Atman in Advaita Vedanta: Variations on a theme from the Principal Upanishads”


CHEN, Shudong (Johnson County Community College)



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CHEN, Shudong (Johnson County Community College)
Dao of Emily Dickinson: Placing of Poetry and Philosophy across Boundaries”

As noun and verb, transitive and intransitive, the word “place” indicates as much of status, stillness, as of action or motion. The word could also connote the imaginary but indispensable locales that creative minds, such as Kafka, depend on for thought-provoking argument and imagery as his essay on “The Great Wall of China” and his novel America may so indicate. The word “place” could then also mean the crucial inborn knowledge not necessarily acquired through actual experiences. This seemingly unlimited or infinite space and power of the inborn knowledge is exactly what Goethe once so emphasizes to Eckermann in as much the same way as it is so stressed in Daodejing, which states how “a wise [person who] may know the world without leaving his home” (ch. 47), or confirmed, along with Emerson and Zhuangzi, by Dickinson, who insists likewise how “I never saw a Moor--/I never see the sea--/Yet know I how the Heather looks.” (J1052). Place could certainly also suggest a never ending process of search for common ground across cultures for transplanting, transforming, and translation of ideas. Similarly, it could also suggest a Daoist version of choice, adaptation, and freedom regarding where and when to fit in -- whether at the center, in the “marginal spots,” at the “low places,” or around “back positions.” Whether imaginary or physical, we need a place as Archimedes of Syracuse, who declares: “Give me a place to stand, and I shall move the Earth,” or simply as ordinary humans; we need a place even if just for the necessity to reflect in, upon, through, with, against, and beyond; we may need a place, just like Whitman’s little “noiseless patient spider,” to be at once physically and emotionally attached to, attached from, or nourished by. On the issue of place, the American literature is particularly rich with many of its creatively philosophical minds so brilliantly sensitive to the influences or power of places, such as Whitman, Emerson, Thoreau, Henry James, and especially Emily Dickinson.


On the issue of “place,” it is, therefore, not an issue of whether or what we could learn from Emily Dickinson the poet as philosopher or a philosopher behind a poet, but how, how much, or how infinitely much from the reputed “Wittgenstein of Amherst” so always tirelessly searching from place to place, “from blank to blank,” trying to find her ways to express the “unutterable” (Wittgenstein) “Pain [that] — has an Element of Blank —” (J 659). Unless with the ultimate silence as Wittgenstein also thus indicates, place could also suggest the maximum efforts and possibility regarding how Dickinson really wants all “lofty ideas,” such as “Faith,” “Heaven,” and “God,” which often make us float like Jonathan Swift’s Laputians of the Flying Island, be literally “put down [along with] this World like a Bundle” (J527) upon the “rough ground” of “actual language” with “frictions” (Wittgenstein 1968, 107, 46c).
The place therefore could also possibly indicate the risk of such a process that would abruptly collapse or be paralyzed as our language would as the “unusable locale” at any moment once involuntarily overloaded with the infinitely growing messages inherent in the deceptively perspicuous “word pictures,” such as “Four Trees – upon a solitary Acre” (J742). Ultimately, the illuminated could also instantly illuminates as Goethe would so suggest here especially in the case with Dickinson as long as there appear any additional slight tints of light as from Goethe’s little lyric of “Wanderers Nachtlied” and Ma Zhiyuan’s “Tian Jing Sha” besides the subtle refractions of Daoism. All in all, at once as noun and as in/transitive verb, the word “place” indicates how often everything in the world could be so simultaneously of an everlasting spatial tempo and an ever present temporal space, and how, with Dickinson rightly set in place, the word “place” could also thus probably indicate Dao itself in ways so reminiscent of a perpetual sense of lyrical contemporaneity that suggests the forever ungraspable but immeasurably real beauty and power of Dao in an infinitely intricate and simple mode and mood of its timely timelessness and motionless motion.
CHENG, Chung-ying (University of Hawai’i)
Place, Time and Confucian Roots”
The place exists due to time and thus we may speak of past place, present and future place. The place also exists for yielding its place to things and people. Thus the world is place full of things and people, but it is also open to continued growth or sudden destruction or being laid waste.  In this panel we explore whether things and people and cultures have their roots in their places or just flow and being thrown. The speakers will specifically speak and raise about the rooting of Confucianism in the world. My paper will deal with the above issues and take a deep root view of Confucianism and see Confucianism as a transformative force of humanity which would require knowledge and moral action. 
CHENNOUFI, Ridha A. (University of Tunis, Tunisia)
Territory, Tribe, and Political Power: A Different View onPolitical Space in the Maghreb”
The object of my paper is to determine on the basis of Ibn Khaldun’s writings the role territorial stakes played in the formation of the modern state. Indeed, to this day, the theory of political power as applied on Islamic lands is essentially centered on the notions of clan-based ‘solidarity’ (‘asabiyya) and “community” (umma). As a result, the territorial factor has been occultated under the pretense that Kabyle, Arab, or Muslim societies, other than Western societies, do not define themselves in relation to the City. This allegedly explains and justifies that it is border conflicts which prevented and still prevent the so-called Arabic-Islamic Maghrib (West) and Mashriq (East) to mutually recognize each other as sovereign states.
My paper will challenge this view by showing that Ibn Khaldun developed a conception of space, territory, and political power that is diametrically opposed to the Westphalian one, and, more importantly, of great actuality. Suffice it to say, the political conflicts igniting the world incessantly since the end of the cold war seem to converge towards the constitution of large geopolitical spaces defined much more in terms of cultural identity than the fundamental rights of individuals.
CHENG, Sinkwan (Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Sweden)

