An Analytic Narrative Approach to Puzzles and Problems Margaret Levi
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ConclusionThe rational choice analytic narrative approach stands in sharp opposition to views of history that would make the outcomes of events totally systematic or unsystematic in the extreme. It is the claim of the analytic narrativists that understanding the institutional context within which events occurs can explain outcomes in certain (but not all) important historical situations: where structured choices have significant consequences. 10 This is an ideological position rather than a methodological position because there is nothing per se in game theory that rules out complete uncertainty. However, it is not a claim that the approach reveals all the effects of that structured choice; unintended consequences and unforeseen contingencies are beyond the scope of the enterprise. Use of the rational choice analytic narrative approach has implications for developing a social science capable not only of explaining the past but also for the far more difficult task of advising about the present. By providing a way to model and explicate a complex but relatively unique event, the combination of rational choice and narrative offers a plausibility test for some kinds of proposed policies. By focusing on the institutional details that affect strategic interactions, choices, and outcomes, it can be useful in suggesting likely outcomes under given initial conditions. In using comparative statics, it can help predict the likely consequences of certain kinds of changes and shocks. The analytic narrative approach is applicable only for a relatively narrow range of problems, perhaps, but it offers some promise of revealing important relations and probable outcomes for those kinds of problems for which it is suited. It may provide insight into a piece of a larger puzzle. It is only one of many tools, however, available to social scientists and not always the most appropriate one. As we progress towards a social science better capable of diagnostics and prediction, we may find better and more powerful tools. In the meantime, we must use what we have to do what we can.
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* This paper draws on earlier work (Bates et al. 1998; Bates et al. 2000a; Bates et al. 2000b) co-authored with my Analytic Narrative collaborators: Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast and on an earlier published paper (Levi 2002). For their tough, smart, and helpful critiques I thank them, Turan Kayaoglu, Kevin Quinn, Renate Mayntz, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and the two commentators at the Yale Conference, Arjun Appadurai and James Scott,. 1 Buth makes this point while also criticizing game theory for being “based on a truncated conception of temporality” (2002: 485). 2 This produces the criticism (Carpenter 2000: 656-657) that the analytic narrative project authors tell a story in the way that fails to fit the aesthetic criteria claimed by some historical institutionalists. 3 In Analytic Narratives, the authors use the language of theory testing. However, as Kevin Quinn has pointed out, it is not really clear that testing is at issue in most analytic narratives, where the number of observations is so few. This is an issue that deserves considerable further exploration. But see Buthe (2002) for a different perspective. 4 This is a common practice among rational choice scholars and one that has led to some very important insights and findings (Golden 1997; Kiser 1994; Levi 1988). 5 This is a somewhat contested point among the five authors of Analytic Narratives. 6 For an excellent review of the literature on critical junctures, see Thelen (1999, 388-392). 7 Turan Kayaoglu suggested this point to me. 8 This is not quite the same claim as that made by Kiser and Hechter (1991; 1998), who are rigorously deductive. The difference lies not only in the emphasis on the relative roles of deduction and induction but equally on the extent of portability of the findings. Nor they find game theory useful in their practice or their theory (Hechter 1990; Hechter 1992). 9 Jean-Laurent Rosenthal made this point to me. He used North (1981) as exemplar of a conception of path dependence that permits generalization and North (1992) as exemplar of a conception that does not. This distinction is, however, widespread among comparative and historical scholars. 10 I thank Chuck Tilly for urging me to be clearer about the ontological claims of the approach. Further elaboration of the status of this claim and specification of the conditions under which it can operate will have to await for a future paper, however. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 94.06 Kb. Share with your friends:
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