China do the plan cp ddi 2011 1 table of contents
Chinese economy sustainable—several warrants
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- NEG Counterplan Solves Unrest China increasing space spending to show strength and solve unrest AFP
- NEG No Instability Impact No internal issues—uprising won’t occur
- No instability—uprising risk is exaggerated and large middle class loves the status quo
- Chinese politics are resilient—recent economic growth checks uprising
- No impact—Chinese government will control the violence.
Chinese economy sustainable—several warrants Pietro Ventani, managing director of NPV Partners and editor of PV’s Investment Commentary, a prominent investment newsletter, 6/2311. “Why China Bears are Wrong” http://www.businessinsider.com/why-china-bears-are-wrong-2011-6 Any serious scenario analysis involving China has to be mindful of certain factors that set the country apart from any other major economy. Those factors are structural in nature and likely to play a role for years, if not decades, to come. As China continues to develop, the key engines that will support economic growth: 1. Whereas the backbone of advanced economies is represented by domestic consumption for goods and services of around 60-70%, in China such component of the economy demand is around 40%. The spending for health care is an excellent example; while the OECD average is about 9% (17% in US), health care in China is only 5.8% of GDP. The natural growth of consumer spending as a component of GDP will provide tremendous fundamental growth. 2. While the Western countries struggle with the “dual mandate” of inflation and unemployment, “和谐“ or “harmony” is the imperative in China’s policy. The government is acutely aware of the risks that economic disparity may have on social order, as twenty-five years of rapid economic growth have created a great deal of unbalances. And Chinese politicians are steeped in the thousand-years old belief that a government retains its “mandate from Heaven” only as long it ensures an harmonious society. 3. Unless there is an unlikely political upheaval, China is likely to become a bigger and bigger magnet for investors both domestic and international. Already the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment after the US, the very high domestic saving rates, together with the development of the local financial markets, will foster greater inflow of capital from domestic investors as well. 4. Last but not least, after capitalizing for years on its labor cost advantage, China is determined to become a major source of innovation. The key drivers are the large and increasingly educated population, the culturally profound respect for learning, and also the need to find local solutions to pressing challenges such as energy, the environment, health care and food production. Innovation will foster increasing economic growth through productivity gains and export of technology. NEG Counterplan Solves Unrest China increasing space spending to show strength and solve unrest AFP, French Associated Press, 3/4/11. “Double-digit rise for China’s military spending” http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/03/04/double-digit-rise-for-chinas-military-spending/ The defence budget will rise 12.7 percent in 2011 to 601.1 billion yuan ($91.7 billion), said Li Zhaoxing, spokesman for China's national parliament, citing a budget report to be submitted to the rubber-stamp legislature. "China has always paid attention to controlling the size of defence spending," Li, a former foreign minister, told reporters. He described the budget as "relatively low" as a percentage of gross domestic product compared with the rest of the world. But the number represents a return to double-digit increases in military spending, which have alarmed the United States, Japan, Australia and several of China's Asian neighbours. That multi-year trend had been broken in 2010 when the budget rose 7.5 percent. In any case, many analysts say the announced budget is far lower than actual spending. "This will not pose a threat to any country," said Li, adding the spending figure represented six percent of the total national budget in the world's second-largest economy. Willy Lam, a China analyst at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said the published military budget -- which he noted was likely only one-third to one-half of actual spending -- will be poured into next-generation equipment. "The return to this double-digit PLA budget reflects the growing power of the PLA," Lam told AFP. "They are trying to close the gap with Russia and the United States." The build-up is also widely seen as geared in large part at reclaiming Taiwan, which split from the mainland in 1949 after a civil war. Taiwanese experts say China has more than 1,600 missiles aimed at the self-ruled island. Rick Fisher, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in the United States, said the increases also reflect jitters among the country's leadership over its hold on power. China already sees tens of thousands of protests each year, and mounting public concern over high inflation and numerous other issues makes it vital for the Communist Party to secure firm PLA political support, he said. "China wants to project strength with this return to double-digit military spending, but in reality it reflects serious regime weakness," Fisher said. Tokyo has repeatedly questioned Beijing's military intentions, especially after collisions in disputed waters in September between two Japanese coastguard boats and a Chinese fishing vessel that sparked a major row. "It is an extremely high ratio for defence spending," Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara told reporters. "We cannot help worrying about what all the money is used for." Japan plans to shift more forces to its scattered southern islands, citing Beijing's increased regional assertiveness. India's defence minister last month expressed "serious concern" over China's growing military might. On Monday, New Delhi announced a nearly 12 percent jump in annual defence spending to $36 billion -- up from a four percent hike last year. In January, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Beijing to patch up frayed military ties -- and was