Problematizing the Liberal Notion of ‘Self’ via Aristotle and Confucius”


My paper uses the classical Greek and Chinese traditions’ common incompatibility with modern liberal notion of “right” to explore the commonalities between them, and examine how two civilizations apart from each other could nonetheless share a similar idea of “self” giving rise to similar notions of “right.” This will serve as the starting point in my search for a new “right” that could better accommodate both Eastern and Western traditions. Note, however, that while exploring the similarities between the ancient Greek and Chinese thoughts— represented in my paper respectively by Aristotle and Confucius--my paper also investigates their critical differences.

Both Aristotle and Confucius prioritize the collective before the individual. Contrary to modern liberal rights, Aristotle’s to dikaion and Confucius’s ren are both ad alterum (to another) rather than ad se (to oneself). A major difference, however, exists between the Hellenic and the Chinese thinker regarding the meaning of the “other.” As evident from Nicomachean Ethics, the “other” must be “either a ruler or a copartner” (NE V 1). Justice for Aristotle, in other words, can only occur between “equal members of a civil or political society, who alone can properly be called 'others'” (Annabel Brett).


The “other” for Confucius, by contrast, is all embracive—regardless of birth, class origin, and even species. One of the highest expressions of justice for Confucius is ren (仁). Being compassionate toward any other human being is ren (仁, humane). However, being kind to animals also qualifies as ren. My paper explores why Confucius believes that justice can be best realized in the world (what Confucius describes as “A World for All (天下爲公)”) in contrast to Aristotle’s idea of justice among “equals in the polis.” I do so by probing the different cultural assumptions, moral ontology, and cosmologies underpinning both systems of thinking.
CHEUNG, Leo K. C. (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
The Place of the Ture Master in the Zhuangzi
Besides attempting to making all things and discussions equal, in the chapter “Discussion on making all things equal” of the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi, the author tries to argue for the existence of the “True Master”, or the “True Lord”, as the one who controls, or governs, one’s action, sensation, passion, and emotion:
…Let it be! Let it be! [It is enough that] morning and evening we have them, and they are the means by which we live. Without them we would not exist; without us they would have nothing to take hold of. This comes close to the matter. But I do not know what makes them the way they are. It would seem as though they have some True Master, and yet I find no trace of him. He can act - that is certain. Yet I cannot see his form. He has identity but no form.

