrine – “Danger Invites Rescue” Peril and rescue count as one “substance”, so continuity is not broken in chain of causation
Foreseeability: whether or not society thinks it’s foreseeable enough for someone to want to try to rescue
“Polaroid Approach” – snapshot of the scene and see whether or not it looks like negligence if it’s a rescue, you have to assume that there is someone to be rescued who might not be in the picture
Wagner v. International Ry. (N.Y. 1921) – conductor invited π to look for his cousin
Foreseeability of Harm / Harm w/in Risk / Risk to Class §29 RS3 ∆ is liable for only those consequences which were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the act
also applies to “unforeseeable π”
In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. (K.B. 1921) – dropped plank ignites ship
Unforeseeable π’s not covered
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. (N.Y. 1928) – trying to board moving train w/ fireworks
Marshall v. Nugent (1st Cir. 1955) – I’m confused by this case
Wagon Mound No. 1 (A.C. 1961) – oil from Sydney harbor to π’s wharf
Virden v. Betts and Beer Construction Co (Iowa 2003) – tripped off ladder, not hit by angle iron
Hebert v. Enos (Mass. App. 2004) – electrified toilet water = too remote
Emotional Distress Impact Rule Mitchell v. Rochester Railway (N.Y. 1896) – no impact when horses stop in front of π
Zone of Danger Rule / Foreseeability of Emotional Distress Dulieu v. White & Sons (K.B. 1901) – accompany of physical injury unnecessary when child born premature from near-miss of horses
Dillon v. Legg (Cal. 1968) – bystanders / zone of danger
Responses to ∆’s actions – (∆ liable for all of these) Escape
Rescue
Aggravation of injury by medical treatment
Ch. 7 – Affirmative Duties Duty to Rescue Affirmative Duty to Rescue – Good Samaritan Laws
Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co (N.H. 1897) – kid w/o English in mill – loses hand
Hurley v. Eddingfield (Ind. 1901) – physician didn’t want to come to help
Misfeasance v. Nonfeasnace – Duty to Warn Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co. (S.C.) – trucks on ice should have put a warning
Duties of Owners and Occupiers Classes of Visitors – Invitees; w/ leave and license of occupier; trespassers
No duty to a trespasser Exceptions:
Constant trespass on a limited area
Must use reasonable care to make that area safe or at least warn of dnagers
Discovered Trespassers
knowledge that particular person is trespassing, owner is under duty of reasonable care for trespasser’s safety
Children
Children are likely trespassers
Owner knows conditions are dangerous to children
Injured child didn’t know of danger
Owner’s benefit slight compared to risk to children
Owner fails to use reasonable care to eliminate danger
Licensees Person who has the owner’s consent to be on the property, but who does not have a business purpose for being there
Mainly “Social guests”
No duty to inspect for unknown dangers
Duty to Warn if knowledge of danger exists
Invitees Persons invited to conduct business; members of public for purposes of which the land is held open to the public
If use of premises goes beyond business or public purposes, person changes from invitee to licensee
Duties to invitees:
Duty of reasonable care
Duty of reasonable inspection to find hidden dangers
Must take affirmative action to remedy a dangerous condition
Attractive Nuisance
Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck (A.C. 358) – kid loses hand in endless wire haulage system
Rejection of Categories
Apply general single “reasonable person” standard of liability (Cal., N.Y., and others)
Rowland v. Christian (Cal. 1968) – broken bathroom fixture – balancing of negligence factors
Tenant – treated as owner
Lessor: generally NOT liable
Gratuitous Undertakings
Special Relationships Common carrier – passengers
Innkeeper – guests
Business – invitees
Employer – employees
School – students
Landlord – Tenants
Custodian – those in its custody (jail and hospital)
Weirum v. RKO General Inc. (Cal. 1975) – DJ contest caused car accident
Contract v. Special Relationship – Landlord / Tenant
Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp (D.C. Cir. 1970) – assault in the hallway
Doctor-Patient Privilege
Tarasoff v. Regentsof U. of Cal (Cal. 1976) – psychiatrist’s duty to warn victim
No general duty to act
Duty of Assistance:
if π’s injury is due to ∆’s conduct or an instrument under ∆’s control
Duty to Warn:
if ∆’s conduct caused unsafe conditions
Assumption of Duty:
once ∆ voluntarily begins rendering assistance to π, ∆ must proceed w/ reasonable care
Ch. 8 – Traditional Strict Liability Animals Trespassing Animals Owners of livestock are strictly liable for property damage caused by them if they trespass on another’s land
Non-trespass Liability: Animals ferae naturae &animus revertendi / Notice of vicious tendencies Domesticated Animals:
No strict liability unless owner knows or has reason to know of the animal’s dangerous characteristics Gehrts v. Batteen (S.D. 2001) – didn’t think dog in back of truck was a biter
Wild Animals
Strict liability for keeping wild animals as long as dangerous propensity is typical of the species in question
Ultrahazardous or Abnormally Dangerous Activities §519, 520 Determining “abnormally dangerousness”
High degree of risk of some harm to others
Harm likely to be serious
Risk cannot be eliminated by exercise of reasonable care – most important
Activity is not common
Activity is not appropriate for the place where it’s carried out
Danger outweighs activity’s value to the community
Limitations:
Scope of Risk
Only liable for damages from the kind of risk that made activity dangerous
Abnormally sensitive πs – not recoverable
Contributory negligence – NOT A DEFENSE
Assumption of Risk – IS a defense
If π knowingly and voluntarily subjects herself to the danger
Common Usage
Spano v. Perini Corp. (N.Y. 1969) – garage destroyed by tunnel blasting in brooklyn
Strict Liability in the Alternative
Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co. (7th Cir. 1990) – leak could have been because of negligence
Siegler v. Kuhlman (Wash. 1972) – strict liability for gasoline tankers on highway