instead greeted with the maiden flight of China's first stealth fighter. Last month, the Pentagon proposed a record "base" defence budget -- excluding the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts -- of $553 billion for fiscal 2012. Gates said after his visit that Chinese advances in cyber and anti-satellite warfare pose a potential challenge to US forces' ability to operate and communicate in the Pacific. But he added Washington and Tokyo could counter the threat with high-tech hardware and that China would not necessarily become a military rival. China began revamping the PLA -- the former ragtag peasant force formed in 1927 by the Communist Party -- in earnest after a troubled 1979 incursion into Vietnam, when the neighbours vied for influence over Southeast Asia. Besides conventional weaponry upgrades, the push also led to China's fast-growing space programme and the test of a satellite-killing weapon in 2007. NEG No Instability Impact No internal issues—uprising won’t occur Frank Lavin, China Expert, 6/7/11. Consequential China: U.S.–China Relations in a Time of Transition http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Consequential-China-US-China-Relations-in-a-Time-of-Transition KATY WANG: I’m Katy Wang with New Tang Dynasty Television. We have seen more and more riots or strikes in China, it keeps on increasing every year. Also, recently, China started to crack down on activists because of the Jasmine revolution. They are afraid that it will influence China. So I’m wondering how do you evaluate the inner stability of the Chinese Communist Party? LAVIN: I might disappoint you with my answer, but I would say that China has a high degree of inner stability, even though we know there is a lot of workplace disruption, workplace turmoil, and also know that China has cracked down in the wake of this Jasmine spring in the Mid-East and has tightened up some human rights policies. I have spent a fair amount of time studying the workplace stability issue, and what’s important to note is that, essentially, none of this has a political dimension. It sometimes can be directed against local political corruption, but the point is it is not political in the sense of what we saw in the Middle East. It is not motivated by people’s views of Beijing; it’s typically very local workplace issues. People think they’ve been treated unfairly, maybe there is local corruption. There is instability in that jurisdiction because of those local issues. But it is not a broad national political issue and one of the challenges in China is that what we could call the normal workplace elements that allow disputes to be resolved do not exist; normal negotiations on wage-related activity do not exist in the same way. You are just going to see more friction and more strikes and more direct worker reaction than you see in the United States. I would not draw any conclusions about national stability from those set of activities. No instability—uprising risk is exaggerated and large middle class loves the status quo Joel Brinkley, Stanford Hearst Visiting Professional in Residence of Journalism, 11. “China's Economy the Key to Quelling Social Unrest” DISTRIBUTED BY TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES, INC. http://bx.businessweek.com/chinas-economy/chinas-economy-the-key-to-quelling-social-unrest/14014567289882450635-52a7269e2013dced10b1794d0e426911/ For a burgeoning world power with the planet's second-largest economy, China may be the most paranoid nation on earth. Chinese leaders, utterly terrified of their own people, are taking every possible step to avert an uprising like those under way in the Middle East -- even though the only signs of fomentation so far have been vague musings on obscure blog posts. The anonymous calls for peaceful demonstrations appear on hidden sites because, nationwide, China blocks Facebook, Twitter and numerous other sites it considers a threat. As if that were not enough, the authorities have been rounding up, beating and imprisoning Western journalists who were waiting to cover protests that never happened. Democracy advocates are simply disappearing while authorities disrupt e-mail and disable some cell phones whose users utter the word "protest." President Hu Jintao called for bolstering the "the great firewall," China's vast and sophisticated censorship machine. As it is, however, few Chinese really know much about the Arab uprisings. The Beijing Daily, a Communist Party newspaper, told its readers that "the vast majority of the people are strongly dissatisfied" with the protests, "so the performance by the minority becomes a self-delusional ruckus." (Tell that to the people in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt or Libya.) A full-blown popular uprising of the sort we've seen across the Arab world seems unlikely. But that doesn't mean the government needn't worry. In fact the leadership has a far deeper concern: China's economic problems could bring its downfall. Certainly the Chinese people have no real love for communism, and no one, anywhere, appreciates authoritarian repression. But the communist leaders have made a tacit bargain with the people. As Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader who pushed the country to adopt a market economy 25 years ago, often put it: The government's goal should be to make everyone rich. That way, he seemed to be saying, they will appreciate us. These days, China's leaders talk about maintaining a "harmonious social environment," as President Hu said during his once-a-year news conference in March. That's code for ensuring universal prosperity. Well, the government has a long way to go. More than half of China's 1.35 billion people still lead impoverished rural lives. Even with all those newly wealthy people in Beijing and other eastern cities, the average income remains about $4,000 a year -- less than Albania's. Fifteen percent of the nation's children suffer from stunting. Half the people don't have access to a toilet. Still, the growing middle class, now hundreds of millions of people, appreciates the status quo. They are the beneficiaries of Deng Xiaoping's grand bargain, and they don't want to jeopardize what they have. But today the economy these people rely on is a house of cards.
