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The U.S. Airforwarders Association told a congressional panel that the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) should move toward permitting private contractors to train explosive-sniffing dogs and make them available for use at government-certified cargo screening facilities. Appearing before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security, AfA board member Chris Connell urged TSA to finalize its efforts to develop a program for private companies to use their own canines, certified to TSA standards, to meet federal air cargo screening mandates. Presently, TSA permits only the use of the agency’s dogs in cargo screening, and only at on-airport facilities. Connell, who is president of Los Angeles-based freight forwarder Commodity Forwarders, Inc., said enabling the use of private sector dogs will help broaden the security options for freight forwarders who operate off-airport Certified Cargo Screening Facilities, which are supervised by TSA. “We are not saying that privatized canines are a magic bullet when it comes to screening cargo, but they are a potentially valuable part of this multilayer approach – another important tool in the toolbox, if you will – that includes a range of other technology solutions that our members can use to meet their screening requirements,” he said. Connell told the subcommittee that in a recent survey of AfA members, 75 percent of respondents said they would strongly consider using dogs provided by private companies if they were given the option. “Time is money in our business. And right now, our company believes that we could save over $1 million a year at our LAX facility if we had access to a third-party solution deploying canines. And of course our customers would highly appreciate the time savings that this solution would help us achieve,” Connell said. Connell also noted that use of specially trained dogs is one of the methods for screening airfreight that are identified in the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act.

But Martin said it took more than a year of "rattling the chain in Washington" to get TSA to revise its model. And when TSA agreed to send extra screeners, she said it took months for them to arrive. "Given TSA's cumbersome hiring practices, they couldn't get them here in time for the summer swell," she said. The lack of screeners led to significant delays for passengers and airlines, she said.

Last week, the Transportation Security Administration raised the security fee charged to airline passengers. This week, the airline industry struck back. Airlines for America (A4A), the U.S. airline trade group, and the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which represents 240 international carriers, filed a petition over the fee increase in federal court. The main complaint: The removal of a cap on security fees. Let’s start with the basics. After 9-11, TSA security fees were pegged at $2.50 per flight (“enplanement,” in industry lingo) with a $10 maximum. If you flew nonstop point to point, you’d pay $2.50 each way, or $5 round trip (two enplanements). With a change of planes in each direction, you’d pay $5 each way (two enplanements), or $10 round trip (four enplanements).

WASHINGTON — Major airlines are asking passengers for help convincing Congress that private aircraft owners should pay more to modernize an outdated air traffic control system. U.S. carriers are drumming up customer support through e-mails, airline magazine commentaries and in-flight videos, blaming a surge in corporate jet and small plane traffic for delays that are at record levels. Delta Air Lines sent an e-mail to its frequent fliers this month, asking them to write their congressional representatives and request corporate jet owners ante up for a new air-traffic control system. The airline plans to start showing a short animated video on most flights Sept. 1, blaming air congestion on increased flying by corporate jets and small planes. The video also suggests operators and owners of those aircraft aren't paying their fair share for a new air-traffic control system.

The Republican lawmaker in line to head the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee is urging airports around the country to consider privatizing security screening. Rep. John Mica, R-Fla., says the law specifically allows airports to opt out of the federalized TSA system, and 17 have already done so. "It is both inappropriate and inefficient for the TSA to serve as the administrator, quality assurance regulator, operator and auditor of its own activities," Mica wrote in a letter dated Nov. 5. Though Mica did not specifically mention the controversy over full-body scanners and security pat-downs, other groups continued to press their opposition to such techniques, and several lawsuits were filed on the basis of safety and civil liberties concerns.

Mas doesn't get involved in the daily running of the station. Instead, as advisory board chairman, he provides the political leverage needed to fix problems with Congress or the bureaucracy. Mas can pick up the phone, call United States Information Agency (USIA) Director Charles Wick or Rep. Mica, and get a prompt response.

So I asked my friends at NowSourcing to explain using an infographic. Here it is, courtesy of NowSourcing and TopComputerScienceDegrees.com. In order to be pretty close to certain that you’re actually a terrorist, the NSA (or the TSA) would have to have a test that’s about as accurate as a DNA test. I’m willing to believe that’s possible, but possible certainly isn’t the same thing as likely. Most likely, NSA screening is like TSA screening: a festival of false positives.

