Uncertainty Key And, uncertainty with the counterplan is CRITICAL – there must be performance measures put in place BEFORE the plan is ever implemented
Flyvberg et al 2k2
(Big decisions, big risks. Improving accountability in mega projects Nils Bruzelius3, Bent Flyvbjerg , Werner Rothengattcr *Lund University. Sweden ^Aalborg University. Denmark 'Institute for Economic Policy and Research. University of Karlsruhe. Kolleghim am ScMoss. Bau 4. 76I2H Karlsruhe. Germany, Transport Policy 9 (2(102) 143-154, pg online @ http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/News%20in%20English/BigDecArtTransportPolicyPRINT0206.pdf //um-ef)
The use of performance specifications implies a goal-driven approach (o feasibility studies and decision making, iastead of the conventional technical solution-driven one. The use of a performance specification approach means thai, to the extent possible, all requirements with respect to a possible fixed link are to be decided before considering various technical alternatives for providing a tixed link and before appraising the proposed project. In engineering, the performance specification approach has in recent years become more common in the development of various types of facilities, thereby replacing in part the traditional approach, which is based on detailed technical specifications. In our view, this way of thinking should be taken further by applying it not only to technical aspects of projects but also, for example, when considering the external effects of fixed connections. In principle, performance specifications would derive from policy objectives and public interest requirements to be met by the project, for instance regarding economic performance, environmental sustainability and safety performance. More specifically, performance may relate to such things as road and road link safety, safety to passengers (e.g. requirements with respects to rescue operations in tunnels, etc.). maritime safety (navigational aspects), environmental impact (emissions, marine environment, energy consumption, etc.) and restrictions on land connections (e.g. identification of possible locations). Performance may also relate to such things as the capacity of a road link, the capacity of a rail link, minimum and maximum speed of vehicles, etc. Performance specification thus covers more than just the approach to the development of a fixed connection from a technical point of view. Performance requirements will reflect national objectives in the transport, environmental and safety sectors, among others. A requirement is. however, that specifications are formulated consistently5 and that they can be measured in an unequivocal way. The measurement requirement is necessary to enable the detailed design to be undertaken, and to allow for monitoring during possible construction and operation. One advantage to using a performance specification approach is that it forces people to focus on the ends rather than the means. Another point to be made is that major requirements should be set not only before a decision is taken, but that the performance specification process should be initiated even before major investigations have been undertaken as part of feasibility studies. The advantages of the performance specification approach is. hence, that it allows for a constructive dialogue with those who play an active role with respect to environmental, safely, economic and other issues. At the same time, the approach forces organisations and groups of people to play a constructive role in relation to how to meet the objectives they would like to see. and undermines the credibility of criticism directed at fixed connections simply because they happen to be fixed connections. Performance specifications are also advantageous from another point of view, which primarily can be exploited if projects are developed and operated in terms of a concession with a competitive tendering procedure to select the concessionaire. For such projects, a performance specification will make it possible to rely on the private sector, and on a competitive process, to identify technical solutions which meet the requirements. Such a process would allow for innovative technical designs to be introduced on the initiative of bidders, which may result in considerable cost savings in comparison with the conventional approach. In the conventional approach, the final design is normally prepared before calling for bids, leaving little scope for introducing new solutions and cost saving devices later.6
AT: Permute – Lie to Congress
Lying to Congress about the costs is intrinsic – It isn’t part of the plan or the counterplan. Reject the perm—it’s a lie which justifies inefficiency and it’s unethical
Flyvbjerg et al 02
[Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Skamris Holm, and Søren Buhl. Flyvbjerg is a professor of planning with the Department of Development and Plan- ning, Aalborg University, Denmark. He is founder and director of the university’s re- search program on transportation infra- structure planning and was twice a Visiting Fulbright Scholar to the U.S. His latest books are Rationality and Power (University of Chicago Press, 1998) and Making Social Science Matter (Cambridge University Press, 2001). He is currently working on a book about megaprojects and risk (Cambridge University Press). Holm is an assistant pro- fessor of planning with the Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg Uni- versity, and a research associate with the university’s research program on transpor- tation infrastructure planning. Her main in- terest is economic appraisal of projects. Buhl is an associate professor with the De- partment of Mathematics, Aalborg Univer- sity, and an associate statistician with the university’s research program on transpor- tation infrastructure planning. “Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?” Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol. 68, No. 3, Summer 2002, http://www.industrializedcyclist.com/Flyvbjerg02.pdf, accessed 7/17/12]//DLi
Both types of economic explanation account well for the systematic underestimation of costs found in our data. Both depict such underestimation as deliberate, and as economically rational. If we now define a lie in the conventional fashion as making a statement intended to deceive others (Bok, 1979, p. 14; Cliffe et al., 2000, p. 3), we see that deliberate cost underestimation is lying, and we arrive at one of the most basic explanations of lying, and of cost underestimation, that exists: Lying pays off, or at least economic agents believe it does. Moreover, if such lying is done for the public good (e.g., to save tax- payers’ money), political theory would classify it in that special category of lying called the “noble lie,” the lie mo- tivated by altruism. According to Bok (1979), this is the “most dangerous body of deceit of all” (p. 175). In the case of cost underestimation in public works projects, proponents of the noble lie overlook an impor- tant fact: Their core argument—that taxpayers’ money is saved by cost underestimation—is seriously flawed. Any- one with even the slightest trust in cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics must reject this argument. Un- derestimating the costs of a given project leads to a falsely high benefit-cost ratio for that project, which in turn leads to two problems. First, the project may be started despite the fact that it is not economically viable. Or, second, it may be started instead of another project that would have yielded higher returns had the actual costs of both projects been known. Both cases result in the inefficient use of resources and therefore in waste of taxpayers’ money. Thus, for reasons of economic effi- ciency alone, the argument that cost underestimation saves money must be rejected; underestimation is more likely to result in waste of taxpayers’ money. But the ar- gument must also be rejected for ethical and legal rea- sons. In most democracies, for project promoters and forecasters to deliberately misinform legislators, admin- istrators, bankers, the public, and the media would not only be considered unethical but in some instances also illegal, for instance where civil servants would misinform cabinet members or cabinet members would misinform the parliament. There is a formal “obligation to truth” built into most democratic constitutions on this point. This obligation would be violated by deliberate under- estimation of costs, whatever the reasons may be. Hence, even though economic explanations fit the data and help us understand important aspects of cost underestima- tion, such explanations cannot be used to justify it.
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