Chicago Debate League 2013/14 Core Files
NC Extension Harms - #3 “Empirically Denied” 99
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- 1NC Frontline: Solvency 100
- 1NC Frontline: Solvency 101
2NC Extension Harms - #3 “Empirically Denied” 991) U.S. foreign policy has historically supported dictators and non-democratic governments while its influence has been strong globally. This proves that democracy promotion is not necessary for strong U.S. influence, and that the plan cannot solve because the U.S. will still be seen as anti-democratic in other regions. Extend our 1NC LARISON evidence. 1NC Frontline: Solvency 1001) Turn: Democracy aid causes the Venezuelan government to push harder against democracy, increasing anti-democratic movements and undermining solvency. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, 06 [A Report prepared by the National Endowment for Democracy for Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate; “The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance,” 06/08, http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdf] Foreign governments’ efforts to impede democracy assistance—from legal constraints on NGOs to extra-legal forms of harassment—have recently intensified and now seriously impede democracy assistance in a number of states. This backlash is particularly pronounced in the former Soviet states of Eurasia, as well as in China, Venezuela, Egypt, and Zimbabwe. Representatives of democracy assistance NGOs have been harassed, offices closed, and staff expelled. Even more vulnerable are local grantees and project partners who have been threatened, assaulted, prosecuted, imprisoned, and even killed. In addition to impeding democracy assistance efforts, regimes are adopting pro-active approaches, channeling funds to anti-democratic forces and using ersatz NGOs to frustrate genuine democratization. All of this has had a “chilling effect” on democracy assistance, intimidating some groups and activists, and making it more difficult for them to receive and utilize international assistance and solidarity. 2) Conditioning assistance doesn’t work – verification processes are too difficult and the long-term planning required of investment projects makes cutting off aid untenable. BROWN, 05 [Stephen, Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Political Studies, and affiliated with the Program in International Development and Globalization at the University of Ottawa; “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa,” The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.2, June; http://www.nimd.org/documents/F/foreign_aid_and_democracy_promotion-_lessons_from_africa.pdf] Political conditionality is not as easy and powerful a tool as it might seem at first. If donors have had tremendous problems ensuring that quantifiable and measurable macroeconomic conditions are met, it is hardly surprising that following up on political conditionality has proven even more challenging [Uvin, 1993: 73]. An effective strategy for action is rarely clear and trade-offs are necessary. If the recipient government complies and aid is renewed, it is unclear how much backsliding will trigger renewed aid sanctions. It is cumbersome to cancel and resume development projects, much more so than aid in the form of loans, credits or balance-of-payments support. Development projects and programs require medium- and long-term planning to have a lasting impact. The kind of instability caused by political conditionality could jeopardise their objectives. Furthermore, the structure of aid agencies does not lend itself well to the suspension and resumption of aid. It is an expensive and disruptive process. Political conditionality is thus a blunt instrument, to be wielded with care. It cannot bypass the complicated yet indispensable process of consensus building within a democratising country. 1NC Frontline: Solvency 1013) U.S. democracy promotion only works in nations where democracy is coming about indigenously – the U.S. cannot foment democracy from the outside. LARISON, 13 [Daniel, PhD., contributing editor at The American Conservative; “On Democracy Promotion and the Failure of the “Freedom Agenda”,” 01/22, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/on-democracy-promotion-and-the-failure-of-the-freedom-agenda/] If other nations wish to establish democratic governments of their own and the U.S. can render constructive, desired assistance, it may make sense to offer that assistance. Pushing for political change in other countries where U.S. efforts are neither welcome nor useful is a waste of resources and an unearned gift for the local regime. Democratists also consistently overestimate the value of U.S. support, which may be useful in some cases but which is hardly ever decisive or essential. The main objection to democracy promotion abroad that I have is that the U.S. government doesn’t have the right or responsibility to shape political conditions in other countries, and it shouldn’t try to do so unless our assistance is welcomed by most of the people in the other country. The debacle of the “freedom agenda” is a sobering cautionary tale of the kind of democracy promotion that harms the countries involved and backfires on the U.S. 4) Elections can’t be secured until institutions are reformed. By putting it backwards, the plan can’t solve democracy. PITTS, 13 [Patrick, student at University of Birmingham; “Jumping the Loaded Gun: How Promoting Democracy Fails to Achieve Peace,” 02/13, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/05/jumping-the-loaded-gun-how-hastily-promoting-democracy-fails-to-achieve-peace/] So where did the West go wrong? Collier sums up the incident precisely in one sentence: “we have been unrealistic in expecting that these societies could in one step make a transition that historically has been made in several distinct steps” (Collier, 2009: 49). Mistakes admitted, how do we proceed? Mansfield and Snyder offer the best course of action, writing “what is needed is to identify the conditions that lead to relatively peaceful democratization and try to create those circumstances” (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995: 79). Luckily for our analysis, Flores and Nooruddin, as well as Nancy Bermeo, have done just that. According to Flores and Nooruddin, the postponement of elections to focus on institution-building decreases the probability of recurring violence (Flores and Nooruddin, 2012: 566). The two researchers identify three main concerns: “a well-designed electorate” for free and fair elections, “constraints on the executive” to reduce the capability of repression, and the need for “security institutions – including civilian control over the military and police to help lower the probability that politicians can resort to violence” (Flores & Nooruddin, 2012: 566). In achieving the third concern regarding civilian control of defence forces, Nancy Bermeo writes that the new government must “purge or retire any officer who is disloyal, punish coup makers ruthlessly, clarify the chain of command…and raise the status of the ‘reformed’ military through public ceremonies” (Bermeo, 2003: 168). Successfully creating these institutional changes before handing out ballots will safeguard the development of democracy in low-income or postconflict societies while at the same time promoting stability. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2011 2011 -> Voices of the Old Sea Norman Lewis 2011 -> Malevil Robert Merle 2011 -> The Elephant Keeper’s Children Peter Hoeg 2011 -> Jv packet •Mars Colonization Affirmative •Mars Colonization Negative 2011 -> Registration Form (Rev. 8-86) omb no. 1024-0018 2011 -> All America Looks Up to Virginia;” Virginia and the Declaration of Independence 2011 -> Rao bulletin 2011 -> Christopher Columbus was born between 25 August and 31 October 1451 in 2011 -> The Battle of Frenchtown (1855), Washington Territory: the Political and Demographic Context rev 9/4/11 2011 -> Seti aff •seti neg •Asteroids Aff Download 3.16 Mb. Share with your friends:
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