Polygon US Corporation is a contractor in the Environmental Consulting Services industry. Last year, they won 8 contracts worth $1.22 Million. Since 2000, the contractor has performed 35 contracts with a total obligation amount of $9.52 Million, which means Polygon US Corporation is a large government contractor. The average obligation amount for their contracts is $272,108.

But here’s what you might not know. The stealing isn’t as random as the TSA may want you to believe. Fleiss visited an optometrist for a replacement pair of glasses, and learned that since the TSA was created seven years ago, he’d seen a “marked increase” in patients requesting receipts for insurance claims relating to security-related thefts. “He said there is a huge market for stolen designer eyewear frames in the New York area,” he added. “You put it together.” One aviation insider I spoke with believes stealing is a systemic problem the federal agency is unable to control, particularly at problem airports like New York’s LaGuardia Airport and Philadelphia International Airport. Not all of the screening areas in U.S. airports are under surveillance, and the TSA’s rules have a big loophole that shifts liability for stolen baggage claims to the airline when luggage is delayed, he told me. In other words, there’s little incentive for the stealing to stop. “It’s the 800-pound gorilla no one wants to discuss at TSA,” he says.

Both our report and FAA's review showed that FAA inspectors needed to provide better surveillance of air carriers' internal maintenance oversight systems. Also, FAA inspectors needed better training on how to evaluate these systems. In addition, we found that inspectors needed to better document their inspections so they could perform trend analysis on the inspection results and ensure that identified deficiencies are corrected. FAA agreed to implement the recommendations we made in these areas. FAA Must Correct Persistent Problems in Its Oversight Process In reviewing reports prepared as far back as 1987 by our office and the General Accounting Office (GAO), we found three common threads limiting FAA's ability to improve its oversight. These problems center on collection and use of safety data, inspector training, and follow-up on previously identified safety problems. In these reports, recommendations were made to address the problems and FAA promised to take corrective action. Yet, a recent FAA study, issued in March 2002, shows problems persist. For example, this study, which was a combined industry and FAA review of certification, operations and maintenance processes concluded that FAA's data analysis efforts had been hampered by a lack of quality data, in part stemming from an inability to compare and combine data from existing databases. Despite the fact that FAA has devoted an inordinate amount of resources to improving its collection and use of data, FAA has been unable to correct long standing problems in this area. These problems severely hinder FAA's ability to use data for analysis, conclusions, and identifying accident precursors; effectively steer its inspections to the areas where they are needed most; and follow up to ensure identified deficiencies have been corrected. To its credit, within the last year, FAA has taken steps to address problems in ATOS and has made progress in generally improving its oversight of air carriers. FAA recently put a new management team in place that seems committed to improving ATOS and correcting past program problems and delays. FAA has agreed to implement recommendations we made in both our ATOS and aircraft maintenance reports. To make material progress on these long-standing concerns, the key now is follow?through on a number of steps. - First, FAA needs to strengthen its process for collecting and analyzing inspection results. - Second, FAA must improve training for inspectors in the concepts and skills needed to effectively carry out safety inspections. - Third, FAA must develop a system to effectively follow up on deficiencies identified during air carrier inspections.

In the latest report damning the Transportation Security Administration’s management of airport security, a report to be released late this week finds that there is little evidence that the $1 billion airport passenger screening program, believed to promote racial profiling, screens passengers objectively. The TSA’s “behavioral detection program” relies on officers selecting passengers who exhibit suspicious signs or behaviors. According to the report, the program and its 2,800 officers had never been assessed by the TSA, and did not have a comprehensive program.

Whatever the next step in airport security, it should be well-planned and thoroughly vetted before it’s implemented. The GAO report and public and legislative interest is a good start to revamping passenger screening tactics. Congress is said to be closely watching the TSA to make sure its employees are held accountable and its screening methods are actually effective. In the years to come, we hope to see improved screening tactics and more use of advanced video surveillance technology to supplement the TSA presence. As U.S. Rep. Richard Hudson wrote recently, “We know the threats to aviation are real. Our enemies continue to plot against us. We need layers of security, but those layers have to make sense. They can’t be based on a hunch; they must be proven.”