Cost Control cp
AT: When is the Cost Control
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- Not normal—9 out of 10 infrastructure projects underperform—increased cost-benefit analysis awareness key
- No integrated cost controls now
- Current oversight about safety, not cost management
AT: When is the Cost ControlAnd, the cost control measures of the counterplan follow a schedule established before the plan is implemented – this ensures on-going cost estimates and controls – that’s GAO AT: CP = Normal MeansNot normal—no performance measures nowZietsman and Rilett 2, Associate Research Scientist at the Texas Transportation Institute, and the Associate Professor at Texas A&M University, (Josias and Laurence R, SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION: CONCEPTUALIZATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES, Southwest Region University Transportation Center—Center for Transportation Research at University of Texas at Austin, March 2002, Google Scholar)//AG Sustainable transportation attempts to address economic development, environmental stewardship, and social equity of current and future generations. While numerous qualitative studies have been performed on this topic, there has been little quantitative research and/or implementation of sustainable transportation concepts. The main reasons for this are related to a lack of understanding of sustainable transportation and a lack of quantified performance measures. To address this problem, a comprehensive definition for sustainable transportation was developed, as well as a framework on how to identify, quantify, and use performance measures for sustainable transportation in the transportation planning process. The proposed framework was applied to a test bed, comprising two freeway corridors in Houston, Texas. Not normal—9 out of 10 infrastructure projects underperform—increased cost-benefit analysis awareness keyFlyvbjerg et al 5, professor of planning at Aalborg University, Denmark. He is founder and director of the university’s research program on large-scale infrastructure planning, (Bent, “ How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works Projects?”, Journal of the American Planning Association, Spring 2005, Google Scholar, http://www.honolulutraffic.com/JAPAFlyvbjerg05.pdf)//AG Despite the enormous sums of money being spent on transportation infrastructure, surprisingly little systematic knowledge exists about the costs, benefits, and risks involved. The literature lacks statistically valid answers to the central and self-evident question of whether transportation infrastructure projects perform as forecasted. When a project underperforms, this is often explained away as an isolated instance of unfortunate circumstance; it is typically not seen as the particular expression of a general pattern of underperformance in transportation infrastructure projects. Because knowledge is wanting in this area of research, until now it has been impossible to validly refute or confirm ,whether underperformance is the exception or the rule. In three previous articles (Flyvbjerg, Holm, et al., 2002, 2003, 2004), we answered the question of project performance as regards costs and cost-related risks. We found that projects do not perform as forecasted in terms of costs: almost 9 out of 10 projects fall victim to significant cost overrun. We also investigated the causes and cures of such inaccurate cost projections (see Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, et al., 2003). In this article we focus on the benefit side of investments and answer the question of whether projects perform as forecasted in terms of demand and revenue risks. We compare forecasted demand with actual demand for a large number of projects. Knowledge about cost risk, benefit risk, and compound risk is crucial to making informed decisions about projects. This is not to say that costs and benefits are or should be the only basis for deciding whether to build. Clearly, forms of rationality other than economic rationality are at work in most infrastructure projects and are balanced in the broader frame of public decision making. But the costs and benefits of infrastructure projects often run in the hundreds of millions of dollars, with risks correspondingly high. Without knowledge of such risks, decisions are likely to be flawed. No integrated cost controls nowGAO 97, Investigative arm of Congress charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and payment of public funds, (Government Accountability Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Managing the Costs of Large-Dollar Highway Projects, Government Accountability Office, February 1997,http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155775.pdf)//AG According to FHWA and state highway officials, initial cost estimates are preliminary and based on a “rough footprint” of the proposed project alternatives that broadly identifies the type of highway or structure to be built, the alignment, and the number of lanes and interchanges. Alternatives are based on generally no more than 30 percent of design. Cost estimates are calculated based on historic state data on the per-mile cost of highways, square-footage cost of bridges and other structures, and per-acre cost of land. Preliminary data specific to the project may also be included, particularly where environmental impacts are expected, such as wetlands mitigation and restoration. FHWA has no requirements for preparing cost estimates. We found that each state we visited used its own standards or methods and database for compiling estimates during the environmental review stage. As a result, the estimates we reviewed differed substantially in the cost categories they included. For example, one state we visited included the costs of designing the project while two others did not. Current oversight about safety, not cost managementGAO 97, Investigative arm of Congress charged with examining matters relating to the receipt and payment of public funds, (Government Accountability Office, Transportation Infrastructure: Managing the Costs of Large-Dollar Highway Projects, Government Accountability Office, February 1997,http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155775.pdf)//AG FHWA’s primary goal on projects where it has “full” oversight is ensuring that the applicable safety and quality standards contained in law and regulations are met. Cost management and cost containment are not explicit statutory or regulatory goals of FHWA’s oversight or part of its organizational culture. As a result, FHWA has few requirements that ensure cost containment is an integral part of large-dollar highway project management. FHWA influences project costs through its review and approval of design and construction plans, and through day-to-day interaction with state departments of transportation. We found several cost management practices that states had initiated to improve highway project management and to focus more specifically on containing project costs. These practices included improving initial project cost estimates, establishing goals for project cost performance, and tracking the progress of projects against such goals. However, FHWA has not been proactive in working with states to evaluate these practices and disseminate information on them to help other states enhance their cost management practices. Moreover, as debate begins on the reauthorization of highway programs in 1997, a range of roles exist for FHWA’s oversight of large-dollar projects. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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