Nuisance Generally: Type of injury which π has sustained
Injury: interference w/ π’s use or enjoyment of his land
May be (1) intentional; (2) negligent; (3) abnormally dangerous activity or other conduct giving rise to strict liability
Private Nuisance Nuisance Generally Unreasonable interference w/ π’s use and enjoyment of his land Must have interest in land
Interference w/ use
No general strict liability
Defenses:
Contributory negligence
Assumption of the risk
“Coming to the nuisance” – no longer absolute defense
Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Electric Cooperative (Wis. 1996) – stray voltage cause crazy cows
Live and Let Live Rule / Reciprocal Harms Michalson v. Nutting (Mass. 1931) – neighbor’s roots mess up π’s sewer pipes
Easement of Light Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five Inc (Fla. App. 1959) – no legal right to the free flow of light; can’t sue for casting a shadow
Extra-sensitive πs / Thin Skull Rule (N/A to Nuisance) Rogers v. Elliot (Mass. 1888) – church bell causes seizures
Coming to the Nuisance Ensign v. Walls (Mich. 1848) – breeding St. Bernards for a long time does not mean they can forever
Permanent v. Temporary Damages Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co (N.Y. 1970) – particulate contamination enjoined until permanent damages paid
Public Nuisance Definition: Interference w/ right common to the general public
Health hazards, improper businesses (unlicensed bars), obstruction of public streets
Factors:
Type of neighborhood
Frequency / duration
Degree of damage
Social value of the activity
Substantial harm required
Must injure public at large
Need not be a crime
Disproportionate Harms to π / Requirement of a particular damage A private citizen may recover for his own damages stemming from public nuisance ONLY if he has sustained damage that is different in kind, not just degree, from that suffered by the public generally.
Magnitude of financial harm is usually irrelevant
Not necessarily imposed when seeking an injunction (rather than damages)
Anonymous (1536) – stopping of the King’s highway bothers π
532 Madison Ave Gourmet Foods, Inc v. Finlandia Center, Inc (NY 2001) – no duty to protect entire neighborhood against purely economic loss
Causal Links in Public Nuisance Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, USA Corp (3d Cir. 2001) – handgun manufacturers and local crime
Ch. 9 – Products Liability Liability of a seller of a tangible item which, b/c of a defect, causes injury to its purchaser, user, or sometimes bystanders
Negligence, warranty, or strict liability
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (NY 1916) – wheel made of defective wood
Cardozo, J. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger
May sometimes be a question for the jury
Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected
Manufacturer is under a duty to make it carefully to both purchaser and 3rd parties Fail in duty of inspection
Injury to 3rd parties other than the purchaser is to be foreseen not merely as a possibility but as an almost inevitable result
∆ not absolved from duty of inspection just because it bought the wheels from a reputable manufacturer
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (Cal. 1944)
Traynor, J.
“it should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute [strict] liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used w/o inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings”
Public policy requires that the buyer be insured at the sellers expense
Follows w/o proof of negligence from the implied warranty of safety attending the sale
Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc
Liability should be limited in terms of the safety of the product in normal and proper use
Negligence
Ordinary negligence principles apply where personal injury from carelessly manufactured product
One who negligently manufactures a product is liable for any personal injuries proximately caused by his negligence
Strict Liability for negligent manufacturing
Manufacturers, Retailers, Bailors
Warranty
Breach of warranty for goods which are not as they are contracted to be
Express Warranties
Expressly represent that goods have certain qualities
If not, sure for breach
Strict liability
Implied Warranty
Existence of warranty as to the quality of goods
Implied from the fact that seller has offered goods for sale
Merchantability
Goods must be fit for ordinary purposes for which such goods are used
Seller must be a merchant
Does not apply to “casual sellers”
Manufacturer’s warranty extends to remote puchases
Any member of household of purchases, any foreseeable user or bystander
Strict Liability
Best claim to bring unless
Pure economic loss better to sue for breach of warranty
Statute of limitations runs sooner on S/L than warranty claim
Proving:
Manufacture or sale by ∆
Existence of defect
Evidence that the product was redesigned to make it safer doesn’t count
Toxic Torts: epidemiological evidence of defectiveness Agent Orange cases
Causation
π must show that the product and its defective aspects were the cause in fact AND the proximate cause of the injuries
Toxic Tort: epidemiological causation
General Causation:
Court may infer specific causation if proof of general causation is strong when coupled w/ evidence of exposure
Defect existed in the hands of the ∆
Res Ipsa test:
Once π shows that the product didn’t behave in usual way and manufacturere doesn’t show that 3rd party tampered w/ it, satisfies “defect in hands of the ∆”
Strict Product Liability
Seller of a product is liable w/o fault for personal injuries caused by product if product sold in defective condition
Liable even if ∆ seller used all possible reasonable acer
Regardless of privity
Applies to any person w/in distributive chain who is in the business of selling products
Economic Loss Rule:
Casa Clara Condo Ass’n Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons Inc (Fla 1993)
Economic Loss rule prohibits tort recovery when a product damages itself, causing economic loss, but does not cause personal injury or damage to any property other than itself
“Disappointed economic expectations”
Protected by contract law, not torts