1ac heg Advantage Scenario 1 is Leadership

AT- Ground

For this reason U.S. military strategy emphasizes air superiority, the high ground of combined air, land, and sea operations. There is also the high ground of space, which U.S. military forces recognize as vital to the operation of our intelligence, communications, reconnaissance, and navigation systems, which rely heavily on satellites. Building an effective missile defense also requires good position. But this position isn't found on the ground, it is found in space where the ballistic missile operates. Building an effective missile defense requires a strategy that deploys a missile defense in the high ground of space. Good leadership would deploy a missile defense in space. Good leadership would point the way to space. Both the Strategic Defense Initiative of the 1980's and early 1990's and Project Defender of the later 1950's and early 1960's pointed the way to space, recognizing the inherent advantages of deploying a missile defense in space. The earlier Project Argus nuclear test shots in 1958 and Starfish 1962 also pointed to space. Dr. Nicholas Christofilos from Lawrence Livermore realized space provides a position with global coverage against ballistic missile threats. The strategic advantages of deploying a missile defense in space are considerable. Global coverage, the capability for boost-phase interception, the use of robotics minimizing operational costs, and the potential of high-energy lasers and particle beams led these earlier missile defense programs to emphasize the development of defenses based in space. Even the Clinton administration was aware of the advantages that accrue from deployment of a missile defense in space, as seen in its decision to complete the termination of the Brilliant Pebbles program for deploying a space-based interceptor defense, and attempt to terminate the Space Based Laser.

The best way to counter even a limited number of missiles is through defense in depth. Defense in depth means there will be a number of opportunities to destroy missiles as they are launched and move through the various stages of their flight paths, or trajectories. For National Missile Defense, a land-based, hit-to-kill interceptor is currently being developed to intercept warheads in the middle of their flight paths. There is also discussion and study of using sea-based missile defenses to complement the land-based system. For its part, SBL represents a potential future space-based component of a national missile defense architecture with residual capability that will enhance the planned theater missile defense architecture. Today, theater missile defense is already being pursued in the form of a layered defense. A family of defensive systems will be able to attack short- and medium-range missiles in various stages of their flight. The boost phase, which occurs shortly after a missile is launched, is the first shot defensive systems have at destroying a hostile missile. Presently, the Airborne Laser is the only theater system being developed that will be capable of attacking and destroying a ballistic missile in the boost phase. The boost phase lasts only a few minutes, after which the launcher burns out. The warhead then continues to ascend and travels outside the atmosphere into space during the middle, or mid-course phase, of its trajectory. A typical trajectory looks like an arc. The mid-course comes after boost phase and before the descent phase. It is during the mid-course phase that decoys might be deployed, complicating the defending nation’s ability to intercept the actual warhead. 3 The final phase of a ballistic missile attack occurs when the warhead descends back into the atmosphere toward its target on the ground. Here, in what is also called the terminal phase, the warhead picks up more speed. The critical aspect of an intercept during this final phase is to hit and destroy the warhead before it explodes. It is also important to hit it high enough to avoid any damage from nuclear, chemical or biological debris. The only active defense the United States has deployed today is a slightly upgraded version of the Patriot missile system used in the Gulf War against short-range Scud missiles. This system is not designed to intercept ICBMs, just short-range ballistic missiles. It will be replaced by the PAC-3 Patriot system in 2001, which will be able to intercept short- and medium-range missiles inside the atmosphere during their descent phase, along with cruise missiles. The Navy Area system, based on Aegis cruisers and destroyers, will complement PAC-3, helping to intercept these shorter-range missiles inside the atmosphere.

Aubin and Streland 2k- Dr. Stephen P. Aubin and Major Arnold Streland, phd. Director strategy execution at Raytheon and Col Arnold H. Streland, Commander, TSAT Space Group, MILSATCOM Systems Wing, Space and Missile Systems Center, October 2000 , “The Space-Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment: Global Missile Defense in the Boost Phase”, Team SBL-IFX, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/SBLWP.pdf

It is the rest of the Secretary’s proposals that should give one pause. Rather than being progressive, they are regressive. Each of the Services’ advanced weapons programs were truncated or terminated. Secretary Gates declared that “although the U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged it is sustainable in the medium term given current trends.” What he means by this statement is unclear. How long is the medium term? What if current trends do not continue? Regaining conventional predominance once lost is much more difficult than simply maintaining it. Secretary Gates' decisions will hamstring the Services' ability to meet the challenges of which he spoke at the end of the so-called medium term. Competitors will be encouraged to pursue conventional arms races, placing future U.S. security in jeopardy.