…The hundred joints, the nine openings, the six organs, all come together and exist here [as my body]. But which part should I feel closest to? I should delight in all parts, you say? But there must be one I ought to favor more. If not, are they all of them mere servants? But if they are all servants, then how can they keep order among themselves? Or do they take turns being lord and servant? It would seem as though there must be some True Lord among them. But whether I succeed in discovering his identity or not, it neither adds to nor detracts from his Truth. (Watson’s translation; emphasis mine.)


The True Master, or the True Lord, is therefore the subject, or, the agent. It is formless, and yet still has its identity.
In the story about Uncle Lack-Limb and Uncle Lame-gait in the chapter “Perfect Happiness” of the outer chapters of the Zhuangzi, the author seems to try to bring out the point that the “me”, or “I”, as my body changes (transforms) in the process of transformation (change):
Uncle Lack-Limb and Uncle Lame-Gait were seeing the sights at Dark Lord Hill and the wastes of Kunlun, the place where the Yellow Emperor rested. Suddenly a willow sprouted out of Uncle Lame-Gait’s left elbow. He looked very startled and seemed to be annoyed. “Do you resent it?” said Uncle Lack-Limb. “No—what is there to resent?” said Uncle Lame-Gait. “To live is to borrow. And if we borrow to live, then life must be a pile of trash. Life and death are day and night. You and I came to watch the process of change, and now change has caught up with me. Why would I have anything to resent?” (Watson’s translation; emphasis mine.)
Moreover, as I argue, with supplementary textual evidence, in this paper in detail, the author also seems to think that the “me”, who changes in the process of transformation, is not the True Master, but that the “me” is identifiable with my body. In other words, the True Master, who governs my action, sensation, passion and emotion, cannot itself reside in its actions, sensations, passions or emotions, and, in particular, the world—the process of transformation.
The claim that some authors of the Zhuangzi hold that the True Master, or the subject, does not change with, nor resides in, the process of transformation at least is supported by the following passage from the chapter “Tse Yang” of the miscellaneous chapters of the Zhuangzi:
And because day by day he was with the one who transforms things, he was one who never transforms—so why should he ever try to stop doing this? (Watson’s translation with alterations.)
The True Master is then a formless subject, who governs one’s action, sensation, passion and emotion, and yet has its identity, and is also the one who never transforms and thus never resides in the world or the process of transformation. One may say, the True Master is transcendental in the sense that it governs, and influences, one’s engagement in the process of transformation, that is, in the world.
Besides arguing for the claim that the Zhuangzi adopts the notion of the True Master as the transcendental formless subject, this paper also aims to investigate the place of the True Master in Zhuangzi’s philosophy.
CHINN, Meilin (Santa Clara University)
Space is the Place: Musical Space as Place in Early Chinese Philosophy”
Music has been called the most temporal of the arts and even the art of time itself. The same is not said of music and space. The assumption that music is not spatial depends primarily on a definition of space as physically extended and dimensional. Following this, music occurs in space, but there is no space in music. In contrast, early Chinese philosophers were disinclined to treat space and time as objective and separate categories, rather taking them to be particular, idiosyncratic, and best understood in terms of events, cycles, and movements. Space is as much an event as time.
Drawing on work by early Chinese philosophers, especially the Confucian view of music articulated in the Yue Ji or Book of Music, I will make the case that music is not only spatial, but that musical space is best understood in terms of place, that is, as an always particular space that emerges through the mutual resonance of performers and listeners within and across their cultural and historical contexts. Consequently, music can be used to cultivate virtue as a kind of virtuosity of sense: skilled, keen abilities to sense right moments, optimal formations, and appropriate, meaningful responses. Finally, and perhaps more controversially, I hope to use this account of musical space as place to explain the Confucian belief that the character of people and cultures could be heard in music from distant places.
CHOI, Dobin (Towson University)
“Environment and Virtue in the Moral Thoughts of Mengzi and Hume”
This paper explores the influences of environment to a person’s virtues in the moral thoughts of Mengzi and David Hume. Our common sense admits that environmental factors exert notable influences toward a person’s temper and character. Those who live near seashore would have acquired different characters from those who dwell in high mountains, or crowded urban area. While Mengzi acknowledges that the change of residence would have great influence on one’s nurturing both qi and body (7A36), Hume admits that ordinary people ascribe “the national characters” to such “physical causes” as “the air and climate” of their dwelling in his essay “Of National Characters.” However, Hume dismisses the physical causes due to their having “no discernible operation on the human mind,” but instead relies on “moral causes” for the characters that are “fitted to work on the mind as motives and reasons.” Given his emphasis on the faculty of sympathy and the force of moral sentiment in motivation, the most influential environmental causes for a person’s virtue are the characters of her surrounding people rather than physical environment. Not surprisingly, Hume’s human environmental causes aptly explicate Mengzi’s ideal dwelling. The environmental influence to a person’s qi does not rule out the change of human environment. Above all, Mengzi’s conviction that a person’s ultimate residence is ren (7A33) delivers the significance of human environment. Given that ren is the other-regarding virtue to care “all in the Four Seas,” a person’s dwelling in ren would partly involve her living surrounded by people, namely the “moral causes.”
In sum, both Mengzi and Hume would agree that human environment is the central factor in forming our virtues and character traits. However, Mengzi goes further to claim that we have the natural capacity to construct the best kind of human environment with our own effort of introspection. While our introspection of the heart and achievement of the inherent ren makes the best residence for our life (4B14), our failure to dwell in ren is identical with “throwing oneself away” (4A10). Mengzi’s suggestion of the autonomous creation of human environment affords us an inward way of virtue cultivation. It enables us to avert the negative influence of undesirable human environment, and further to keep our natural aspiration for benevolence untarnished.
CHUNG, Hyun-jung (Yonsei University, Korea)

Uncleanness of Childbirth and the Purity of Ancestral Rite”


According to one of the Confucian classics, the Book of Rites, one should perform purification before conducting ancestral rite, and a husband is not supposed to enter the delivery room of his wife when he is performing purification. Childbirth had been regarded as an unclean event by the Confucian scholars of the Joseon Dynasty. They argue that if a wife is in childbirth, the family must not conduct ancestral rite because the childbirth disturbs the purification and soils the cleanness of ancestral rite. In general, Confucianism put a high value on human life and being alive. However, Confucian scholars of the Joseon Dynasty define the moment of birth as a kind of uncleanness in contrast to purification for ancestor worship ceremony.
CIOFLEC, Eveline (University of Tubingen, Germany)

Belonging Somewhere: Journeys and Dwelling”

In my paper I will show how “belonging to” defines identity by being a central component of “dwelling”. “Belonging somewhere” is necessarily included in the first sense of belonging. Hence, “belonging” cannot be reduced to virtual or abstract entities, but remains rooted in places exceeding meaning by being grounded on earth. Such, “belonging to” has a bodily component of “belonging somewhere”. As Edward Casey has shown, journeys like those of Basho and Odysseus reveal the interlacement between places and identity.
CLAUS, C. Anne (American University)
Coral Reef Cultures and Place-Making in Okinawa”

 

Over the past 40 years in southwestern Okinawa, views of the sea and ino (nearshore coral reefs) have shifted as this region has become a site of stewardship among coastal residents.  Village life shapes and is shaped by the coral reef in multiple dimensions. Spiritual interests in the nearshore sea result in engagements with the sea during annual festivals and in daily prayers, occasions during which the nearshore sea (ino) becomes a site for purification and protection. At the same time, Shiraho village has emerged as a cohesive target of mainland scientific and tourist interest because of its presentation as an eco-village with a strong “coral reef culture.” Past and present articulations of Shiraho as a cohesive village shaped by its coral reef are conditioned by demographic changes that have brought increasing numbers of newcomers from mainland Japan. Two recent conservation projects involve residents in new kinds of material engagements with the ino, and I examine how the Sunday Market and periodic walks provide the platform for self-reflective enforcement of a village sense of place as well as aspirational place-making by mainland Japanese conservationists. 


COOK, Benjamin (Almiraj Sufi and Islamic Study Centre, Australia)
The Place of the Zawiya within Sufism”
The Zawiya (Sufi Centre) occupies a significant place within Islam generally and the Sufi community in particular. For the general population, a zawiya may be seen as a place wherein people gather and worship. For the adherents of Sufism, the zawiya is a transformative space wherein teaching is transmitted, baraka (spiritual energy) is concentrated, and soteriological development is intensified. This paper is divided into three sections. The first section will provide a historical overview of the development of the zawiya. The second section will detail what a zawiya ideally contains and how this informs its functionality. The third section will explore how suhba (companionship) is an important aspect of the zawiya and how this can contribute to an intensified soteriological development for the adherents of Sufism.
COYLE, Daniel (Birmingham—Southern College)
On Global Wandering and Strategic Place: Nietzsche’s Trans-Asiatic Hyperboreans”

Throughout his professional career, Nietzsche employs a hermeneutic method of deliberately and experimentally estranging (entfremden) himself from the time, place, and culture of the present so that he might “look 'into the world' otherwise.” The practice involves a strategic distancing that seeks to awaken ordinarily dormant perspectives on emerging futures. This “subtler art and aim of travel” reveals a global sensibility that we can trace from Nietzsche’s first book to his last. His genealogical and depth-psychological searching of the ancient past presages a trans-historical philosophy of a global future, his interest in traveling to North Africa arises from a specific desire to sharpen his “judgment and eye for all things European,” and finally, his admitted trans-cultural need employs “the foreign” to “learn to think more orientally,” even “emigrate to Japan.” This global aspiration matures in the “trans-Asiatic eye” of Zarathustra and the enigmatic experience of eternal recurrence, which arrives through the spontaneous cycle of process itself. Since this eye “sees under itself,” it undermines fixed place. Nietzsche’s places are strategic: calls to wander, signposts for global travelers. His culminating figure of the “Hyperborean” is curious in many ways. For one, the self-proclaimed “disciple of Dionysus” in a final flash of lucidity again identifies himself as a pious worshiper of Apollo, thereby establishing a global task.


I argue that within the polar continuum of human experience, when we increase distance we increase intensity and effect, and that Nietzsche’s mask of Apollo imparts the insight that reversing perspectives (Perspektiven umzustellen) derives states of affairs from their correlative opposites, and thus propel us beyond metaphysical contraries to “life herself.” Nietzsche's method of temporal, spatial, and cultural distancing provides a valuable hermeneutic resource for understanding East-Asian ways of thinking, specifically, I show that his deliberate strategy of estranging himself in quest of an optimal disposition towards the oscillating recurrences of life remarkably resonates with the proactive Daoist strategic praxeology of “fan 反” (‘returning’).
CRELLER, Aaron B. (University of North Florida)
Place-ing Chinese Epistemology on the Map: The Danger of Ignoring Place in Accounts of Knowledge”
Analytic epistemology has largely ignored the works of non-English (specifically Chinese) speaking comparative epistemologists. This paper investigates the problems of contemporary attempts to integrate Chinese philosophy into Anglo- and Euro-centric models of knowledge, as well as the role played by geo-political place in dismissing comparative approaches to theories of knowledge.

Starting off with an analysis of the recent attempts at comparative epistemology surrounding Ernest Sosa, I argue that much of the original comparative work done by major analytic Chinese philosophers in the Twentieth Century is ignored because it does not conform (and perhaps even undermines) contemporary models of knowledge. One major cause for this confirmation bias amongst English-speaking analytic epistemologists is the lack of attention to the importance of place, power, and history.


The second half of the paper examines the works of Zhang Dongsun and Jin Yuelin, identifying the influence Western philosophy has had on Chinese thinkers, as well as the ways in which they integrated the nuances of both traditional analytic philosophy and classical Chinese philosophy. Contemporary attempts by Western epistemology to find “universal epistemic principles” can easily be put into dialogue with the ideas of philosophers such as Zhang and Jin because they are all discussing the structures of knowledge, but these figures are mostly ignored in English language sources that are “discovering” epistemology in Chinese sources, such as Warring-States era texts.
I conclude by arguing that the possibility of such a dialogue demonstrates that the new interest Western epistemology has in Chinese thought at minimum ignores the history of Chinese comparative epistemology, and at worst is actively ignoring the important particulars of its own geo-political place.

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