Chicago Debate League 2013/14 Core Files
AC Solvency: A/t - #3 “Democracy Promotion Fails” [2/3] 84
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- 2AC Solvency: A/t - 3 “Democracy Promotion Fails” [3/3] 85
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2AC Solvency: A/t - #3 “Democracy Promotion Fails” [2/3] 84[WALSER 12 evidence continues, no text deleted] monitor the situation in Venezuela on October 7 for evidence of incitement to violence by political parties, harassment of or harm to opposition figures, reprisals against voters, distribution of arms to militias, and increases in politically-related violence. Establish a coalition for Venezuelan democracy. The U.S. should employ active diplomacy to establish a coalition of democratic leaders—one that could certainly include Canada, Costa Rica, Panama, Chile, Spain, the United Kingdom, and others—to act in unison in case of fraud or violence. Continue support for democracy. Although the defeat of Capriles would clearly demoralize many Venezuelans, the U.S. must nonetheless continue to offer sustained support for civil society, a free press, free labor unions, and other voices for liberty and preserve the resilience of a unified opposition for future elections. Appoint a high-level Cuba/Venezuela Mission Director. The position of Cuba/Venezuela Mission Director in the Office of the National Intelligence Director should be filled with a senior-level official with responsibility for all ALBA countries. Develop an aggressive, proactive plan of action. October 8 will mark the starting point for one of two courses: either one of sustained cooperation and support for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela or one of tough, proactive responses to Chávez’s promised radicalization. Potential policy tools for leverage include visa denials, further Treasury designations of corrupt Venezuelan officials, financial and trade sanctions, interdiction of Venezuelan vessels and aircraft used to transport drugs, the designation of Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism, and an embargo on the purchase of Venezuelan oil. All of these tools should be considered in the event of electoral fraud, significant electoral violence, or hostile acts contrary to U.S. security interests. Conclusion Hugo Chávez is by nature a demagogic populist, nationalist, and military-minded leader who believes that history has assigned him a mission to convert a representative democracy and free-market economy into a one-party, authoritarian, socialist state. His goal is to crush the opposition with a winner-take-all approach. If the people of Venezuela reject this somber plan for the future and vote to return the country to a more democratic course, it is vital that the U.S. stand as a leader in support of a transition to democracy, rule of law, and economic and personal liberty. If Chávez prevails, as he is confident he will, the U.S. needs to prepare for the increasingly dangerous consequences of a radicalized, despotic, anti-American leader with six more years to make the Bolivarian Revolution and socialism of the 21st-century irreversible. 2AC Solvency: A/t - #3 “Democracy Promotion Fails” [3/3] 853) Even if other forms of aid fail, tying economic aid to democracy promotion works. SCOTT AND STEELE, 11 [James, professor at Oklahoma State University; and Carie, professor at University of Illinois, “Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to the Developing World, 1988–2001,” International Studies Quarterly (2011), http://www.ucdc.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Academic/Courses/V12SB/demostatistical.pdf] Can democratic sponsor states such as the United States promote democracy through foreign assistance? Our analysis supports two important conclusions: (i) democracy aid has a positive impact on democratization even when controlling for the effect of democratization on aid allocation decisions ; (ii) democracy aid has a positive impact on democratization, while general foreign economic aid does not. Not only do we find empirical support for the hypothesized linkage between democracy aid and democratization since the end of the Cold War, but this empirical evidence is consistent with and lends support to a theoretical model articulating the mechanisms connecting such targeted democracy aid to progress in democratization, while differentiating such assistance from other forms of aid. In a suite of empirical tests, targeted, democracy-specific aid projects to the developing world were consistently and systematically related to better democracy scores, while other forms of US aid were statistically and ⁄ or substantively insignificant. 2AC Solvency: A/t - #4 “Elections Aren’t Enough” 861) U.S. economic pressure on elections in Venezuela solves instability from Chavez’s death. WALSER AND ZUCKERMAN, 13 [Ray, PhD., senior policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation; Jessica, Research Associate in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, “Venezuela After Chavez: U.S. Should Rally to Democracy,” 3/06, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/venezuela-after-death-of-chavez-us-should-rally-to-democracy] On Tuesday, cancer claimed the life of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, silencing one of Latin America’s most controversial leaders in the 21st century. Chavez’s death opens the way to an uncertain succession process, continued polarization, and potential instability in oil-rich Venezuela. Dealing with a post-Chavez Venezuela will require an ongoing U.S. commitment to free and fair presidential elections, to the defense of individual rights and liberties, and to leveraging future improvements in bilateral relations to genuine cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism. Working with Venezuela for a more stable and secure hemispheric energy market is also a desired, if still distant, objective. 2) Engaging now creates spillovers to other areas of cooperation. Even if there are other issues to overcome, the plan can create a framework for larger engagement with Venezuela. HARVARD CRIMSON, 13 [John Griffin, editorial writer, “Engage with Venezuela,” 4/03, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/] For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies—nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey. 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