Ying Ma, Feb/March, 7. “China’s Stubborn Anti-Democracy” in Hoover Instition Policy Review http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/5513661.html To promote democratization in China effectively, the United States must better understand the reasons for authoritarianism’s resilience. Various factors contribute to such resilience, including spectacular economic growth, regime institutionalization, suppression and cooptation of the political opposition, and stringent restriction of what democracy theorists called “coordination goods”. First and foremost, the Chinese regime’s ability to deliver continued economic growth has prolonged its ability to govern. Between 1978 and 2005, the World Bank reports, China’s gdp growth averaged 9.4 percent annually. For the past four successive years, China’s eonomy has grown approximately 10 percent each year.2 This growth has created jobs, raised living standards, delivered modernization and boosted national pride. According to the United Nations Development Program, 250 million Chinese citizens were lifted out of poverty between 1980 and 2005. Though some critics, notably Gordon Chang, have predicted that China’s economy will collapse before the end of this decade,3 economists such as Thomas Rawski and Barry Naughton and institutions such as the imf argue that China’s prospects for continued economic development appear bright.4 Ironically, impressive economic growth has bolstered the government’s legitimacy and reduced pressures for it to liberalize politically. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs argue, economic growth, at least in the short term, stabilizes and legitimizes authoritarian regimes more than it undermines them.5 For this reason, Chinese President Hu Jintao expects — and fervently hopes — that China’s gdp in 2020 will quadruple that in 2000.<6 Aside from achieving spectacular gdp growth, the regime has also increasingly institutionalized its bureaucracy. Instead of weakening, floundering or over-centralizing, observes Andrew Nathan, the ccp has smoothed out succession politics, promoted meritocracy over factionalism for the advancement of political elites, modernized a disparate and large bureaucracy, and established the means of political participation at the local and work-unit levels to strengthen legitimacy.7 According to Nathan, this means that leadership successions, such as the recent ones in 2002 and 2003, now occur in an orderly fashion and are no longer characterized by the violent factional struggles of the Maoist era. Senior government leaders arrive at top posts increasingly because of their educational background and technocratic competence rather than pure loyalty to specific ccp leaders. The party has decreased its interference in the work of government organs and bureaucracies, allowing them more leeway to oversee their functional responsibilities. All the while, the central government has also instituted mechanisms for — or created the appearances of — being receptive to citizen opinions at the very micro levels of society. The regime, in contrast to previous eras, has shown little internal disagreement over its overarching approach to governance. Institutionalized and unified, the regime is determined to tackle China’s major economic and social challenges, suppress any viable political opposition, and stay in power. Of course, regime institutionalization alone cannot quell political discontent, dissent, or opposition, but this is where the effective suppression and cooptation of rival political groups come in. Beijing has brutally suppressed the spiritual group Falun Gong, a Buddhist sect that surprised and alarmed the regime by massing outside of its walled leadership compound in Beijing in a 10,000-strong silent protest on April 25, 1999. Similarly, the ccp has effectively cracked down on the China Democracy Party, which democracy activists in 1998 attempted to organize as the first national opposition party under communist rule. Simultaneously, the ccp has keenly and successfully co-opted potential political competitors. According to Minxin Pei, the party has built coalitions with 1) intellectuals, who were at the forefront of criticizing the regime in the 1980s and in leading the Tiananmen Democracy Movement of 1989; 2) private entrepreneurs, who comprise the emerging middle class that many believed would demand more rights as they acquired fuller stomachs; and 3) technocratic reformers, who focus on the changes necessary to institutionalize and modernize China’s governance.8 By doling out everything from party membership to senior government positions to financial perks, the party has rendered moot the political threat from these three potent and potential opposition groups.9 The ccp’s suppression strategy is capped off with the restriction of what democracy scholars refer to as “coordination goods.” These goods include political rights, such as free speech and the right to organize and protest; general human rights, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest; and press freedom. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs contend that the availability of coordination goods affects democratization because they drastically influence the ability of political opponents to coordinate and mobilize but have little impact on the continued economic growth that is crucial for sustaining an authoritarian regime’s legitimacy.10 The Chinese government suppresses these goods by censoring the press and the Internet, cracking down on coalition-building and organization among dissident groups, diffusing and discouraging protests through a combination of cash payoffs and outright intimidation, and trampling on the human rights of its citizens. By suppressing these coordination goods, Beijing has in effect elevated and prolonged its survival prospects. In short, the Chinese regime has not sat haplessly by when confronted with challenges to its rule but has instead aggressively fought to maintain power. Its tactics may have differed with each political challenge, but the result — continuation of ccp rule — has remained the same. No impact—Chinese government will control the violence. Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, 3/14/11. “Is China Next?” appeared in The Wall Street Journal, http://fsi.stanford.edu/news/fukuyama_comments_on_chinas_potential_for_revolution_20110314/ According to Mr. Huntington, however, revolutions are made not by the poor but by upwardly mobile middle-class people who find their aspirations stymied, and there are lots of them in China. Depending on how you define it, China's middle class may outnumber the whole population of the United States. Like the middle-class people of Tunisia and Egypt, those in China have no opportunities for political participation. But unlike their Middle Eastern counterparts, they have benefited from a dramatically improving economy and a government that has focused like a laser beam on creating employment for exactly this group. To the extent that we can gauge Chinese public opinion through surveys like Asia Barometer, a very large majority of Chinese feel that their lives have gotten better economically in recent years. A majority of Chinese also believe that democracy is the best form of government, but in a curious twist, they think that China is already democratic and profess to be satisfied with this state of affairs. This translates into a relatively low degree of support for any short-term transition to genuine liberal democracy. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the middle class in China may fear multiparty democracy in the short run, because it would unleash huge demands for redistribution precisely from those who have been left behind. Prosperous Chinese see the recent populist polarization of politics in Thailand as a warning of what democracy may bring. The fact is that authoritarianism in China is of a far higher quality than in the Middle East. Though not formally accountable to its people through elections, the Chinese government keeps careful track of popular discontents and often responds through appeasement rather than repression. Beijing is forthright, for example, in acknowledging the country's growing income disparities and for the past few years has sought to mitigate the problem by shifting new investments to the poor interior of the country. When flagrant cases of corruption or abuse appear, like melamine-tainted baby formula or the shoddy school construction revealed by the Sichuan earthquake, the government holds local officials brutally accountable-sometimes by executing them. Another notable feature of Chinese government is self-enforced leadership turnover. Arab leaders like Tunisia's Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's Mr. Mubarak and Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi never knew when to quit, hanging on 23, 30 and 41 years, respectively. Since Mao, the Chinese leadership has rigidly adhered to terms of about a decade. Mr. Hu, the current president, is scheduled to step down in 2012, when he is likely to be replaced by Vice President Xi Jinping. Leadership turnover means that there is more policy innovation, in sharp contrast to countries like Tunisia and Egypt, which have been stuck for decades in the rut of crony capitalism. The Chinese government is also more clever and ruthless in its approach to repression. Sensing a clear threat, the authorities never let Western social media spread in the first place. Facebook and Twitter are banned, and content on websites and on China-based social media is screened by an army of censors. It is possible, of course, for word of government misdeeds to get out in the time between its first posting by a micro-blogger and its removal by a censor, but this cat-and-mouse game makes it hard for a unified social space to emerge. A final critical way in which China's situation differs from that of the Middle East lies in the nature of its military. The fate of authoritarian regimes facing popular protests ultimately depends on the cohesiveness and loyalty of its military, police and intelligence organizations. The Tunisian army failed to back Mr. Ben Ali early on; after some waffling, the Egyptian army decided it would not fire on protesters and pushed Mr. Mubarak out of power. In China, the People's Liberation Army is a huge and increasingly autonomous organization with strong economic interests that give it a stake in the status quo. As in the Tiananmen uprising in 1989, it has plenty of loyal units around the country that it could bring into Beijing or Shanghai, and they would not hesitate to fire on demonstrators. The PLA also regards itself as the custodian of Chinese nationalism. It has developed an alternative narrative of 20th-century history that places itself at the center of events like the defeat of Japan in the Pacific war and the rise of a modern China. It is very unlikely that the PLA would switch sides and support a democratic uprising. The bottom line is that China will not catch the Middle Eastern contagion anytime soon. But it could easily face problems down the road. China has not experienced a major recession or economic setback since it set out on its course of economic reform in 1978. If the country's current property bubble bursts and tens of millions of people are thrown out of work, the government's legitimacy, which rests on its management of the economy, would be seriously undermined. 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