What about reliability? The test record of the GMD system is not good enough to claim the defense is reliable, even against missiles without countermeasures. The system has had few intercept tests under a very limited set of conditions. And even in that case the test record has not been great. The Pentagon has only conducted six intercept tests of the GMD system since the decision to field the system was made in December 2002, and half of those have failed. So even with a creative definition of “limited attacks” the statement that the U.S. is “currently protected” is not true.

What about the statement that the Aegis missile defense system is “proven”? The current Aegis interceptor (SM-3 Block 1A), is intended to intercept missiles up to about 1,500 km range. The Pentagon considers the Aegis anti-missile system “proven” – even though it has not been tested against missiles with countermeasures – because it defines the threat Aegis may face to be missiles without countermeasures. The argument seems to be that the most likely threat from Iran is an attack by potentially large numbers of conventionally armed missiles, to which Iran would not bother to add countermeasures, even if it could make them.

This argument is questionable for various reasons. Even if this is the threat, the statement that Aegis is “proven” is not true in any meaningful sense. As with the GMD tests, the Aegis tests have been done under a limited set of controlled conditions, and to argue that this means the system is “proven” against attacks under other conditions is wishful thinking, and should not be the basis of military planning.

The United States has the freedom to launch SBMD assets into orbits favorable for deterring or responding to threats from hostile states. After unilaterally deploying such capabilities, the United States would be free to launch its space-based interceptors when it felt the need to project power. Land- based defenses located on foreign soil, by contrast, might have to request permission from the host nation before launching their interceptors. SBMD could therefore enhance both power projection and freedom of action.

Political ties between the United States and other countries may be strained if there is public controversy over proposals to field land-based missile defense. Foreign populations who view interdependence as a potential vulnerability may find it unsettling to depend on the United States for their defense. SBMD could insulate the United States from the oscillating currents of foreign public opinion.

It is also known that enemies of the United States can put a nuclear weapon over U.S. territory using a ballistic missile. The detonation of this weapon at a high altitude could unleash an electromagnetic pulse that would wipe out satellite and airborne navigation, intelligence, and communications systems and impede any U.S. military response to the aggression. Such a pulse of energy would disable or destroy the unprotected technological infrastructure of a region or the nation. According to the emp Commission, “a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our nation. . . . [A]t some point the degradation of infrastructure could have irreversible effects on the country’s ability to support its population.” Space-based interceptors may be the only effective way to counter this threat and mitigate the effects of an electromagnetic pulse resulting from the intercept. Engaging the missile close to its launch point would release the resulting explosion of gamma rays closer to the attacker’s territory. Relying on an intercept in space, in the midcourse of a missile’s flight, risks damaging unprotected satellites (i.e., just about all commercial and civilian satellites), regardless of who owns them

Notably, Russia has considered attack options that include EMP. During the May 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia, members of the Russian Duma, meeting with U.S. congressional counterparts, reportedly speculated about the paralyzing effects of an EMP attack on the United States.89 To amplify on the Rumsfeld statement cited under "Ship-borne Scud Threat," above, Iran is reported to have tested whether its ballistic missiles, such as the Shahab-3 or the Scud, could be detonated by remote control while still in high-altitude flight. The most plausible explanation for such tests is that Iran is developing the capability to explode a high-altitude nuclear weapon that could destroy critical electronic and technological infrastructures.90 Without an effective missile defense the United States will remain vulnerable to the EMP threat given its extensive dependence on high-tech, electronic infrastructure that cannot easily be hardened to withstand such an attack. The ability to launch an incapacitating EMP strike against the United States provides enemies with an asymmetric threat that would not only inhibit U.S. military action but would also strike a severe economic and psychological blow.