Pinkerton 01- James K., frequent columnist for fox news fellow at the New America foundation in Washington D.C. Former Columnist for Newsday He worked in the White House domestic policy offices of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush and in the 1980, 1984, 1988 and 1992 presidential campaigns. In 2008 he served as a senior adviser to the Mike Huckabee for President Campaign, July 16, 2001, “Missile Defense Spinoffs from Outer Space”, http://www.newamerica.net/node/6152
Which is unfortunate, because the unfashionable science they champion has a way of proving itself. In the last few years it's become the conventional wisdom in Washington that missile defense technology is doomed, because, in the popular cliche, "You can't hit a bullet with a bullet." Well, the Pentagon did just that on Saturday night. A projectile, the so-called "kill vehicle," hit a dummy warhead when both were traveling at 4.5 miles per second. Not bad. And while missile defense has a long way to go, the test is a distant early warning to the establishment that the idea might work. As for the astronomers who have been reaping the huge benefits of SDI/NMD, they are not obligated to support missile defense as a form of gratitude for the technogoodies they have received. But as a group, speaking louder than the articulate but lonely voice of Jastrow, astronomers might speak up just a bit. After all, if missile defense technology is good enough for them to use in their stargazing, it might just be good enough to use in defending America.
Aff Key
Missile Threat is on the rise now. China, North Korea, and Iran
Aubin and Streland 2k- Dr. Stephen P. Aubin and Major Arnold Streland, phd. Director strategy execution at Raytheon and Col Arnold H. Streland, Commander, TSAT Space Group, MILSATCOM Systems Wing, Space and Missile Systems Center, October 2000 , “The Space-Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment: Global Missile Defense in the Boost Phase”, Team SBL-IFX, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/SBLWP.pdf
Ballistic missiles have represented one of the greatest vulnerabilities for all the nations of the world ever since the Nazis first launched the V-2 rocket near the end of World War II. One of the tragic reminders of the real and increasing threat to U.S. forces deployed abroad was the death of 28 U.S. soldiers caused by a Scud missile that struck a barracks in Dhahran during the Gulf War. More than five decades after the V-2 first appeared and nearly a decade after the Gulf War, U.S. forward-deployed troops, allies, and even the U.S. mainland remain vulnerable to missile attack and the potential delivery of weapons of mass destruction. In his February 2000 testimony on the Worldwide Threat, CIA Director George Tenet said that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had “become even more stark and worrisome” than just a year before. “Transfers of enabling technologies to countries of proliferation concern have not abated,” he said. “Many states in the next ten years will find it easier to obtain weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.”1 Tenet added that “the missile threat to the United States from states other than Russia and China is steadily emerging. The threat to US interests and forces overseas is here and now.” Tenet pointed out that, over the next 15 years, U.S. cities will face ICBM threats from a wider variety of nations, including North Korea, Iran, and possibly Iraq. He also expressed concern about the security of nuclear weapons and materials in Russia.2 In its unclassified version of its 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, the intelligence community reiterated that “the proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) – driven primarily by North Korean No Dong sales – has created an immediate, serious, and growing threat to US forces, interests and allies, and has significantly altered the strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia.”3 In South Asia, Pakistan and India are locked in a nuclear rivalry, and the intelligence community has assessed that both countries’ short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles may have nuclear roles.4 Foreign assistance has played a key role in the increasing proliferation of missile technology, with Russia, China, and North Korea as the principal suppliers. And, Tenet warns, the recipients of missile-related technology, such as Syria and Iraq, “may emerge in the next few years as suppliers.”5
Colonization adv. Uniqueness- missile defense programs obsolete built in cold war- military R&D down
Cleave & Pfaltzgraff et al.09- Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Report Independent Working Group on Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 39-40 http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf
Compounding the challenges from abroad is a weakening of the technological and industrial base on which American space power relies. Numerous reviews of U.S. space policy, programs, and budgets over the years have called for altering how space programs are budgeted and managed, changes in how space personnel are trained and the career paths available, and increased investment in research and technology. None of these concerns is new. Troubling signs of a weakening base for American space have been appar26ent for some time. The absence of a peer competitor and the sizeable lead in space capabilities from Cold War-era investments gave policy makers, the public, and even military leaders a false sense of security and reinforced the impression that U.S. leadership would go unchallenged with only minimal attention. Despite the national security importance of space, the United States has not put adequate resources into military space programs. Many of the approximately 100 U.S. national security satellites presently in orbit for military and surveillance operations are approaching obsolescence. Successor-generation models based on new and improved technologies frequently are delayed because they are over budget, behind schedule, and facing technical difficulties. The acquisition process for national security space programs is under severe strain, buffeted by excessive technical and schedule risk and unrealistic cost projections, leading the Defense Science Board to conclude that: “Government capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition process have seriously eroded.”27 The deleterious results of a broken acquisition system are apparent throughout the space sector. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)-High and the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) are two cases in point. While both are key parts of the missile defense system to be deployed by the United States, they have had to be restructured because of large cost overruns, schedule delays, and technical problems. For example, SBIRS-High, which is replacing the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites and will provide rapid early warning and ballistic missile trajectory data, is now projected to cost approximately $10 billion, well over twice the amount of earlier estimates.28 Cost increases in excess of 25 percent during the last quarter of FY 2005 forced the Pentagon to recertify the program in December 2005. For FY 2009, DoD requested $2.3 billion for the program, though the Air Force is currently exploring a potential alternative or early replacement for SBIRS-High called 3GIRS.29
Military response key to stop assymetrical attack against U.S. space based assets- these develop future technologies
Cleave & Pfaltzgraff et al.09- Dr. William R. Van Cleave Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Report Independent Working Group on Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century”, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 39-40 http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf The United States must protect its critically important space systems, which are obvious targets for future adversaries who will seek to eliminate the edge those assets give our military forces. This asymmetric U.S. advantage is well known to even limited powers who confront U.S. interests, and they will inevitably strive to reduce that advantage if they seek to attack the United States – and today’s technology makes that possibility a serious concern. Perpetuating the well-known vulnerability of U.S. space assets is, therefore, an unacceptable security risk. The crucial importance of space was clearly highlighted in the early 1990s by the results of the first Gulf War – which the then-Air Force chief of staff, General Merrill McPeak, called the first “space war.”5 More recently, space-based assets, including communications and surveillance systems and sensors, again were essential to the rapid and decisive military victory in Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom would have been impossible to conduct with lightning speed and low casualties in the absence of space-based assets providing for unprecedented connectivity among internetted military systems.6 U.S. space systems are also playing a vital role in the current counter-insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The importance of space systems for the United States and its allies lies in their utter ubiquity throughout the spectrum of conflict at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The overriding importance of space to our national security was underscored in January 2001 by the “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization” (the Space Commission) headed by Donald Rumsfeld. How the United States develops space for civil, commercial, defense, and intelligence uses will have profound implications for national security in the next several decades. The commission emphasized that the United States has key national security interests in: