Link turn – Social Security

MPX D – US not key

US is not key to the global economy

(Lael, “CAN AMERICA STILL LEAD IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY?,” Scholar)//BB

1. Dispersion of Economic Power: The rest of the world no longer depends on the United States as the engine of global growth as in the past. The emerging market countries are booming, integrating into the global economy, and learning to assert their interests more forcefully. Europe, with $17 trillion in 2007 GDP (before the recent rise of the Euro) is a formidable economic bloc and a complex political unit with which to interact. The U.S. economy, while fundamentally sound, is now about one-fourth of the global economy, a fraction that is falling. Although in reality most major economies are deeply coupled rather than decoupled through multiple transmission channels, the sheer size and vibrancy of demand from emerging market economies are large enough to propel the global economy even when the U.S., European, or Japanese economies falter—though not if they fail.

MPX D – Economic decline doesn’t lead to war

No impact to economic decline – prefer new data

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

**No conflicts resulted from the recession – disproves the impact

Barnett 9—senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

History proves

Ferguson 6— Laurence A. Tisch prof of History at Harvard. William Ziegler of Business Administration at Harvard. MA and D.Phil from Glasgow and Oxford (Niall, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the_next_war_of_the_world.html)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

Robust studies prove

Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another.

No geopolitical effects

Blackwill 2009 – former US ambassador to India and US National Security Council Deputy for Iraq, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Robert D., RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf)
Did the economic slump lead to strategic amendments in the way Japan sees the world? No. Did it slow the pace of India’s emergence as a rising great power? No. To the contrary, the new Congress-led government in New Delhi will accelerate that process. Did it alter Iran’s apparent determination to acquire a nuclear capability or something close to it? No. Was it a prime cause of the recent domestic crisis and instability in Iran after its 2009 presidential election? No. Did it slow or accelerate the moderate Arab states intent to move along the nuclear path? No. Did it affect North Korea’s destabilizing nuclear calculations? No. Did it importantly weaken political reconciliation in Iraq? No, because there is almost none in any case. Did it slow the Middle East peace process? No, not least because prospects for progress on issues between Israel and the Palestinians are the most unpromising in 25 years. Did it substantially affect the enormous internal and international challenges associated with the growth of Jihadiism in Pakistan? No. But at the same time, it is important to stress that Pakistan, quite apart from the global recession, is the epicenter of global terrorism and now represents potentially the most dangerous international situation since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Did the global economic downturn systemically affect the future of Afghanistan? No. The fact that the United States is doing badly in the war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with the economic deterioration. As Henry Kissinger observes, “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” And NATO is not winning in Afghanistan. Did it change in a major way the future of the Mexican state? No. Did the downturn make Europe, because of its domestic politics, less willing and able over time to join the U.S. in effective alliance policies? No, there will likely be no basic variations in Europe’s external policies and no serious evolution in transatlantic relations. As President Obama is experiencing regarding Europe, the problems with European publics in this regard are civilizational in character, not especially tied to this recession—in general, European publics do not wish their nations to take on foreign missions that entail the use of force and possible loss of life. Did the downturn slow further EU integration? Perhaps, at the margin, but in any case one has to watch closely to see if EU integration moves like a turtle or like a rock. And so forth. To be clear, there will inevitably be major challenges in the international situation in the next five years. In fact, this will be the most dangerous and chaotic global period since before the 1973 Middle East war. But it is not obvious that these disturbing developments will be primarily a result of the global economic problems. It is, of course, important to be alert to primary and enduring international discontinuities. If such a convulsive geopolitical event is out there, what is it? One that comes to mind is another catastrophic attack on the American homeland. Another is the collapse of Pakistan and the loss of government control of its nuclear arsenal to Islamic extremists. But again, neither of these two geopolitical calamities would be connected to the current economic decline. Some argue that, even though geopolitical changes resulting from the current global economic tribulations are not yet apparent, they are occurring beneath the surface of the international system and will become manifest in the years to come. In short, causality not perceptible now will become so. This subterranean argument is difficult to rebut. To test that hypothesis, the obvious analytical method is to seek tangible data that demonstrates that it is so. In short, show A, B, and/or C (in this case, geopolitical transformations caused by the world slump) to have occurred, thus substantiating the contention. One could then examine said postulated evidence and come to a judgment regarding its validity. To instead contend that, even though no such data can be adduced, the assertion, nevertheless, is true because of presently invisible occurrences seems more in the realm of religious conviction than rigorous analysis. But it is worth asking, as the magisterial American soldier/statesman George Marshall often did, “Why might I be wrong?” If the global economic numbers continue to decline next year and the year after, one must wonder whether any region would remain stable— whether China would maintain internal stability, whether the United States would continue as the pillar of international order, and whether the European Union would hold together. In that same vein, it is unclear today what effect, if any, the reckless financial lending and huge public debt that the United States is accumulating, as well as current massive governmental fiscal and monetary intervention in the American economy, will have on U.S. economic dynamism, entrepreneurial creativity, and, consequently, power projection over the very long term. One can only speculate on that issue at present, but it is certainly worth worrying about, and it is the most important “known unknown”27 regarding this subject.28 In addition, perhaps the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on China is more fragile than posited here, and possibly Pakistan and Mexico are much more vulnerable to failed-state outcomes primarily because of the economic downturn than anticipated in this essay. While it seems unlikely that these worst-case scenarios will eventuate as a result of the world recession, they do illustrate again that crucial uncertainties in this analysis are the global downturn’s length and severity and the long-term effects of the Obama Administration’s policies on the U.S. economy. Finally, if not, why not? If the world is in the most severe international economic crisis since the 1930s, why is it not producing structural changes in the global order? A brief answer is that the transcendent geopolitical elements have not altered in substantial ways with regard to individual nations in the two years since the economic crisis began. What are those enduring geopolitical elements? For any given country, they include the following: • Geographic location, topography, and climate. As Robert Kaplan puts it, “to embrace geography is not to accept it as an implacable force against which humankind is powerless. Rather, it serves to qualify human freedom and choice with a modest acceptance of fate.”29 In this connection, see in particular the works of Sir Halford John Mackinder and his The Geographical Pivot of History (1904)30, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890).31 • Demography—the size, birth rate, growth, density, ethnicity, literacy, religions, migration/emigration/ assimilation/absorption, and industriousness of the population. • The histories, foreign and defense policy tendencies, cultural determinants, and domestic politics of individual countries. • The size and strength of the domestic economy. • The quality and pace of technology. • The presence of natural resources. • The character, capabilities, and policies of neighboring states. For the countries that matter most in the global order, perhaps unsurprisingly, none of these decisive variables have changed very much since the global downturn began, except for nations’ weaker economic performances. That single factor is not likely to trump all these other abiding geopolitical determinants and therefore produce international structural change. Moreover, the fundamental power relationships between and among the world’s foremost countries have also not altered, nor have those nations’ perceptions of their vital national interests and how best to promote and defend them. To sum up this pivotal concept, in the absence of war, revolution, or other extreme international or domestic disruptions, for nation-states, the powerful abiding conditions just listed do not evolve much except over the very long term, and thus neither do countries’ strategic intent and core external policies— even, as today, in the face of world economic trials. This point was made earlier about Russia’s enduring national security goals, which go back hundreds of years. Similarly, a Gulf monarch recently advised—with respect to Iran—not to fasten on the views of President Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Khamenei. Rather, he counseled that, to best understand contemporary Iranian policy, one should more usefully read the histories, objectives, and strategies of the Persian kings Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes, who successively ruled a vast empire around 500 BC.32 The American filmmaker Orson Welles once opined that “To give an accurate description of what never happened is the proper occupation of the historian.” 33 Perhaps the same is occasionally true of pundits. ■

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